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HISTORY OF THE LIFE

OF

ARTHUR

DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

FROM THE FRENCH OF M. BRIALMONT

CAPTAIN ON THE STAFF OF THE BELGIAN ARMY.

WITH EMENDATIONS AND ADDITIONS

BY THE

103486

REV. G. R. GLEIG, M.A.

CHAPLAIN-GENERAL TO THE FORCES AND PREBENDARY OF ST. PAUL'S.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

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CONTENTS

OF

THE FOURTH VOLUME.

CHAPTER I.

1831–32.

The Recess. — Preparations for a renewed Struggle. — The Duke at Walmer. — The Waverers. — Substance of his Correspondence with them and others - - - - - - - - Page 1

CHAP. II.

1832.

Reform Bill. — Second Reading carried. — The Duke attempts to form an Administration. — He Fails. — The Bill passed. — The Duke's Life attempted on the 18th of June - - - - 38

CHAP. III.

1832–35.

The Duke after the Reform Bill. — His great Influence in the House of Lords. — Fall of Earl Grey. — Lord Melbourne Minister. — His Dismissal. — Sir Robert Peel's Government. — The Duke Chancellor of the University of Oxford. — His Tenderness of Heart - - - - - - - - - - - - 64

CHAP. IV.

1837–46.

Death of William IV.—Accession of Queen Victoria.—The Duke in and out of Parliament.—The Duke's great Affection for Her Majesty.—His Proceedings as Commander-in-Chief.—The Corn-Law Question - - - - - - - - - Page 87

CHAP. V.

1846–52.

The Duke in private Life.—His Peculiarities.—His Friends.—Mr. Arbuthnot.—His Habits.—His Anxiety on the Subject of National Defences.—His last Illness, Death, and Funeral. 148

CHAP. VI.

The Duke as a Man, a Soldier, a Statesman.—His Playfulness.—His Kindliness.—His Self-possession.—His Wisdom - - 209

APPENDIX.

I. M. Brialmont's Estimate of the Duke's Military Character 261

II. Contrasts between the Duke and Napoleon - - - - 360

III. Titles of honour borne by the Duke - - - - - 371

IV. Lord Castlereagh's Letter of Instructions - - - - 372

Index - - - - - - - - - - - - - 379

ERRATUM.

The clause inserted at page 197, line 7 from foot, beginning "and in 1850 referred briefly," and ending at page 198, line 3, "even himself," *ought to be* read in page 193, after the sentence ending "the war of the Punjaub."



MEMOIR

OF THE

DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

CHAPTER I.

THE RECESS.—PREPARATIONS FOR A RENEWED STRUGGLE.—THE DUKE AT WALMER.—THE WAVERERS.—SUBSTANCE OF HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH THEM AND OTHERS.

1831–32.

IMMEDIATELY on the rejection of the Reform Bill in the House of Lords parliament was prorogued. Intimation was however given, that the recess would be a short one; and both parties felt that on the use to which this interval might be turned, the fate of the measure, and with it, perhaps, of the monarchy, depended. No exertions were, therefore, spared on either side to operate upon public opinion. The press teemed with pamphlets, some exposing the faults of the ministerial plan, others calling upon the people to reject every other. The violence of the newspapers became greater than ever; and other influences besides those of written arguments and invectives came into play. Already while the

question was before the lords, the Birmingham Political Union had met, and after setting forth "the awful consequences which must ensue from a rejection of the bill," urged the ministers to create as many peers as might be necessary to avert the calamity. The same body, after the bill was thrown out, passed a vote of thanks to Lord Althorpe and Lord John Russell, and were told in reply, with an unfortunate forgetfulness of the interpretation which the phrase might bear, "our prospects are now obscured for a moment, and I trust only for a moment. It is impossible that the whisper of a faction should prevail against the voice of a nation." This was followed by the setting forth of a scheme of more perfect organisation throughout the country, while demands began to be made for arms, and the necessity of establishing a national guard was openly advocated.

No reasonable man suspected at the time—nobody will now pretend to say, that this movement of the masses was encouraged by the king's ministers for any other purpose but one. They had staked their political existence on the passing of a particular measure, and doubtless considered that in so doing, they were promoting the best interests of the country. But probably no thoughtful man, be his abstract opinion what it may, will now deny, that in seeking that object they went as close to the brink of revolution, in its worst form, as it was possible with safety to go. For to mob rule succeeded what was infinitely worse; —mob obedience to the mandates of irresponsible leaders, and an apparent connivance, on the part of magistrates and other persons in authority, in the proceedings of these leaders. To the Duke, the moving prin-

ciples of whose nature were loyalty to the throne and reverence for the laws, all this was intolerable. He remonstrated with Earl Grey, and, using his privilege as a peer of parliament, did not hesitate to represent to the King himself the dangers with which the monarchy was threatened. Nor were his remonstrances and representations vain. Just as the audacity of the unions had reached its culminating point, a royal proclamation came out, declaring the existence of organised societies for political purposes to be illegal, and prohibiting a meeting which had been fixed for a certain day, in Birmingham, for the avowed purpose of providing the members of that body with arms.

Probably at no period of his life was the Duke engaged in a more voluminous correspondence than during the months which intervened between the prorogation and the re-assembling of the present parliament. If the old Tory party was dissolved, a new combination, quite as numerous and influential, had been brought together, consisting of men who, on other subjects, might entertain various, and even contradictory, opinions, but who combined in denouncing the ministerial reform bill as a blow struck at the very ground-work of the constitution. Of this heterogeneous body the Duke became, without any effort on his part, the head; and as the individuals composing it were not statesmen merely, but, in very many instances, persons who had never till of late given up any portion of their thoughts to politics, they were not over scrupulous in regard to the demands which they made both on the time and the patience of their leader. Every human being who had a scheme to propose, or a doubt to solve, wrote to the Duke; and as with characteristic good-breeding he an-

swered all their letters, — briefly, or at length, as the occasion seemed to require,—the strain upon his energies was not only severe, but incessant. Not content with sitting down to his desk as early as six in the morning, we have seen him, when the castle was full of guests, go on with his letter-writing after dinner in the drawing-room, either regardless of the buzz of conversation which passed around him, or else stopping from time to time to take part in it. And yet, cheerful and good-humoured as he was, he could not quite forget that the very men who now surrounded or turned to him for advice, were in many instances those who had driven him out of office. "You see how they come about me," he once observed, "they were never satisfied till they got rid of me as a minister; and now they would willingly see me put my neck in the halter for them. As if I cared one farthing for their personal influence, or for their boroughs either, except that I know the importance of the latter to the balance of power in the state."

Among the consequences of the agricultural riots of 1829-30 was the re-enrolment, in various parts of England, of corps of yeomanry cavalry; one of which was raised, mainly through the exertions of the Earl of Winchelsea, in East Kent. Lord Winchelsea, when he began to recruit, was one of the warmest supporters of Earl Grey; and, as a matter of course, an equally warm denouncer of the Duke of Wellington and his policy. But times were now changed; and Lord Winchelsea, like many other Tory peers, after vainly striving to become reconciled to the ministerial Reform Bill, had broken off from his Whig connexions, and placed himself again under the political guidance of the Duke.

He invited his Grace this autumn to Eastwell Park, where a grand review of his regiment took place; and where the reception awarded to the Duke by upwards of 400 well-mounted and well-armed yeomen, could not fail to be very gratifying to him.

But small triumphs like this were far from compensating the Duke for the graver and more trying disappointments which seemed, day by day, to gather round him. The apathy, or it might be the complicity, of the government in the proceedings of the political unions, weighed upon his spirits, and irritated his temper. He could not now expect — he did not expect — to escape from the struggle on which he had induced the House of Lords to enter, without a measure, and a large one too, of parliamentary reform. But the only hope which seemed to him to remain, of rendering it comparatively little dangerous, depended upon the continued determination of the House of Lords not to accept the ministerial or any other measure, till, by putting down the unions, the government should have left parliament free to deliberate calmly on the merits of the question whenever it came before them. That section of the conservative party, on the other hand, which, so early as the dissolution in April, had begun to consider how far it might be possible to go in the way of concession, was now very busy. Lords Wharncliffe and Harrowby had placed themselves at the head of it; and, as the Duke was given to understand, they were already in communication with Earl Grey. Though the time has not, perhaps, arrived for making public the *ipsissima verba* of the correspondence to which these proceedings led, there can be no impropriety in giving the substance of it; more especially as the subject

matter of it obtained a wide circulation at the moment; and the nickname of "Waverers," which was attached in consequence to Lord Wharncliffe and his friends, has never passed away.

About the 17th or 18th of November, the Duke received from Lord Wharncliffe a letter, announcing the fact that he had entered into a sort of negotiation with the government; and that he entertained good hope of being able to arrange such a plan of compromise, as would prevent the necessity of a second rejection of the bill by the lords, and so enable them to alter and amend it when it came into Committee. The Duke answered this letter on the 19th; and after expressing himself happy to learn that government was disposed to come to an understanding with his correspondent, Lord Harrowby, and others, as to the possibility of an arrangement by mutual concession on the Reform question, he went on to say that most of those who had spoken to him on the subject were loud in their complaints, and as he thought with reason, of the partiality of the Reform Bill, as well in disfranchising as in enfranchising boroughs. For his own part, all that he desired to see was a chance under the new system, of a government for this hitherto prosperous, happy, and great country, which should give security to life and property hereafter.

His opinion was, that those who really held the reins of government had already taken a step beyond all reform. They had incited the formation of political unions all over the country. These had assumed an organisation which any man who could read would pronounce to be for military purposes, and nothing else. Their creed was only so far better than that of

the United Irishmen in 1798, that they did not attempt to keep it secret. But this comparative merit lost its value when it was remembered, that at that moment secrecy was not necessary to security. It must be observed, likewise, that secrecy would deprive these organised bodies of one of their most efficient instruments, viz. terror.

His Grace had heard that a contract had been entered into for arms by the Birmingham Union; and he had considered it his duty to the King, to draw his Majesty's attention to the consequences of the assumption of arms by these self-formed bodies, to which they were incited daily by our governors of the press. It appeared, however, that he had been misinformed respecting the contract; and the press had certainly altered its tone of late respecting a national guard. But the organisation had since been adopted; and every information which he received led him to the belief, that the radicals composing these associations thus organised did possess arms.

For what purpose was all this? To carry reform by terror. That could not be the intention of Lord Grey, Lord Harrowby, and Lord Wharncliffe. See what Mr. Hume had said in his letter published in the "Times," of the previous day. He tells the parish of St. George's in the East, that he thinks there ought to be a union, in every parish, of all the middle classes, with the working men or operatives: firstly, for the protection of persons and property; secondly, to be ready to express the opinions of the parish on any public measure; and in case the ministers or the House of Commons are lukewarm in the cause of the people, to urge them to the performance of their duty. Up to that

moment ignorant people had thought that the preservation of the public peace, and of life and property, was the function of the King, and of those empowered by his Majesty. Till now, we never before heard of unions (organised unions) suggesting to the King's ministers and parliament their duty.

Was it not necessary for the government to place the King and parliament in a situation of safety and freedom to deliberate, before the latter should be called upon to decide on such a serious matter as the reform of the constitution? Ought not the people to be informed that these unions, these military organisations and arrays, these armaments for the pretended purposes of keeping the peace, but in reality to control the government and the parliament, were illegal; and that his Majesty's government have the will, as well as the power, of putting them down? That once done, the reform of parliament might be considered with honour and safety, if not with advantage. Till those unions were put down, it did not much signify, in reality, what course was taken.

It is obvious from the tone of this communication, that the subject uppermost in the Duke's mind was the necessity of relieving parliament from the external pressure which, according to his view of the case, rendered calm and deliberate legislation on any subject impossible. Little notice is therefore taken of the special information conveyed in his correspondent's letter, while Lord Wharncliffe is urged to require, as a step preliminary to all others, that the ministers should either suppress the political unions, or separate themselves from them. But his Grace's suggestions do not appear to have been understood in the sense which he intended them to con-

vey, for on the 24th he received from Lord Wharncliffe a detailed account, both of what had passed in an interview between Earl Grey and himself, and of the results to which it was expected that their negotiation would lead. Lord Wharncliffe, it appeared, had waited on Earl Grey at his house in Sheen by appointment. They had discussed the ministerial bill and its principles for two hours, without ever adverting to the unions, or to the noxious influence exercised by them upon parliament; and Lord Wharncliffe considered that he had achieved great success, when, in point of fact, he appears to have conceded everything.

His lordship seems to have opened the conference by expressing his anxiety that the country should be taken, if possible, out of its then dangerous condition; and his wish to ascertain whether the opposers and promoters of the late bill might not come to some understanding which should soften the feelings of both. His wishes, in these respects, being frankly reciprocated, his lordship went on to put questions which drew from Earl Grey answers to the following effect:—that Lord Grey considered himself pledged to the enfranchisement of a certain number of great towns, and to give additional members to certain counties; that 10*l.* must be the qualification in the towns so enfranchised, and that the process of disfranchisement in the small boroughs should extend as far as it had been carried in Schedule A. of the former bill. As to the number of members to be given to the towns so dealt with, that was a question which, when the divisions of counties, and the regulations to which the 10*l.* franchise should be subjected came to be considered, lay fairly open to discussion.

In regard to Schedule B., the impression conveyed to Lord Wharncliffe's mind was, that the minister was himself not quite satisfied with it; and that giving up the idea of a diminution in the total number of representatives for the United Kingdom, arrangements might be made for taking some of the doomed boroughs out of that schedule. Lord Grey was, however, averse, under any circumstances, to swell the constituencies of boroughs by throwing into them portions of counties, but was willing, so long as the power of nomination were given up, to treat all that part of the bill as subject to consideration elsewhere.

With respect to the proposal to give additional members to Ireland, the minister expressed himself fully alive to the dangers which must attend that act. But Scotland had increased so much in wealth and population that she had a just right to an enlarged representation; and if they gave additional members to Scotland, he did not see how they could refuse a similar boon to Ireland. Then, again, he felt the force of the objections which had been raised to the multiplication of electoral districts in London, and said that possibly some expedient might be devised for effecting a change in that respect. He was, moreover, quite convinced that steps ought to be taken for preventing the influence of large towns, themselves sending members to parliament, from being brought to bear upon county elections.

Some further conversation followed, out of which Lord Wharncliffe was led to hope, that the principle of population in boroughs would be modified by taking it in connection with the number of houses in each, and the amount of taxation paid by the inhabitants;

and he seems to have received an assurance that the limits of boroughs should be settled, not by commissioners as had been proposed, but in the bill; and that the population returns of 1821 and 1831 would be set aside, as notoriously incorrect.

In return for these trifling concessions, if, indeed, concessions they deserve to be called, Lord Wharncliffe gave Earl Grey the assurance, that he would do what he could to bring the opposition lords to take a more favourable view than they had previously done of the ministerial scheme and its probable consequences. He acknowledged that, with others, he had originally hoped that disfranchisement would not have been carried so far as it was in Schedule A; but that now, after what he had heard, he was inclined to believe that a bill giving to certain large towns the privilege of sending members to parliament, — disfranchising the smaller and poorer boroughs, and increasing the number of city representatives, would not meet with the same determined opposition as had been offered to it last session. This was followed by a cordial shaking of hands, and permission given on either side, to communicate with intimate friends and colleagues. And so, after deriving great comfort from the bitterness with which Earl Grey spoke of the newspapers, and their manner of expressing themselves, Lord Wharncliffe took his leave; flattering himself that the matter was in a better train than it had been in for some time, and that it would end in their obtaining something like a reasonable measure at last.

The memorandum, of which we have here endeavoured to give the substance, was transmitted to the Duke along with another paper, wherein were set forth the funda-

mental principles on which Lord Wharncliffe and Lord Harrowby had agreed that the great conservative party ought to treat. These papers were accompanied by a private letter, of which the tone was less confident than that of the concluding sentences in the memorandum; but which was so far consistent with the sentiments there laid down, that it spoke of the utter impossibility of expecting or obtaining better terms.

The Duke lost no time in replying both to this letter and to the documents which accompanied it. He admitted that the circumstances of the times, the extent to which the King's name had been made use of, and the direct pecuniary interest which it was falsely stated that some of the party had in the maintenance of the existing system of representation, might render it necessary to consider of some changes. Be this, however, as it might, he had no power to offer effectual opposition to the consideration of such changes, or to the changes themselves, provided those who had heretofore been satisfied with parliament should think, that future resistance would produce greater evils than could be expected to follow upon the most extensive changes proposed.

This was not his opinion. He believed that the country could be governed with difficulty under the existing system; that the difficulty was unquestionably increased for the moment, principally by the part which the King had been induced to take; and he did not see how the government of the country was to be carried on at all, under either of the systems of representation proposed, if the King and his government were expected still to protect establishments, institutions, rights,

interests, or property, as they then existed in England. Under these circumstances, his Grace would deceive his correspondent, Lord Harrowby, and the public if he took any part in their deliberations.

The Duke's view of the case was this, that, contrary to the opinions and wishes of men of property and education, an effort was now making to form a democratic parliament. Hitherto the House of Commons had been the representative of the whole nation—of the lowest ranks through the pot-wallopping and the scot-and-lot boroughs and the populous towns—of the middling classes through the counties, the maritime towns, and the towns of moderate size in the interior of the country, and of the whole of society through the close or rotten boroughs. According to the best of the systems proposed, they should hereafter have in parliament a vast majority of the representatives of the lowest class. The whole system of our government, and of our social existence, must be altered accordingly, or the country must prepare itself for a renewal of those contests between the crown and the people from which it had been fortunately so long exempt.

The Duke's reasoning was either entirely overlooked or misunderstood by Lord Wharncliffe. He replied to it by a frank avowal, that looking to the circumstances in which the Duke was placed, and to the opinions which he had expressed on the great question, he (Lord Wharncliffe) had never hoped for his Grace's co-operation in the endeavour to obtain a mere modification of the measure which the government had proposed. It was, however, a satisfaction to him to find that, being made aware of his own and of Lord Harrowby's feelings upon the subject, his Grace did not blame them for

endeavouring to render somewhat less dangerous that of which they could not entirely get rid.

The case as put by the Duke, his lordship observed, was perfectly fair. His Grace thought that the country could with difficulty be governed under the existing system, and doubted whether the government could be carried on at all under that proposed by the ministry, even if it should be modified and altered according to the suggestions of Lord Harrowby and himself. They, on the contrary (Lord Harrowby and himself), were persuaded that a continuance of the present state of things, even for a short time, would involve the country in difficulties;—that such difficulties could be averted only by timely concession, which, if it did not avoid dangers that at the most were only prospective, and therefore not quite certain, would, at all events, remove those which were imminent, and give time to provide, as well as could be done, against others which they believed that they foresaw.

There was, however, another point of view in which to look at the present state of affairs. Had they the power to resist this measure, or the leading principles of it? The House of Lords, by their late vote, had given to the country an opportunity of getting rid of those principles, if there really was any wish of that nature. What had been the result? Scarcely any demonstration in support of the House of Lords; and where such had been feebly shown, it had been accompanied by declarations which, in fact admitted that the principles of the bill, as far as they went to the enfranchisement of populous and wealthy places, and the disfranchisement of small and poor ones, ought to be conceded. Where, then, was the battle to be fought?

Certainly not in the House of Commons. In the House of Lords? and against the crown, its ministers, the House of Commons, and the people—to whom an appeal had been once more made to re-consider the question. This appeared to him to be impossible; and, if possible must be attended with the greatest danger to the state. For first, it would probably lead to such an addition to the peerage as must, for all purposes of deliberate legislation, destroy the House of Lords. And next, they must depend upon means to which none of them desired to have recourse, and which, besides, might not altogether be trusted to keep the nation quiet. He therefore held to his former opinion, that the time had come for solving the difficulty by mutual concession: and he believed that the course which Lord Harrowby and himself had adopted was the only one of which existing circumstances admitted.

Lord Wharncliffe's reasoning was not such as to carry conviction to the mind of his correspondent, and the Duke lost no time in pointing out to him how completely it went wide of the point really under discussion. He explained that his lordship was quite mistaken in supposing that his Grace had in any manner pledged himself on the question of parliamentary reform. He was perfectly free to take on that subject whatever course might appear to be expedient. Indeed, it seemed to him that the strong ground of those who had resisted the late bill was this, that they did not constitute a party at all. The government to which his Grace had belonged had been broken down by a union between those from whom he had separated on the Roman Catholic question, and others who had uniformly voted in support of that question. Some belonging to both

of these parties, and men of all parties and opinions, had joined to oppose the Reform Bill, without entering into any bargain upon that or upon any other question whatever. The Duke did not think that any of these persons, who now considered it right to support the bill, or a modification of it, afforded any ground of complaint to the rest; but, on the other hand, he could not feel that they who believed themselves bound to persevere in their opposition to these measures, and even to endeavour to induce the House of Lords to continue its opposition to them, ought in fairness to be regarded as a faction. It might be very convenient for the government to call them so, but he must deny the justice of the imputation.

The question as it then stood was one of degree. He admitted that he should not so regard it, but that the King had involved himself in it; for it was his firm belief that if the government could carry their bill at that moment, they would do so against the inclination of every man of property and education in the country. The King, however, had pronounced himself in favour of reform, and so far an unnatural impetus had been given to the movement; but the more gradual and gentle the reform, the better it would be for the country, and the more satisfactory it would prove to all who knew wherein the interests of the country lay, and felt for its greatness and prosperity. His lordship had said that no human being spoke a word in favour of the House of Lords. Did he ever go into a private room where anybody spoke otherwise? He seemed to have forgotten that the King and his government had entered apparently into combination with the mob for the destruction of property. Who would venture, under

such circumstances, to express his sentiments in public? Look about, and observe the state of society. Would magistrates venture to do their duty? Would any man put himself forward upon any subject? Was not every man doubting whether the power of government which he was called upon to exercise, might not be in contravention of the wishes of the King and his ministers, and that he himself might be left unsupported? Under these circumstances, it could not be expected that gentlemen would come forward to declare opinions which all the world knew that they entertained, but the avowal of which might expose them to the risk of being hunted even through their own parks and gardens. His lordship said, that the evils which the Duke apprehended were remote and contingent, while those of which he was himself apprehensive were immediate. The Duke positively denied the existence of the latter. The government had the power of preventing, or of putting them down; the whole country would support them. As to the former, not a week would pass in the first session of the reformed parliament without affording examples of them. Would any one undertake to say what style of person would be returned under the new system by any county, town, or borough in England, Ireland, or Scotland? Yet that was the point of inquiry to which wise and good men, undertaking to settle this question, ought to direct their attention; and they ought not to stir a step in it, situated as the country then was, without knowing the result.

This reference to the probable ill-treatment by mobs of public men who ventured to express opinions in opposition to the bill, was very appropriate. Lord Wharncliffe himself on his return into Yorkshire, after

the adverse division in the House of Lords, had been chased through his own park and gardens, and narrowly escaped with life. It is possible that this circumstance may have had some effect in bringing about the change of opinions which the Duke was combatting. But, however this may be, his lordship persevered in his attempt to come to an understanding with the government, continuing his correspondence with the Duke all the while. On the 28th of November, for example, he wrote to the following effect:—that he concurred in the views which the Duke had taken of the state of parties in the House of Lords;—that, equally with his Grace, he felt that each individual peer was at perfect liberty, notwithstanding the vote which he had recently given, to take any line on the reform, or any other question which he might think proper; and that it was a great happiness to him to communicate with one, who dealt so fairly and liberally with every opinion that he expressed.

On the main points of the argument, however, they were quite at variance. He did not deny that the House of Lords had done itself honour by the course which it had just taken, but he was perfectly satisfied that a majority of those, who were neither in parliament themselves, nor mixed much in political circles, believed that the Lords had committed a mistake in not going into committee with the bill, and trying to alter it there. As to reform, so far at least as the disfranchising of small boroughs, and enfranchising of large towns meant reform, he was satisfied that only an inconsiderable minority of persons of property and education were adverse to it; and he believed that an administration unwilling to concede these points, would not only

not be supported, but that the attempt to form it would be the signal for violence, which would soon become too powerful to be controlled. "You must always remember," he continued, "that those persons whom you see, know your opinions, and conform their language to them. But be assured that you are deceived, as you have been before, on the subject of reform, if you believe that anything can save the nomination boroughs. The events of the last year have so damaged them in the public mind, and the arguments that we have been driven to use in their favour are so unintelligible to everybody who has not, by being in parliament, seen the practical use of their existence,—while those against them are so palpable to everybody's understanding, that they absolutely stink in the nose of the country. Nay, I am persuaded that even if they could be preserved, those persons who sat for them would be placed in the House of Commons in a quite different position from that which they have hitherto held."

His lordship then goes on to notice the Duke's remarks with respect to the difficulty of governing the country under the existing system. He neither denies that fact, nor calls in question the extent of the risks which might attend the proposed change of system; but he holds to his old opinion, that these risks were contingent merely, and that the only choice was, between incurring them, and the attempt to carry on the government with the aid of constant military interference. Nor had he any doubt that a good deal of the democratic tendency of the measure might be neutralised by regulations and changes after the nomination boroughs had been abandoned.

At the risk of wearying our readers, we consider it

right to give the substance of the reply which this communication called forth; because it places in a clear point of view the motive under which the Duke acted, and the chain of reasoning which brought him under the influence of that motive. He admitted that he might be mistaken as well as other men in respect to public opinion, not less than in regard to what might occur in future, but he could not be deceived respecting the past. He was quite certain that his government had been broken down by the Roman Catholic question, and by the conduct of parties in reference to that question, and not by parliamentary reform. He was convinced that if those who combined against him on that occasion could have foreseen what had since happened, much more what was likely to occur, the ministry would not have been changed. They would have heard nothing of the King's desire for reform; the rage for reform would have spent itself as heretofore, and the country would have been saved. He was satisfied that his information was correct, when he stated that the gentlemen and better description of yeomanry, and others possessing property in the intelligent and opulent counties of Kent and Hampshire, were against the government measure. He believed that he could name as many as a dozen other counties in the south of England, where the same opinion prevailed. And he had reason to believe that in Scotland no small reaction had set in, and that in Ireland the protestants were to a man against any change. He admitted that men in general were not well informed of the uses, nor sensible of the value of the close boroughs in our system; but he could not on that account admit that if they were retained, those who sat for them would cease to have

weight in the House of Commons. The use of such boroughs was, that they opened the door of the House to men of talent who could not otherwise find their way there: and these men must always command attention wherever they were. He admitted, likewise, that the constitution and habits of the House of Lords were not generally understood, nor the reasons which made it difficult to amend a legislative measure in a committee of that House. The House might therefore be liable to undeserved censure for having considered of rejecting rather than of amending the late bill. Still the conduct of the House of Lords was, he maintained, generally approved, and men who felt that their existence depended upon the continuance of good order in the country, looked to the House of Lords with confidence, and would see its constitutional power destroyed with dismay. Moreover, he was bound to tell his correspondent that when he thought of what would be the state of this country under the control of the reformed House of Commons, he was not dealing with mere fancies. He looked at what was going on in England at the present moment; he saw what had passed and was passing in other countries under a similar system of government. It might be the British constitution in name, but it was not so in fact, as the British constitution had been acted upon for the last 150 years. Indeed, every advocate for reform admitted that when their point was carried, corresponding changes in the practice of the constitution must be introduced. Now what were these changes likely to be? What he feared was, the destruction of the race of gentlemen in the country, and with them of its glory, its honour, and its prosperity. For it was a fallacy to

believe that any class—least of all the lowest, would benefit by that catastrophe. He defied all the political economists and reformers in the world to provide for more than 22,000,000, of people, half so well as all the classes of the population were provided for at that moment.

Still, in spite of all these considerations, it might, he acknowledged, be necessary to consider of improvements in the representation of the people. If so, let them proceed practically; let them adhere to the principle of what was in existence, examine well the probable effect of every improvement before it was introduced, and the actual effect before another was proposed, and then they might preserve the country. If the bill were taken, or even Lord Wharncliffe's improvement on it, as his Grace understood it, neither Lord Grey nor any nobleman of his circle, nor any gentleman of his caste, would govern the country six weeks after the reformed parliament met, and the race of English gentlemen would not last long afterwards. Such was his Grace's sincere opinion, founded on what he saw going on around him, and had seen elsewhere, and he earnestly recommended it to the attention of others.

It has elsewhere been observed, that whatever the subject might be which the Duke of Wellington undertook to discuss, the terms in which he dealt with it were not always rigidly measured. His argument, as here stated, may appear to many wild in the extreme, time and events having long ago confuted it. But is the case really so? Was the Duke referring to the physical or even the intellectual condition of the great body of the people? Nothing of the sort. His mind's eye was fixed upon the great institutions of the country; upon the prerogatives of the crown, especially in the

selection of its ministers ; upon the Established Church, with all its rights and privileges ; upon the House of Lords, and its power to control and modify the decisions of the House of Commons ; and upon the intimate connection between the House of Commons itself, and the territorial interest, which he held to be the very foundation-stone of England's greatness. Will anybody pretend to say, that these or any of them hold the same vantage ground which they occupied previously to the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832 ? Are we not, on the contrary, in the full current of change, which though less rapid than the Duke anticipated, is not less steady ; and which, for better or for worse, must bring us under an order of things, the anticipation of which, to men educated as the Duke had been, could not fail to be terrible. Let no man, therefore, say of the Duke that he was frightened at a shadow, or that the language which he held, and the line of conduct which he considered it necessary to pursue, were neither creditable to him as a statesman, nor in accordance with his acknowledged magnanimity and patriotism. He struggled then for what he believed to be a great principle, by what process and with what effect, will best be understood after a careful perusal of the following outline of his proceedings, which he communicated at this time to a statesman much in his confidence.

After acknowledging the receipt of a letter enclosing a communication from Lord Wharncliffe, his Grace proceeds to say, that he likewise had had some correspondence with that nobleman, upon the subject of his communications with government respecting the changes in the Reform Bill. After receiving Lord Wharncliffe's explanation of his own and Lord Harrowby's views, as

well as the details of his conversation with Lord Grey, he had told Lord Wharncliffe that he could not be a party to his deliberations with Lord Harrowby. Indeed he had before observed to him, that Lord Grey had never intended to include him (the Duke of Wellington) in the number of peers who entertained the same opinions as himself and Lord Harrowby. At the same time his Grace had observed to Lord Wharncliffe, that as government appeared by their proclamation against political unions to be disposed to break with the Radicals, they must rely upon him (Lord Wharncliffe) and his friends for support. That his position would thus become one of power and responsibility, and that both must be increased in proportion as the opponents of the Reform Bill might manifest a disposition to co-operate with him. He had therefore earnestly urged him to agree to nothing, which should not leave to the country some prospect of being governed.

Passing on from this subject, his Grace states it as his opinion that the proclamation of the 22nd, just alluded to, was a made up affair with the Radicals.

About three weeks previously he had written to the King respecting the danger that would result from the political unions taking arms and forming themselves into National Guards, to which at that time they were daily incited by the government newspapers. He had informed his Majesty, that according to information which had reached him, a contract had been entered into for supplying the Birmingham Union with arms. The King, it appeared, replied immediately, stating in strong terms his opinion that these armaments could not be tolerated, and his conviction that his ministers concurred in that opinion, and would resist them. His

Majesty having sent to Lord Grey the Duke's communication and his own answer, his Grace had corresponded with Lord Grey respecting the arming of these associations, and subsequently respecting their organization, the result of which was the proclamation. It was on the 7th that the Duke had written to the King, and in the course of the week the tone of the newspapers on the subject of these armaments underwent a complete change. His Grace was therefore of opinion, that Lord Grey must have been aware on the 8th or the 9th of his communication to the King, and of his Majesty's answer. What the date of Lord Grey's first communication with Lord Wharncliffe might have been, he could not tell; but it was probably about the same time. At all events he was satisfied that the proclamation came out in consequence of the remonstrance which he had made to Lord Grey on the previous Sunday on the subject of the organisation of the Birmingham Union, and in answer to a letter which he had received from Lord Grey, communicating the results of inquiries which had been instituted into the reported armament of the Union.

The King, it appeared, had been very much excited by the Duke's communication on the subject of armaments, and his Grace considered it probable, that the government thereupon notified to their friends of the press that they were going too far. Probably they did the same by the Birmingham Union. At all events he knew that his Majesty had seen his letters to Lord Grey. He had himself sent copies of the first, in which he had told Lord Grey that he would not find it an easy matter to deprive of their arms an association which had once assumed them, and that the public

ought to be warned by authority of the illegal and dangerous course which these unions were pursuing. He thought it most likely also that his Majesty had seen his last letter to Lord Grey, of which however he did not send his Majesty a copy, containing his remonstrance against the organisation of the union, and his statement that it was the same as that of the United Irishmen and could be intended only for military purposes. Neither had he forgotten to remonstrate against the pretensions of the union to keep the peace, and to control the government and parliament. His opinion therefore was, that the King must have insisted upon the issue of the proclamation, and that the Ministers prevailed upon the Radicals to submit to it by informing them that the government must break up if they did not.

His Grace could not on any other grounds account for the meeting of the Birmingham Union on the 22nd, and the withdrawal of the resolution respecting organisation; that being the very day on which the proclamation was published in London, and the day after that on which it must have been agreed to in council. If this view of the case were correct, and appearances strongly confirmed it, then very little reliance could be placed on the honesty of the Whig government, and Lord Wharncliffe would certainly become its dupe.

On the other hand, supposing the government to have separated from the Radicals, it was impossible to tell what would be the result of Lord Wharncliffe's negotiation. His Grace had done everything in his power to make him and Lord Harrowby sensible of the responsibility which they were assuming. If they remained firm, some of the evils of the bill might be

averted, and the country would have gained so much by the persevering labour of the minority of the House of Commons, and the firmness of the majority of the House of Lords.

The result of Lord Wharncliffe's negotiation was exactly such as the Duke appears all along to have anticipated. It came to nothing, and on the 29th of November his lordship communicated the fact to the Duke in the following terms:

"Curzon Street.

"My dear Duke,—I have seen Lord Grey again this morning, and have had a long conversation with him, the result of which is, that although I wait for Harrowby's arrival, which I expect this evening, I have no idea that anything remains for us to do, but to put an end to the communication between us and the government. I thought it only due to you to let you know this circumstance as early as possible."

The consequence of this failure was, that while the government returned to its close alliance with the Radicals, the party opposed to the great question of the day broke up into two sections. That of which the Duke was at the head adhered to his original opinion, that come what might the House of Lords, if still unconvinced of the policy and the justice of the ministerial measure, was bound to reject it as it had done before. Lord Wharncliffe and his friends, on the contrary, though thrown over in private discussion by Earl Grey, continued to persuade themselves that by some process or another the ministers would be induced to concede a great deal to their wishes in committee.

They appear, also, to have entertained the belief that however ready Lord Grey might be to create peers in order to carry the second reading of the bill, he would not take so desperate a step for any less important purpose. Both sections of the party exerted themselves during the remainder of the recess to stamp their own views of things upon the minds of others. The waverers, and especially Lord Wharncliffe, engaged actively in a correspondence, which is not always remarkable for its strict adherence to logical principle. Assuming certain premises to be true, for which, as the event proved, they had no authority, they argued from them as if they had been acknowledged facts, and succeeded in deciding many against further opposition to the second reading. As to the Duke, his letters appear almost all to have been written in reply to communications from others. They differ little, in their general tone, from those to which we have just referred; and were calm, argumentative, and looking at the question from the point of view in which he regarded it, as wise as they were moderate. For example, he is implored by one noble duke, on the 1st of January, 1832, to go to Brighton immediately to see the King, to urge his Majesty not to make peers, and to offer, himself, to form such a government as would be able to protect the sovereign from the demand to make them. Being confined at the time by illness to his chamber, he replies, that he could not follow the noble duke's advice, even if he considered the course recommended to be advisable. But was it advisable? When he wrote to the King in the previous November, on the armament of the political unions, he had a case in hand in which he was certain that nineteen-twentieths of the

whole country would concur with him. He took that step, also, at a period of the year when he knew that if the King desired to get rid of the bonds in which he was held, he (the Duke) could assist him in doing so. There was time to call a new parliament, and the sense of the country might have been taken on a question, about which there could be no doubt. But what did the King do? He concurred, even to exaggeration, in every opinion which the Duke expressed. His ministers saw that they had got into a scrape; they prevailed upon the press and the political unions to alter their course; they issued a mock-proclamation, and promised the King a bill to suppress the associations, which promise they never performed; and the King became quite satisfied with them, and went on as before. This happened in a really good and undoubted case, and at a peculiarly favourable season of the year. How did the Conservative party stand, while he was writing, in the matter of the peerage?

The Duke did not deny that the question of the independence of the House of Lords was a very important one for the country; or that the country, if it understood what was really proposed to it, would respond favourably to an appeal in support of that independence. But would the country be allowed to understand the nature of the appeal? Would not the move be represented or understood to be an appeal on the question of reform? And then was there time to make the appeal, or to get a new parliament together. Even if they were to dissolve on that day (2nd of January) they could not open a new parliament till the 8th of March at the earliest; and on the 25th of March the Mutiny Act expired.

Observe next what was to be done. His Grace was to see the King, to advise him to refuse to create peers, to tell him that he would form a government to protect him from that demand, to convince his Majesty that he was really able to protect him. He would then have a government to form, and the parliament to dissolve, which, using all possible haste, could not be done under ten days; and so the opening of the second parliament would be put off to the 18th of March.

But perhaps they might be able to go on without a dissolution. That was clearly out of the question. The existing House of Commons had been formed on purpose to carry parliamentary reform. It was a member of the conspiracy against the House of Lords. It would not hear of a minister who should found his authority on the basis of protection to the independence of the House of Lords. When, therefore, his Grace went to the King, he must answer the first question which his Majesty would put to him, by saying that no ministry, founded on the principle of supporting the independence of the House of Lords, could look for the support of the existing House of Commons; and that he could not, at that moment, advise his Majesty to dissolve his parliament.

But would the King embark with the Duke on a new course? His Majesty would, in the first place, so manage his conversation, as to discover whether the Duke himself had any confidence in the course which he was recommending. If the King should discover that the Duke saw the risks and dangers, which as an honest and experienced man he could not avoid seeing, his Majesty would shake him off, and would found his compliance with the recommendations of his ministers

upon the very reasoning which had been pressed upon him by the Duke.

The noble Duke, to whom this letter was addressed, had implored his correspondent to consider himself on the field of battle; and to risk all, as he knew that he would do, against a foreign enemy, in order to save the country. We cannot give his Grace's answer in any other words than his own:

"I know that the times are approaching, if not come, when men must consider themselves as on a field of battle, and must sacrifice themselves to the public interests. But it behoves a man like me to look around him, and to consider the consequences, not to himself alone, but, what is more important, to the public interests, of every step he takes. And I must say that, taking that view of the case, I differ in opinion with you; and am convinced that I should do harm, rather than good, by interference."

We have given this as a specimen of the manner in which the Duke met a strong appeal made to him on the subject which then occupied all minds. In discussing another question, he appears to have taken the initiative. The Irish Protestants were at this time becoming very impatient. They could not brook the insults that were daily heaped upon them by the Roman Catholics, and they were irritated by the neglect with which the King's government treated them. A great meeting was called in consequence from all parts of the country, and was advertised as about to be held on the 17th instant, in the Rotunda at Dublin. Deprecating that move, the Duke wrote, on the 7th, to the noble head of the Protestant party, to the following effect:—He enter-

tained, he said, a very high opinion of the Protestants of Ireland, and particularly of the class which would probably be assembled on the occasion in question; but he confessed that, being accustomed to deal with masses of men, he could not look with confidence to the safety of so numerous an assembly (20,000 were expected to attend), unless their arrangement and classification were very perfectly made and understood; and it was known what each man was to do, and with whom he was to act, in case of attack or interruption. Without such previous arrangement and understanding, 20,000 gentlemen would be just as much a mob, as any other assembly of equal numbers. They could only submit to an organised attack, if it were made upon them.

His Grace would suppose some probable cases; first, that the Radicals of Dublin should attack the Protestant gentlemen — that was not impossible; some might even believe that it was probable. Would the government protect the meeting of the Protestant gentlemen? Secondly, suppose the government were to recommend that the meeting should not take place, or were to prohibit its taking place, on the ground of apprehended disturbance. Would not the meeting be an act, in that case, very little in accordance with the feelings of the great body of the Protestants of Ireland? Thirdly, suppose the government should order the civil magistrate to disperse the meeting. Would not that occasion a good deal of feeling among all the better classes, and be a complete triumph to the Radicals?

In whatever light he regarded the proposed meeting, it was a subject of regret to him that it had been called; and he was satisfied that unless every man fully understood what he was expected to do, there could be no safety for any who attended it.

The meeting, fortunately, instead of being attended by 20,000, scarcely comprised 2000 persons; and as all these were accommodated within the walls of the Rotunda, it passed over without bloodshed.

The same hand which thus puts on record sage advice in reference to events that are impending, is called upon to state the Duke's views on the property of the Established Church in Ireland, on the state of the labour market, and of the currency in England. The prospects of the church are thus rapidly disposed of. The writer is convinced that the landed interest of Ireland, that is to say, the Protestants, if fairly supported as they ought to be by the government, and supporting the government as they ought, are too strong, whether in a moral, a political, or a military view, for all the rest. He does not think that the government are yet prepared to act with the Roman Catholics for the overthrow of the Church of England in Ireland. They must be better supported than they are as yet, both in and out of parliament, particularly in regard to the affairs of the church, before they can venture upon such a contest. We must see what a reformed parliament, and a ministry forced by that parliament upon the King, will do in respect to the church in general, and that part of it in Ireland in particular. The latter is, however, at the outposts, and the first to be attacked.

And yet the statesman who looked thus suspiciously upon the government was too honest to oppose them in their Irish Tithe Commutation Act when it came on. He believed that the clergy, though forced by that measure to make a sacrifice, would gain more in the avoidance of angry collision with the te-

nantry, than they lost in income: and finding that the Primate took the same view of the subject, he voted for the bill.

On the labour and currency questions the Duke expresses himself thus; showing thereby that he had been no careless student of Adam Smith, but that, possibly, he had either not read, or had failed to catch the entire meaning of Malthus, Ricardo, and, above all, of Mill, the ablest of the disciples of the great Glasgow professor. "In respect to labour in England, it is one of the most difficult topics of our time. The labourer has acquired some very bad habits of late years, which at the same time that they render his subsistence more expensive to himself, incapacitate him from rendering service to his employer of a value equal to the money price paid to him for that service. This has unfortunately occurred at a period when the increase of population in the country, the growing increase of the use and capability of machinery to perform the service of men's hands, and the great decrease of public expenditure, and the general increase of capitalisation throughout the country, have increased the supply of labourers, and have diminished the demand for their services to an amount that is quite distressing. But I confess that I consider what we see now as nothing to what we shall witness by and by, when the prospect of the Reform Bill being carried will have approached a little nearer to us, and will have produced the effect which must be expected from it, of putting an end to private expenditure.

"I quite concur with you that every country labourer should have land. I should think four acres too much. I should think one acre would be sufficient. If he

holds more he will not labour for hire. This country would soon in that respect resemble Ireland.

"In respect to paper currency, your lordship does me justice in believing that I have no objection to reconsider that or any other subject upon which I have formed and given an opinion. I say this with the reserve always of avoiding, in the mode of consideration, the holding out expectation to the public of changes which might not after all be deemed advisable.

"My objection to allow of an unlimited issue of 1*l.* notes in England is, that it enables anybody who sets up as a banker in the country to trade upon the property of others as his capital. He issues his notes upon loans and interest, and the borrower, with these notes, buys the property of any description that is in the market. The banker stops payment, and he who holds the notes, and has given valuable property for them, is the loser. This is the simple transaction, and I contend that the legislature ought, in a state of society like ours, to prevent such transactions.

"It may be said that the holder of valuable property is not under the necessity of giving it for these notes. That is true in respect to legal necessity, but the attendant upon this system is, that every other description of money moves out of the country. This would appear, indeed, to be one of the objects of the system. The holder of valuable property must then sell or exchange it for notes, or not sell at all; of course then he will sell for notes.

"But it is contended that we will take security from the issuer of these notes. The mode of taking this security, in proportion to the amount of notes in circu-

lation, is not very easy; but security at all, which I know at one time was much talked of, is very difficult. The whole of a banker's, and of every man's personal property is, at this moment, security for all his debts. How is it possible to allot a portion to be security for a particular description of debt in the shape of a one-pound promissory note? But would the country bankers give this security? I was in the cabinet, and recollect Mr. Vansittart's endeavour to arrange such a plan. He was vehemently opposed by all the country bankers, and by all over whom this powerful body had any influence.

"As I said before, the arrangement of a security proportioned to the dealings in small notes of each country banker, is a very difficult operation. But if it should be successful, I must say, that nearly all the advantage expected to be derived from the taking off the restriction upon the circulation of these notes would fail. Country bankers would then feel that they gave security for every pound that they should lend to a farmer or other individual. They would become as cautious of making loans in their own paper, as they now are in making them in their own notes of 5*l.* and 10*l.* value, which they know that they are liable to be called upon to exchange for gold at any moment. Thus but little facility would be given to speculation according to this scheme.

"But it is contended that there will not be a sufficient sum of money in circulation for the purposes of the country. I believe that if people would not shut their eyes to the truth, they would find that there is more money now in circulation, than there ever has been before. But this is quite certain,

that no more would be issued and circulated than would be absolutely necessary, and possibly not so much as is now in circulation, under the proposed system. Particularly if it should be possible to discover a mode of obtaining security from country bankers, for the payment of every small note that they should issue, into which they would consent to enter."

CHAP. II.

REFORM BILL.—SECOND READING CARRIED.—THE DUKE ATTEMPTS TO FORM AN ADMINISTRATION.—HE FAILS.—THE BILL PASSED.—THE DUKE'S LIFE ATTEMPTED ON THE 18TH OF JUNE.

1832.

THE time drew on when parliament was to meet, and still the minds of the opposition lords remained unsettled. Lord Wharncliffe, indeed, re-opened his correspondence, not only with the Duke, but with the government. To the former he reiterated all the arguments which he had employed during the previous autumn, and added an earnest request that, in the event of the second reading being carried, the Duke would so far give way as to assist him and his friends in their attempts to take the sting out of the bill. From the latter he strove to obtain a promise, that no new peers would be made, provided the principle of the bill, as Lord Grey had on a former occasion explained it, should be established. At the same time his lordship, in writing to the Duke, neither disguised his own abhorrence of the measure, nor made any secret of his alarm at the consequences which must attend its enactment into law. Satisfied as he was that the old constitution answered every purpose of good government, he was ready to incur any amount of odium, or even of hazard, rather than allow a mere party in the houses of parliament, with the aid of the Radicals and Dissenters, to overbear the opinions and wishes of the wiser part of his country-

men. But all that had passed during the preceding year and a half satisfied him, that the number of those was very small indeed, out of the houses of parliament, who did not believe a considerable measure of reform to be necessary. He could not, therefore, persevere in obstinately refusing such a measure as would enable the country to ward off the blow which was too evidently aimed at all its institutions.

But his lordship went further than this. He had never ceased, since the bill was thrown out in the Lords, to regret that its refusal had been unaccompanied by some resolution, in accordance with the opinion which everywhere prevailed, that the time was come for applying a remedy to the blots and defects, which confessedly existed in the constitution. Had such a resolution passed the House, he was convinced that they would have been now in a far better condition to deal wisely with the ministerial plan; because from the absence of such a resolution the country had accepted their adverse vote as one of mere resistance to all reform.

Under these circumstances he and others had made up their minds to vote for the second reading, or at all events, not to oppose that reading. When in committee they would do their best to amend the bill, and by the extent of their success or failure in that effort their future course would be determined.

It would serve no good purpose were we to give in full the reasoning by which Lord Wharncliffe endeavoured to justify the policy on which he was bent. It turned entirely upon two hinges. First, who was prepared, if the present bill were rejected, to propose another, such as the country might be expected to

accept? Could the Duke, after his declaration against all reform, take this course? Would it be reasonable to expect Sir Robert Peel to do so? And were there any other members of the party, in either House, whom the party would consent to follow? For it was quite clear to him that the ministerial measure could not be again rejected, except by those who should be prepared to substitute for it a plan of reform, which, if not identical with that thrown out, must comprise all those of its features which appeared to him and to the majority in the Lords to be most objectionable. Next, if the House of Lords was to be saved at all, it could only be by giving way so far as to concede a second reading to the bill. And it was necessary, in order to effect that object, that some public avowal of their readiness to pass the second reading should be made. For it was consistent with his lordship's knowledge, that the King had agreed to make as many peers as his ministers might require, in order to carry the second reading; and the only reason why they were not already created was, that there were in the cabinet a certain number of persons who desired to avoid that extremity and who put it off from day to day by holding out the expectation that it would not be necessary at all. "But we cannot," continued his lordship, "expect that they will, in the absence of any public declaration in support of their opinion, be long able to stand out against the more violent, who, from personal or party views, as well as from thinking their retention of office identical with this bill, are constantly pushing Lord Grey to this measure, which not only ensures the passing of the bill in its worst form, and the permanence of Whig power in the House of

Lords; but for ever puts an end to the respectability and weight of the House as a part of the legislature." Therefore was his lordship urgent, that the Lords should no longer act on an erroneous notion of their duty. Their part in the constitution, at such a crisis, was to interpose a moderate and well-considered check to the inroad of principles of too popular or democratic a character; but not, after an unsuccessful appeal to the country, to persist in an obstinate refusal to try whether, by amendment, the obnoxious measure might not be rendered comparatively safe. "Let us take care," he adds, "that we are not at issue with the crown, the House of Commons, and the people, and that we do not become responsible for all the confusion which must ensue, without the least hope of final success in a struggle which we shall have unnecessarily provoked."

The communication, of which we have extracted the substance, reached the Duke on the 1st of February, and on the 3rd he replied to it. It was impossible for him to accept Lord Wharncliffe's view of the position, or to act as his lordship suggested. If evil followed the rejection of the second reading, the ministers, not the House of Lords, must bear the responsibility. As to amending the bill in committee, that, from the very constitution of the House, would be next to impossible; and if it were possible, what would be gained? The administration, which was ready to sacrifice the independence of the House for the second reading of the bill, would be equally ready to create peers, in order to undo what the committee might have effected. Had ministers adhered to any of their pledges? They promised, at the outset, to bring forward a plan of moderate reform. Was the plan before them a moderate one? They announced

that they were prepared to stand or fall with their measure. Had they done so? After carrying it to a second reading, and so establishing the principle, they had been defeated in committee on a point of detail; and then, instead of falling with their bill, they dissolved parliament. In the new parliament the same results take place. They are defeated in the Lords, and the line which they adopt is to prorogue, and to bring in a third bill, as mischievous as the first. But this was not all. What good had come of his lordship's former dealings with Earl Grey — first, when they discussed the question face to face; and by and by, when, under the auspices of Lord Chandos, they renewed the negotiation? His lordship could not say that the minister had yielded one point.

The Duke was perfectly satisfied that a reform bill must now pass. That had been rendered inevitable by the combination of the King, his ministers, and the House of Commons, with the political unions. He had not, however, changed his opinions since he expressed them in 1830; and was convinced, if this bill passed into law, the House of Lords must, sooner or later, perish, and with it all the great institutions of the country, including the monarchy. He therefore intended to do as he had done before; he would make up his mind to nothing till the bill came into the House, and would then take such a course as might appear best: and he recommended others to do the same.

Meanwhile every new day and every fresh piece of information which he received more and more led to the conviction that the struggle which impended would be desperate. One noble lord, for example, wrote to say that he had learned from Mr. O'Connell that

Lords Wharncliffe and Harrowby had consented to support the second reading, on the understanding that not more than twelve new peers should be made. Another makes him aware that peer after peer of his own party is worked upon by the chiefs of the waverers to swerve from their steadfastness. A third assures him, on the authority of a friend who had been an ear-witness of what he repeats, that the Duke of Bedford described Earl Grey as determined to carry his measure in its integrity; that if he could not carry the second reading without a large creation, a large creation should take place; but that he was not thereby restricted from using the same means to prevent its mutilation in committee. For the only change to which he might perhaps assent would be the transference of a few seats from one schedule to another, and that if more were attempted he should not hesitate to ask the King for any number of new peers up to a hundred. These were grave announcements, yet they had no power to move the Duke from the course which he believed to be that of duty; indeed they tended only to confirm him in the persuasion at which he had already arrived, that the House of Lords would gain nothing by concession. In this spirit he expresses himself when he says, "My professional habits have, I believe, induced me, in general, to look forward and consider the consequences of any course of action which I am about to follow; and occasionally to look back and consider the consequences which have followed from a previous determination. I wish that noble lords would do something of the kind in relation to this Reform Bill. First of all, looking forward, they would find that if they vote for the Reform Bill, and it passes, as it

will, the constitution of the country is destroyed; and the House of Lords will be the first institution to fall. If they vote against the Reform Bill, we are told that peers will be created. I don't dispute the truth of this assertion. It may be doubtful whether every peer created will be a vote gained. But I admit that an additional creation of peers, for the purpose of carrying this question, will destroy the independence, and the character of, and the respect for, the House of Lords. Is it not better that this, and the destruction of the constitution, should be the act of the ministers, rather than of individual members of the House of Lords, who will vote for the bill at the same time that they disapprove of it?

"What will be the feeling of those who have carried this bill for the ministers, against their own opinions and inclinations; but out of deference to others who, by the bye, were our leaders in the former debates!

"Let noble lords only look back upon the consequences of their vote. A few windows were broken, and other outrages committed, but we have gained six months of time, during which there has been a remarkable alteration of sentiment in the country. Let us gain more time, and the advocates of the bill know that we must get the better of them."

Looking back to the state of public feeling, as it was expressed in the newspapers, at the period when the Duke thus spoke and wrote, the superficial observer will at once arrive at the conclusion, that his Grace was labouring under a complete delusion. They who had an opportunity of seeing deeper than the surface of things, will be slow to endorse that opinion. Undoubtedly, the crowd was everywhere favourable to the bill. Many able and honest men went with the crowd; while the newspaper

press, which is as much a mercantile speculation as any other article of commerce, adopted in general the tone which insured for it the widest circulation. But, had the good sense of the three kingdoms been polled at the Inns of Court, in the Universities, among the leading merchants of London, Liverpool, and Bristol, and among the heads of the great firms in Manchester, Birmingham, and Glasgow, it would have been found that there was really no desire for any violent change in the constitution; and that recent events had only more and more confirmed the conviction, that such change as the ministry proposed would amount to revolution. We say nothing of the landed proprietors and clergy, of whom nine out of every ten were strong anti-reformers; or of the yeomanry, a vast majority of whom, though dazzled at first, were awakened to a sense of danger, by the scenes which had been enacted in Bristol and Nottingham. And when we shall have deducted all these classes, or the bulk of them, from the supporters of the bill, surely it is not going too far to affirm that the Duke had at least some ground to rest upon when he stated that reaction had set in, and that there could be no risk of permanent confusion, should the House of Lords, still believing the bill to be a mischievous one, continue its opposition, and reject it. Be this however as it may, the Duke believed that resistance was the safest course left for the House of which he was a member; and to the last moment he persevered in counselling and preparing for it.

Meanwhile, several noblemen, who desired to follow his lead, yet could with difficulty screw their courage to the sticking place, endeavoured to divert him into, what they conceived to be, a safer course of opposition

than that which he advised. One discovered that no plan of parliamentary reform ought to be considered, unless it came before the House as a complete measure. He therefore suggested that they ought to refuse a second reading to the bill, on the ground that it made no provision for the re-adjustment of the electoral system in Ireland. But to that proposal the Duke could not listen. He was ready to dare everything in defence of the constitution as it stood, but he would not defend even the constitution itself by a subterfuge. In like manner he refused to be a party to a motion against the creation of new peers, which he justly regarded as an attack upon the prerogative, and which he was convinced would serve but to precipitate the evil which it was intended to avert. Nor was this all. At a moment when the utmost exertion both of mind and body scarcely sufficed to carry him through the correspondence which the reform negotiation cast upon him, every peer who had a crotchet of his own to maintain, or a scheme to propose, laid it before the Duke, and besought him to become its advocate. "I assure you, my dear Lord," he writes to one of these, "that in referring these matters to me, you entirely mistake my position. I cannot prevail upon Lord Ellenborough and Lord Carnarvon to take a part in any question, unless it should suit their views. I must first understand the object myself, and then impart my information to those noble lords. This is the case with hundreds of questions which noble lords think proper to propose for discussion in the House. I have to reconcile their jarring views and interests, and this by personal conference and discussion with them all. There is no individual who, in these times, is equal to such a task, be his diligence and

ability what they may. My time, from nine in the morning till midnight, is occupied in conferences, discussions, and correspondence; and I declare that I am broken down by the weight unnecessarily, and in my opinion without advantage, imposed upon me. I can't see why Lord Wynford should not himself speak to Lord Ellenborough and Lord Carnarvon."

"He characterises most truly the Reform Bill. The object is to aggrandize one party. The result will be the ruin of the state. If men, interested in the preservation of the state, are sensible of this result, and will not unite cordially in their efforts to defeat the Reform Bill, the fault is not mine."

"There are at this moment depending not less than half a dozen discussions upon which we cannot draw together. Upon some of them, some noble lords insist upon having divisions previous to discussion. Is it not a hopeless task that is imposed upon any man to desire him to effect union in such a party?"

At last the bill, having been carried in the House of Commons, was introduced into the House of Lords. The first reading took place on the 26th of March, and the discussion which arose on that occasion, though brief, was, in the Duke's opinion, sufficiently indicative of the course which the minister had made up his mind to follow. Earl Grey, he perceived, was determined to concede nothing, and expected to carry the second reading by a small majority. This done the House would probably adjourn for the Easter holidays, and during the recess peers enough would be created to overcome all resistance in committee. It is worthy of remark, that the Duke's views in regard to the latter arrangement were not generally entertained by noble lords on the opposition

benches. Most of these expected to go into committee before the Easter holidays, when time would not be afforded for the creation with which his Grace threatened them. And this expectation the waverers turned to account, in the resistance which they now openly made to the Duke's purpose of defeating the bill on the second reading. The result was that when the day of trial arrived, a larger amount of defection than his Grace's worst fears had anticipated, manifested itself. After a grave debate which lasted three nights, ministers carried the second reading of their bill by a majority of nine, and parliament adjourned almost immediately afterwards, as the Duke had foretold that it would do.

It would not be easy to describe the effect, of this decision, both upon political parties in parliament, and upon the great community out of doors. Reformers, particularly those of the unions and of the press, seemed at a loss how to give utterance to their joy. They gloried apparently as much over the humbling of the House of Lords, as over the success of their own measure; and demanded that danger in committee should be guarded against by a large and immediate creation of peers. Lord Grey, on the other hand, took his triumph meekly. He felt, indeed, that his difficulties were but beginning, for determined as he was to pass his bill in its integrity, the prospect of destroying the independence of one branch of the legislature was to him not agreeable. As to the Duke, he spoke and acted as he would have done had a great battle been lost in the field; he did his best to gather the wreck of his army together, and looked about for a new position on which to dispute with the enemy the approaches to the capital. While others in despair seemed dis-

posed to withdraw from the struggle, he animated and cheered all whom he could reach to persevere. At the same time he declined having any further communication with Lords Wharncliffe and Harrowby. He was quite willing to accept their support of such changes in the bill as he and his friends might endeavour to effect in committee; but he would neither admit these noble lords to his councils beforehand, nor in any way, directly or indirectly, sanction the negotiations into which he was informed that they had again entered with Lord Grey. His principal correspondents seem to have been, as was natural, Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Bathurst, with other members of both Houses in whom he could fully trust; and one great point which he never failed to press upon them, was caution. Anything like a premature disclosure of their plans would inevitably lead to their defeat; as the government would have been defeated on the first reading of the original bill, had they exercised less prudence in hiding it. With men like Lord Lyndhurst, the Duke had no difficulty in dealing; but there were others more confident in their own powers of persuasion, whom he did not find it so easy to control. One gentleman in particular, whose pen was as active and able as his tongue, had of late been eloquent, insisted on being allowed to print and circulate among the waverers certain propositions of change, and was scarcely restrained from doing so. On the whole, however, the secrets of the party were well kept; which is the more to be wondered at, that a large measure of confidence was of necessity extended to a large number of persons, and that of these several neither filled, nor could ever expect to fill, any office of trust or responsibility in

the state. Such is the effect of the moral ascendency of a great over inferior minds, whether the operations which it undertakes to direct be military or political!

We gather from the correspondence which now lies before us, that accepting the principle of parliamentary reform as settled, the Duke's sole object, at the present stage in affairs, was to render the change of system which had become inevitable as safe, and therefore as gradual, as possible. He did not profess to regard the ministerial measure, however modified or altered, otherwise than with detestation. He could not see how the country was to be governed under such a system, amend it as they might. But being convinced that no other proposition would be listened to, the next best thing, in his opinion, was to form out of the ministerial scheme something as little removed as could be from that to which the country was already accustomed. With this object in view, he dwelt strongly upon three points:—first, that they should get rid of Schedule B altogether, so that no borough might return only one member; next, that they should refuse the proposed addition to the metropolitan members: and lastly, that they should prevent voters for boroughs from voting for counties also. He was further of opinion that counties should not be divided; but that each, as a general rule, should return two members, as it had hitherto done, and that Schedule A, since it could not be expunged, should at all events be mitigated so as to afford openings for the representation of the colonies in the imperial parliament. As to keeping knots of rotten boroughs in the hands of individual proprietors, the Duke was not prepared to fight such a battle as that; which would have been quite opposed to all his

previous notions, as well as to his practice through life. He did not pretend to believe, that such a modification of the ministerial measure would maintain, as the old system had done, the monarchy and the great institutions of the country above the reach of assault. But he was confident that were it adopted, change would occur more slowly; and next to the assurance of safety, such as the old constitution afforded, he valued the power, by the arrangements of the new, of keeping danger, as long as possible, at a distance.

In pursuance of this plan, the Duke drew up with his own hand a new edition of the Reform Bill, which he submitted to the consideration of those among the opposition lords in whose judgment he reposed the greatest confidence. He wrote at the same time to a few friends in the country, telling them what had been done, and adding, that a meeting was to take place in the course of the week, in order to settle the plan of campaign in the committee. The following letters will better explain than any narrative of ours, the channel in which his Grace's thoughts ran at the moment:—

"May 1, 1832.

"My dear Lord Duke,—I have read your Grace's letter with profound sorrow, because its tone corresponds but too well with my own previous notions of the existing state of things. Perhaps you will say that I need not trouble you with a letter in order to say this, nor would I, except that it occurs to me that the very projects which you tell me are entertained, must prove eminently mischievous. The conservative peers may rely upon it, that the period when opposition might have been made to good purpose, has passed

away. By admitting the bill to a second reading, they have given up the principle; and matters of detail are not only not worth contending for, but the victories gained will all be productive of evil.

"Supposing that the King does not make peers, what will follow? You must pass the bill in some shape or another. You cannot, by any alterations in committee, render it materially less mischievous than it is. But you will alter it considerably, so considerably as to make it unpalatable to all parties. If passed in its integrity, I am sure that it will, sooner or later, disappoint its advocates; if passed with your mutilations, it will disappoint them also. But in the latter case you will be blamed for evils which are founded, not in your alterations, but in the bill itself.

"Of course, your Grace knows much better than I what to do; and, were I a peer, I should put myself implicitly into your hands; but my firm persuasion is, that your best policy now is to let the measure go through the third reading as it stands, and so to cast all the odium of its consequences on the shoulders of its authors."

"London, May 2, 1832.

"My dear ——, I have received your letter of the 1st instant, which affords a good deal of room for reflection. Is it true that we cannot do any good by mending the bill?

"The metropolitan representation is ruin. We may, possibly we shall, get rid of that. The democracy has, by the bill, a positive gain of sixty-four members. We may reduce those members very considerably. We may improve Schedules A and B. We may improve the

10*l.* franchise. All this would be important, if the measure is to be carried into execution.

"You say truly, that it will not give satisfaction. In our state of society nothing will give satisfaction. It would be best to remain as we are; but not being able to remain as we are, I think that we ought not to pay attention to the charges of responsibility for the real improvements, and the principle of conservatism, which we may introduce into the bill.

"I admit that nothing that we can do would make the bill safe. The country will have to pass through a severe crisis; but let us meet that crisis on the best grounds that we can, rather than leave all to chance,—or to what we know is as bad as possible."

In addition to the three main points to which we have already adverted, the conservative peers were prepared to struggle for certain alterations in detail, such as the substitution, in small boroughs, for the 10*l.* franchise, of a three years' residence in the same house, and for the raising in larger boroughs of the qualification from 10*l.* to 20*l.* or 25*l.* In every case, however, three years' occupation of the same tenement was to be required, and a receipt produced, showing that rates and taxes had been paid; by which means the system of registration could, it was hoped, be got rid of, as advantageous, not to the quiet and repose-loving citizen, but only to the bustling demagogue. But we need not pursue this part of our subject further. Lord Grey, though kept well in the dark as regarded the exact plan of operations which the leaders of the opposition were maturing, knew from Lord Wharncliffe and others, that he was to be opposed in committee, and took steps

to bring matters to just such an issue as would either defeat him utterly, and at once, or leave him perfect master of the field.

On the 7th of May parliament met, after the Easter holidays; and on the 8th Lord Grey moved, that the House of Lords do resolve itself into committee in order to consider, clause by clause, the bill to which, before the recess, it had afforded a second reading. It seemed by the terms in which this motion was made, that Lord Grey was desirous of conciliating the opposition; for instead of throwing all the condemned boroughs together, as had been done in the Commons, he proposed that the case of each should be considered separately, and the fullest justice done to it. Nor was the fact unnoticed on the other side of the House; indeed, Lord Lyndhurst expressed himself the more emboldened in consequence to move, that before proceeding to disfranchise any borough, the committee should come to a clear understanding in respect to the number of new places on which the right of sending members to parliament was to be conferred. But if Lord Lyndhurst, either for this or any other reason, really calculated on carrying his point, the result proved that his calculations were baseless. Ministers resisted the amendment with all the strength which they could muster; and when, on coming to a division, they found themselves in a minority of twenty-five, they declined to go on with their measure.

It is well known that Earl Grey and the Lord Chancellor having arrived at this determination, waited upon the King, and made a formal demand for such a creation of peers as would enable them to pass their bill unmutilated into law. The King refused to comply

with a request which he regarded as tantamount to the destruction of one branch of the legislature; whereupon the ministers resigned. It was an event for which the Conservative peers were not wholly unprepared, and therefore when his Majesty sent for Lord Lyndhurst to advise him, the advice wisely given was that his Majesty should put himself into the hands of the Duke of Wellington. We do not feel at liberty to transcribe the correspondence which followed, or to give more than a mere outline of its substance. But the purpose of both will be sufficiently served when we say, that the Duke's conduct on this, as on every similar occasion, was that of the high-minded and disinterested patriot. He saw the strait to which his sovereign was reduced, and resolved that no effort should be wanting on his part to set him free. He advised that a prime minister should be sought for in the House of Commons; and besought Mr. Peel to accept the post. He expressed himself willing to go as far, in the way of change, as it would be possible with safety to do; and undertook, on his own personal responsibility, to maintain order in the country. Mr. Peel, as we need scarcely stop to observe, refused to take any part in the new administration. Mr. Manners Sutton, the speaker of the House of Commons was, for a moment thought of. But communications from the city and from all parts of the country came in to say, that apart from Mr. Peel, there could be no confidence in any Conservative member of either House as First Lord of the Treasury, except in the Duke himself. What could his Grace do? If he also refused to serve, how was the authority of the crown to be maintained? and if at such a crisis, through any backwardness on his part, the crown fell

into the hands of men who had exhibited a settled determination to humble it as well as to destroy the House of Lords, rather than modify in ever so trifling a degree their pet measure, how should he ever be able again to hold up his head in society? It was not in the Duke's nature to hesitate. He accepted the charge of forming an administration, and day and night, for a fortnight together, he laboured to bring the work to a successful issue.

It was in the House of Commons that the great obstacle to the accomplishment of his Grace's purpose lay. As to the excitement out of doors, the Duke treated it with the indifference which it deserved. He held as nothing, both the ravings of the press and the threats of the political unions; and even Lord Milton's refusal to pay taxes, and the advice given to the country at large to follow his Lordship's example, went with him for very little. Not so the refusal of one after another of the Conservative leaders in the Lower House, to share with him the responsibilities of office. Mr. Goulburn and Mr. Herries both held back. Mr. Wynne doubted the possibility of forming a Conservative government at all. Sir George Murray and Sir Henry Hardinge were, indeed, at his Grace's disposal, and Mr. Alexander Baring, afterwards Lord Ashburton, gave a reluctant consent to become his Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr. Manners Sutton also, after a good deal of hesitation, agreed to take office. But except in these and a few instances besides, friends and foes seemed alike determined to stand aloof from him. Sir Robert Inglis, for example, could draw no line of distinction between public and private honour; he was unable, therefore, to see how statesmen who had

expressed themselves so strongly against reform, could, without a total loss of character to themselves and their party, accept office on the condition of bringing in a reform bill. Mr. Peel, though as much opposed as ever to the ministerial measure, would be no party to a fraud upon the people. He could not assist in the attempt to force a modification of the bill upon parliament. Meanwhile Lord Ebrington proposed and carried a vote to the effect, that the House of Commons could not repose confidence in any other than the administration which had just been removed from office. And to sum up all, Mr. Baring himself, after he had agreed to accept the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, did not hesitate to say in his place that it would be better for the country that those who had prepared the reform bill should carry it into law, and that whatever he might do in opposition to this course, he would do reluctantly.

We have alluded to the state of feeling out of doors. Nervous persons watched it with deep alarm; for mobs are always noisy, and when the functions of governments are suspended, they are, up to a certain point, dangerous. The Duke was not influenced by it for one moment; and yet he received at this time some curious letters, of which the following is a specimen:—

"Birmingham, May 13, 1832.

"My Lord,—I have the honour to inform your lordship, that as soon as the rumour arrived in this town of your lordship's appointment to be the prime minister of William the Fourth, five hundred of us simultaneously bound ourselves by a solemn engagement that we would prevent such an event; and that, if not preventing it, your continuance in office should be of short

duration, and *we have no doubt* but our endeavours shall be crowned with success.—We have the honour to be, your lordship's humble advisers, by order of the meeting,

"JOHN WM. THOMPSON."

To the same purport, though in a different spirit, a Mr. Anderton wrote, on the 14th, to say that the cry in Birmingham was for a 10*l.* franchise; and that, coerced by a large meeting which had taken place on the previous day, many respectable people had enrolled their names as members of the political union, while others were petitioning for the passing of the ministerial bill, though their own convictions and wishes were all against it.

Such remonstrances as these had no effect whatever in guiding the Duke's deliberations. But the defection of some of his oldest parliamentary friends, and the reluctance with which others consented to stand fast, forced upon him, in the end, the painful conviction that resistance to the stream was no longer practicable, except by recourse to measures which he was the last man in the empire to recommend, or, if recommended by others, to adopt.

The government had been in abeyance long enough, when, on the 15th of May, his Grace waited on the King, and informed his Majesty of what had passed in the House of Commons on the previous evening. He represented at the same time that he no longer entertained the hope of being able to form such an administration as could lead the House of Commons, or be able to conciliate public confidence. He, therefore, advised his Majesty to recall his former ministers; and

when his Majesty, of his own accord, proposed to write to Earl Grey, and to prevail upon him, if he could, to forego the desire for an extension of the peerage, and to introduce such amendments into his bill as might satisfy the more moderate of its opponents, his Grace offered no objection to the arrangement. The Duke was not, however, so sanguine as to anticipate any very favourable issue to the endeavour; and he was right. Lord Grey answered the King's letter immediately. He assured his sovereign that he would do what he could, though it would be impossible, after recent events, to deviate from any leading principle of the measure. A few alterations in details might be admitted, but beyond that the government could not go. As to the King's request that the demand for new peers should not be repeated, his lordship took no notice of it. The King was in his hands, and in the hands of the House of Commons, and of the political unions; and his Majesty was made to feel that he must do whatever might be desired of him.

There was but one line of action now open to the Duke, and he did not hesitate to enter upon it. The House of Lords must at every hazard be saved, by taking away from the minister all kind of pretext for swamping it with a large creation of new peers. At the interview which led to the reopening of communications between the King and Earl Grey, his Grace accordingly assured his Majesty that he would offer no farther opposition to the progress of the bill; indeed, that he would cease to attend in his place in parliament till after it should have passed into law. A like pledge was given by Lord Lyndhurst, and his Majesty breathed more freely. But all the Duke's difficulties

were not yet over. Peer after peer asked to be informed as to the course which he wished them to follow, while many besought him to join with them, at the last moment, in a measure which, at an earlier stage of the contest, he had condemned. To the latter proposal he replied, as he had replied before, that he could be no party to a resolution of the House which, besides amounting to an attack upon the prerogative, would probably bring on the very evil which it was intended to avert. To the former he stated, without reserve, his own intentions, assigning his reasons, but carefully avoiding to advise his friends. Meanwhile, a few of the more excitable of the party expressed strong disapprobation of all that he had done. Having defeated the Whigs in parliament, he ought, according to their view of the case, to have risked all, even the dangers of a dissolution, rather than suffer the reins of government to pass again into their hands. Even with such correspondents as these the Duke kept his temper, being satisfied to demonstrate to them the utter helplessness of their schemes, and the impossibility, without great danger to the public peace, of maintaining the state of suspense one day longer than he had maintained it.

On the other hand there were, among his friends, several who, adhering to the opinion that the battle had been lost at the second reading, wrote to congratulate his Grace on having escaped from the situation of peril and difficulty into which his chivalrous sense of duty to the crown had thrown him. One specimen of the manner in which he replied to these communications we subjoin, because it places in a clear light the motives which guided him in his management of those

delicate affairs, and the view which he took of the inevitable consequences of his failure.

"London, May 21, 1832.

"My dear ——, I have received your note of yesterday, for which I return my best thanks.

"I think that the mistake made by my friends is this. First, in not estimating the extent of the advantage of taking the thing out of the hands of the Radicals,—that is, in reality, of giving the country the benefit of some government. Secondly, in not estimating the farther advantage of diminishing the mischief of the Reform Bill; and particularly that of the Scotch Bill.

"In my opinion the advantage first mentioned more than compensates for all that would have been lost by our having anything to say to the Reform Bill.

"We shall have the bill in its worst form. In the meantime we have no government. God knows whether this country can have one again without passing through a crisis in its affairs.

"One advantage, however, has resulted from the transactions of the last week. The country perceives that the King is against what is doing."

We need not, however, pursue further the progress of affairs, which have long since become matters of history. After a brief adjournment, to afford time for the reconstruction of the cabinet, parliament again met, and on the 17th of May the Duke and Lord Lyndhurst entered into a full explanation of their conduct during the late recess. This done, they quitted the house, and a considerable body of noble lords following their

example, the arena was left clear for the ministers to disport upon at their pleasure. They took up the bill at the point where it had been dropped, and carried it, clause by clause, through committee; and in due course, after being read for the third time, it received the assent of the crown, and became law.

The mob had gained their end, and the joy of its members was, or seemed to be, as unbounded as their anxiety had of late been painful. But there was no admixture of generosity in it. Not satisfied with having triumphed over the opposition of the great Duke, they followed him with the most rancorous personal hatred, and escaped the everlasting disgrace of dipping their hands in his blood only by a sort of miracle. He took occasion on the 18th of June to visit the Mint, which he did on horseback, attended by a single groom. Some ill-disposed persons recognised him as he was returning, on Tower Hill, and he was instantly surrounded by a crowd, which grew more dense and more furious as he proceeded westward. The Duke's countenance underwent no change. He never put his horse out of a walk, and the groom rode after him as calm and self-possessed as his master. It was in vain that the city police, attracted by the throng, and the yells and cries which proceeded from it, endeavoured to gather round his Grace; they were pushed aside, and one fellow seizing the bridle of the Duke's horse, endeavoured to dismount him. But the groom, riding up, drove the man back, and a gentleman who was driving a phaeton, placed the carriage with great presence of mind close to the tail of the Duke's horse, and so broke the violence of the pressure from behind. Other well-dressed persons likewise came to the assist-

ance of the police, and his Grace was saved from personal outrage. At last they reached the end of Chancery Lane, up which the Duke turned, the crowd still following. He made for that gate which opens into Lincoln's Inn from Carey Street, where a good many gentlemen belonging to the establishment met him. They advanced upon the mob, drove them back, and his Grace rode into New Square. "Is there any other way out?" he asked, with a smile, of those by whom he was immediately surrounded; and being informed that there was, he quietly answered, "Then be so good as shut the gate." The gate was shut accordingly. The mob howled and shouted outside, and made preparation to burst it open. Meanwhile his Grace, attended by his groom, passed leisurely out into Lincoln's Inn Fields, and so reached Apsley House in safety.

CHAP. III.

THE DUKE AFTER THE REFORM BILL.—HIS GREAT INFLUENCE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.—FALL OF EARL GREY.—LORD MELBOURNE MINISTER.—HIS DISMISSAL.—SIR ROBERT PEEL'S GOVERNMENT.—THE DUKE CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.—HIS TENDERNESS OF HEART.

1832—1835.

THE opinion which the Duke had so often expressed, in regard to the inevitable consequences of the ministerial measure while it was in progress, underwent no change after the Reform Bill became law. He believed, and among his intimate friends never hesitated to say, that the foundations of England's greatness were sapped. There was, indeed, a moment when this conviction took such fast hold of him, that he thought seriously of withdrawing for ever from public life; and spoke, half in joke half in earnest, of making a provision against the evils to come, by investing a portion of his property in foreign securities. But the Duke was too much of a patriot to abandon the path of duty because of the increased difficulties with which he believed it to be beset. "The bill is now the law of the land," he used to say, "and as good citizens and loyal subjects we must conform ourselves to it. It has effected the greatest revolution that ever occurred without bloodshed, in any country; and we, or those who come after us, will be taught that fact, sooner or later. But in the meanwhile, it is our duty to keep the crisis

as long as we can at a distance, and to render the fall of our great institutions so gradual, that it shall do as little damage as possible, both to individuals and to the community." Accordingly, he set himself at once to collect and consolidate a party, which should act together, not for the purpose of wresting office from those who held it, but with a view to keep the powers of government, as far as might be, in the King's hands, and to hinder the King's ministers from being driven too rapidly along the declivity on which they had placed themselves. And this, in the House of Lords, he found to be, comparatively speaking, an easy task. His unswerving adherence to principle, during the late struggle; the temper and moderation which he exhibited on all occasions; his indefatigable industry, and the patience with which he bore with the whims and crotchets of men less wise than himself, had earned for him an amount of deference and respect, such as was probably never before yielded by the peers of England to any individual belonging to their order. He became, so to speak, perfect master of the upper House of Parliament. Perhaps no member of that august body ever had so many proxies entrusted to him; none certainly ever spoke with more authority, from his place. Not that the Duke either was, or pretended to be, an orator. His speaking, on the contrary, was to the last, laboured, his articulation indistinct; but somehow or other he contrived always to say the right thing at the right moment, and to clothe his sentiments in language which, if it could not claim to be considered artistically eloquent or even correct, was invariably forcible. The storm of unpopularity also which broke upon him during the reform struggle, soon passed away. In 1832, he was

insulted in the streets, and had the windows of his house broken. His very life was threatened in the manner described in the last chapter, and when he went on a certain occasion to preside at a Pitt dinner in the Freemasons' Tavern, he was obliged to drive thither armed with loaded pistols, and in a carriage of which the doors were fastened by a spring. In 1833, individuals began again to salute him respectfully as he passed, and here and there the old cry was raised, "There he goes, God bless him!" With all his apparent indifference to such matters, with all his real contempt for the sort of popularity, to obtain which men stoop to do mean and mischievous things, the Duke was touched by this evidence of the place which he had established for himself in the affections of the English people. "I'm getting up in the market," he observed, with a cheerful laugh, one day, as he dismounted from his horse after a run with the fox-hounds at Strathfield-saye. "What has happened; did the people cheer you?" "No, not that, but they did what was much better; every man in the field seemed anxious to be kind to me, by making way for me, and opening gates, and that sort of thing." The Duke was right. He rose in the market so rapidly, that before twelve months were over, all, except the men who had most deeply slandered and done him wrong, seemed to have forgotten that he ever opposed himself to their wishes. And of all the speeches delivered by him in the House of Lords, none was so frequently quoted with approval as that in which he declared, that had he refused to go to the King's assistance when the resignation of his Whig ministers left his Majesty surrounded by difficulties, "he would have been ashamed to show his face in the streets."

The Duke was little satisfied with the domestic policy of the government, and still less with its foreign relations. As he had disapproved of the measure of parliamentary reform, so he entertained no respect for corporate reform, which in due time followed. He regarded it as a scheme for converting every borough-town in Great Britain into a normal school of political agitation, and for transferring all political influence in Ireland, from the Protestant to the Roman Catholic portion of the community. He was less averse to the plan for effecting important changes in the constitution of the Established Church there, which Lord Grey brought forward. When the suppression of ten bishoprics was first proposed to him, he seemed, indeed, to be greatly startled by it. But finding that the primate approved of the arrangement, he gave it his support. Nothing could induce him, however, to consent to that clause in the bill, which provided, under certain circumstances, for the confiscation to secular purposes of Irish benefices; and he succeeded in throwing it out, when the bill came into committee in the Lords. But neither in this nor in any other instance, could his opposition be characterised as the result of rancour or party prejudice. He sat in the legislature not to embarrass, but as far as possible to assist the King's government; by preventing the King's ministers from passing bad measures when they brought them forward, and supporting them in their endeavour to pass good ones. The sober-minded portion of the community out of doors understood this policy, and came in time to respect him for it. To keen partisans on both sides, in either house of parliament, it was unintelligible, and they were unanimous in condemning it.

But perhaps it was with the foreign even more than with the domestic policy of the government that the Duke was dissatisfied; and no wonder. In every imaginable particular it contradicted, not only his own views of abstract right, but the confession of faith which Lord Grey had put forth when first appointed to office. The Belgian revolt was taken up, as his Grace had foretold that it would be; and in due time a French army laid siege to Antwerp, while a combined French and English fleet blockaded the Dutch coast, and made prize of Dutch vessels. The affairs of Portugal were next dealt with, in a manner as repugnant to his notions of political justice, as it was hurtful in his opinion to the national honour. Instead of realising the hope which, under the Duke's administration, his Majesty had been advised to express, of a speedy renewal of friendly relations between the two states, Lord Grey's cabinet sympathised openly with Don Pedro's daughter, and encouraged, if it did not provoke, a civil war in Portugal. Nor was this policy more distasteful to his Grace for its own sake, than because the manner in which it was followed up outraged his sense of what was due to the dignity of the British crown. To Don Pedro's appeal for armed assistance, no attention was paid. A British fleet was not sent to blockade the mouths of the Tagus and the Douro; a British army was not landed to restore the exiled queen to the throne; but individual Englishmen were permitted, and secretly encouraged, to take service with Don Pedro, and bands of condottieri made war upon Portugal in the name of its constitutional sovereign. It was in vain that the Duke protested against such a palpable infraction of the principle of non-

intervention. He succeeded, indeed, at last in forcing the ministers to recognise the purport of the foreign enlistment act, and a proclamation was issued, forbidding Englishmen to take service with either of the belligerents. But all the world knew that a proclamation so called forth was not meant to be attended to. The enlistment, therefore, went on as before; the mercenaries took possession of Oporto, and the native forces of the King of Portugal were encountered, on shore and at sea, by free lances gathered in from all the other nations of Europe. Nor was it the least curious feature in this transaction, that Englishmen were seen in high command on both sides of the quarrel. The English admiral, Napier, fought for Donna Maria; the English admiral, Sartorius, for Don Miguel. The former prevailed, and Don Miguel was driven from his throne.

Meanwhile Spain had become the theatre of still more serious complications. Ferdinand VII. died, leaving behind him a will, which, in defiance of the Salic law, acknowledged to be binding on the Spanish princes of the house of Bourbon for more than 120 years, settled the crown upon an infant daughter. In order to ensure the acceptance of this settlement, the queen-mother, to whom the powers of regent had been committed, gathered round her a knot of statesmen of the ultra-liberal school; and, hating as cordially as her husband had ever done free institutions, she proclaimed Donna Isabella and the constitution of 1812. Don Carlos, brother of the deceased monarch, protested against the arrangement, and claimed the throne as his own by right of succession. But his party was weak, or unprepared to act, probably because so eccentric a

move had never been anticipated; and being forced to escape out of Spain, he took refuge at the court of Don Miguel.

It is no part of our duty to describe in detail the events which followed. The British government, still professing to hold to the principle of non-intervention, threw the whole of its influence into the scale of the queen's party, and eventually, as is well known, sanctioned the enrolment of a British legion, to fight the queen's battles and receive the queen's pay. Of this measure, as well as of all that preceded it, including the quadruple alliance with its attendant inconveniences, the Duke never spoke except with sorrow and indignation. As to King Ferdinand himself, his Grace had but one opinion of him, which he took no pains to conceal. "I can conceive nothing more wicked," he used to say, "than the conduct of that man. He misgoverned his country as long as he lived, and at his death bequeathed to it a legacy of civil war; and we, forsooth, because Ferdinand's executors call themselves liberals, must help them to carry his bad purposes into effect. I dare say it is great weakness on my part to retain my interest in nations, which, God knows, never behaved too well to me; but it makes my heart bleed to see Spain and Portugal given over to anarchy, when a little firmness and moderation on the part of the English government might have prevented it."

If the Duke had been capable, which he was not, of seeking for comfort in public misfortune, or in contemplating the personal humiliations and distresses of those whom he regarded as the authors of it, he might have found it abundantly in the distracted state of the

Whig cabinet from 1832 to 1834. Torn by differences of opinion among themselves, and powerless in that House of Commons which they had called into existence, the ministers were unable to pursue any fixed line of policy, either at home or abroad. That they ever deliberately planned, or even contemplated such results from their great measure, no thinking person seriously believed, or believes. On the contrary, Lord Grey spoke as he felt, when, in reply to some taunt about revolution, he said: "That the time was coming when they would be blamed for increasing, instead of diminishing, the power of the aristocracy." And it is fair to assume that in so expressing himself, he expressed at the same time the opinions of those with whom he acted. But this only seems to prove that Lord Grey, and the members of his administration, failed to perceive the real tendency of their measure. Be this, however, as it may, there can be no doubt of the fact, that from the time in which their bill received the royal assent, they found themselves continually pressed forward against their will, and continually baffled in their endeavours to resist the pressure. This was strikingly shown in the results of their Irish policy, and in the reception awarded to it by those whom it was intended to conciliate. The reductions which they had effected in the Irish Church establishment, so far from allaying agitation, appeared only to render it more fierce. Mr. O'Connell, and the leading members of the Romish hierarchy, declared war against the payment of tithes in any shape, or on any pretence whatever. The Irish Protestant Dissenters demanded that the confiscation clause, thrown out by the House of Lords, should be restored, and so sharp were the con-

troversies that arose on this subject in the cabinet itself, that Lord Stanley, Sir James Graham, the Duke of Richmond, and the Earl of Ripon, sent in their resignations. By and by, fresh difficulties presented themselves, in regard to the insertion, in a new coercion bill, of a clause which had stood in the old act, against meetings for political purposes in Ireland. Mr. O'Connell, not without some show of reason, complained that he had been deceived in this matter. He brought the subject before the House of Commons, and the explanations which followed proved so damaging to ministers, that Lord Althorpe refused to remain longer in office. But Lord Althorpe was, in the estimation of Earl Grey, the main prop of the cabinet, and the latter nobleman, having failed to persuade his colleague to withdraw his resignation, resigned also. Meanwhile, the King had become very weary of his Whig advisers. The movement party, also, impatient for further progress, ceased to repose confidence in them. For they had called into being influences which they found themselves unable to direct, and the management of the state machine passed out of their hands. Yet some good measures were either carried or put in train by them. Such were the abolition of slavery throughout the empire; the enactment of a new body of poor laws; and the law for shortening the labour of infants in factories. Their bill, renewing the East India Company's charter, was a measure of more doubtful excellence, depriving that body, as it did, of the monopoly of the tea trade, and commuting the profits of its trade with India itself for an annuity of 630,000*l*. The Duke of Wellington, at all events, disapproved of it, because, in his opinion, it was neither just nor politic; and predicting frequent

wars with the Chinese empire as the inevitable result, he left a protest against it on the records of the House of Lords.

Startling as Lord Grey's resignation seemed on the first blush to be, it produced, in point of fact, little change in the *personnel* of the administration; and with only a slight modification on the side of liberalism, none whatever in its general principles of action. There were those, indeed, who did not scruple to assert that all which led up to that climax had been arranged beforehand. For Lord Grey was no sooner out of office than Lord Althorpe quietly resumed his place at the Exchequer. Lord Melbourne removed, at the same time, from the Home Office to the Treasury; while five noblemen and gentlemen of advanced views filled up the vacancies in the cabinet; and the administration went on as before. The result was, that the Irish Tithe act was again brought forward, and an amendment moved by Mr. O'Connell, to the effect that the incumbents should receive for the future only 12*s.* in the pound, was carried in the House of Commons. This the Lords threw out; but they were more compliant in their dealings with the Coercion act, which passed denuded of the clause to which Mr. O'Connell had objected. Against that omission the Duke recorded his protest, as he had done against the India Bill. But he did not consider it necessary, in either case, to fight the battle to a division, because the time was not, in his opinion, come for trying the strength of parties, or of profiting by victory, should it be achieved. Perhaps it would have been well had similar views been entertained in higher quarters; but such proved not to be the case.

Parliament was prorogued on the 15th of August,

1834. The Duke, according to his usual custom, withdrew into the country; and the King retired for air and repose to Brighton. As to his Majesty's ministers, some of them remained at their posts, while others went forth to be feasted in the provinces, and, with greater candour than wisdom, to speak in public one against the other. This did not tend to restore to them the confidence of that section of the people on whom they mainly depended; and the press itself, which had formerly written them up, seemed well disposed to write them down. Sanguine politicians on the Tory side began to talk, in consequence, of reaction, and of a return to old principles of government in Church and State. They were much mistaken. The ministers ceased to be popular only because they ceased to be revolutionary. It was not a return to old usages, but a more rapid progress in the opposite direction, that the press and the political unions desired.

Such was the state of public feeling when the death of Earl Spencer, by removing Lord Althorpe to the House of Lords, occasioned a vacancy in the chancellorship of the Exchequer and in the leadership of the House of Commons. Lord Melbourne waited upon the King, and proposed that Lord John Russell should become Lord Althorpe's successor. But to his no small astonishment, the sovereign informed him that he intended to ask the advice of the Duke of Wellington on that subject. We need not stop to give even an outline of his Majesty's well-known reasons for taking that step. Suffice it to state that the same night, (the 14th of November,) a letter was despatched to the Duke, and that on the following day his Grace arrived at the palace to receive his Majesty's commands.

The Duke, though he neither anticipated nor desired so sudden a summons, had felt for some time back that sooner or later it must come. He had communicated confidentially with Sir Robert Peel upon the subject, and prepared him to accept office as prime minister whenever a vacancy should occur. But Sir Robert, more cautious, perhaps a better judge than his Grace of the real state of public opinion, put the project from him; and, immediately on the prorogation of parliament, set out with his family for Rome. A man of ordinary talent would have been at a loss how to act under such circumstances. Either he would have accepted for himself the task of forming an administration, and left a prominent place in it for his absent friend; or if, like the Duke, he conceived that, under existing circumstances, the prime minister ought to be in the House of Commons, he would have advised his sovereign to leave matters as they were till Sir Robert Peel could be recalled. The Duke adopted neither alternative. He at once, indeed, declined to form a government of his own. He advised, and gave his reasons for advising, that Sir Robert Peel should be created first lord of the treasury, and left free to fill up not only the cabinet, but all subordinate places in the administration. And when the King raised the obvious objection, that this course could not be followed with Sir Robert at a distance, he met the difficulty by proposing arrangements as bold as they were novel. Since his Majesty was bent on changing his ministers at once, and had, indeed, announced to the head of the cabinet his purpose of doing so, the Duke was ready to take charge of the vessel of the state, and so to manage matters that public business should suffer no interruption till a

regular government could be formed. We much regret that considerations of delicacy to others hinder us from giving the account of all that followed in the Duke's own words. But the truths of history are sufficiently served when we state—that placing the great seal in commission, with Lord Lyndhurst, the chief baron, as chief commissioner—he himself was sworn in as first lord of the treasury and secretary of state for the home department. Both arrangements were, and were understood to be, temporary only; indeed, the Duke, when pressed by the King to complete his cabinet, reserving only the premier's place for Peel, declined to do so, for "I thought nothing could be more unfair than to call upon you (Sir Robert Peel) to put yourself at the head of a government which another individual had formed."

The first step taken by the Duke, after his conference with the King, was to despatch Mr. Hudson in post haste to Rome, and to write by him to Sir Robert Peel, giving as full an account as time would allow of the state of public affairs, and of the part which Peel himself was expected to play in them. Other messengers followed day after day, each conveying what may be called a report of proceedings; and it is creditable to their intelligence, as well as to the skill of the guidance under which they acted, that almost all contrived to encounter Sir Robert, at one stage or another, on his homeward progress. Meanwhile Lord Melbourne and his colleagues gave up their seals of office, not, as may well be believed, in the best possible humour; and on the 17th of November the Duke kissed hands. And then began, for his Grace, such a season of activity as even he, busy as his life had been, never encountered before. We need scarcely stop to explain, that by the

usage of this country one secretary of state has the right of access to the cabinets and portfolios of all the rest, though, in point of fact, these high functionaries rarely interfere with the details of each other's duties. His Grace had been sworn in as home secretary, because to the home secretary it belongs to maintain the tranquillity of the country, and to enforce obedience to the laws. But in passing, as he daily did, from the Home to the Foreign Office, and from the Foreign Office to the Colonial, he violated no constitutional law; and he was equally in his right place, whether he sat to transact business in the Treasury, or read Indian despatches, or dictated the replies to them in Cannon Row. Nor was this all. He organised a temporary Treasury board, and made every preparation for what he believed to be inevitable, a dissolution of parliament and an appeal to the country. And all this with such regularity and precision that each successive day saw its tale of business complete, without leaving the slightest arrear to be dealt with on the morrow.

It is said that, on more than one occasion, his Grace very much surprised the ministers from foreign courts by appointing meetings with them, at eight, and even at seven o'clock in the morning. It is certain that he never knew an idle hour himself, except while he slept. He had always been remarkable, among other things, for his powers of abstinence, often, when much engaged, going without food from breakfast on one day to breakfast on the day following. Even breakfast was, with him, a very brief affair, while the whole pressure of the state was upon him. Yet his spirits were excellent, his health good, and his letters to Sir Robert Peel all breathe a tone of strong confidence in regard to the

issue. His friends were in the highest state of delighted excitement, and though here and there an attempt was made to rouse the mob against him, the mob refused to stir. The truth is, that people were taken so completely by surprise, that they did not know what to say or how to act; and that the press itself, though it censured the arrangement as unconstitutional, could not refuse either its meed of praise to his courage, or its joke at the ludicrous position into which the ex-government was thrown. Here and there indeed an ungenerous attempt was made to throw the blame of the crisis upon the Queen. But on the whole, England seemed satisfied with the anomalous state into which the government had fallen; and waited very patiently till the moment came for bringing things back to their normal condition.

Meanwhile Sir Robert Peel was prosecuting his homeward journey with all speed. He received the first announcement of the King's wishes late in the evening of the 25th of November, and soon after midnight set out on his return to England. He travelled by Turin and Geneva, over roads which at that season were execrable; and reaching Lyons on the night of the 3rd of December, pushed forward at once to Paris. He arrived in London early in the morning of the 9th, and the same day, about 11 A. M., called upon the Duke at Apsley House. They proceeded together to St. James's Palace, where they were graciously received by the King, and Sir Robert, after kissing hands, was sworn in as First Lord of the Treasury.

And now the real difficulties of a Conservative administration began. It had been settled already, that any attempt to go on with the present House of Com-

mons would be idle. Sir Robert dissented from that view of the case, and perhaps he was right; but it was too late. Probably he would have found the existing house unmanageable enough; but even a defeat on some measure of acknowledged national importance would have been better than no contest with the existing house at all; for the power of dissolving, with which the King armed him, could have been exercised at any moment. As matters stood now, there was no alternative, except to complete the ministerial arrangements with as little delay as possible, and to dissolve. The ministerial arrangements were soon completed, and then the new premier bethought him of some channel through which to set forth the principles of policy which he had accepted office to maintain. Had parliament been sitting, these would have doubtless been enunciated from his place in the House of Commons. As matters stood, he embraced the opportunity of the dissolution, to embody them in a letter, which he addressed to the electors of Tamworth. It was a very forcible and clever manifesto, which appealed, and was intended to appeal, to moderate men, of all shades of opinion. Accepting the Reform Bill, as "a final and irrevocable settlement of a great constitutional question," the writer denounced the notion, that, "by adopting the spirit of that bill, we are to live in a perpetual vortex of agitation;" or that "public men can only support themselves in public estimation by adopting every popular impression of the day; by promising the instant remedy of anything, which anybody may call an abuse, and by abandoning altogether that great end of government, more powerful than either law or reason, the respect for ancient rights, and the

deference for prescriptive authority." Resting upon these principles, he professed himself ready to deal, in a spirit of perfect fairness, with every question which might come before him; with corporation reform; with church rates; with the claims of dissenters to be admitted to degrees in the universities; and with church reform, both in England and Ireland. On one point alone he gave notice that his mind was made up. He would never consent to alienate the property of the church, upon any pretext, or under any circumstances, from the church itself; though he was perfectly ready to consider, upon its own merits, the question of re-distribution.

This letter or manifesto was upon the whole well received, and Sir Robert followed it up by making overtures to Lord Stanley and Sir James Graham; which, however, they declined to entertain. He then went to the country, and his appeal was responded to, so far, that the combined return from England and Scotland gave him a majority. Ireland, however, was in the hands of Mr. O'Connell, whom the ex-ministers hastened to conciliate, and who agreed to support them on his own terms. The consequence was that when the Houses met, ministers sustained a defeat in the choice of a speaker, and that having fought from the outset what they felt to be a losing battle, in the end they lost it.

The part assigned to the Duke of Wellington in the new administration was that of foreign secretary. It was an arrangement which could not fail to be agreeable to all the old allies of England, and to which the new, including Louis Philippe in that category, had no just reason to object. But it was viewed with real or pretended distrust by the opposition, which, after

assailing the Duke on account of his late monopoly of power, a move which neither added to their strength, nor raised them in public estimation, began both in Parliament and out of it to deprecate any change in the relations of England with foreign states. There was not so much as the shadow of an excuse for the insinuations thus thrown out. The Duke regulated his public conduct then, as he always did, by what he felt to be the requirements of public duty. He found England committed to certain treaties, and he adhered to them. However little he might have been inclined to enter into these engagements when first proposed, he never for a moment thought of breaking through them now that they were completed. Even the quadruple alliance, much as he disapproved both of its object and of the means employed to secure it, he felt himself bound to maintain, and he maintained it rigidly.

The history of Sir Robert Peel's government in 1835 is well known. It administered the affairs of the country just long enough to give evidence of what might have been expected from it, had not its days been cut short. Sir Robert brought in bills for the commutation of tithes in England, for a redistribution of the English dioceses, for the equalisation of the episcopal incomes, and for the application to the increase of small benefices of the revenues arising out of certain church dignities, which he proposed either to cut down or wholly to suppress. It is but fair to all concerned, if we stop to observe, that this measure of church reform was not, in all its details, cordially approved by the Duke of Wellington. His Grace could not, indeed, object, nor did he object to the principle of an arrangement recommended by a com-

mission, to the appointment of which he had himself been a party, and of which the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of London, and other prelates were members. But he would have been better pleased with its details, had arrangements been made for connecting the claims of particular localities for relief with the sources whence relief was to come; and for managing the funds of the suppressed canonries by a machinery less expensive and complicated than that which the bill called into existence. The Duke's rule of life, however, as a public man, had always been fidelity to the cabinet of which he was a member; and on the present, as on other occasions, he surrendered his own opinion, and acted cordially with the head of the administration.

In all these particulars, and in many more, the new ministry carried public opinion along with it, and could afford to bear, not only its defeat in the choice of a speaker, but the adverse decision at which the House of Commons arrived, on the subject of an address in reply to the King's speech. Beyond this, however, Sir Robert Peel conceived that he would not be justified in venturing. Probably he was right. The King's minister in 1835 did not stand towards the people in the same relation in which the King's minister stood half a century before. Mr. Pitt took the lead in a House of Commons, which was quite as hostile to him then, as the present House was to Sir Robert Peel; and by patient and resolute endurance he overcame its hostility. But Mr. Pitt had what Sir Robert had not, the power of a dissolution in his hands, and a constituency to fall back upon which was neither fresh from the excitement of a recent triumph, nor prejudiced against the statesmen over whom the triumph had been achieved. When

therefore, on the 30th of March, Lord John Russell moved, "That the House do resolve itself into a committee of the whole House, to consider the temporalities of the church of Ireland, with a view of applying any surplus not required for the spiritual care of its members, to the general education of all classes of the people, without distinction of religious persuasion," Sir Robert saw that he was about to fight, not for victory only, but for existence. A debate ensued, which was conducted on both sides with great ability, if not always with temper. But the opposition proved too strong. At four in the morning on the 7th of April, Lord John's motion was carried by a majority of 33, and on the following day the ministers sent in their resignation.

From that moment down to the day of his death, the Duke of Wellington never again took charge of any of the great civil departments of the state. A politician he continued to be,—it was impossible that he should cease to be a politician to the last—but his line was henceforth that, rather of a guide and counsellor to the nation at large, than of the busy leader of a party struggling for power. There never occurred a difficulty at home or abroad, on which he was not consulted by the minister of the day, whosoever he might be. The crown was never in a strait because of the mistakes of its servants, or through disagreements, personal or otherwise in the cabinet, that he was not sent for to advise in the case. The crown and the people appeared alike to have confidence in his judgment, and he became more than ever an object of veneration to all classes of society.

One of the first and most remarkable proofs of the

universal respect in which he was held, was evinced about this time, by his elevation to the dignity of Chancellor of the University of Oxford. On the 12th of January, 1834, Lord Grenville died; and, contrary to all precedent, a proposal was made in the Senate to offer to the Duke of Wellington the vacant Chancellorship. His Grace had no claim to the distinction on the ground of scholarship, or even of patronage extended to scholars. He was totally unconnected with the University itself, except so far as that, simultaneously with Marshal Blücher, and the late sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, he had received from it in 1814 the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws. But the heads of houses knew that they had fallen upon perilous times; and that the university stood more in need of a chancellor who should be able, as a statesman, to defend it, than of one who, by his writings or otherwise, might add to its renown as a nursery of learning. As was to be expected, the leaders of the Opposition and their organs of the press, endeavoured to throw ridicule upon the whole proceeding. Among others, a distinguished but eccentric Irish prelate waited officially upon the lord-lieutenant, and begged that he might be appointed to a troop of dragoons; and when asked to give a reason for so curious a request, replied: "Your Excellency must know that I have as good a right to be made a captain of cavalry, as the Duke of Wellington, your brother, has to become chancellor of the University of Oxford." Oxford, however, had made up her mind what to do, and went gallantly through with her purpose. The installation, which took place on the 9th of June, was one of the most brilliant affairs that had ever been witnessed; and the enthusiasm of the under-

graduates, seldom under much control, proved quite overwhelming. "I perfectly understand now," observed the Duke, when he met his friends later in the autumn at Walmer, "how revolutions are got up in such places as the *École Militaire* in Paris, and in Warsaw." "The under-graduates were very boisterous, were they?" "Boisterous! You never saw anything like it in your life! Let these boys loose in the state in which I saw them, and give them a political object to carry, and they would revolutionise any nation under the sun."

It is not to be supposed that the Duke, successful as he was in great affairs, passed through life without his own share of private and domestic trials. Perhaps the very turn of his mind, and the constant dedication of his energies to the public service, in some degree unfitted him for the quiet enjoyment of domestic life. Perhaps, as often happens, where blame is scarcely attributable to either party, he was ill-matched in his domestic relations. Be this as it may, it would be idle to conceal the fact, that the Duke's home, properly so called, was never a sunny one. It is certain that his confidence was much more largely given out of the domestic circle than within it; and for this reason, even when not abused, it scarcely filled up the measure of his aspirations. In moments of despondency, of which the crowd saw nothing, he has been heard to say, "There is nothing in this world worth living for." Yet no man felt more acutely than he, the pang of severance from those to whom any share of his affections was given. From his mother, as we have elsewhere explained, he experienced in youth and early manhood little else than neglect. As he grew into fame, pride

with her expanded into affection ; and when she died, at the advanced age of ninety-six, he mourned for her with sincere sorrow. So also the death of the Duchess, on the 22nd of April, 1831, touched him keenly. They had seen comparatively little of each other for years. There was no natural congeniality between them in tastes, habits, or pursuits ; and, unfortunately for both, the Duchess, while she doated on her husband, never appears to have thought it necessary to adapt her own views of things to his. Hence alienation stole in, which there were no opportunities of living down, though it never resulted in a formal separation. But during her last illness, he was indefatigable in his attentions to her ; and when she ceased to breathe, he evinced great emotion. She was buried at Strathfieldsaye, the Duke following her to the grave ; indeed, he descended into the vault after her remains had been deposited there, and remained some time alone with them. Other deaths which occurred no great while afterwards, and among them that of his trusted friend Mrs. Arbuthnot, made also a deep impression upon him. For a more tender heart than his never beat in human bosom, though he put constant restraint upon himself to hide his feelings; and, except on such occasions as these, generally succeeded.

CHAP. IV.

DEATH OF WILLIAM IV.—ACCESSION OF QUEEN VICTORIA.—THE DUKE IN AND OUT OF PARLIAMENT.—THE DUKE'S GREAT AFFECTION FOR HER MAJESTY.—HIS PROCEEDINGS AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.—THE CORN-LAW QUESTION.

1837–46.

On the 20th of June, 1837, died William IV., leaving the vacant throne to be filled by her present most gracious Majesty, then barely of age to exercise the functions of royalty. No change was thereby effected either in the state of political parties in parliament, or in the position of the Duke of Wellington in connection with them. Her Majesty retained in office the minister whom she found at the head of affairs, and the Duke took his seat, as heretofore, on the opposition benches in the House of Lords. But the same wise discretion which had characterised his proceedings ever since the Reform Bill passed into law characterised them still. He supported every measure, no matter by whom proposed, which he believed to be deserving of support. He resisted every proposition, the tendency of which he believed to be mischievous. He would be no party to a factious move, however sure the prospect of success might be; and he restrained his own friends, over and over again, from pushing fair—though perhaps unseasonable contests—to an extremity. The honour of the crown, the safety and well-being of the country, were the sole objects which he appeared to

keep in view; and perhaps his prudent reserve exercised as great an influence in securing them, as the wisdom of the cabinet on the one hand, and the zeal and activity in criticising its policy among opposition statesmen on the other.

His Grace's public duties, apart from those of a peer of parliament, were at this time such as devolved upon him from his connection with Hampshire, as Lord Lieutenant of the county; with the Cinque Ports, as Lord Warden; with the Tower of London, as Constable; and with the University of Oxford, as its Chancellor. Of the University of Oxford his care was sleepless, without being troublesome. It was a season of difficulty, if not of danger, for the demand for change was incessant, and this, so far as it appeared to him unjust or unreasonable, he resisted strenuously. It is proper to add, that he seldom acted on such occasions without previous consultation with those whose knowledge of the subject could not fail to be more extensive than his own, and that before making up his mind to any course of proceeding, he heard, and carefully considered every thing that could be said, as well against as for it. Hence, after checking repeated attempts to innovate upon the rights both of the University and of particular colleges, he assented to that commission of inquiry, from the report of which have emanated changes acceptable to all; to some because they were not undertaken on compulsion, to others, because in themselves they are changes for the better.

Of the Duke's attention to the business of the Cinque Ports, it is impossible to speak too highly. No court of Lode-manage was ever held during his periodical visits to Walmer, without his presiding over its delibera-

tions; and often, if the occasion seemed to require, he would travel from London, and even from Strathfield-saye to Dover, on purpose to take part in them. For it was one of his maxims, that whatever charge a man undertakes, he is bound, whether the business in hand relate to great or small matters, to treat it as if it were important. And in his estimation few matters could be more important, than to provide competent pilots for the navigation of the Channel, and to maintain among them when appointed strict discipline. He was, as is well known, the last of those functionaries permitted to exercise powers which took their rise in times gone by, when Sandwich was an important naval station, and the defence of the coast, from the North Foreland to Hastings, depended mainly upon the inhabitants of the towns which lie between them. But it cannot be said in this, as in most other cases of the kind, that an institution once vigorous expired at last of its own innate corruption. The pilotage of the Channel was never so carefully attended to; the magistrates within the Cinque Ports' jurisdiction were never so judiciously selected, as just before the right of superintendence and selection passed from the Lord Warden for ever.

The same reforming hand which effected so much at Dover and along the Kentish coast, was felt in the Tower also. Hitherto the Constables of that fortress had been in the habit of disposing by sale of warder's places, whilst all offices superior to that of warder were dispensed, worthily or not, under the pressure of political or private influence. The Duke put an end to all this. Wardenships under him became prizes to which meritorious non-commissioned officers might aspire;

and higher posts were given to gentlemen who had done good service as commissioned officers in the field. One of the most deserving of these was the late Colonel Gurwood, a distinguished veteran of the Peninsula and of Waterloo, to whom the world is indebted for the greatest military work which has appeared in any age or in any country. His compilation of the despatches of the subject of this memoir was begun in 1835, when Gurwood held a staff-appointment at Portsmouth; and it arose out of a previous publication—a collected edition of his Grace's general orders. In the progress of both works the Duke took a very lively interest, himself reading the proof sheets, and striking out with his own hand every sentence, and indeed every word which was likely to give unnecessary pain to individuals. It was due to the editor of such works that the country should mark its sense of the services which he had rendered to posterity, and the Duke, as representing the country, bestowed upon him, when it fell vacant, the lieutenancy of the Tower, which, with the honorary dignity of squire to his Grace, Gurwood held to the day of his death.

Equally assiduous in his habits as Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire, the Duke neglected no application that was made to him, and received at Strathfieldsaye every body who came to him on public business. He made it a point also to break off from all demands upon his time elsewhere, in order that he might be at home to receive and entertain the judges when they arrived in the county on circuit. At the bottom of this practice, as of many others to which the Duke was addicted, lay that which seems to have been the grand principle of his life. The judges represented the sovereign; and no

claim of society, no call even of duty, was strong enough to hinder him from paying to them the same marks of respect which his loyalty would have induced him to pay to the sovereign, had she been personally present.

Of the relation in which his Grace stood towards the royal lady who now happily fills the throne of these realms, it is scarcely necessary to speak. They were of the most intimate and even affectionate nature.

By every possible token of public esteem and private confidence her Majesty's regard for her great subject was shown; while the Duke's loyalty to the sovereign was, in her Majesty's case, mixed up with such feelings as animate an aged and experienced parent towards a child whom he not only loves but respects. He remained, moreover, under every change of circumstances, on the best terms, personally, with her constitutional advisers. The consequence was that Lord Melbourne, appreciating aright the perfect integrity of his Grace's character, expressed neither jealousy nor surprise when his royal mistress desired from time to time to have the benefit of the Duke's opinion; and took in excellent part the avowal, that her Majesty considered the Duke of Wellington to be not only the greatest but the best and wisest of her subjects. All this soon got abroad, and tended more and more to replace him in the affections of the English people, who, though like the natives of other free states, they are not always under the guidance of judgment and moderation, seldom prove permanently ungrateful to those who have served them faithfully.

The ceremony of her Majesty's coronation took place in 1838. All the crowned heads of Europe sent special

ambassadors to represent them on that occasion — Louis Philippe selecting for the service one of the ablest of the Duke's former opponents, Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia. Marshal Soult was received wherever he showed himself in London with such a burst of enthusiasm as surprised as much as it delighted the old warrior; and the Duke, in particular, embraced every opportunity of treating him with marked kindness and urbanity. A pleasant sight it was to see these two aged rivals in arms seated amicably together; and very gratifying to listen to the terms in which, on fitting occasions, they spoke one of the other. This was especially the case at the Mansion House, when, in reply to a toast which coupled their names as subjects of commendation together, the Duke alluded to Soult in language which seemed to stir every generous feeling in the French marshal's heart. It called forth from him expressions of the warmest admiration and esteem for the English army and its illustrious commander, which were of course applauded to the echo by all who heard them, and were doubtless the reflex of the speaker's honest convictions. Marshal Soult, during his stay in London, was a frequent visitor at Apsley House, and made there the acquaintance of many officers with whose names the events of the Peninsular war had rendered him familiar. Among others, the late Lord Hill was presented to him, and was greeted in these words, "What! have I found you at last? You, whom I followed so long without ever being able to overtake you." This was said in allusion to Hill's masterly retreat from Madrid to Alba de Tormes, after the failure before Burgos. It was meant as a compliment to the vigilance and activity of the English general, and, as a

compliment Lord Hill, the best-hearted and gentlest of living men, accepted it.

Though meeting Lord Melbourne in private on friendly terms, and ever ready to advise when consulted on points which might be referred to him, the Duke never, as a public man, compromised his own principles, or affected to approve, far less to support, measures which contradicted them. He condemned, on all fitting occasions, the policy of the government in conniving at the growth of Mr. O'Connell's influence in Ireland, and denounced its truckling to Chartist agitators in England and to the chiefs of the democratic party in the Canadas. Its relations with foreign states, though less complicated than they had been, were still, according to his view of such matters, unsatisfactory; and with the general treatment of the colonies, and especially of the West Indies, he was by no means pleased. But while he took care to express himself freely on these subjects, he carefully avoided bringing on premature divisions; and lost no opportunity of urging his supporters in the House of Lords to bide their time. That, however, which the leaders of the opposition would have willingly deferred, the ministers themselves at length precipitated. Lord Melbourne, unable to cope with the question of the Corn Laws, and with the absolute anarchy into which Ireland was falling, took advantage of a defeat on the suspension of the constitution of Jamaica to send in his resignation. This was in 1839, and proved to be a step for which no one in or out of parliament was prepared. The Queen, young and without experience, could not but feel the loss of a minister who had been, so to speak, her first instructor in public affairs; while the Duke,

however instinctively adverse to Whig government, was not disposed, if the step could be avoided, to sanction a change for which he believed that the public mind was scarcely ripe. Being sent for by her Majesty, however, he at once obeyed the summons, and recommended that she should take counsel with Sir Robert Peel. From the complication of mistakes which arose out of that interview, it is not worth while to raise the veil which time has thrown over them. There was no difficulty in allotting the great offices of state to individuals recommended by the future minister; but when the royal household came to be touched misunderstandings forthwith arose. We need not go farther into the discussion of these matters than to state, that the minister, in making one demand, was understood to make another; and that her Majesty refusing to submit to what had been represented to her as an unprecedented outrage on her personal dignity, Sir Robert Peel felt that his commission was at an end. The result was, that after an interregnum of less than a week, Lord Melbourne returned to office, and that for two years more the affairs of the country were conducted as they had previously been.

The part played by the Duke in these transactions was necessarily a subordinate one. That he approved of every step taken by Sir Robert Peel is beyond dispute. It is equally certain that he believed the Queen's confiding nature to have been imposed upon, and his own and Sir Robert Peel's intentions in the matter misrepresented; yet he would have held his peace on both subjects, even in the House of Lords, had not Lord Melbourne, in a speech explanatory of his own conduct, compelled his Grace to break silence. The Duke then

showed that Sir Robert Peel had taken no single step, except with his and Lord Lyndhurst's concurrence. After which he proceeded to say, "I confess that it appeared to me impossible that any set of men should take charge of her Majesty's government, without having the usual influence and control over the royal household; that influence and control which their immediate predecessors had exercised before them. As the royal household was formed by their immediate predecessors in office, the possession of that influence and that control over it appeared to me to be especially necessary to let the public see that the ministers who were about to enter upon office, possessed the entire confidence of her Majesty." His Grace then alluded shortly, but sharply, to the interference by a former Whig government with the household of the queen consort; and after expressing himself in terms at once delicate and affectionate towards the sovereign, concluded in these words: "My lords, I cannot but think, that the principles on which we proposed to act with respect to the ladies of the bed-chamber, in the case of a queen regnant, were the correct principles. The public will not believe that the Queen holds no political conversation with those ladies, and that political influence is not exercised by them, particularly considering who those persons are who hold such situations.* I believe the history of this country affords numberless instances in which secret and improper influence has been exercised by means of such conversations. I have, my lords, a somewhat strong

* Two of the ladies, the only two indeed whom the Duke and Sir Robert Peel were anxious to remove, happened to be near relatives of two of the ministers whom they were about to supersede.

opinion on this subject. I have unworthily filled the office which the noble viscount now so worthily holds, and I must say that I have felt the inconvenience of anomalous influence, not exercised, perhaps, by ladies, but an anomalous influence undoubtedly of this description, and exerted simply in conversations; and I will tell the noble viscount, that the country is at this moment suffering some inconvenience from the exercise of that very secret influence. My lords, I believe I have gone further into principles upon this subject than may, perhaps, suit the taste of the noble viscount, but this I must say, that at the same time we claimed the control of the royal household, and would not have proposed to her Majesty to make any arrangements which would have been disagreeable to her, I felt it was absolutely impossible for me, under the circumstances of the present moment, to undertake any share in the government of the country without that proof of her Majesty's confidence."

So ended an affair which was certainly not brought on by any effort on the part of the Duke or of Sir Robert Peel. Lord Melbourne's administration resumed its place, and retained it till the summer of 1841. It had lost, however, the confidence not only of the House of Commons but of the nation, and it managed from year to year to exhibit a growing increase of the expenditure over the revenues of the country. In divisions likewise, its majorities, which had never been large, became continually smaller, till in the end, on a direct vote of want of confidence, it was left in a minority. There remained now only the alternative between resignation and a dissolution, and the latter being preferred, it resulted in a failure. When the new parliament met

on the 19th of August, an amendment was moved to the address in both Houses, which the opposition carried in the Lords by 168 to 96 votes; in the Commons by 360 to 269. Then followed, as a matter of course, the retirement of Lord Melbourne and his colleagues, and the assumption of office by Sir Robert Peel, with full powers to dispense the patronage of the crown, whether in the household or elsewhere, as might appear to him best suited to promote the public service.

Though he accepted a seat in the new cabinet, the Duke of Wellington declined to take charge of any special department of the state. It was an arrangement dictated entirely by the principle of self-abnegation, which was stronger, perhaps, in his Grace than in any public man of his age; and though it placed him, under a constitutional government, in a somewhat anomalous position, it had its advantages too, of which the public was not slow in becoming sensible. It left him full leisure to discuss every question, both of home and foreign policy, without imposing upon him the labour of attending to the details of administration; while it placed him towards both the people and the crown, in the position of an independent and therefore unprejudiced adviser. No great while elapsed, however, ere the anomaly, if such it deserved to be called, passed away. In 1842 Lord Hill died, and the command of the army, which thereby became vacant, was at once pressed upon his Grace. Moreover, in order to avert the risk of his again resigning it, a patent of office was made out in his favour and presented to him. It is curious to contrast the position of the Duke of Wellington, in this as well as in other stages of his career, with that of his illustrious predecessor in glory

and in a nation's caprices, John Duke of Marlborough. The latter, when driven into exile, was charged, among many other delinquencies, with having plotted to obtain from Queen Anne an appointment by patent to the command of her armies. The former, without any solicitation on his part, was by Queen Victoria constituted, by patent under the great seal, commander-in-chief of her armies, during the term of his natural life.

The command of the army thus conferred upon him, the Duke retained to the day of his death; and as there is probably no interval in his public life with respect to which so much misunderstanding prevails, it appears to us that we cannot do better than give here a brief and connected view of his habits of acting and thinking; and of the estimation in which, as a man of business, he was held by those who had the readiest opportunities of conversing with him on professional subjects, and were best qualified to form a judgment as to his manner of dealing with them.

It was the Duke's custom, when no special business pressed, to arrive at the Horse Guards about one o'clock in the day; and to remain there, during the sitting of parliament, till his presence was required in the House of Lords. His attendance there was, as we need scarcely observe, very punctual, and he almost always arrived in time for prayers, or soon after. When parliament was not sitting, he often remained at the Horse Guards till six, and sometimes till seven in the evening.

As soon as he entered his room, his messenger proceeded to inform the several heads of departments that he was come; and they all waited upon him with their

papers, if they had any reports to make, or points on which to consult him. They came, however, one by one, and one by one he saw them. Nor was this ceremony omitted, even if there happened to be no special reason for the interview. On many occasions the officer looked in, wished his Grace good-morning, and told him the news of the day; and if there followed the statement, "I have nothing with which to trouble your Grace this morning," the never-failing answer was, "I am very glad of it." Nor need it be a matter of surprise that he should so express himself. The business of his own department proved often to be that which made the smallest demand upon his time; and wearied, as he generally was when he arrived at the Horse Guards, a respite from any fresh strain on his attention could not prove otherwise than agreeable.

"I remember," writes one who knew him well,* "when his own friends were in office, going over to him on one occasion with my box full of papers, when he turned to me, and asking what I had, observed rather angrily that he had already had thirteen boxes referred to him that morning, before he left Apsley House." Yet the same correspondent observes, "Speaking from the experience which I had of him, I should say, that the Duke was a remarkably agreeable man to do business with, because of his clear and ready decision. However much I may have seen him irritated and excited, with the subjects which I have repeatedly had to bring under his notice, I have no recollection of his ever having made use of a harsh or discourteous expression to me, or of his having dismissed me without

* Private letter from General Sir George Brown, G.C.B.

a distinct and explicit answer or decision in the case under consideration. Like all good men of business, who consider well before coming to a decision, his Grace was accustomed to adhere strictly to precedent; to the decisions he may have previously come to on similar cases. This practice greatly facilitated the task of those who had to transact business with him, seeing that all we had to do in concluding our statement of any particular case, was to refer to his decision on some similar one."

"During the latter years of his life, the Duke had a great objection to waste his time in deciphering or making out the meaning of cramped or indistinct manuscripts. It was customary, therefore, to have all such clearly written out by a clerk, to whose hand he was accustomed, and to announce every case by a short statement or *précis;* in which, however, no one ever attempted to dictate to him what his decision should be. The *précis* generally concluded with some such words as these:—'Perhaps your Grace may consider that this case can be disposed of as was done in so and so.'

"These *précises* were always written out distinctly in half margin. His Grace usually gave his answers on the opposite side of the page, for the most part laconically, but sometimes in great detail. These memoranda of his never failed to exhibit that thorough acquaintance with the details of the military service, for which the Duke was remarkable. And if, at any time, he happened to be at fault, or that recent changes had occurred, modifying regimental matters since he was intimately associated with them, the circumstance had only to be pointed out. He would listen with the greatest patience

to such explanations, and never made the slightest difficulty in modifying his memoranda so as to meet them."

Although the Duke did not always read the correspondence in the cases laid before him, he nevertheless insisted that it should invariably accompany the statement or *précis*, in such order of arrangement as that he should be able to refer to it, if found requisite, without difficulty or delay.

It is scarcely necessary to observe, that all orders for the movement of troops, for the assembling of general courts martial, &c. &c., as well as leaves of absence to officers, and permission to give furloughs to the men, emanate from the commander-in-chief. In granting leave of absence to any but general officers in command of districts, and officers commanding regiments, the adjutant-general seldom troubled the Duke by referring to him. But the applications of general and commanding officers were always submitted to his Grace. On such occasions, his unvarying question was, "How is the duty to be done?" and if the arrangement proposed seemed to him satisfactory, he never refused the indulgence.

There was nothing of which the Duke was more jealous, than of proposals which involved, or threatened to involve, any addition to the expense of maintaining the army. His scruples on that head originated in two sources. In the first place the Duke, as a minister and a statesman, was, perhaps, the most rigid economist in modern times. He effected greater reductions in the public expenditure, during the brief period of his administration, than had been effected before, or has been effected since, by any other head of the government,

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within the memory of man. In the next place, he retained to the last a persuasion that the less the army, in its expenditure and general management, is brought into public notice, the better. "Depend upon it, gentlemen," (a common expression of his when he was in earnest,) "that the greatest enemies the army has in this country, are those who would add unnecessarily to its expense."

It was during his administration of affairs at the Horse Guards that the questions of improving the armament of the troops, and establishing a better system of education in regiments, originated; and a general impression seems to prevail that he stoutly resisted both. This is far from being correct. In regard to the infantry soldier's old weapon, it is perfectly true that he often spoke of it as the most formidable thing of its kind in Europe; and that he was accustomed to quote the authority of Marshal Marmont in corroboration of that sentiment. But so far was he from expressing any desire to check the progress of improvement, that he has often been heard to declare that, "looking to the amount of mechanical skill in this country, and the numerical weakness of our army, as compared with those of the great continental powers, British troops ought to be the best armed troops in the world." Accordingly it was with his express sanction and approval, that the Minié musket was introduced; and the manufacture of 28,000, undertaken by Lord Anglesey, who was then Master-General of the Ordnance. The one point to which the Duke adhered was, that the old bore should be retained, partly because the greater size of the English bullet had rendered it much more effective than any other in former wars; partly because, in the event of the stock of conical bullets running short,

the troops, in case of emergency, would be able to use the cartridges which were already in store. Besides, the fabrication of the new weapon was necessarily a work of time, and it could be introduced only by degrees into the ranks. He would not, under such circumstances, consent to have two different kinds of ammunition in use, out of which confusion would almost inevitably arise were the army to take the field in a hurry.

It was with this weapon, the Minié musket, bored up to the width of the old firelock, that the battles of the Alma and of Inkermann were fought. The Enfield, which is a lighter weapon of the same construction though of narrower calibre than the Minié, was introduced when Lord Hardinge presided at the Ordnance Office, and came, ultimately, to supersede the Minié.

The first specimens of the Minié musket made use of were put into the hands of detachments from Chatham and other places, which assembled at Woolwich for practice, under Captain Brownrigg, of the Grenadier Guards. Anxious about the matter, and desirous himself of witnessing the operation, the Duke arranged with Sir George Brown, the Adjutant-General, that they should proceed to Woolwich together; Lord Charles Wellesley, the Duke's younger son, bearing them company. "There were about 100 men," says General Brown, "extended in a line of skirmishers for the purpose of firing at a target, placed near the butt. I took the Duke up to the butt, in order to see the practice they made, but he did not remain there five minutes before he expressed a wish to go back to the skirmishers. It was not the practice made that he desired to witness,—of that he had no doubt,—but the loading and manipulation of the cartridges, in respect

to which he was anxious to satisfy himself. He accordingly went along the whole line, watching each man as he loaded his musket; and having satisfied himself that there was no difficulty, at once recommended that the manufacture of the arms should be proceeded with. As soon as a portion of them was prepared and distributed to the troops, it became necessary to issue some instructions in regard to the mode of loading and using them. I accordingly drew up a short paper of instructions, and submitted it to his Grace for approval. In reading it over, I saw him deliberately pass his pen through the word 'rifle' wherever I had used it; and on my asking him why he had done so, he explained that 'we must not allow them to fancy they are all riflemen, or they will become conceited, and be wanting next to be dressed in green, or some other *jack-a-dandy* uniform.' He then went on to say, that there was nothing we ought to watch more jealously than any infringement on the national uniform, nor anything more important to maintain, than the solidity and steadiness of our infantry.'"

Of this infantry,—of what he called the infantry of the old stamp,—it is well known that the Duke entertained the highest admiration. He believed that the world had never seen anything equal to it. In illustration of this fact, Sir George Brown has kindly communicated to us the following facts:—

It was the general's practice, while in office, to inspect the troops, reporting direct to head quarters, and to make a verbal as well as a written report of the state in which he found them to the Duke. "Returning on one occasion, from the inspection at Canterbury of the 97th Regiment, which had recently landed from North America, I informed his Grace, that I had

found the regiment in excellent order; that the men looked robust and healthy, and that they were well drilled, and remarkably steady under arms. I concluded by stating, that they had adopted no newfangled notions, either in their dress or appointments, and that, on the whole, the regiment presented the best specimen I had lately seen of the old stamp of British infantry, and appeared to me to be all that could be desired. His answer was, 'I am very glad to hear it, very glad indeed. Depend upon it, there is nothing like them in the world in the shape of infantry. Let the men have their furloughs, and visit their friends.'

"When I was at Walmer, in the winter, I always apprised him when I was about to inspect the troops at that place, and at Dover. He generally attended these inspections in his Lord Warden's uniform, accompanied by any friends he might have staying with him at the Castle; and when I found any corps in particularly good order, I used to ask his Grace to say a complimentary word or two to the commanding officer, which he always willingly did. On one occasion, at Walmer, when the depôts of two regiments were there, and had been formed into one small battalion under the senior officer, the Duke, after he had performed several evolutions, in order to amuse himself, and no doubt expecting to puzzle the major, desired him to place his battalion in line between the spire of a chapel to the north of the barrack-yard, and a windmill standing out in the fields to the southward.

"It may not, perhaps," observes our correspondent, "be very generally known, that one individual has no means of adjusting himself exactly on an alignment between two distant points; and that it can only be

accomplished by two or more mutually dressing each other on the points respectively. Having allowed the major, therefore, to boggle at it for some time, the Duke good-humouredly himself took the matter in hand, showing how it might be done; and in the course of his ride afterwards, set to work on the Downs, drilling the party which was with him in the same exercise!"

There was not one of all his exploits of which the Duke loved more to speak, than of the affair with Marmont's cavalry at El Bodon. This was never done with a view to self-glorification; but in illustration of the steadiness and discipline of his troops, of which he held that it afforded a most remarkable proof.

"On the same day to which I refer," says General Brown, "when the battalion was formed into square, he broke out on the subject, declaring that 'it was with two or three squares such as that, *we* beat off all the French cavalry. Aye, not only beat them off, but attacked them, and recovered the guns which those fellows were about to carry off.' And then he made me move the square, without reducing it, in order to show how easily it could be done."

The Duke, except in bad weather, generally proceeded to his office at the Horse Guards on foot or on horseback. If on horseback, he usually rode through the Park, if on foot he came by the streets, and always alone. Everybody knew him; and everybody, high and low, rich and poor, saluted him as he passed. He never failed to acknowledge these marks of respect in his own peculiar way, by touching his hat with the two first fingers of the right hand, which he held upright, the palm of the hand itself being turned to the front.

The Duke's peculiarity in keeping engagements is well known. It is not, perhaps, so generally understood, that he was very particular in his record of time. He used often to step into Dent's shop at Charing Cross, on his way to the office, to see how his watch was going, and to put it right. The watch, by the way, which is now one of the relics in Apsley House, he had worn throughout the Peninsular war, and never afterwards laid aside. It was a gold repeater, with hands so arranged, that by bringing his fingers round upon them his Grace could tell in the dark what o'clock it was to a second.

The Duke was no great promoter of high education among the working classes, and could not, therefore, be expected to originate schemes for its advancement in the army; but to say that he fought against the establishment of the new school system in regiments, is to say too much. He was jealous, whether rightly or wrongly, of the interference of the War Office in that matter, and believed that the arrangements for providing corps with more efficient schoolmasters would have been better left in the hands of the commander-in-chief. But when the subject was fairly taken up, he never set himself against it; but on the contrary declared, that, as far as his influence could go, it should have fair play. Even in regard to the compulsory attendance of recruits at school, he declined to act upon the suggestions of those who were opposed to it. He did not deny that the recruit, on first joining, has so much both to learn and to unlearn in other respects, that to compel his attendance in school for a couple of hours daily, seems to tax his powers of application too far. But having accepted the proposition

as made to him by the Secretary at War, nothing could induce him to go back from it. Indeed, it was a matter of principle with the Duke never, as Commander-in-Chief, to place himself in an attitude of antagonism to any department of the Queen's government; but, on the contrary, to afford all the assistance in his power in carrying into effect the views of her Majesty's responsible advisers.

The general order which he issued, defining the sort of examination to which candidates for first commissions and for promotion should be subjected, indicates pretty plainly what his opinions were on the subject of education for officers. Long before that question was publicly agitated, he found opportunities over and over again to state, that a young gentleman intended for the military service of this country should receive the best education which the country could afford; that looking to the duties which he might be called upon to discharge, such education ought not to be too professional; and that it was no where to be procured of a higher or more practical shape than at one of our great public schools or universities. "An officer in the British army," he used to say, "is not a mere fighting machine. He may be called upon any day to serve the crown as governor of a colony, or in disturbed districts as a magistrate; and he will not be able to fill either post well, unless he know something of the constitution and of the laws of the land." His Grace's predilection in favour of military academies, and even of staff colleges, was not therefore, very decided.

"You think that officers ought to be educated specially for the staff. Perhaps you would like to have a staff corps also. That is what they do in France, and in

other continental countries, and the consequence is that their staff corps are generally made up of pedants and coxcombs. I am sure that I found the young gentlemen who came to me from High Wickham to be pretty much of that stamp. Indeed the only good staff officers that I had, were men who knew their regimental duties thoroughly, and possessing a fair share of natural ability, soon learned to apply the principles of regimental handling to the handling of large bodies. I don't mean to say that officers of engineers and of artillery can do without some knowledge of mathematics, or that sketching is not useful, as far as it goes, in all branches of the service; but if you limit a general in the selection of his staff to mathematicians, or to the members of a particular corps, instead of giving him, as he has now, the choice of the whole army, you will soon find that you have not chosen the best means of placing talent where it may be most usefully employed for the public service."

There was no question in the Duke's day about permanently organising the army, on the home establishment, into divisions and brigades. We are, therefore, unable to say how far he would or would not have approved of the arrangement. But looking to the strong opinions which he entertained against increasing the expense of our military establishments, and even against bringing the army prominently into public view, it seems to us probable that the plan would not have secured his hearty approval. Even camps of instruction he never recommended, which it is natural to suppose he would have done, had he considered that the sort of experience to be acquired in them was adequate to the cost. Be this, however, as it may, there can be no doubt of his hostility to other changes

which have been effected since his death. Never having himself experienced the slightest inconvenience in his intercourse with the War Office, as it used to be, or with the Board of Ordnance, he was entirely opposed to the principle of amalgamation which now prevails. He used, on the contrary, to speak of the Ordnance as a perfect model for boards, and of the master-generalship as affording the best constitutional means of bringing an officer of experience and ability into the cabinet. Whether the Duke was right or wrong in his views on these subjects, time will doubtless show. As yet there has certainly been no visible improvement in the working of the machine,—because of the construction of one cumbrous and gigantic department, out of two or three smaller and more manageable offices.

The Duke was far from being satisfied with the constitution and management of the medical department of the army. He believed that it had become less instead of more efficient, through its intimate connection with the War Office. And with respect to the commissariat, his opinion was that of every man who has seen war, or thought much about it. It can never be rendered efficient except in the field; and should therefore, in time of peace, be kept to all intents and purposes in abeyance.

There never lived a man in high station and authority more patient of the involuntary errors of those under him, or more anxious to keep them right if they were inadvertently going wrong. The perverse blunderings of wrong-headed officials, on the other hand, provoked him exceedingly. The following anecdotes will better illustrate these facts than any statements of ours.

A young officer of a distinguished regiment once brought his soldier servant to a court martial, on charges, — we believe, of theft — which he failed to establish. The commanding officer, conceiving that the officer had deliberately stated what was untrue, insisted upon his retiring from the corps; and was unfortunately supported in his view of the case by a majority of the other officers, who threatened, if he persisted in remaining with the regiment, to send him to Coventry. This coming to the knowledge of the young man's father, he complained through the Adjutant-General to the Duke, and the Adjutant-General being desired to investigate the case, found that the ground assumed by the offended commanding officer was quite untenable. The commanding officer, however, an honourable but obstinate man, would not consent to change his course; and the case, as a matter of necessity, was laid before the Duke. It did not find him unprepared. He had read all the papers, and knew every incident as it had fallen out during the progress of the disagreement; and now, making the colonel sit down, he argued the matter with him, and advised, more like an indulgent father reasoning with a son, than a commander-in-chief speaking to a subordinate. All, however, was of no avail. The colonel would not be convinced; and at last said, that if the officer were allowed to remain in the regiment he must quit it.

Upon this the Duke rose from his chair, and looking with some severity at the colonel, said, "that hitherto he had spoken to him as an officer of greater experience than his own; he must now address him as Commander-in-Chief of the army; while he told him, that his conduct in this matter was unreasonable, and

the views of discipline which he maintained quite incorrect."

We wish that it were in our power to add, that the high-minded, but mistaken commanding officer was brought round to see the truth at last. Unfortunately it was not so. In anguish of spirit, and in spite of the advice of all his friends, he retired from the service by the sale of his commission; while the young officer behaved so gallantly throughout the Crimean campaign, that with one consent his brother officers took him to their hearts again, and whatever prejudice might have existed for a season against him, passed away.

Our next anecdote is somewhat different, both in its details and in its moral. There were two noble lords then in the army, both cavalry officers, though one is now dead, who managed to be in constant hot water with somebody or another, and gave, in consequence, a great deal of trouble at the Horse Guards. It happened that on a particular occasion the Adjutant-General went into the Duke's room with a bundle of papers in his hand, and found his Grace seated at his table with a large pile of correspondence spread out before him. This was at Walmer, where, more perhaps than any where else, the Duke disliked to be worried with disputes and misunderstandings on points of discipline among officers; which, indeed, he declared never could take place, if officers would only study and make themselves acquainted with the regulations and established practice of the service. Looking up, evidently out of humour, the Duke asked what the Adjutant-General had there; and when the answer was, "Another complaint from Lord——," his Grace seized the papers which were before him with both hands,

dashed them down with a thump upon the table, and throwing himself back in his chair and crossing his arms on his chest, exclaimed, "By ——, these two lords, my Lord C—— and my Lord L——, would require a commander-in-chief for themselves ; there is no end to their complaints and remonstrances."

It turned out that the papers which the Duke had before him comprised a correspondence which had been forwarded to him by post between Lord L—— and the Military Secretary, in consequence of the objections raised by the former to the examination of candidates for commissions in the regiment of which he was colonel.

The Duke, as is well known, could not bear to be interrupted when engaged in business which he wished to transact when alone. All who were acquainted with his habits, whether at the Horse Guards or elsewhere, did their best on such occasions to prevent his privacy from being broken in upon. With reasonable men they succeeded; with others they failed. General Brown has given us the following story of himself: — "I don't know whether or not you are aware of the circumstance, that the Duke not only understood, but could write the Spanish language with considerable ease. I was going into his room one day, when Lord Raglan told me I had better not, for his Grace was at that moment writing a Spanish note to Marshal Narvaez, who happened then to be in London." Of course General Brown followed Lord Raglan's advice. Not so a gallant officer of higher rank, who, either on that or some other day, desired at an equally inconvenient moment to have an interview with his Grace. It was in vain that Lord Raglan, then Lord Fitzroy Somerset, told him that his Grace was much engaged,

and that it would not do just at that moment to interrupt him. The noble officer insisted on Lord Raglan going in to the Duke, which his lordship agreed to do, placing his friend at the same time so close to the door, that he could overhear the terms in which his desire for an audience was received. We need not stop to particularize them. They were of such a nature as led to the precipitate retreat of the intruder; and they probably induced him to be guided ever after by the counsels of those who were more conversant than himself with the Duke's feelings and habits.

There is a strange belief abroad that the Duke cared little for the comforts of the soldier in barracks, or his rational and healthy recreations when off duty. This is a great mistake. It was under his Grace's régime that the most important improvement ever made in the soldier's condition as the inhabitant of a barrack was introduced. Till his Grace became commander-in-chief each bed in a barrack-room contained two soldiers; and in many barracks the beds were arranged, like berths on board of ship, in two tiers. The Duke did away with these practices, and gave every soldier his own bed; besides which, from the bed next to it, a certain space was ordered to be kept clear. His Grace was at the head of the army also when ball-courts were established, and cricket-grounds prepared at large military stations. To every suggestion that was offered for improving the ventilation, as well as for affording facilities to improved cooking, and the means of cleanliness in the men's rooms, he gave prompt and favourable attention. He believed, indeed, that in this, as in other matters, ideas in themselves good might be carried too far; and that there was some danger

both of overtaxing the liberality of parliament and of spoiling the soldier, by first creating for him, and then supplying, wants which before enlistment he had never felt. But this did not hinder him from going as far as he believed to be right in bettering the soldier's condition, and dealing liberally with him. He never, indeed, became a convert to the notion, that the ranks can in this country be filled with persons of what is called a respectable position in life. He still looked to want of other employment, and to idle habits, as the readiest sources of recruitment. And so believing, he was reluctant to part with the power of maintaining discipline through the dread of corporal punishment. But all this never prevented him, on proper occasions, from standing forward as the champion of the rights and of the honour of the army. When the ten years' enlistment act was brought forward, and proposals were made for granting to non-commissioned officers and privates rewards for good conduct*, he cordially supported both measures. He did so, however, in the former case, only after he had obtained the insertion of a clause in the bill, whereby ten years' men were allowed to re-enlist, counting their back service towards establishing a right to a pension. For, as he arrived at the conclusion that a good soldier would always re-enlist, so he held that the efficiency of an army depends quite as much upon the experience

* For this as well as for many other measures calculated to improve its discipline and add to its respectability, the army is much indebted to the Right Hon. Sidney Herbert. To him belongs the merit of having devised and put into shape arrangements for which others obtained credit, because they happened to introduce them into parliament.

and soldierly habits of the men as upon the talents of the officers. And he illustrated his case by referring to the triumphs which a handful of British troops had recently achieved in China, Africa, and India. "I ask you, my lords," he said, after describing the night attack of the 80th regiment at Sobraon on some Seikh guns which were plunging shot among them in their bivouac, "I ask whether such a feat could have been performed, under such circumstances, except by old soldiers. It would have been impossible. Bear in mind the conduct of the Emperor Napoleon with respect to old soldiers; remember the manner in which he employed them. Recollect, too, how much they are prized by every power all over the world; and then, I will once more entreat your lordships never to consent to any measure which would deprive her Majesty's service of old and experienced men; and thus pave the way for disasters which assuredly would follow when the army should come to be employed in war."

The same generous spirit appeared to animate him, as often as the opportunity was afforded of speaking of the services of the army in the presence of an enemy. It was he who, when, at a critical moment, the Court of Directors recalled Lord Ellenborough, sent out Sir Henry Hardinge to succeed him as governor-general; and who, by and by, after the affair of Chillienwallah, forced the late Sir Charles Napier upon the reluctant authorities in Leadenhall Street. Indeed, he did more; for when Sir Charles, naturally disinclined to serve under a body of men by whom he conceived that he had been ungenerously treated, refused to go out, the Duke overcame his scruples by observing: "Then I must go myself." The result proved that

for this demand upon Napier's self-control there was no real occasion. Lord Gough had won the battle of Gujerat, and reduced the Seikhs to submission, before Sir Charles quitted England. But not the less flattering to Napier, nor the less illustrative of his own high sense of duty, were the terms in which the victor of Waterloo pressed military command upon an officer of whose talents he entertained an exalted opinion. Not that the Duke, with all his admiration of Napier, regarded him as uniformly judicious, either in the manner in which he acted, or the terms in which he expressed himself. In the difference between the conqueror of Scinde and the Marquess of Dalhousie, his Grace decided in favour of the latter; and Sir Charles's famous order against gaming in India was thus ludicrously criticised. His Grace's attention having been drawn to that order one day in terms of commendation, he looked at the speaker, and, leaning back in his chair, moved his head slowly from side to side, but said nothing. On being asked whether he was to be understood as disapproving the order, he replied: "I am of opinion with Napoleon, that we had better wash our foul linen at home."

The details of Sir Robert Peel's administration, between the years 1841 and 1846, have passed into history. They were eminently successful; and towards their success the Duke, by his wisdom in the cabinet and his influence in the House of Lords, greatly contributed. The revenue, which for a series of bygone years had steadily fallen off, soon recovered its buoyancy. The imposition of a property tax, though resisted as an innovation during a season of peace, sufficed to convert a deficiency into a surplus; while the total repeal of

duties on some articles in daily use, and a large reduction of them upon others, reconciled the mercantile classes especially to the arrangement. In Ireland likewise, where by monster meetings Mr. O'Connell had contrived rather to amuse his dupes than to frighten the authorities, a blow was struck for order. Neither looking to him for support, nor caring for his opposition, the Conservatives put the law in force against him, and he was arrested, tried, and condemned to two years' imprisonment. No rebellion followed, nor any attempt at rebellion; and though Mr. O'Connell was subsequently discharged, after his case had been heard on appeal in the House of Lords, he never again exercised the same influence either among his countrymen or in the House of Commons.

So far all went well. The permanent endowment of the Roman Catholic College at Maynooth, which was effected in 1845, gave indeed some offence to the advanced Protestants of England and Scotland; while the country gentlemen of the three kingdoms looked with no great favour on the modifications which were introduced into the corn laws of 1828. But as neither class could deny that the country flourished under these changes; that both its internal condition and the state of its relations with foreign powers, were satisfactory; they refrained from offering any factious opposition to the minister. There were, however, difficulties in the minister's way, which he found himself unable either to evade or to surmount; and amid which he made shipwreck in the end, not of his own administration only, but of the great country and conservative party which had lifted him into power.

For some years past there had prevailed among the mercantile and manufacturing classes a growing im-

patience under laws which, according to their view of the case, aimed at no higher object than to keep up the rent of land for the sake of its owners, by enhancing the price of human food in the market. From writing and talking about the grievance, men of energy and talent began to act, and the Corn-law League, originating in Manchester, soon established its branches in every large town and district in the kingdom. By and by that terrible disease broke out, which year by year destroyed the potato crops, just as they were arriving at maturity; and reduced Ireland, the inhabitants of which depended mainly on the potato for subsistence, to the extremity of famine. It was an event which furnished the advocates of free trade in corn with an argument which, though more plausible perhaps than solid, told with immense effect upon the public mind. It gave the Whigs also, or at least a powerful section of them, an opportunity of taking up what they felt to be a popular cry; and the ministers began to be pressed on every side for the removal of all restrictions on the trade in corn. How the controversy began, continued, and ended, every reader of history must be aware. While Mr. Cobden was advocating in Covent Garden Theatre the cause of unrestricted commerce to its fullest extent, Lord John Russell issued manifesto after manifesto in the House of Commons and through the newspapers, against the sliding scale as it then existed, and in favour of a fixed duty on corn imported from abroad, first of 8*s*., and then of 5*s*. a quarter. Matters had reached this point when, on the 6th of November, 1845, Sir Robert Peel proposed to the cabinet that the corn then in bond should be released on the payment of 1*s*. duty; and that the ports should, by order

in council, be thrown open. He further suggested that parliament should assemble on the 27th, in order to pass an act of indemnity on these proceedings, and that the government should pledge itself to take up, at an early period, the question of the corn laws, with a view to their modification.

It appears from Sir Robert's posthumous volume, that he was supported in these proposals by only three members of the cabinet, viz.: Lord Aberdeen, Sir James Graham, and Mr. Sidney Herbert. Whether a knowledge of what was in progress got abroad, or whether he was moved by a sense of duty to take the step, is a question with which we are not now concerned; but on the 22nd Lord John Russell put forth another letter in the newspapers, in which he announced that the Whigs were prepared to make common cause with the League, and that the total repeal of the corn laws would be conceded. This was a fresh move in the game which it became necessary to meet; and Sir Robert met it by submitting to the consideration of his colleagues a memorandum, in which it was suggested that the corn laws should be suspended by order in council; and that if it were thought inexpedient for the existing administration to repeal them, ministers should resign, and leave the repeal to be carried by others. What the opinions of the rest of the cabinet were on these points, will be seen by all who take the trouble to consult the publication from which we are now quoting. But the Duke adopted a course peculiarly his own. He was opposed, conscientiously, both to the suspension and to the repeal of the corn laws. He did not see how a people who ate no wheaten bread were to be relieved by reducing the price of wheat in the market; or in

what way the cheapening of bread was to benefit those who were admitted to be destitute of all means of paying for it. He was quite willing to expend the public money in the purchase of food for the sufferers by the famine, and to put them in the way, at the public expense, of earning their own subsistence by their own industry. But a repeal of the corn laws, he contended, would effect neither of these objects, while it must inevitably throw the whole social system into confusion. He then went on to say,—"Here then comes the question which Sir Robert Peel has not discussed,—I mean the party view of it. The only ground on which I think that view important, is one upon which he must be a better judge than any one else,—that is, whether he could carry on a government for the Queen, supposing the support of the landed interest were withdrawn from him. I am afraid he must reckon on its being withdrawn from him, unless he should be able to show clearly the necessity for the measure in question.

"In respect to my own course, my only object in public life is to support Sir Robert Peel's administration of the government and the law.

"A good government for the country is of more importance than corn laws, or every other consideration; and as long as Sir Robert Peel possesses the confidence of the Queen and of the public, and he has strength to perform his duties, his administration of the government must be supported.

"My own judgment would lead me to maintain the corn laws. Sir Robert Peel may think that his position in parliament and in the public view, requires that the course should be taken which he recommends; and if that should be the case, I earnestly recommend that

the cabinet should support him, and I for one declare that I should do so."

The one ruling principle of the Duke's public life was loyalty to the throne. As a statesman, he had two great objects of apprehension,—the aggrandisement of the French nation abroad, and the permanent establishment of a Whig administration at home. Every move in his foreign policy, while he had the power of influencing the foreign policy of the country, was directed to restrain the former; every measure suggested or taken up in domestic affairs, was approved or condemned, in proportion as it held out the prospect of preventing the consolidation of the latter. Not that he was anxious to interfere in the internal concerns of the French people, or to hinder them from developing the immense resources of their own country; but he could not divest his mind of the impressions which their career in the early part of the century had made upon it; and he was perpetually on the watch for tokens of a desire to renew it. Nor were his suspicions groundless. It is no longer a secret, that for his jealousy of the expedition to Algiers in 1830 there were just reasons; and that one of the motives which induced him to acknowledge as he did the dynasty of Louis Philippe, was the check thereby given to the Russian alliance, and to the dangers to Belgium and to the Rhenish provinces in Prussia which were involved in it. In like manner the views which he entertained of Whig statesmanship and its principles of action, kept him in direct and constant antagonism to the Whigs as a party. He could not forget the impediments which they had systematically thrown in the way of the policy of Mr. Pitt and his successors, while their very watch-

words, however unmeaning, except when the party using them happens to be out of office, offended his settled convictions with respect to the prerogatives of the crown. Hence no sacrifice which a conservative government could honestly make was in his opinion to be withheld, provided it had the effect of keeping power out of the hands of ministers who were not conservative. Stronger evidence of this fact than was afforded by his line of argument on the corn-law question, it would be impossible to produce. He believed that the maintenance of these laws was essential to the support of what still remained of territorial influence in the country; yet he was ready to sacrifice even that, greatly as he prized it, rather than see the government transferred, at a critical juncture in the history of parties, from a Conservative to a Whig administration.

In spite of the Duke's support, Sir Robert Peel was still unsuccessful in carrying the whole of the cabinet along with him. The time will probably come, when, examining the question from the point of view in which he then placed it, the arguments of those who resisted his proposals will be admitted to have been more logical than his own. Yet, swayed in a great degree by the example of the Duke of Wellington, all except Lord Stanley, now the Earl of Derby, and the Duke of Buccleugh gave way. Lord Stanley and the Duke of Buccleugh, however, were men of so much mark, that Sir Robert declined to go on without them; and accordingly, on the 5th of December, he repaired to Osborne House, and there laid his resignation at the Queen's feet.

We need not follow in detail the course of events, the task of describing which belongs to the historian of the nineteenth century. Lord John Russell was called upon

to form an administration. After devoting upwards of a fortnight to the task, he found that it was not to be accomplished; and on the 20th Sir Robert Peel resumed his place as head of the Queen's government. He did so, however, rather to inform his colleagues of the policy which he had determined to adopt, than to consult them in regard to its expediency. All except Lord Stanley stood by him, not without a settled conviction on their minds, that in so doing they were about to make shipwreck of their own prospects as public men, and possibly to break up for ever the great party of which, for so many years, through good report and evil, they had been the leaders. Among them all there was none who experienced the latter dread more keenly and painfully than the Duke. His own political prospects gave him no concern whatever. In the noontide of life, he had ever been ready to postpone personal considerations to a sense of public duty. Now, the future presented little for him, either to excite ambition or the reverse. But his devotion to the Queen, his love of country, and his reverence for the institutions, on the maintenance of which he believed its greatness to depend, never grew cold; and already he was at work, striving, if it might be, to prevent the breach in the party, or, if that were inevitable, to pave the way to a speedy rejunction of its fragments. We regret that considerations of delicacy towards individuals still living render it impossible to give any portion of his Grace's correspondence on that occasion. But the following analysis of one letter, addressed to a noble lord possessing great and deserved weight with the agricultural interest, will show what his tone of argument was, and the issue to which it pointed.

On the 4th of January, 1846, just, as it will be remembered, before parliament met, his Grace stated, that he had long thought of communicating with his correspondent. Matters grew upon him, however, so thickly every day, that explanation would be impossible if much longer deferred, and even now it would not be easy to give a clear account to one, not himself an actor in the scene, of all that had occurred within the last few months. The case, moreover, could be understood only by never losing sight of the different epochs at which the various events had befallen.

It was his Grace's belief that the potato disease had shown itself, and that apprehensions of the consequences were seriously entertained before his correspondent quitted Walmer Castle in the previous autumn. The Duke himself had never given way to these apprehensions, and the feelings of the noble lord to whom he was writing were, he believed, in unison with his own.

This, however, was not the feeling of others. In the end of October and the beginning of November, great apprehensions were entertained of the consequences of the disease; and it was held that famine might prevail in Ireland within the year from that date, and that it had become necessary, without loss of time, to consider of the measures which it would be expedient to adopt.

As to himself, the Duke never doubted of the inconvenience which would be produced in Ireland by the potato disease; not from the want of food, for there was abundance of food of other descriptions, the produce of last year's harvest, in Ireland, as well as in England and Scotland; and in granaries, more than a year's consumption of all descriptions of grain. But the difficulty was this, that the social habits of nearly the

whole of the lower class of the male population, each of whom raised for his own family the provisions which it should consume, and paid the rent of the land on which the provisions should be raised by mortgaging his labour for months, and even for a year, left him, when food failed, without money, or the facility of earning it by labour, already mortgaged, wherewith to buy food in the market, however abundant it might be.

That, therefore, which was required for Ireland was the organisation of the means to find employment for those in want of food. This, it is true, was likely to be expensive, but still it was practicable; and there was nothing which apparently required any augmentation of the quantity of food in the country, excepting, possibly, in one article, maize, which might have been substituted in some cases for potatoes.

The first determination of the government was to wait and see what the nature and extent of the disease was; to prorogue the parliament till the 16th of December; and afterwards to consider of the course to be taken.

The cabinet accordingly met again early in December, but the alarm appeared rather to have increased. It was thought by some that even the measures recommended to be adopted in Ireland, with a view to apply a remedy to the peculiar local evil there existing, would occasion additional resistance to the corn laws; that a reconsideration of them, at all events, would be necessary, and certain relaxation the consequence.

The majority of the members of the cabinet was of a different opinion; but the most influential, particularly in the House of Commons, felt strongly the necessity of making an alteration.

After several discussions, it was found that the adoption of a plan on which all should agree was hopeless, and full consideration of the case, in all its bearings, led to the conclusion, that the most advantageous course for the Queen's service, for her Majesty personally, and for the landed interest in general, was that the minister should inform her Majesty, that finding he could not go to the House of Commons and propose a plan, with the consent of his colleagues, he recommended to her Majesty to consider of the formation of another ministry. This communication was made on Saturday the 6th of December, on which day her Majesty sent for Lord John Russell; the ministers attended her Majesty in council on Wednesday the 18th, and parliament was further prorogued to the 30th of December. From that day forward, her Majesty's servants continued in office only till a new administration should be formed.

Lord John Russell saw her Majesty on Wednesday, the 10th. On Thursday the 11th he undertook to form an administration, and continued his efforts to do so, till Saturday the 20th, on which day he resigned the commission. It is necessary to bear in mind all these dates, for they are important.

During the interval between the 10th and the 20th of December, those members of the cabinet who had objected to the plan proposed by the minister, were required to state whether they, or any of them, were prepared or disposed to form an administration on the principle of maintaining the corn laws as they are. His Grace himself, and he believed all the rest, answered that they were not so prepared; and his Grace added, that in spite of all that was said or written about protection, nobody had ever heard of any individual ap-

proaching the Queen, with the advice that she should form an administration on that principle.

When Lord John resigned his commission on the 20th of December, her Majesty sent for Sir Robert Peel; who, before he went, wrote to the Duke and informed him that, if the Queen should desire it, he would resume his office, and even if he stood alone, would, as her Majesty's minister, enable her Majesty to meet her parliament, rather than that her Majesty should be reduced to the necessity of taking for her minister a member of the League, or any of those connected with its politics.

As soon as his Grace heard of this determination, he applauded it; and declared his determination to co-operate in its execution. For the question to be considered then was, not what the corn laws should be, but whether the Queen should have a government; and the Duke felt himself bound to stand by the sovereign, as he had done in 1834. At the same time he saw that from what had happened, the position of the corn-law itself was very materially changed. As soon as Lord John Russell undertook to form an administration for the Queen, he became entitled to demand, and he obtained a knowledge of the cause of the dissolution of the preceding administration. He thus became acquainted with Sir Robert Peel's opinion, and the difference between him and the majority of his cabinet. It was impossible, under such circumstances, that Sir Robert Peel could any longer go into the House of Commons as the defender of the existing corn laws.

The position was next to be considered of those members of the cabinet who, previously to the 6th and 10th of December, differed from Sir Robert Peel. They

could not but feel, that though able perhaps to command votes enough to support the existing corn law, they could not reckon on maintaining it by force of argument in debate. They must therefore look to some other system which should provide for the interests of the land, equally with the existing law, though differing from it in the provisions which it should propose to enact.

The point which his Grace was anxious to press, looking to what had passed, to the dates and facts stated, and to the situation in which the government then stood, was, that the great landed proprietors, and the landed interest generally, should pause, and consider well what was proposed to them, and not separate themselves from the government till they should have seen and fully weighed it in all its bearings. His Grace was the more anxious on this subject, because he had observed, that one of them was already loud in declaring, that such a course would be like that of one who locks the stable door when the horse is stolen.

On the other hand, if the great landed proprietors were not disposed to adopt this reasonable and manly course, he advised that they should agree among themselves to form a government for the Queen ; that one or more of them should solicit an audience of her Majesty, and request her Majesty to select for her servants men who would maintain, at all events, the existing corn laws ! At the same time they should be prepared to propose to her Majesty the names of persons to fill the different offices of the state, and be responsible for carrying on the government.

His Grace, after alluding to the only alternative left, assuming that neither Sir Robert Peel nor Lord John

Russell was permitted to take the lead, intreats his correspondent to give to all that he had said his earnest attention ; and to exert his influence with those who, like himself, were great landed proprietors, so that they might adopt a course on the occasion worthy of their station, their talents, and their patriotism. At all events, the great landed proprietors ought not to be in a hurry. They should consider, individually, what was about to be submitted for the consideration of parliament, in regard to which it could never be too late for the landed interest to take whatever course might appear desirable. If, however, the great landed proprietors were determined not to wait and see what was coming, they were bound themselves to submit a proposal for the formation of a government.

This manly appeal so far prevailed, that the heads of the landed interest in the House of Lords remained quiet. Other politicians, not in either house of parliament, were less docile, and one in particular, a man of great ability, but retired by this time into private life, strongly urged the Duke to extricate himself from the false position into which Sir Robert Peel had thrown him. The sum of the advice was, that the Duke should be no party to measures which would destroy the gentry, the aristocracy, and the monarchy ; that he should withdraw from the administration, and leave Sir Robert Peel and Lord John Russell to work together; in which case his Grace, commanding an army of observation, they would find themselves unable to effect much mischief, and they would certainly not succeed in carrying repeal. The Duke answered this letter to the following effect: that though there was no more sincere well-wisher to the existing

corn laws and the sliding scale than himself, and though he had done, and would continue to do, everything in his power to maintain them, the position which he had taken up was not the corn laws. His object was to maintain a government in the country. For that he had always contended, and always would contend. He was very sensible that any influence which he might possess, any good which he might aid in doing, any evil which he might contribute to avert, must depend upon the kindness and good opinion of his friends. Such influence might easily be written, or cried, or even talked down. So be it; he could not avoid the evil. But he positively and distinctly declined to take a step, which must have the effect of dissolving a government, of which the dissolution must be followed by the loss of corn laws, and everything else.

He would not attempt to reason upon the hypothetical views which his correspondent took of Sir Robert Peel's propositions. He hoped soon to see what they were. In the mean time he endeavoured to prevail upon those who desired to learn, or were willing to read, or to listen in conversation to his opinions, to wait and see what Peel would propose, before they decided upon the course which they would take when his proposals saw the light. This would be reasonable in any course, except, perhaps, in one involving party politics.

At last, on the 27th of January, Sir Robert Peel propounded his scheme. He was listened to with breathless silence while he spoke, and when he sat down, there followed such a burst of mingled cheering and execration as has not often been heard in any popular assembly. The effect upon the great bulk of the

Duke's friends in the House of Lords was stunning. One after another they wrote to say, that they could not give their support to Sir Robert Peel's policy; that they could discover in his explanation no sufficient reasons for departing from a system which had rendered England what she was; and that while they admired the chivalrous devotion with which the Duke had sacrificed his own judgment in order to support the Queen's government, they could not bring themselves, not being officially connected with that government, to follow his example. When the time comes for giving unrestricted publicity to his Grace's correspondence, the manner in which he dealt with these remonstrances will command, as it deserves, universal admiration. He assured his friends that he was much more concerned and grieved, than he was surprised, at the line which they considered themselves under the necessity of taking. He lamented the whole course into which the affair had fallen. He recommended to such men as his correspondents, to maintain the political influence in the country which their station, their conduct, their abilities, and character, had acquired for them; to avoid all imitation of the illegalities of the League; to act with the wisdom and discretion which had secured for them the confidence of the public; and if circumstances should for a moment separate them, the great landed proprietors of the country, from the ministers of the crown, to let the separation be as brief as possible, for the sake of the crown and of all the interests of the country worth preserving. Unfortunately for all concerned, the great body of the Conservatives fell too much under the influence of anger and disappointed hope to attend to counsels so safe. The debates in the

Commons soon degenerated into a succession of bitter personalities, and the great ends to be achieved were lost sight of in the desire to humble and wound the feelings of individuals. The case was different in the House of Lords. There, by a course of action which at once marked him out as the future head of the great Conservative party, Lord Stanley, though opposed to the policy of his late colleague, co-operated with the Duke in preventing the heaviest of all calamities—an angry collision on such a subject between the two Houses. It is much to be regretted that considerations of delicacy towards individuals still living, render impossible the publication at this time of the great bulk of the important correspondence which now lies before us. But two letters we have been permitted to transcribe, one from the present Earl of Derby, then Lord Stanley, to the Duke; the other from the Duke in reply, which, because of the light thrown by them upon the state of parties as they then existed, and still more on account of the insight which they afford into the characters and feelings of the writers, cannot fail to be read with the deepest interest.

Lord Stanley, it appears, had discussed in confidential conversation with the Duke, not only the actual state of affairs and the causes which led to it, but its probable effect upon the future constitution of the government, and through the government on the fate of the nation. The Duke seems to have made no disguise of his own feelings, and to have pressed upon Lord Stanley the duty of rallying, with as little delay as possible, the great Conservative party, and placing himself at its head. How this advice was received, and

to what results it led, the following communications show: —

"St. James's Square, Feb. 18, 1846.

"My dear Duke, — The kindness with which you have always spoken to me on public matters since we became members of the same government, and especially what fell from you the other night at Apsley House, induces me to address you with a frankness and unreserve which our relative positions would hardly justify in circumstances less critical than those in which the country is now placed. We cannot disguise from ourselves that the unfortunate measure now under consideration has, for the time at least, completely dislocated and shattered the great Conservative party in both Houses, and that the sacrifice of your own private opinion, which you and others have made for the purpose of keeping it together, has failed, as I feared it would, to effect your object. You may remember my appealing to Sir Robert Peel himself in the cabinet, to confirm my statement, that if his measure were carried, it would be by the aid of the whole body of his opponents, and the lukewarm support of a few of his friends, against the angry opposition of the great mass of the Conservative party. It is evident that these anticipations have been realised to the fullest extent, and I think it very doubtful whether even your great name and influence will induce the Lords to sanction the bill, especially if the majority in the House of Commons be not far greater than seems now to be anticipated. I am obliged to add frankly, that I think confidence has been so shaken in Sir Robert Peel, that in spite of his pre-eminent abilities and great services, he can never reunite

that party under his guidance. Nor do I at present see any one in the House of Commons of sufficient ability and influence to do so; yet it is clear that if the party is to be efficient, in office or out of office, but especially in office, it must have leaders of eminence in that House. In the House of Lords the case is widely different. There your influence and authority are, and must be paramount, and much as many of your followers may regret the course which a sense of duty has led you to take on this occasion, they will still regard you with undiminished personal respect and attachment; and while you are at their head, will follow no other leader, if any were ill-judged enough to set himself up in opposition to you. And this leads me to speak with entire unreserve of my own position, to which you referred in such kind terms the other evening. I will not affect to deny that my wish to be removed to the Upper House was influenced in great measure by my desire to assist you as a colleague, and to take a portion of the weight of public business off your shoulders;—nor that I looked forward to making myself so known to the members of that House as to qualify me in some degree to act as your successor whenever you should yourself desire to be relieved from the burthens of office. But when, with that disregard of yourself which you have shown throughout your life, you advise that I should now endeavour to rally the Conservative party, I am forced to remind you that in the present state of affairs and feelings they could only be so rallied in opposition to the measures of your own government. I may be compelled by my strong sense of the impolicy of the present measures to give my vote against them; but I have resisted, and I

shall continue to resist, entreaties that I would take an active part, and put myself at the head of a movement to throw them out. Such a course would be wholly repugnant to my personal feelings, and I think it would not be for the public good, nor even for the ultimate interests of the Conservative party, which I think it would tend rather to disunite than to consolidate. Whatever course, therefore, I may take, I feel it to be for the general advantage, as it is consistent with my own feelings, that it should be the least prominent that circumstances will allow; and above all, that it should be such as to place me as little as I can help in even apparent competition with you. It is very difficult, in the present entangled posture of affairs, even to guess, at the course of events; but I must avow my conviction, that whatever be the result of this measure, the days of the present government are numbered, and that the country must again, for a time, be subjected to a Whig government. And this is the natural course of events, as the overthrow of the present administration will be effected by some Whig majority, aided by the absence of some of the dissatisfied Conservatives in the House of Commons, where alone a defeat will justify the resignation of the cabinet. The party which succeeds in overthrowing Peel must replace him; and, in the formation of an administration verging on Radicalism, I see the only chance of reuniting, in opposition, the great Conservative party, and training the House of Commons members of it to the conduct of public business. While the present government lasts, the Conservatives will be disunited and discontented. If it were possible, which I think it is not, to form a Protection government now, they would be separated from

that section of the party which has adhered to Peel; but, in opposition, both sections would again rally, forgetting past differences, and, in our House, following as readily as before your lead, so long as you are able and willing to give them the benefit of your counsel and guidance. It is possible that I may hereafter be called on to take a more active part, and though my personal wishes would lead me to withdraw as much as possible from politics, I suppose that, like others, I must obey the call; but at present I can do little but harm by putting myself forward; and if I have been unable to prevent a separation of party, which I deplore, I will not do anything to widen that separation, and make the present unhappy breach irreparable.

"I am sure, my dear Duke, that you will forgive me for having spoken of these matters as openly as if you and I were only spectators, with no personal interest in the issue. Your frankness has encouraged mine, and I am quite confident that the public good is the main consideration which influences both of us. If you desire to see me on the state of public affairs, I will readily obey your call; but after what you said to me, I have thought it best that you should be fully aware of the view which I am disposed to take, and of the considerations by which my course, so far as I can yet judge of it, is likely to be influenced.

"Believe me, my dear Duke,

"Yours very sincerely,

"STANLEY."

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington, K.G. &c."

"February 19.

"My dear Lord Stanley,—I did not receive your letter till I returned home yesterday evening; and having been under the necessity of dining with the members of the cabinet at the Duke of Buccleugh's, I can only now write an answer to it. I am much flattered by the confidence which you repose in me, and I will write to you with as little reserve, relying with confidence that what passes between us will be communicated only by the consent of both.

"You are aware how anxious I have been throughout these discussions, commencing in October last, to preserve and maintain the administration of Sir Robert Peel, for the sake of the Queen's ease; knowing what he had performed: the restoration of the finance of the country; the settlement of the banking system; the revival of commerce; the settlement of this very corn question, and his defence of what had been settled; the success in Ireland in putting down the monster meetings; the universal tranquillity prevailing throughout Great Britain; the confidence which then was felt in his government abroad, and even in the United States. To this, add the confidence in him and respect for him felt in the great manufacturing and commercial towns of the country, such as Manchester, Liverpool, Bristol, &c.

"I felt that he deserved, if he did not possess, the entire confidence of both Houses of Parliament, and I attributed his want of it, particularly in the House of Commons, very much to his omission to make use of the majority which he had at his disposition.

"I am very much afraid that the confidence of par-

liament has vanished, and that there is no chance of its revival ; on the contrary, I am convinced that if his opponents in either House were to move a vote of want of confidence in him, it would pass in the Commons by a large majority,—and would be opposed in the House of Lords only by you and myself, and his and my colleagues, a few in the Queen's household, and very few personal friends of his, and relations and personal friends of mine.

" This is a sad change, and I am very apprehensive that there is no prospect of an improvement. That which I look for therefore is, the holding together in other hands the great, and at this moment powerful, Conservative party ; and this for the sake of the Queen, of the religious, and other ancient institutions of the country, of its resources, influence, and power ; all necessary for its prosperity, and the contentment and happiness of the people. It is quite obvious, that I am not the person who can pretend to undertake, with any chance of success, to perform this task. It is not easy to account for my being in the situation which I have so long filled in the House of Lords. Its commencement was merely accidental: I was commander-in-chief of the army, and master-general of the ordnance, when Lord Liverpool was struck by palsy ; and although I had not, I believe, once spoken in parliament for twenty years, I at once succeeded to the influence and power which he had for many years exercised in the House of Lords, always in high office ; which, however unworthily, I have held ever since, whether in or out of office. But circumstances have for a length of time tended to bring the exercise of this influence to a termination, as I will show you in this letter, and I will

likewise show you that if it has not already terminated, it must terminate in a very short period of time.

"You will see, therefore, that the stage is entirely clear and open for you, and that notwithstanding that I am, thank God, in as good health as I was twenty years ago, I am as much out of your way, as you contemplated the possibility that I might be when you desired to be removed to the House of Lords.

"I think that you were quite right in doing so; and I rejoiced, and still more now rejoice, that you did so.

"For many years, indeed from the year 1830, when I retired from office, I have endeavoured to manage the House of Lords upon the principle on which I conceive that the institution exists in the constitution of the country, that of Conservatism. I have invariably objected to all violent and extreme measures, which is not exactly the mode of acquiring influence in a political party in England, particularly one in opposition to government. I have invariably supported government in parliament upon important occasions, and have always exercised my personal influence to prevent the mischief of anything like a difference or division between the two Houses,—of which there are some remarkable instances, to which I will advert here, as they will tend to show you the nature of my management, and possibly, in some degree, account for the extraordinary power which I have for so many years exercised, without any apparent claim to it.

"Upon finding the difficulties in which the late King William was involved by a promise made to create peers, the number, I believe, indefinite, I determined myself, and I prevailed upon others, the number very large, to be absent from the House in the discussion of

the last stages of the Reform Bill, after the negotiations had failed for the formation of a new administration.

"This course gave at the time great dissatisfaction to the party; notwithstanding that, I believe it saved the existence of the House of Lords at the time, and the constitution of the country.

"Subsequently, throughout the period from 1835 to 1841, I prevailed upon the House of Lords to depart from many principles and systems which they as well as I had adopted and voted; on Irish tithes, Irish corporations, and other measures, much to the vexation and annoyance of many. But I recollect one particular measure, the union of the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, in the early stages of which I had spoken in opposition to the measure, and had protested against it; and in the last stages of it I prevailed upon the House to agree to, and pass it, in order to avoid the injury to the public interests of a dispute between the Houses upon a question of such importance.

"Then I supported the measures of the government, and protected the servant of the government, Captain Elliott, in China. All of which tended to weaken my influence with some of the party; others, possibly a majority, might have approved of the course which I took.

"It was at the same time well known that, from the commencement at least of Lord Melbourne's government, I was in constant communication with it upon all military matters, whether occurring at home or abroad, at all events. But likewise upon many others.

"All this tended, of course, to diminish my influence in the Conservative party, while it tended essentially to the ease and satisfaction of the sovereign, and to the maintenance of good order. At length came the resig-

nation of the government by Sir Robert Peel, in the month of December last, and the Queen desiring Lord John Russell to form an administration.

"On the 12th of December, the Queen wrote to me the letter of which I enclose the copy, and the copy of my answer of the same date; of which it appears that you have never seen copies, although I communicated them immediately to Sir Robert Peel.

"It was impossible for me to act otherwise than is indicated in my letter to the Queen. I am the servant of the crown and people. I have been paid and rewarded, and I consider myself retained; and that I can't do otherwise than serve as required, when I can do so without dishonour, that is to say, as long as I have health and strength to enable me to serve.

"But it is obvious that there is, and there must be, an end of all connection and counsel between party and me. I might with consistency, and some may think that I ought to, have declined to belong to Sir Robert Peel's cabinet on the night of the 20th of December. But my opinion is, that, if I had, Sir Robert Peel's government would not have been framed; that we should have had —— and —— in office next morning.

"But, at all events, it is quite obvious that when that arrangement comes, which sooner or later must come, there will be an end to all influence on my part over the Conservative party, if I should be so indiscreet as to attempt to exercise any. You will see, therefore, that the stage is quite clear for you, and that you need not apprehend the consequences of differing in opinion from me when you will enter upon it; as in truth I have, by my letter to the Queen of the 12th of December, put an end to the connection between the party

and me, when the party will be in opposition to her Majesty's government.

"My opinion is, that the great object of all is that you should assume the station, and exercise the influence which I have so long exercised in the House of Lords.

"The question is, how is that object to be attained? By guiding their opinion and decision, or by following it.

"You will see that I have endeavoured to guide their opinion, and have succeeded upon some most remarkable occasions. But it has been by a good deal of management.

"Upon the important occasion and question now before the House, I propose to endeavour to induce them to avoid to involve the country in the additional difficulties of a difference of opinion, possibly a dispute, between the Houses, on a question in the decision of which it has been frequently asserted that their lordships had a personal interest; which assertion, however false as affecting each of them personally, could not be denied as affecting the proprietors of land in general.

"I am aware of the difficulty, but I don't despair of carrying the bill through.

"You must be the best judge of the course which you ought to take, and of the course most likely to conciliate the confidence of the House of Lords.

"My opinion is, that you should advise the House to vote that which would tend most to public order, and would be most beneficial to the immediate interests of the country.

"But do what you may, it will make no difference to me; you will always find me aiding and co-operating in the road of good order, Conservatism, and government;

and doing everything to establish and maintain your influence in the Conservative party, which my position may enable me to do.

"I am certain that the establishment of that influence, and your success in keeping the party united, are essential to the ease of the Queen, the maintenance of the religious and other institutions of the country, and the promotion of its best interest.

"I have to observe upon only one other point referred to in your letter, that is, the formation of another administration, which I have always considered as referable to the sovereign alone. I concur in opinion with you, that the difference in the Conservative party, arising out of the existing state of affairs, must be reconciled by a period of joint opposition to a Whig government. But if you should succeed, as I feel confident you will, in rallying round you the Conservative party in the House of Lords, I submit to you that if you should be required by the sovereign to form a government, you should not decline without taking time to consider of the proposition, and for inquiry as to the means of forming a government in the House of Commons, and the support which the Conservative party would give you there.

"Protection to agriculture is out of the question. I have considered the corn law of 1841 and 1842 to be at an end since the day on which Sir Robert Peel resigned his office, and recommended to the Queen to form another government. He never could return into parliament and retain that law, and I did not, and do not see in the House persons capable of retaining it. I shall be happy to go to you or to receive you here at any time you please. In the meantime this letter will

show you exactly how I stand, and what I mean to do in the measures now under consideration."

It is not to be supposed that the Duke corresponded during this great crisis exclusively with members of either House of Parliament, or with men who filled then, or had formerly filled, conspicuous places in the administration of the country. As had occurred during the agitation of the Reform Bill, every individual, high or low, who conceived that he had excogitated a new idea, wrote to explain it to the Duke. It appeared, indeed, as if his Grace's half-jocular expression were about to change its nature, and that the whole British people, regarding him as public property, considered that his time, as well as his purse, was at everybody's disposal. He had begun, however, before this, as the following extracts from his letters will show, to cut short such volunteer advisers. A great admirer of the sliding scale wrote from Bristol, on the 2nd of March, to say, that he had discovered a strong reason, not as yet adduced in either House, why the existing laws should be maintained. It amounted to this, that as foreign corn might be imported at an expense of at least 21*s.* per quarter below what was required to raise wheat at home, a few corn merchants, by combining together, could so operate upon the market as to throw the whole, or three-fourths, of English wheat-growing land out of cultivation. The Duke answered the communication thus:—

"Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington presents his compliments. He has received, and returns thanks, for Mr. ——'s letter of the 2nd inst. He begs leave to decline to correspond with any gentleman on any subject

which either is or may become the subject of discussion in her Majesty's cabinet or in the House of Parliament of which he is a member."

Another gentleman, equally zealous on the opposite side, had addressed to him, on the 13th of February, from Birmingham, an earnest and, as the writer doubtless imagined, an eloquent appeal on behalf of free-trade to the largest extent. It was answered in these terms:—

"Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to ——, and has received his letter. He begs leave to decline to correspond with any gentleman on subjects under the consideration of her Majesty's cabinet or in parliament."

He was a little more discursive in his rejoinder to a third stranger, who, writing from Wolverhampton, called his attention to certain errors, real or imaginary, in one of Sir Robert Peel's speeches:—

"Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to ——. He is the commander-in-chief of the army, but he has no control over, or connection with, Sir Robert Peel's speeches in parliament—above all, not with their correction or criticism. He recommends that —— should address the gentleman who made the error, and not one who had nothing to do with the speech, and knows nothing about it."

We must hurry over what remains to be told respecting the progress of the great measure, and of the effect upon the state of parties to which the success of the minister led. From the first it was evident to all lookers on, that the repeal of the corn laws must be

carried, and that a combination would immediately afterwards be entered into between the Whigs who supported, and the Tories who opposed the bill, to expel the administration from office. The Duke was strongly in favour of offering every resistance to this move, first by counter projects on the part of the cabinet, and next, should these fail, by dissolving parliament. But Peel declined to come into his views. He fought the corn-law question to a triumphant issue, and being defeated on a registration of arms bill for Ireland, at once resigned. The Duke, of course, retired with him; indeed he had written so early as the 12th of December to the Queen to prepare her Majesty for his final secession from political life. He adhered to that resolution, and never again, except when called up by some question which affected the military state of the country, took any prominent part even in the debates of the House of Lords.

CHAP. V.

THE DUKE IN PRIVATE LIFE.—HIS PECULIARITIES.—HIS FRIENDS.—MR. ARBUTHNOT.—HIS HABITS.—HIS ANXIETY ON THE SUBJECT OF NATIONAL DEFENCES.—HIS LAST ILLNESS, DEATH, AND FUNERAL.

1846-52.

We have now to follow the great Duke into private life; into a manner of life as private, at least, as was consistent with the due performance of the many official duties which still devolved upon him, and with the regular demands of the House of Lords upon his attendance, which he never omitted to render. His time he appears to have divided pretty much as he had done for many years previously, residing during the parliamentary session in London, and spending the recess partly at Strathfieldsaye, partly at Walmer. It was one of his amiable peculiarities, that whatever happened to be his own possessed great attractions in his eyes. Strathfieldsaye, a commodious house of the date of Queen Anne, but in an architectural point of view certainly not an imposing one, he regarded as one of the best in England. Of Walmer Castle he often said, that it was "the most charming marine residence he had ever seen—that the Queen herself had nothing to be compared with it." And Apsley House, as it had been rebuilt under his own superintendence, so it was, according to his view of such matters, without a defect. His pictures, his statuary, his furniture, his horses, and his carriages, were all regarded in the same light.

Of these latter, there was one which was in special favour with him, and which he valued the more because it owed its peculiar shape to his own ingenuity. Originally a cabriolet, he had prefixed to it a driving seat, by means of which it became a phaeton, having the perch of more than ordinary length, and the four wheels all of the same diameter. It was in this vehicle that, during the last years of his life, he was accustomed, in bad weather, to drive to and from the Horse Guards, and he spoke of it as the most comfortable and convenient of all his carriages.

Another of the Duke's peculiarities was, that though retaining to the last a warm regard for his old companions in arms, he entered very little with them, after he became a politician, into the amenities of social life. We have reason to believe that neither Lord Hill, nor Lord Raglan, nor Sir George Murray, ever visited the Duke at Strathfieldsaye; nor could they or others of similar standing, such as Lord Anglesey, Sir Edward Paget, and Sir James Kempt, be reckoned among the *habitués* of his hospitable gatherings in Apsley House. The circle in which he chiefly moved was that of fashionable ladies and gentlemen, who pressed themselves upon him, and were flattered, as indeed they had much reason to be, with the notice which he took of them, and by his presence at their parties. At the same time, the Duke knew perfectly well how to draw the line, even within that circle, between intimacy and mere acquaintanceship. From the friends of his youth he never withdrew the attachment which first brought them together, and among connections of later growth, there were some which he valued very highly. It would be invidious to particularise individuals, as if

they alone stood in this category; but the names among others, of Earl Stanhope, of the Earl of Clanwilliam, of the late Earl of Ellesmere, and of Colonel Gurwood, will at once occur to those who have had any opportunity of making themselves acquainted with the Duke's predilections and antipathies.

Of his old friends, none, perhaps, shared his confidence more fully than the late Mr. John Wilson Croker and Mr. Charles Arbuthnot. With the former, his acquaintance began when he was Irish Secretary, and it continued uninterrupted to the day of his death. It was, however, a wise confidence which his Grace gave. He relished Mr. Croker's society, because of the great extent of that gentleman's knowledge, and his varied powers of conversation. But he was not blind to the failings of the ex-Secretary to the Admiralty; and used to enjoy nothing more than seeing him, as occasionally happened, tripped up in an argument. Mr. Croker was one of his most regular correspondents, especially in seasons of political perplexity. The Duke did not always number him, on such occasions, amongst the most judicious of his advisers.

From Mr. Arbuthnot, on the other hand, he seems never to have kept back a thought. Mild and gentle in his deportment, that gentleman possessed, in no common degree, the quality of discretion; and gave himself up so entirely to the Duke and his concerns, as to postpone to them all apparent consideration of himself. He reaped his reward in such a measure of confidence and affection as were not bestowed upon any other human being. Latterly, indeed, after both had become widowers, Mr. Arbuthnot occupied apartments in Apsley House, and was the

Duke's constant companion for a portion, at least, of the months which he passed in the country, as well at Walmer as at Strathfieldsaye. It was touching to witness the regard of these old men, one to the other ; and especially to observe the degree of tenderness with which the Duke watched over the comforts of his friend. Though nearly of the same age, Mr. Arbuthnot was physically more infirm than the Duke, and the Duke knew it. Hence, after they had walked together for a while, in an autumnal evening, on the beach beneath the castle, the Duke would stop short and say: "Now, Arbuthnot, you've been out long enough. The dew is falling, and you will catch cold; you must go in." And like a child obeying the behests of its mother or its nurse, Arbuthnot, not always without a brief remonstrance, would leave the Duke to continue his walk alone, and withdraw into the castle.

Having touched upon this matter, we may as well sacrifice chronological order to bring our narrative of the friendship of the two men to an end. Mr. Arbuthnot, after living with the Duke for many years, was at last seized with the malady from which he was not to recover. Dr. Ferguson was sent for, and having carefully examined his patient, he made a report to the Duke, that the case was hopeless. They were sitting together in that back room which the Duke usually occupied, and which, as it still continues in the state in which his Grace left it, so, let us hope, that it will be retained in the same condition while Apsley House shall endure. The Duke drew his chair close to Ferguson's, in order that he might hear; and when the doom was uttered, he seized the doctor's hand, and rubbing it between his own, and gazing into Ferguson's face, exclaimed in a broken voice, "No, no ;

he's not very ill, not very bad,—he'll get better. It's only his stomach which is out of order. He'll not die." But he did die, in spite of all the nursing with which the Duke personally tended him, and the eagerness with which his Grace clung to every symptom which he could by any means interpret as favourable.

Mr. Arbuthnot was buried in Kensal Green, and the Duke attended his funeral. While the service was read, the hero of a hundred fights sat wrapped in his mourning cloak, with tears streaming down his cheeks. There is a custom there, for which the Duke was evidently not prepared. At that stage in the service, when the clergyman reads the words, "earth to earth, dust to dust, ashes to ashes," the coffin is made, by machinery, to sink slowly under the floor of the chapel. The Duke, when he saw the coffin begin to sink, gave a start. He watched it with intense apparent interest till it disappeared; but he could not be persuaded to descend afterwards into the vault. What passed within his mind during that interval, who shall undertake to say? But whatever it might be, it stayed his tears, and sent him back, calm and collected, as soon as the funeral service was over, to the haunts of busy men.

They who never visited the Duke at Strathfieldsaye, or at Walmer, can form no accurate idea of his qualities as a private member of society. At both places, but especially at the latter, he seemed to lay aside all the conventionalities of life, as it passes in the capital. He was perfectly at ease himself, and leaving his guests to do as they preferred, he placed them at their ease also. His general habits, to which he adhered to the last, may be thus described.

He rose early, and read and wrote till ten o'clock.

At ten, breakfast was served, after which he withdrew again to his own room, where he remained till about two in the afternoon. He then joined his friends, rode or drove out with them, or walked, as the case might be, making himself most agreeable to all who approached him. At seven he dined. The Duke ate but twice a day, at breakfast and dinner. Though not a large feeder he ate fast, and had an excellent appetite. He was never given to much wine, and in later years found it advisable to cease from the use of it altogether. But the hospitalities of his table were generous. His conversation also, till deafness grew upon him, was lively and instructive, and at table he made it as general as possible. About nine, or occasionally later, he would say, "Will anybody have any more wine?" and then rise and propose to go to the drawing-room for coffee. It was a peculiarity of his that he always led the way on these occasions, the ladies having, *more Anglicano*, retired somewhat earlier. In the drawing-room he sat usually in an arm-chair near the fire-place, and chatted with such of his guests as drew near him. There was a total absence of restraint, for every one present felt that he was at liberty to do as he pleased. Cards were never introduced, but books and newspapers lay on all the tables, and the conversation rarely flagged. About eleven the ladies usually retired, and half an hour afterwards the Duke would light his candle and say, "I am going to bed; whoever leaves the room last will ring for the lights to be put out."

The Duke was an excellent sleeper, indeed he seemed to have the faculty of sleeping whenever he chose, and it was an unbroken slumber with him, when in health, from the time he laid his head on the pillow till he rose

again. It is said of him, that when one of his lady friends expressed surprise that he should continue to make use of a bed on which there was no room to turn, his answer was, "When one begins to turn in bed it is time to get up."

The Duke's conversation was of the most varied kind. He read a great deal, and forgot nothing. His favourite authors were Clarendon, Bishop Butler, Smith's "Wealth of Nations," Hume, the Archduke Charles, Gibbon, Leslie, and the Bible. But he did not confine himself to these. Every new work of any merit which came out, he read; and he was especially interested in French and English memoirs, and what our neighbours call "materials for history." Nor was he obliged to go far in search of this intellectual pabulum. There was scarcely an English author, there was certainly not an English novelist, who failed to send the Duke a copy of his book; indeed, to such an extent was this habit carried, that his Grace was obliged, at last, to give orders that no parcels of books should be taken in, unless he knew beforehand that they were coming. But he was peculiar in his reading, as in other things.

It chanced, on one occasion, that he was in want, when at Walmer, of a new book. Niebuhr's History was recommended to him; and he began it. He read on till he reached the narrative of Cæsar's cruelty to his prisoners; and there shut the book. Nothing could induce him to go further. This was too much. He could not have his idols so thrown down.

The Duke did not approve of the habitual, and therefore common-place, discussion of sacred subjects, but as often as they were introduced, you might perceive by his change of manner, that he felt himself to be upon

holy ground. Of the Lord's Prayer he used to say, that "it contained the sum total of religion and of morals." But the greatest enjoyment to his friends was when they could get him to discuss his own campaigns. When asked which of the French marshals he considered the best officer? he replied, "Massena, I always found him where I least desired that he should be." Of the campaign of Salamanca he spoke as of "the most perfect piece of manœuvring which the world had seen since the times of Frederick the Great." Soult he respected, but observed, "though his plans seemed always to be admirable, he never knew when to strike." His opinion of Napoleon was a very mixed one. He considered him "a great man, but also a great actor." And here we may insert an anecdote, which, though it be not immediately connected with his daily proceedings at Walmer, may tend to illustrate the subject of which we are speaking.

On the 8th of December, 1825, the following persons met at Teddesley, the seat of Lord Hatherton, then Mr. Littleton; the Duke of Wellington, Mr. Richard and Lady Harriet Bagot, Mr. Peel, Mr. Croker, Mr. George Fortescue, Mr. and Mrs. Foster Cunliffe, and Mr. and Mrs. Littleton. After dinner the conversation turned on the Waterloo campaign, when Croker alluded to the criticisms of the French military writers, some of whom contended that the Duke had fought the battle in a position full of danger, because he had no practicable retreat. The Duke said, "At all events they failed in putting it to the test. The road to Brussels was, however, practicable, every yard, for such a purpose. I knew every foot of the plain beyond the forest and through it. The forest on each side of the chaussée

was open enough for infantry, cavalry, and even for artillery, and very defensible. Had I retreated through it, could they have followed me? The Prussians were on their flank, and would have been in their rear. The co-operation of the Prussians in the operations I undertook was part of my plan, and I was not deceived. But I never contemplated a retreat on Brussels. Had I been forced from my position, I should have retreated to my right, towards the coast, the shipping, and my resources. I had placed Hill where he could have lent me important assistance in many contingencies, and that might have been one. And again I ask, if I had retreated on my right, would Napoleon have ventured to follow me? The Prussians already on his flank would have been in his rear. But my plan was to keep my ground till the Prussians appeared, and then to attack the French position; and I executed my plan." On quitting the room, Croker remarked that he had never heard the Duke say as much on that subject before.

It was not, however, exclusively by dealing with great subjects like this, that the Duke delighted his auditors. When speaking of his own wars he had numberless stories to tell, both of individuals and of corps, some of them very ludicrous—all of them deeply interesting. For example, he used to say of his old aide-de-camp, Sir Colin Campbell, who died at last, Lieut.-Governor of Plymouth, a man gallant, trustworthy, and naturally intelligent, "that he knew no language except his own, and that not very correctly. I had a French cook in Spain, and Colin had charge of my domestic affairs. The *batterie* was not, as you may suppose, very perfect, and the cook came to Colin to complain. Neither un-

derstood a word of what the other was saying, but I overheard this pass between them. 'Mais, monsieur, comment travailler?' 'Travel!' said Colin, 'why you travel in a coach!' On another occasion when we were in St. Jean de Luz, I had the mayor and all the magnates to dine with me. In going away the mayor took up an umbrella which belonged to Colin, upon which Colin seized the other end of it, took it away, and said with a low bow, 'C'est *moine*.'"

Speaking of the battle of Vimeira, the Duke observed, "The French came on, on that occasion, with great boldness, and seemed to feel their way less than I always found them do afterwards. They came on, as usual, in very heavy columns, and I received them in line, which they were not accustomed to, and we repulsed them three several times."

Referring to the advance from the Ebro to the Douro, the Duke stated that "he got famously taken in on that occasion." "The troops had taken to plundering a good deal. It was necessary to stop it, and I issued an order announcing that the first man taken in the act should be hanged upon the spot. One day, just as we were sitting down to dinner, three men were brought to the door of the tent by the prevôt. The case against them was clear, and I had nothing for it but to desire that they should be taken away, and hanged in some place where they might be seen by the whole column in its march next day. I had a good many guests with me on that occasion, and among the rest, I think, Lord Nugent. They seemed dreadfully shocked, and could not eat their dinner. I didn't like it much myself, but as I told them I had no time to indulge my feelings. I must do my duty. Well, the dinner went

off rather gravely, and next morning sure enough, three men in uniform were seen hanging from the branches of a tree close to the high road. It was a terrible example, and produced the desired effect; there was no more plundering. But you may guess what my astonishment was, when some months afterwards I learned, that one of my staff took counsel with Dr. Hume, and as three men had just died in hospital, they hung them up, and let the three culprits return to their regiments." "Weren't you very angry, Duke?" was the question. "Well, I suppose I was at first; but as I had no wish to take the poor fellows' lives, and only wanted the example, and as the example had the desired effect, my anger soon died out, and I confess to you that I am very glad now that the three lives were spared."

Talking of Napoleon, and the influence which he exercised over his troops, the Duke gave a curious instance of their belief that resistance to him was hopeless. The circumstance occurred at the battle of Waterloo. "I had three battalions of Nassau troops under my command; they were the same who, after being beaten by us a dozen times in the Peninsula, came over in a body on the 11th of December, 1813. I put them in the park at Hougoumont, and expected that, being old soldiers, they would keep their ground. But the moment the French began to advance, I saw them waver. It was this which made me withdraw them, and put a battalion of the guards in their place. I ascertained afterwards just what I expected to find, that the name of Napoleon had beaten them before they fired a shot; and that if I had left them there, the park, and probably Hugoumont itself, would have been carried at a rush."

Though free in discussing the merits of those to whom

he had been opposed, the Duke was delicate in giving any opinion respecting the military abilities of the officers who served under him. Being pressed on one occasion to say which among them all he considered to be his most promising pupil, he replied: "That is not a fair question; it is not for me to answer it. Wait till they have opportunities of showing what they can do, and then you will find out." "But was not Moore a first-rate officer?" "Moore was no pupil of mine; he was as brave as his own sword; but he did not know what men could do or could not do." "And Hope?" "I entertained a high opinion of Hope; he served but a short time with me, but I found him to be very intelligent." "And Hardinge?" "Well, Hardinge is a very clever fellow." Beyond this the Duke could never be prevailed upon to go.

Both at Strathfieldsaye and Walmer, the Duke was a regular attendant at public worship, and received the Sacrament as often as it was administered. It was a touching sight to see that great and venerable man, kneeling devoutly before the rails of the village church, with the sunlight falling through the stained glass upon his head, and his own attention fixed entirely upon the act in which he was participating. He was not always so attentive during sermon time. Indeed, unless the preacher were eloquent, or the subject out of the common, he used generally to gather himself up into the corner of the pew and go to sleep, when he sometimes snored audibly. He was very particular also in requiring that his guests should attend divine service somewhere. It happened on one occasion that Count Nugent, an Irish gentleman, but an Austrian general, paid him a visit at Walmer Castle. Sunday morning came, and his ex-

cellency said, "Duke, do you go to church?" "Always, don't you?" "I can't go to church with you, for you know I'm a Catholic." "Oh, very well," was the answer, and he rang the bell. When the servant entered, the Duke said, "His excellency wants to go to the Roman Catholic chapel, you can show him where it is." And sure enough to the Roman Catholic chapel his excellency was marched. The Duke was a good deal tickled, and as we walked to church, observed, "I knew he did not want me to go to church, nor to go himself either, but I thought it best that we should both go."

And here, though somewhat out of place, we may be permitted to detail an anecdote which does equal credit to the venerable prelate who administered the advice, and to the great warrior and statesman who took it in such excellent part.

After one of those severe attacks of illness which from time to time laid him prostrate, and awakened the sympathies of the whole nation, the Duke received a letter from the present bishop of Exeter, which not only expressed his lordship's lively satisfaction at his Grace's recovery, but called the Duke's attention to the fact that, before the Author of all, human greatness is nothing; and that it would be especially becoming in one who had achieved, like himself, the highest pitch of glory, if he publicly evinced his reverence for God and for religion. That letter, with the Duke's reply, will, we trust, sooner or later, be published at length. Meanwhile we must be content to state, that the Duke thanked his monitor for the advice so kindly given, and entered into a long and most satisfactory statement of his own religious principles and practices. He was neither the

careless nor the profligate man which the world represented him to be. Wherever his example was likely to tell, he attended public worship regularly; and would do so in London also, except that he could not hear a word that was said for years. He used to be present at the early morning service in the Chapel Royal, till he found that in winter he could no longer do so, without getting laid up with cold. No man knew better, no man felt more keenly than he, the nothingness of human power and glory; and if he did not trust, as the bishop advised him to do, he could have no hope at all for the future.

The Duke never appeared so fretful and dissatisfied, as when the French and English squadrons, which were about to blockade the Scheldt, cast anchor together in the Downs. It seemed to him an outrage on nature that England should ally herself with France, in order to dismember a kingdom which she had been mainly instrumental in consolidating, with a view to keep France in check. He did not, however, allow his feelings to over-ride his habitual good breeding and hospitality. He invited the commanders of both squadrons to the castle, though he was probably not sorry that the state of the weather would not permit the French admiral to land.

The Duke was very proud of his eyesight, which indeed continued to be remarkably good and clear to the last. He has been heard to say that he was able to distinguish the national flags of ships passing up and down channel, at distances which made them perfectly unintelligible to others; and he even asserted, and no doubt believed, that at night he could, from the ramparts of the castle, see the lights in the town of Calais. This, assuming the distance to be what

it is stated to be, was, we suspect, impossible; but there is no doubt that the Duke could, at eighty-three years of age, read in the open air a well-written manuscript without using spectacles.

The Duke's fondness for children was great; and he was, as might be expected, strongly attached to his own grandchildren, the children of his son, Lord Charles. One of these was taken ill when on a visit at Walmer, and the Duke's anxiety about the little sufferer knew no limits.

But the feeling was not new with him, as it sometimes is with men who, for the first time, come under its influence when they are well stricken in years. Though never demonstrative, under any circumstances, and through the pressure of constant business, cut off from indulging much in pastime with his sons, he was extremely fond of them, and took the deepest and the truest interest in their early training and education. The Rev. William Wagner, vicar of Brighton, became tutor to the present Duke, then Marquess of Douro, and to Lord Charles Wellesley, in 1817; and he thus describes his first interview with their illustrious father:—

"In 1817, when the Duke sent for me to go to him at Mont St. Martin, the head-quarters of the army of occupation, at the very first interview he told me his intention was that 'his boys should serve the King.' He desired that they might be brought up as Christian gentlemen, in all singleness and simplicity, every consideration being postponed to that of duty. The interest which he took in their education may, in a manner, be exemplified by a single fact. During a period of seven years that I was with the Marquess of Douro and Lord Charles Wellesley, he (the Duke) never failed to

answer by the very first post any inquiry or letter connected with the well-being of his sons. No matter what were the Duke's occupations, whether *en route* for the inspection of the fortresses in the Low Countries; whether at the congress of Verona, or on a special mission to St. Petersburg, he invariably answered my letters touching his sons by the first post; and the same exactitude prevailed in the transmission of money for the payment of bills at Eton and elsewhere." On this head, indeed, he was always most particular; and he did his best to stamp the same character of punctuality on the moral being of his sons. He laid it down as a rule for their guidance at Eton, that they should purchase nothing for which they had not in their pockets the means of paying. But the following letter to Mr. Wagner, written after the young men had entered the university, sets this matter in so clear a light, that we make no apology for transcribing it.

"Hatfield, October 10, 1824.

"My dear Sir,—I have received your letter of the 7th, to which I proceed to give an answer; and I request you to communicate it to my sons, which will save both me and them trouble.

"After all the inquiries which I have made, I believe that the allowance which they ought to have, and which would go nearest to provide for their education at Oxford, excluding a private tutor, but including everything else, would be for Douro, who will be entered as a nobleman, 800*l.* per annum, including his half-pay; and for Charles, who will be entered as a gentleman commoner, 500*l.* per annum, besides his half-pay. I,

therefore, by this post, direct Messrs. Coutts to pay Douro 200*l.*, and Charles 125*l.*, on the 1st October, 1st January, 1st April, and 1st July each year, beginning with the 1st inst.

"I beg that Charles will observe that I make him this allowance, at present, in order that he may defray the expenses of his education. He must recollect, however, that he is only a younger brother, and that it is not at all clear that he will ever have so much again, unless he should make it by his own industry and talent; and I beg you will tell them both that when I entered the world I had just the sum for the whole year which I now give Charles every quarter.

"I intend that these allowances shall cover all expenses of every description; and I have reason to believe them so ample that I expect they will not run in debt; particularly as I begin by paying them in advance, and as I will take upon myself the following expenses:—

"The entrance fees at the college and university for both.

"The expenses of the nobleman's and gentleman-commoner's gowns.

"They must pay for the furniture of their rooms themselves, but if you should think the expense too heavy upon them immediately, I would advance the money, and they can repay me hereafter.

"I give them the horses which they now have with them, of which they may dispose as they may think proper; and they may take any servants they please out of my house or stables, they, of course, paying their wages, and also their expenses, from the time of their leaving me.

"Accordingly, if you let me know what the entrance-money is, and the expense of the gowns, I will send you the money.

"I beg you to impress upon them that there is but one certain and infallible way of avoiding debt, that is, first, to determine to incur no expense, to defray which the money is not in their pockets; secondly, to pay the money immediately for everything they get, and for every expense they incur. They will then be certain that everything they have is their own, and they will know at all times what they can and what they cannot do. There is nothing so easy, provided they begin in time; and I give them these ample allowances, and pay them beforehand, purposely that they may at once pay for everything the moment they get it.

"They should, in adopting this system, advert to the expenses of the college, which they have to defray themselves, their servants' wages and clothes, the keep of their horses, and lay by a sufficiency to defray their expenses till the 1st January. The remainder will be their own, and they will lay it out as they please; observing always, that if this remainder is laid out uselessly or idly, and they act up rigidly to the system of paying for everything at the time they get it, they may want clothes or other necessaries, or reasonable gratifications, before the quarter will expire.

"I think it best to remind them of all this, because I hope that they and I will have no further discussion upon these subjects. In respect of their studies, I am very anxious about their mathematics, as essential to those who serve in the army. If you will let me know what the course is in the university, I will give you my

opinion upon other matters. They should likewise have a perfect knowledge of modern geography and history, of course, but I shall hear further from you on these points. I will go and see them shortly after they shall have gone to Oxford, where they ought to be on the 14th. They had better probably go to Strathfieldsaye to make their arrangements for their departure, as soon as you will receive this letter.

"I wish you would let each of them keep a copy of this letter, and send me one."

Though not himself a scholar, the Duke was remarkably alive to the charm of scholarship, and seemed to value his brother, Lord Wellesley, almost more for his success at Eton, than for any of the great deeds which he performed in after years. He was, therefore, very anxious that his sons should excel in all their school and college exercises, and was in the habit of requiring from them weekly reports of their course of study, and of the themes and verses which they wrote. The latter he sent, from time to time, to Lord Wellesley, in order to obtain his corrections and opinion; and on many of the former, which now lie before us, his own remarks in pencil remain. One of Lord Wellesley's answers to these communications from the Duke will, we are sure, be read with interest.

"Richmond, May 2, 1821.

"My dear Arthur,—I was much gratified by your kind attention in sending me the exercises of your sons. I could not answer your letter until I had examined them carefully; they were naturally very interesting to me, and they have afforded me sincere pleasure.

"I assure you that they are superior in a high de-

gree to the ordinary scale of exercises of that class during my time. It was a great satisfaction to me to observe the regular progress of improvement, especially in Douro's exercises, from the first to the last copy of verses. Douro's verses, upon the character of Homer's poetry, are highly creditable, and his four concluding verses of that exercise display considerable spirit and original thought. Tell him from me, that the boy who admires Homer must have made great proficiency.

"Charles's exercises are very promising, and I think he has already attained a sense of the harmony of Latin verse. There are two copies marked 'Gerald Wellesley;' I suppose the author is Henry's boy; they are also very creditable for the fourth form.

"I consider these efforts as the true foundation of distinction in the progress of life. Not that I should wish to see your sons distinguished as writers of Latin verses in future times; but these exercises at school are essential to the accurate knowledge of the great fountain of ancient genius, science, and taste, as well as of the ancient examples of virtue, honour, and glory. The habit of composition in the ancient languages is most useful, if not absolutely necessary, to those who desire completely to understand those languages; at all events, it is useful to employ young persons in acquiring such accomplishments, and it is satisfactory to find that they apply themselves with the zeal and success which these exercises display.

"Always, my dear Arthur,

"Yours most affectionately,

"WELLESLEY."

"N.B. The Latin verses of your boys are much more

correct, and better in every respect, than those published by *the eighth wonder of the world, Master Dallas.*"

Mr. Wagner naturally passes from this subject to notice some of the Duke's peculiarities as a man of business, and within the domestic circle. "It was always a positive pleasure," he says, "to transact business with him, for this reason, that he was never small, even in small matters. He was true, generous, confiding, unselfish, great in little as well as in great things. His promptitude surpassed that of all other men with whom I ever came in contact. Take the following example:—It was about the year 1819 that I went to Apsley House, to tell the Duke that there was a house vacant, which was well calculated for the reception of his boys and myself. On entering his sitting-room, I found him buckling on his sword. He bade me enter at once upon business, because he was on the point of going to Carlton House. 'The rent of the house,' I said, 'is so much.' 'Take it,' he replied. 'The taxes are so much.' 'Pay them.' 'The furniture is so much,' 'Buy it. Have you anything more to say?' 'No, sir.' 'Then, good morning.'

"When at Strathfieldsaye, the Duke played tennis in the tennis court, which was a riding-school in Lord Rivers' time, and which the Duke had converted to its present use. His Grace and I were, perhaps, more equally matched than men usually are, and hence the Duke often, I might almost say invariably, sent to ask me, whether I was disposed to play at tennis with him. On one occasion I remember to have made a chance, back-handed, violent return of the ball, which was so rapid and twisting that he could not get out of its way. It

struck him on the side. I jumped over the net, and expressed my regret; secretly wishing that I, and not he, had received the blow. He rubbed the place, and referred to a custom in India, of rubbing for a variety of ills. He then resumed the game, and would not leave off till he had played out the set."

Long after the elasticity which carried him through such sports as this was gone, the love of children indicated in his treatment of his sons remained, of which the following instance, taken at random from many, seems to deserve notice.

There was an order against strangers wandering from the road which leads up to the gate, and getting into the grounds and shrubberies about Walmer Castle. It happened, on one occasion, that a lady, ignorant of the existence of that order, strayed into the paddock with two children, and was, as a matter of course, warned off by one of the servants. The Duke rode up just as the warning was administered, and asking what was the matter, received from the lady an account of the mistake which she had committed, with a nervous apology for the same. "Oh, never mind, never mind," was his answer. "You're quite welcome to go where you will. And, by the by, bring the children here to-morrow at one o'clock, and I'll show them all about the place myself."

The lady came, as desired, and was delighted to find that the Duke had prepared a dinner for her children, and lunch for herself, with fruit. The young people ate their fill, and the Duke, after showing them through the castle, and over the garden, hung a half-sovereign suspended from a blue ribbon round each of their necks, before he sent them away. Without doubt these gold

medals will be highly prized, not by the individuals only who wore them on that day, but by their descendants, to many generations, if they have any.

The Duke's temper, never naturally a placid one, became more irritable as the infirmities of age grew upon him; and he found it impossible, very frequently, to restrain it. But he never gave way to a burst of passion without regretting it, and showing, if the opportunity offered, by some unmistakable proof, that he had wounded himself more than he had wounded others. This was particularly the case in his dealings with his valet, one of the most faithful and most attached domestics that ever waited upon a great man. Take the following example.

The Duke's bell sounded very violently, and when the servant entered, he was seen standing beside his table. "What have you done with the book I was reading last night? I laid it there,—just there!" striking the table with his hand, "and you have taken it away. What have you done with it?" "I never saw it, your Grace, I never touched it." "But you must have seen it, and you did touch it; where is it?" And then he would get into a towering passion, and walk up and down the room, blaming everybody, till the servant retired. By and by he would recollect that he had taken it into another room and left it there; upon which he would ring the bell again, and on the servant showing himself, he would ask some ordinary question. The answer being given, he would reply in a tone of marked kindness, "Thank you, I am much obliged to you." The valet perfectly understood that this was as much as if he had said, "I've done you wrong, pray forgive me."

Of the Duke's liberality to persons in distress, some notice has elsewhere been taken. His generosity appeared, against all precedent, to have increased with his years. He subscribed also, but quietly, to many charitable institutions, and especially to orphan asylums, assigning as his reason, that he had been the involuntary means of making many orphans, and was therefore bound to do what he could to provide for them. That he was imposed upon continually is quite true, and it is equally true that he was not blind to these acts of imposition; yet they never dried up the springs of his benevolence. One among many instances of the extent to which he suffered himself to be plundered, obtained publicity in consequence of the case having been brought into a police court; yet we question whether even that has been correctly narrated. It was this:—

A band of noted impostors had for months made the Duke their prey. They wrote to him now, in the character of officers' widows; now, as the daughters of officers; now as ladies who had fallen from virtue, and were anxious to regain a place in society; and on every occasion he sent them money. At last Mr. Kendal (the Duke's valet), whose suspicions had been awakened by the similarity of the handwriting on letters to which registered replies were returned, communicated with the Mendicity Office, and the plot being discovered, the parties to it were arraigned before the magistrate, and committed to prison. We must not forget to add, that the Duke never became aware of Kendal's interference in the matter. Had such a discovery been effected, the probabilities are that Kendal's connection with his master would have ceased immediately. And yet the Duke used to complain in his private letters, of the

endless applications that were made to him, and of the spirit which seemed to suggest them, as thus : —

"September 8, 1852.

"It is certainly very curious, that every blackguard beggar, male or female, no matter of what country, considers it the right of each to demand money from me! and that every lady or gentleman, whether I am acquainted with them or not, considers that he has a right to demand the service of my power and influence in favour of some relation of the writer, or that, if I have any office, or advantage, or benefit in my gift or at my disposal, the applicant considers himself as exceedingly ill-treated if I do not dispose of the same as he desires. I am certain it is generally understood that I am a good-natured man, who will do anything; and that moreover I have been highly rewarded and am still in the public service, and that everything I have belongs to the public; as certainly would be the case if I were an *emancipated slave.* I cannot otherwise account for the demands made upon me."

The Duke's hospitality to his neighbours in Walmer, and to the officers of the regiments quartered there and at Dover, were great. Two or three times a week, during his autumnal residence in Kent, he had dinner parties, which all who were present at them enjoyed, because they seemed to be agreeable to their host. He was most particular, too, on such occasions, not to disappoint his guests, even if he should himself be put to inconvenience. It happened, on one occasion, that he invited as he supposed, all the officers not on duty in Dover Castle to dine with him. Captain Watts, the captain of Walmer Castle, happened to discover that

one young officer had been accidentally passed over, and knowing how keen the disappointment to the youth would be, he ventured to state the circumstance to the Duke. "How many are there to dinner?" was the Duke's reply; and when informed that the table would hold an additional guest, he said, "By all means, write and invite him too."

On another day, when the officers from Walmer barracks had been invited, the Duke was taken, about four in the afternoon, with one of those fits to which he was liable. As he was extremely ill, his servants, when he rallied a little, were naturally desirous of putting off the dinner. Captain Watts accordingly went to his Grace's bedroom, and made the proposal; but the Duke would not hear of it. "Let the dinner go on;" and the dinner did go on, Captain Watts and Dr. M'Arthur doing the honours of the table.

One of the common penalties of greatness the Duke was called upon to pay more frequently than perhaps any Englishman of modern times. He sat to painters and sculptors over and over again; and, on the whole, bore the infliction patiently. Once or twice it is recorded that his temper got the better of him; but this befell only when the artist was, or his Grace believed him to be, unpunctual in keeping his engagements. Generally speaking, he was composed, and sufficiently in good humour. Among others he sat to Leslie, who had received a royal command to paint the ceremony of the coronation, introducing portraits of the principal persons present. Leslie resided then at Abercorn-place, in one of the districts of St. John's Wood; and the Duke, immediately on entering the studio, remarked, "It's a long way to come, Mr. Leslie—five miles." "No, sir," was

the answer, "not quite so far as that. But if your Grace finds it inconvenient to come to me, I can easily go to Apsley House." "Very well," replied the Duke: and to Apsley House Leslie accordingly went the very next day appointed for a sitting. He was greeted thus: "Well, don't you find it a long way to come — five miles?"

Either on this or some other occasion the Duke, after having ascertained how the artist wished him to sit, observed, "Now, mind the shape of my head. It's a square head. I know it, for Chantrey told me so."

The single-mindedness of such a remark would excite our astonishment were the story told of any other man but the Duke; but that perfect simplicity was one of the peculiarities of his nature was remarkably illustrated on the occasion of a morning visit which he paid to Mr. Croker, during his temporary sojourn in England at an early stage in the Peninsular war. The municipality of Lisbon, grateful for the deliverance of their country from Junot's army, had requested Sir Arthur Wellesley to sit for his portrait; and, the portrait being afterwards engraved, the words "VICTOR INVICTUS" were printed beneath. Mr. Croker, by some means or another, obtained a copy of this engraving, which he showed to Sir Arthur; whereupon Sir Arthur wrote with his pencil under the motto, "Don't halloo till you're out of the wood." The portrait, with his Grace's pencil criticism attached to it, is still, we believe, in Mrs. Croker's possession.

As a landlord, the Duke was liberal and very considerate. In order to prevent all ground of clashing between the tenantry and the incumbent of Strathfieldsaye, he charged himself, long before the bill for the commutation of tithes came into force, with the pay-

ment of the latter. He laid out large sums, also, in draining and improving the land, and in rebuilding and putting into complete repair all the farms, homesteads, and cottages on the estate. Indeed, he never applied to his own use one farthing of the rents which accrued from his Hampshire property. "I do this," he observed, "out of consideration for future Dukes of Wellington. I am a rich man, because I have my pay as commander-in-chief, and hold other offices under government. My successor will not have these sources of income, and I therefore consider it my duty to lay by for him all that is not required out of my rents, to put and keep the property in perfect order."

Of the Duke's rigid integrity an instance occurred in reference to this estate, which is well worth placing on record. Some farm adjoining to his lands was for sale, and his agent negotiated for him the purchase. Having concluded the business, he went to the Duke, and told him that he had made a capital bargain. "What do you mean?" asked the Duke. "Why, your Grace, I have got the farm for so much, and I know it to be worth at least so much more." "Are you quite sure of that?" "Quite sure, your Grace, for I have carefully surveyed it." "Very well, then pay the gentleman from me the balance between what you have already given and the real value of the estate;" and it was done.

It is not to be supposed that the Duke, though he withdrew himself from the turmoil of party politics, was therefore forgetful of the wants of the country, or indifferent to them. A subject which had long been present to his mind, now appeared well nigh to engross it. He considered that England lay at the mercy of

any great continental power which possessed a navy, and was willing to run some risks in order to attack her; and looking to the political state of France, and remembering the occasions on which, since the accession of Louis Philippe, war between France and England seemed imminent, the thought of what might have befallen, and would befall, were some future quarrel to be pushed to an extremity, haunted him like a nightmare. It was a subject on which he not only spoke freely to all who approached him, but about which he communicated in memoranda, and in official and private letters with almost every member of the government. He showed that we had not at sea, or ready to put to sea, a force sufficient to hold its own against a sudden attempt on the part of our neighbours to gain temporary command of the channel. He demonstrated that to meet an invasion on shore, we had neither men, nor guns, nor horses, in a state of preparation. And being requested to make suggestions, he drew up a paper, wherein he sketched a plan for the preparation of works, purely defensive, on which, though certainly not with much energy or spirit, successive governments have ever since acted. It was, in substance, this :—

After pointing out that the application of steam to purposes of navigation, had converted the channel into little more than a broad river, while, at the same time, it rendered such a system of blockade as had prevailed in the late war impossible, his Grace asked, first, for a fleet, which should be more than a match for anything that France could bring against it; and next, for certain harbours of refuge, which should combine the advantages of shelter, in all weathers, with strategetical position. He considered the Channel Islands, Jersey, Guernsey,

and Alderney, to be the key of the whole of our outer line of defence. In each of these he required that a harbour of refuge should be constructed, of sufficient capacity and depth of water to receive a stout squadron; and then, with Portsmouth well guarded on one flank, and Plymouth on the other, he held that England would be pretty safe from invasion on a large scale. For Jersey, Alderney, and Guernsey being within a few miles of the French coast, interpose between Cherbourg and St. Malo, Brest, and the harbours in the Bay of Biscay. It would be impossible, therefore, for a fleet which might have assembled in the first of these ports, to form a junction with the squadrons in any of the others, without being observed and attacked: unless, indeed, in seeking to form this junction it were to take the outer passage, in which case it would be seen from the Isle of Wight, and its progress barred by the Portsmouth division.

Next to the Channel Islands, he regarded Seaford as the most important station along the entire southern coast. If properly provided with a harbour and fortifications, it would cover all the exposed space which lies between Selsey and Beachy Head; where facilities of landing from boats are ample, and from which many excellent roads branch off in converging lines towards London. He did not think meanly either of Portland, or Newhaven, or even of Dover. The security to be afforded by properly dealing with these was considerable. But provided government gave him the Channel Islands, Seaford, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, all completely fortified and fitted to receive respectively their squadrons, then he was satisfied that, though it might be impossible to prevent marauding parties from landing

here and there, England would be placed beyond any risk of invasion on such a scale as to endanger her existence, or even to put the capital in jeopardy.

Providing thus an outer line of defence, he asked for men and *matériel*, wherewith to meet an enemy, should he succeed in breaking through that line. He would be satisfied with an addition of 20,000 men to the regular army; provided such a force of militia were raised as would enable him to dispose of 70,000 men among the principal fortresses and arsenals in the kingdom, and to keep two corps of 50,000 men respectively, in hand, one in the neighbourhood of London, the other near Dublin. He would thus have open to him all the great lines of railway, which would enable him to meet with rapidity any danger, from whatever side of the capital it might threaten.

The militia for which he asked, he proposed to raise to the extent of 150,000 men, by beat of drum if possible, by the operation of the ballot, if voluntary enlistment should fail. He required that in time of peace the whole force should be out for training four months in every year,—a space of time not long enough in his opinion to convert recruits into perfect soldiers, but sufficiently so to give to the men the habit of depending on one another, and acting together. Such a force he preferred to an army of reserve, composed of soldiers discharged after their regular term of service, which the ministers talked of enrolling at an annual expense of 8*l.* or 9*l.* per man; and he expressed himself confident that were these means supplied, he should be able, old as he was, to provide for the safety of the country.

The memorandum of which we have thus extracted the substance, went the round of the government offices,

and was commented upon, discussed, and partially answered, long before his memorable letter to Sir John Burgoyne made its appearance. But no results followed. Plans and estimates might or might not be called for, and farther correspondence seems to have been carried on, among others with the Inspector General of Fortifications; but not a man was raised, not a ship was built, not a stone was laid in the Channel Islands, at Seaford, or anywhere else, except at Dover. It was under these circumstances that the Duke addressed to Sir John Burgoyne, in answer to a communication from that officer, one of the most touching, as well as able letters, which ever proceeded from his pen. His Grace never intended that the letter in question should go before the public. On this, as on other subjects, he held to his own, or rather to Napoleon's maxim, that we "should wash our foul linen at home." But Sir John having given it, as well as some important papers besides, to be copied, it fell into indiscreet hands, and made its way to the newspapers. The blunder was a source of extreme annoyance to Sir John, and of positive indignation to the Duke. Yet out of evil to individuals, public good often arises. The people of England, whom inferior authorities could not move, became alarmed when the Duke of Wellington spoke out; and the government, acted upon by the force of public opinion, could no longer refuse to treat as serious, a subject which had taken such fast hold of the foremost military mind of the age.

The Duke's letter to Sir John Burgoyne appears to us so important, that it ought not to be omitted from any narrative which professes to describe the career of

the illustrious writer. In a national point of view, likewise, it deserves to be kept continually before the eyes of the government and the legislature. We, therefore, insert it here:—

"Strathfieldsaye, January 9, 1847.

"My dear General,—Some days have elapsed, indeed, a fortnight has, since I received your note, with a copy of your observations on the possible result of a war with France, under our present system of military preparation.

"You are aware that I have for years been sensible of the alteration produced in maritime warfare and operations by the application of steam to the propelling of ships at sea.

"This discovery immediately exposed all parts of the coasts of these islands, which a vessel could approach at all, to be approached at all times of tide, and in all seasons, by vessels so propelled from all quarters. We are, in fact, assailable, and at least liable to insult, and to have contributions levied upon us, on all parts of our coast, that is, the coast of these, including the Channel islands, which to this time, from the period of the Norman conquest, have never been successfully invaded.

"I have in vain endeavoured to awaken the attention of different administrations to this state of things, as well-known to our neighbours (rivals in power, at least, former adversaries and enemies) as it is to ourselves.

"I hope that your paper may be attended with more success than my representations have been.

"I have above, in a few words, represented one

danger. We have no defence, or hope of defence, excepting in our fleet.

"We hear a great deal of the spirit of the people of England, for which no man entertains higher respect than I do. But unorganised, undisciplined, without systematic subordination established and well understood, this spirit opposed to the fire of musketry and cannon, and to the sabres and bayonets of disciplined troops, would only expose those animated by such spirit to confusion and destruction. Let any man only make the attempt to turn to some use this spirit in a case of partial and local disturbance, the want of previous systematic organisation and subordination will prevent him even from communicating with more than his own menial servants and dependents; and while mobs are in movement through the country, the most powerful will find that he can scarcely move from his own door.

"It is perfectly true that, as we stand at present, with our naval arsenals and dockyards not half-garrisoned, 5000 men of all arms could not be put under arms, if required, for any service whatever, without leaving standing without relief all employed on any duty, not excepting even the guards over the palaces and person of the sovereign.

"I calculate that a declaration of war should probably find our home garrisons of the strength as follows: particularly considering that one of the most common accusations against this country is, that the practice has been to commence reprisals at sea simultaneously with a declaration of war, the order for the first of which must have been issued before the last can have been published.

"We ought to be with garrisons as follows at the moment war is declared:—

Channel Islands (besides the militia of each, well organised, trained, and disciplined) .	10,000 men.
Plymouth	10,000 „
Milford	5,000 „
Cork	10,000 „
Portsmouth	10,000 „
Dover	10,000 „
Sheerness, Chatham, and the Thames . .	10,000 „

"I suppose that one half of the whole regular force of the country would be stationed in Ireland, which half would give the garrison of Cork. The remainder must be supplied from the half of the whole force at home stationed in Great Britain.

"The whole force employed at home in Great Britain and Ireland would not afford a sufficient number of men for the mere defence and occupation, on the breaking out of war, of the works constructed for the defence of the dockyards and naval arsenals, without leaving a single man disposable.

"The measure upon which I have earnestly entreated different administrations to decide, which is constitutional, and has been invariably adopted in time of peace for the last eighty years, is to raise, embody, organise, and discipline the militia, of the same numbers for each of the three kingdoms united, as during the late war. This would give a mass of organised force amounting to about 150,000 men, which we might immediately set to work to discipline. This alone would enable us to establish the strength of our army. This, with an augmentation of the force of the regular army, which would not cost 400,000*l.*, would put the country on its legs in respect to personal force; and I would engage for its defence, old as I am.

"But as we stand now, and if it be true that the exertions of the fleet alone are not sufficient to provide for our defence, we are not safe for a week after the declaration of war.

"I am accustomed to the consideration of these questions, and have examined and reconnoitred, over and over again, the whole coast, from the North Foreland by Dover, Folkestone, Beachy Head, Brighton, Arundel, to Selsey Bill, near Portsmouth; and I say that, excepting immediately under the fire of Dover castle, there is not a spot on the coast on which infantry might not be thrown on shore at any time of tide, with any wind and in any weather; and from which such body of infantry, so thrown on shore, would not find, within the distance of five miles, a road into the interior of the country, through the cliffs, practicable for the march of a body of troops; that, in that space of coast (that is, between the North Foreland and Selsey Bill), there are not less than seven small harbours, or mouths of rivers, each without defence, of which an enemy, having landed his infantry on the coast, might take possession, and therein land his cavalry and artillery of all calibres, and establish himself and his communications with France.

"The nearest part of the coast to the metropolis is, undoubtedly, the coast of Sussex, from the east and west side of Beachy Head and to Selsey Bill. There are not less than twelve great roads leading from Brighton upon London; and the French army must be much altered indeed since the time at which I was better acquainted with it, if there are not now belonging to it forty chefs-d'état-majors-general, capable of sitting down and ordering the march to the coast of

40,000 men, their embarkation, with their horses and artillery, at the several French ports on the coast; their disembarkation at named points on the English coast,—that of the artillery and cavalry in named ports or mouths of rivers, and the assembly at named points of the several columns; and the march of each of these from stage to stage to London.

"Let any man examine our maps and road-books, consider the matter, and judge for himself.

"I know no mode of resistance, much less of protection from this danger, excepting by an army in the field capable of meeting and contending with its formidable enemy, aided by all the means of fortification which experience in war can suggest.

"I shall be deemed foolhardy in engaging for the defence of the empire with an army composed of such a force of militia. I may be so. I confess it, I should infinitely prefer, and should feel more confidence in, an army of regular troops. But I *know* that I shall not have these. I may have the others; and if an addition is made to the existing regular army allotted for home defence of a force which will cost 400,000*l.* a-year, there would be a sufficient disciplined force in the field to enable him who should command to defend the country.

"This is my view of our danger and our resources. I was aware that our magazines and arsenals were very inadequately supplied with ordnance and carriages, arms, stores of all denominations, and ammunition. The deficiency has been occasioned, in part, by the sale of arms and of various descriptions of ordnance stores since the termination of the late war, in order to diminish the demand of supply to carry on the peace

service of the ordnance; in part, by the conflagration of the arsenal, which occurred in the Tower some years ago; and by the difficulty under which all governments in this country labour, in prevailing upon parliament, in time of peace, to take into consideration measures necessary for the safety of the country in time of war.

"The state of the ordnance, arms, ammunition, &c., in magazines, is, in part, a question of expense, and perhaps, in some degree, one of time.

"I would recommend to have an alphabetical list of the stores examined by a committee, and made out in form, as upon the enclosed half sheet of paper, by ascertaining what there was in 1804, and what there is in store now, of each article, and the difference between the two amounts. I have taken the year 1804 as the standard, as that was the year in which the invasion was threatened. It was previous to the employment of the armies in the Peninsula or North America; in short, as nearly as possible similar to the political circumstances in which we stand at this moment, excepting that we are now at peace with France,—we were then at war.

"A fourth column would be the estimate of the expense of bringing the magazines to the state in which they were in 1804.

"With this information before him, the Master-general could give the government accurate information of the wants of ordnance, arms, ammunition, and stores in the magazines of the country.

"You will see from what I have written, that I have contemplated the danger to which you have referred. I have done so for years. I have drawn to it the attention of different administrations at different times.

You will see, likewise, that I have considered of the measures of prospective security, and of the mode and cost of the attainment.

"I have done more. I have looked at and considered these localities in quiet detail, and have made up my mind upon the details of their defence. These are the questions to which my mind has not been unaccustomed. I have considered and provided for the defence,—the successful defence,—of the frontiers of many countries.

"You are the confidential head of the principal defensive part of this country. I will, if you and the Master-general of the Ordnance choose, converse, or otherwise communicate confidentially with you, upon all the details of this subject; will inform you of all that I know, have seen, and think upon it, and what my notions are of the details of the defensive system to be adopted and eventually carried into execution.

"I quite concur in all your views of the danger of our position, and of the magnitude of the stake at issue. I am especially sensible of the certainty of failure, if we do not, at an early moment, attend to the measures necessary for our defence, and of the disgrace, the indelible disgrace, of such failure,—putting out of view all the other unfortunate consequences, such as the loss of the political and social position of this country among the nations of Europe; of all its allies, in concert with, and in aid of whom, it has, in our own times, contended successfully in arms for its own honour and safety, and the independence and freedom of the world.

"When did any man hear of the allies of a country unable to defend itself?

"Views of economy of some, and I admit that the high views of national finance of others, induce them to

postpone those measures absolutely necessary for mere defence and safety under existing circumstances, forgetting altogether the common practice of successful armies, in modern times, imposing upon the conquered enormous pecuniary contributions, as well as demanding other valuable and ornamental property.

"Look at the course pursued by France in Italy and Russia! At Vienna repeatedly; at Berlin, at Moscow; the contributions levied, besides the subsistence, maintenance, clothing, and equipment of the army which made the conquest! Look at the conduct of the allied army which invaded France, and had possession of Paris in 1815! Look at the account of the pecuniary sacrifices made upon that occasion, under the different heads of contributions, payments for subsistence, and maintenance of the invading armies, including clothing, and other equipments, payments of old repudiated state debts due to individuals in the different countries of Europe; repayment for the contributions levied, and movable and immovable property sold in the course of the revolutionary war.

"But such an account cannot be made out against this country. No! but I believe that the means of some demands would not be wanting. Are there no claims for a fleet at Toulon, in 1793? None for debts left unpaid by British subjects in France, who escaped from confinement under cover of the invasion in 1814, by the allied armies? Can any man pretend to limit the amount of the demand on account of the *contribution de guerre?*

"Then look at the conditions of the treaties of Paris, 1814-1815.

"France having been in possession of nearly every

capital in Europe, and having levied contributions in each, and having had in its possession, or under its influence, the whole of Italy, Germany, and Poland, is reduced to its territorial limits as they stood in 1792. Do we suppose that we should be allowed to keep,—could we advance a pretension to keep,—more than the islands composing the United Kingdom, ceding disgracefully the Channel Islands, on which an invader had never established himself since the period of the Norman conquest?

"I am bordering upon seventy-seven years of age, passed in honour.

"I hope the Almighty may protect me from being the witness of the tragedy, which I cannot persuade my contemporaries to take measures to avert.

"Believe me, ever yours sincerely,

"WELLINGTON."

So early as the autumn of 1846, the Duke, when discussing the question of the Spanish marriages, did not hesitate to express himself in very plain terms, respecting the conduct of Louis Philippe. He condemned the whole transaction as discreditable in the highest degree to the chief movers in it; and spoke still more bitterly about it, because of the utter disregard which was manifested throughout to the wishes of England, the intimate ally, as was then considered, of France. He believed that the feeling of respect for this country would be lowered by it, not in the Spanish Peninsula only, but throughout Europe; and agreed with those who expressed an opinion that England ought to have interfered to prevent those marriages, even at the hazard of a quarrel. But what then? "We are not in a state to risk

even the smallest manifestation of angry feeling on this or any other subject. We must first put our country in that reasonable state of defence in which it was put after the seven years' war, in which it was before the French revolutionary war, and in which it ought always to have been kept, particularly in late years; but in which it would almost appear that it had been the object of government in modern times not to place it. The neglect of these necessaries has, in my opinion, been the cause, not only of these late transactions, but of many others. But I for one should regret to see any manifestations of feeling upon these matters, until I should be certain that we could resent the feeling which might be manifested on the other side. These are melancholy topics."

It happened one day, in the autumn of this year, that the conversation at table turned upon certain alarmist articles which had just made their appearance in the Times. A good many of the officers of the garrison were present, when a gentleman, not an officer, put the question, "But, Duke, do you really think that an invasion of England by France is possible?" "Possible!" replied his Grace, "is anything impossible? Read the newspapers." He said no more while dinner lasted; but when the company had retired to the drawing-room, he took his questioner apart, and entered with him in the fullest manner into the whole subject. "And I'll tell you what," he observed, "the French would have an immense advantage over us, even if we were prepared to oppose a landing, because they would be able to see further and better than we." "How is that?" was the natural question. "Why thus. They start at midnight, and arrive off our coast

just before sunrise. The dawn, which renders everything clear to them, will not enable us to observe what they are about. They will have a full half hour of light before we shall be able to distinguish between the line of beach and the line of sea ; far less to observe boats in motion. And let me tell you, that in calm weather, and with preparations well settled beforehand, a great deal may be done towards throwing troops ashore on an open beach, in half an hour."

It was the Duke's habit, when any matter took fast hold of his attention, to commit his thoughts upon it to paper. He was ready, likewise, when consulted by others, to give his advice, or to record his judgment in writing at great length. Sometimes he would even take the trouble, at the request of friends whom he was willing to oblige, to discuss, in memoranda, subjects on which they desired to ascertain his opinions. It was in this spirit and to gratify Colonel Gurwood, that he drew out his masterly criticism on M. Clausewitz's book; and an able sketch of the character of Marlborough, written by him at the desire of the present Earl of Stanhope, is extant, and in his lordship's possession. Rarely, indeed, if ever, has a man, so much occupied as he, found time for one half the amount of non-official authorship into which he entered. His ordinary chit-chat letters were alone sufficient to fill up the day of many, who would have resented the charge, had they been accused, of spending any portion of their lives in sheer idleness. Yet he had always leisure to join in the intercourse of society ; and never failed to keep an engagement, be it ever so little to his taste, into which he had entered.

The last important service which this great man

rendered to his country was the arrangement of the small military force, which alone he could assemble for the suppression of the expected Chartist out-break on the 10th of April, 1848. The moral tempest which swept that year over the continent of Europe, broke, though with mitigated violence, on the shores of this country. Meetings were got up, chiefly in London and through the manufacturing districts, to demand the concession of what was called the people's charter; and a petition, said to have 2,000,000 of signatures attached, was carried by a well-marshalled band of men to Westminster, and rolled along the floor of the House of Commons. The leader of this band, and head of the Chartist body, a half-crazy Irish member of parliament, called Fergus O'Connor, fixed the 10th of April as the day on which the people were to return for their answer; and as he promised to come at the head of half a million of men, the government considered that it would be proper to guard against all possible contingencies. The Duke being applied to, undertook to maintain peace in the metropolis, or to suppress disturbances should they arise. He recommended the swearing in of special constables, which was done to an unprecedented extent. He caused the public offices to be fortified by piling up books and ledgers against the windows. He stored them severally with three days' provisions, put arms into the hands of the gentlemen connected with them, and desired them to maintain themselves there to the last extremity. He drew together about 7000 infantry, a few regiments of cavalry, with twelve pieces of cannon, and distributing the troops, some in the riding school of Buckingham Palace, some in the prison at Millbank, he

shut up the rest, after providing for the safety of the Bank and of the Houses of Parliament, in their barracks. Kennington Common, on the Surrey side of the river, had been selected by Mr. O'Connor as the place of rendezvous for his followers. The Duke gave strict orders that no opposition should be offered to the march of the masses towards that point. But the moment they crossed the bridges he barred all chance of their return, by planting cannon at the end of each, and filling the houses which overlooked it with troops.

Never in the palmiest days of his youth had the Duke, now seventy-nine years of age, been more self-possessed or energetic. He issued his instructions beforehand with the precision for which during the war in the Peninsula he had been remarkable; and when the day of action came, he took post in his ordinary blue coat and round hat at the Horse Guards. Not a military uniform was to be seen in the streets that day, not even a sentry at the palace gates, for the Queen and the royal family had removed to Osborne, and the basement of Buckingham House was filled with soldiers. His very aides-de-camp went and came, as he directed them, in the ordinary costume of English gentlemen. The police, armed with cutlasses, stood here and there in columns; the special constables, carrying staves in their hands, patrolled backwards and forwards through their respective districts. We need not pause to describe the issue. About 25,000 men, marching from various points, met on Kennington Common, and there found themselves helpless. London was arrayed against them as one man; and without a blow struck, without a drop of blood shed, with scarcely an angry word spoken, the revolution with which England was threatened, col-

lapsed. The master mind was still, when the occasion required, equal to its work, and the work was done.

Our tale of the life of this great and good man is drawing to a close. Besides suppressing the Chartist movement of 1848 in London, he gave orders for that distribution of the military force in Ireland, which effectually kept down the rebellious spirit of the people there; inflamed though it was by the speeches and writings of a knot of very clever, but very wrong-headed journalists. His paper on that subject, which happily survives, exhibits the wonderful accuracy of his recollection, not in regard to the leading features of the country alone, but in reference to obscure streets and alleys in Dublin and other towns, which he could have had no opportunity of visiting for upwards of half a century. In 1849 he spoke with his usual heartiness and good feeling, in support of the vote of thanks which was passed in the House of Lords to Lord Gough, and the officers and men who had brought to a glorious termination the war of the Punjaub. In 1851 he was chiefly engaged in defending the privileges of the University of Oxford, and in achieving that modification in the constitution of the royal commission, which rendered it, as we have seen, so effective for good. But years in their progress were beginning to tell even upon him. His frame, once erect and athletic, had become shrunken; his hair grew thin and white, contrasting strongly with the eyebrows, which retained much of their original dark tinge to the last. And though the eye itself, when lighted up, was still clear and piercing, the lines of old age were strongly marked on every other feature of his face. Fits of somnolency used to come over him also, and he was no

longer the indefatigable man of business that he used to be. For some time back he had stooped a good deal; he now began to totter in his walk. His seat on horseback, never at any time a firm one, grew loose, and he reached and descended from the saddle with difficulty. Deafness likewise increased upon him to a painful degree, so much so, indeed, as to render society often irksome to him; and his mind, though vigorous when any important or interesting subject was presented to it, began visibly to stiffen. Still, with the iron will which never deserted him, he struggled against the infirmities of the flesh, and kept them at bay. When the Great Exhibition took place in 1851, he played his part well in the pageant of its opening. Nor were many public men more diligent than he in their after visits to the Crystal Palace. In the evening of the opening day he dined with Miss Burdett Coutts, for whom he entertained a sincere regard, and who was among the warmest of his admirers; and as it happened to be his birthday, the Duke of Brabant, who was present, proposed that the company should drink his health. This was done some little time after the ladies had withdrawn, and the compliment was acknowledged very characteristically: "Gentlemen, I am much obliged to you," said the Duke, rising from his seat, "and now let us go to the ladies."

In 1852 the administration was again changed. Lord John Russell, being defeated on a question of the militia force of the country, resigned, and the Conservatives came into power. The parliament was in consequence dissolved; but in spite of his acknowledged preference for the policy of which Lord Derby was the exponent, the Duke took no part whatever in the elec-

tions which followed. He adhered to his old principle, that they who endeavour by extraordinary means to bias the minds of the constituency at such seasons, are guilty of a wrong both to individual voters and to the public; and though urged to exert his influence, both at Dover and Sandwich, in favour of the government candidates, he refused to do so. The government party, as was natural, complained that such refusal was unfair towards them. But he acted on this as upon all occasions, from a strong sense of duty, and took the reproaches which were heaped upon him patiently. These, with many other topics of passing interest, are freely discussed in his private correspondence, which, so far from diminishing, appears to have grown more voluminous as years increased upon him. It may not be uninteresting if we subjoin one or two specimens of the tone which pervaded this correspondence.

A letter full of feeling, addressed to the Marchioness of Salisbury on his birthday, opens thus: —

"London, May 1, 1852.

"I have been all this morning receiving visits, and have just now been down with Lady Douro as far as her house. I was followed and saluted as I went there in the streets. Cromwell's reflection occurred to me: They would readily follow and pull me to pieces, if convicted of exciting undue influence," &c.

Another of later date is curious, as giving his own version of the attack made upon him by the mob in 1832. After noticing an application from Dr. Maltby, Bishop of Durham, in favour of some man who desired an appointment under the corporation of the Trinity House, in consequence of services rendered, or assumed to be

rendered, to the Duke on that day, his Grace proceeds: —

"The whole story is false. I picked up two old soldiers, who recognised me, and I placed one on each side of me, to guard my legs and heels; and I desired, if I halted, that they should each of them face outwards, and prevent anybody from approaching my heels. The soldiers were followed by women, children, and men, waving their handkerchiefs. Many men came out and offered me an asylum in their houses. But I declined, saying if I were to get in, in what manner am I to get out again and go home? All I cared about was the loss of my way. If I had taken a wrong turn, and had been obliged to return in the face of the mob, I should have been destroyed. There was fortunately no mud in the streets, and nothing could be thrown. I passed some carts loaded with coals, with which I expected to be pelted, but the head of the mob could not stop to get the coals; and those which followed, if they got any, could not make their way to the head, in order to pelt me. One gentleman followed me in a tilbury, and the groom now in my service. I never discovered who that gentleman was. I thought that he was of service to me, and that he intended it. Certainly, while he followed me, the mob could not run in upon me."

It would be unjust to the Duke's memory, after this reference to his letter to the Bishop of Durham, were we to withhold the letter itself. It was written on the 7th of September, that just quoted on the 8th, and both bear date Walmer Castle.

"My Lord Bishop,—I have had the honour of receiving your lordship's letter of the 6th instant. I

perfectly recollect having been followed by a mob from the Mint to Lincoln's Inn on the 18th of June, 1832. I have heard of individual acts of many persons for my relief, but I am under the necessity of confessing that I have no recollection of such acts during the progress of the riot and pursuit. If I could recollect such acts, I should personally feel very grateful. But, my lord, I have been unanimously elected a Master of the Corporation of the Trinity House. I believe many have as good a right to it as I. I consider myself bound to perform the duties in a view solely to the interests of the public and the credit of the corporation, and I cannot use its patronage to reward services rendered to myself personally—particularly if I were in personal danger. But, moreover, I never have decided upon any question of patronage at the Trinity House, excepting when seated in my place at the board, and I must decline," &c.

The Duke gave his usual Waterloo dinner this year on the 18th of June, and it was remarked by all his guests, of whom the Prince Consort was the only one who had not shared with him the dangers and glories of the day — that he had never on any previous occasion appeared more cheerful, or more completely master of himself. He spoke, likewise, in the House of Lords with great animation in support of the Militia bill, introduced into parliament by Mr. Walpole; and in 1850 referred briefly, but in excellent taste, to the loss which the country had just sustained, by the death of Sir Robert Peel. He expressed himself on that occasion, much as he used to do when discussing in private the character of that great statesman; for he observed among other things, "that of all the men he

ever knew, Sir. Robert Peel was the most truthful. He believed that, for truth, he would sacrifice everything, even himself." Yet the hand of death was already stretched out towards him. His constitution, naturally robust, had sustained a severe shock from repeated fits of catalepsy, the first of which seized him in 1837, when riding on horseback in Hyde Park. It was not so severe as to deprive him of all command over himself, for he kept his seat and reached home. But the groom observed, when he dismounted, that he staggered, and he was supported to his own apartment, where he lay down. Dr. Hume was sent for, of course, but before he arrived the fit had passed away, and the Duke, treating the matter very lightly, refused to take any medicine, and went about his business as usual. From that time up to 1841 the fits frequently returned, and, on one or two occasions, with such severity, as to cause great alarm to his family and friends. An opinion generally prevailed that the Duke consented to have a seton introduced into his neck. This was not the case; but by a rigid attention to diet, and submission to such treatment as his medical attendants prescribed, he managed to keep the disorder at bay, and the fits occurred more rarely and with less violence. Still the disease was there, and both mind and body, more or less, suffered from it. The irritability of his temper grew painfully upon him, and even his generosity degenerated, on more than one occasion, into weakness. We have elsewhere referred to this subject, extracting, at the same time, a letter, which showed that his Grace, when deceived, was deceived with his eyes open, for he certainly did not believe half of the stories of distress that were conveyed to him. The letter in question

was written at Walmer Castle, to which place the Duke had repaired on the 25th of August, apparently in his usual health. He had previously run down on the 7th, attended only by his valet, in order to receive the Queen, should her Majesty be disposed to land, on her progress from Osborne to Ostend. But the weather proved boisterous, and her Majesty preferred staying on board the yacht, the Prince Consort only coming on shore, and spending an hour with the Duke, in the Castle grounds. This was on the 10th of August, and on the 11th, the royal squadron pursued its course, while the Duke drove across to Dover, and there took the rail for London. On the 25th, however, as has just been stated, he returned, bringing with him his whole establishment of servants, horses, and carriages,—a sufficient indication that his autumnal sojourn was begun; and preparations were immediately made to welcome and entertain guests, to whom he appeared desirous of doing honour.

The guests in question were, the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Mecklenburg-Strelitz,—the latter a Russian princess, and daughter of the late Grand Duke Michael. They reached the castle on the 26th, and were met at dinner by Baron Brunow, the Russian minister at the court of St. James's, and his private secretary; by the Earl of Clanwilliam, captain of Deal Castle, with the Countess, and their daughter, Lady Selina Meade; by Admiral Sir John Hill, Captain of Sandown Castle; Captain Vincent, R.N., Captain of Sandgate Castle; and Captain Watts, Captain of Walmer Castle. "I never," says Captain Watts, "saw the Duke in better health or spirits. In the evening, soon after we had left the dining-room, the Grand Duke asked me

whether there was not a particularly good picture of the Duke in Walmer Castle? I replied that there was no picture, but a very good engraving,—that it hung in the dining-room, and that I had often heard the Duke say, that he considered it the best likeness of himself that had ever been taken. The Grand Duke requested me to return with him to the dining-room, that he might examine the engraving; and after he had gazed at it for some time, remarked that the Grand Duchess ought likewise to see it. He went immediately into the drawing-room to fetch her; whereupon the Duke himself came back with them, and observing what the purpose was which brought them into the dining-room, he said to the Grand-Duchess in French, "That is the very best likeness that was ever taken of me." He added after a short pause, "Perhaps you would like to possess it." The offer was at once and gladly accepted; upon which he rang the bell, and desired the butler to take the engraving out of the frame, and to bring it to him next morning, that he might inscribe his name at the bottom. Everything was done as the Duke directed. The engraving was taken from the frame; the Duke subscribed it with his name; it was then carefully packed, and probably hangs at this hour in one of the apartments of the palace at Mecklenburg.

Two incidents marked the progress of this little affair, of sufficient importance, as it seems to us, to justify the minuteness with which we have detailed it. The first is, that when the engraving was brought to the Duke in the morning, in order that he might subscribe it, he did what he was never known on any previous occasion to have done; he tried the pen which was put into his hand before making use of it. The

next, that though he wrote by that night's post to his publisher in London, for a fac-simile of the engraving, wherewith to fill the vacant frame, his order was not executed. The fact is, that the engraving which he had given away was what is called a proof engraving, of which no stock remained on hand. Great pains were taken to seek for a copy in various directions, but without success; and now among the effigies of other lords warden that of the Duke hangs in the dining-room at Walmer Castle, not a proof, but a common engraving, which did not reach its place till the day after the great original had ceased to take interest in sublunary affairs.

On the 28th, a little before noon, the grand-duke and grand-duchess took their departure, the Duke driving the latter to Dover in a pony carriage. He returned after seeing them on board the packet, and spent the evening alone. He never from that day received any more guests at his table; indeed up to the 8th of September, he remained, with his domestics, the sole occupant of the castle. Daily, however, he might be seen riding or walking about, and once he went as far as Folkestone. It was to visit Mr. Croker, who had removed thither in search of that health which was never to be restored to him again; and the Duke's movements being dependent on the return of the train to Dover, they spent some hours lovingly together. Mr. Croker, ill as he was, made a note of the conversation which passed between them, and sent copies of it to several of his Grace's friends. It related almost entirely to times gone by, and to persons long removed from the scene of life. It was full of interest, of course, to the pair who joined in it; and as evincing the clearness of the

Duke's mind when turned to such subjects, the members of his own family, and the few individuals without that circle, to whom names and dates of more than sixty years' standing are familiar, cannot fail to value such a record. But the general reader would scarcely care to have it brought before him, and if it were so brought would probably not understand it.

On the 8th of September, his Grace's solitude was broken in upon by the arrival of his second son, Lord Charles Wellesley, accompanied by Lady Charles and their children. This was a great delight to the Duke; for, independently of his attachment to the parents, he was exceedingly fond of his grandchildren, and often made them his companions in the strolls which he took through the grounds, or to and fro along the terrace-walk, which runs between the castle and the sea. In other respects, he pursued his usual course, devoting a portion of each morning to his private correspondence, while the evenings were spent chiefly in reading. One out of the many letters written by him at this time, contains a sentence which is at least remarkable; and which, if the mind of the reader be prone to superstition, may appear even to have been ominous. On the 12th of September, he wrote thus:—"I had a letter this morning from a madman, who announces that he is a messenger from the Lord, and will deliver his message to me to-morrow morning: we shall see." Who the writer was has never been ascertained, but the message from the Lord was already on its way.

The Duke took more than his usual amount of exercise on the 13th, and ate a good dinner with much relish. Wine he had long given up, but he drank his iced water, as his custom was, and retired to bed,

apparently in excellent health, about half-past eleven o'clock. He was always an early riser, and his valet went at six in the morning of the 14th to call him. He appeared, however, to be sleeping heavily; and the servant, finding that he did not awake, though the fire was stirred and the fire-irons clashed together, thought that it would be a pity to disturb his master, and withdrew again. Soon afterwards one of the maids met him, and said she was afraid that the Duke was ill, for she thought that she had heard him groan. Mr. Kendal, for so was this faithful servant called, repaired at once to his master's chamber, and opening the shutters, said, "It is getting quite late, your Grace; it is past seven o'clock." "Is it?" replied the Duke in his usual tone of voice. "Do you know where the apothecary lives?" "Yes, your Grace." "Then send and let him know that I should like to see him. I don't feel quite well, and I will lie still till he comes."

This was such an admission as the Duke had never been known under similar circumstances to make, and it created proportionable alarm in Mr. Kendal. A messenger was accordingly despatched on horseback for Mr. Hulke, of Deal, who soon arrived, and was introduced into the Duke's apartment. Mr. Hulke examined his patient, looking at the tongue and feeling the pulse; and having pronounced that there was no ground for apprehension, advised that his Grace should take a cup of tea, and remain quiet. He prescribed no medicine, because he considered that none was required; for the Duke's stomach seemed to have relieved itself during the night, and rest was all that appeared necessary to restore him. Mr. Hulke, therefore, took his leave, and a cup of tea was given to the Duke as soon

as it could be got ready. It operated upon him, after a brief interval, like an emetic, and he became very restless and uneasy. By this time the whole household was disturbed, and Lord and Lady Charles came into the bed-room, whither also Captain Watts soon followed. They all saw that this was no passing fit of indisposition, and at once sent off fresh messengers in search both of Mr. Hulke and of Dr. McArthur. The former after a brief interval arrived; the latter, who happened to be from home, did not come till later. An emetic was given which, however, produced no amelioration of the symptoms, but the reverse; and then calomel, which it appeared had never failed before in relieving such attacks, was administered. Probably neither calomel nor any other remedy, no matter when applied, would have been of the smallest avail. The Duke's hour was come; and though with the determination of purpose which belonged to his nature, he seemed to put it from him, the summons had gone forth which admits of no baffling. His anxious attendants perceiving that he breathed with increased difficulty, and appeared otherwise to suffer, lifted him out of bed, and placed him in an easy chair. Nothing was gained by that change of position; he never rallied. The strong will kept death at bay till towards seven o'clock in the evening; but physical power was wanting to repel him altogether. A fit came on, similar in every respect to the worst of those to which he had formerly been subject, and after a few convulsive struggles he ceased to breathe. Yet so calm and tranquil was his departure; so little was he changed, even in appearance, that not till a mirror had been held up before his face, could those by whom he was surrounded tell that life was extinct.

The alarming nature of the attack under which the Duke was suffering no sooner became apparent, than telegraphic despatches were sent off to London for Dr. Ferguson and Dr. Hume. Both, unfortunately, happened to be in Scotland; and, after considerable delay, Dr. Williams was requested to go down to Walmer. He took the first train which started, but could not reach the castle till all was over. He found but the mortal remains of his illustrious patient laid out upon the little camp bed, in which while living he usually slept; and a household plunged in the very depths of sorrow and consternation.

The Marquis of Douro, the Duke's eldest son, chanced to be abroad at the time of his father's death. He was immediately informed by telegraph of the calamity which had befallen, and travelling post, he arrived at the castle on the 17th. We draw a veil over all that followed. The great Duke had been the property of the nation while he lived, and the nation claimed the right of disposing of his remains now that he was dead. It was determined that a public funeral should mark the sense of the people's reverence for his memory and of their grief for his loss. But time was needed to mature and complete the necessary preparations, and the body being inclosed in a shell, was, therefore left for a while, under proper care, in the castle. A guard of honour, composed of a portion of his own rifle regiment, did duty over it. The castle flag was hoisted daily half-mast high, and on the 9th and 10th of November the public of Deal and Walmer and its vicinity were admitted to take their last look at his remains, as they lay there in state. Upwards of 9000 persons availed themselves of this privilege, and all,

without exception, evinced unmistakable proofs of reverence, many of deep emotion.

At six in the evening of the 10th, Lord Douro, the present Duke, arrived, accompanied by Lord Arthur Hay, and by a gentleman from the Lord Chamberlain's office, who had been directed to superintend the removal of the body from Walmer to London. It was placed upon a hearse, and conveyed by torchlight to the railway station, a guard of the rifle brigade attending it, and the batteries at Walmer and Deal Castle firing minute guns. Sandown Castle took up the melancholy salute as the train, with its sacred burden, swept by; and, about half-past twelve, the hearse, with its attendants, reached the Bricklayers' Arms. Here a squadron of the 2nd Life Guards was in waiting to receive them, and once more, by the dim light of torches, the melancholy cortège passed on. Many a window was thrown up, that men might gaze on the cavalcade as it moved through the streets, and few, whom the unaccustomed tramp of horses had roused from their slumbers, slept again that night, except with spirits saddened and subdued.

The procession reached Chelsea about three in the morning, when the coffin containing the body was carried into the hall of the Royal Military Hospital. That noble apartment, as well as the chapel, had been previously hung with black, and was now lighted only by waxen tapers, placed here and there in silver sconces. The coffin rested upon an elevated platform at the end of the hall, over which was suspended a cloud-like canopy or veil. Life Guardsmen, with arms reversed, lined the apartment like statues, while beside the body sat six chief mourners. The coffin itself was

covered with red velvet, and at the foot stood a table, on which all the decorations of the deceased were laid out. Thither, day by day, in a constant stream, crowds of men, women, and children repaired, all dressed in deep mourning, that they might pay their last tribute of respect to him who could no longer acknowledge it. The first of these visitors was her Majesty the Queen, accompanied by the youthful branches of her family. But so deeply was she affected that she never got beyond the centre of the hall, where her feelings quite overcame her, and whence she was led, weeping bitterly, to her carriage.

The public funeral took place on the 18th of November, and was attended by the Prince Consort, and all the chief officers of state. The military arrangements necessary for it had previously been completed; and with a view, it is presumed, to give consistency to the whole affair, the body was removed by torchlight a little before midnight on the 17th, under an escort of cavalry, to the Horse Guards. There, in the room which had often witnessed his attention to the affairs of that army which was now to furnish his chief mourners, all that remained of the Duke rested till dawn. And then the solemn ceremony began. From St. Paul's Cathedral, down Fleet Street, along the Strand, by Charing Cross and Pall Mall, to St. James' Park, troops lined both sides of the streets; while in the Park itself columns of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were formed, ready to fall into their proper places after the march began. How it was conducted, with what respectful interest watched by high and low, how solemn the notes of the bands, as one after another they took up and poured out the "Dead March in

Saul," how grand, yet how touching the scene in the interior of St. Paul's, within which were gathered almost all that survived of his companions in arms, it is not necessary for us to describe. The representatives of all the great powers of Europe, Austria alone excepted*, were there to do him honour. The rank, talent, station, and beauty of Great Britain joined in the solemn requiem wherewith the funeral service closed. And as if it had been decreed that to the very last everything connected with him should have a character of its own, the elements themselves combined as it were to do him honour. The weather had been boisterous for some days previously, and the early morning of the 18th itself set in with wind and rain. But scarcely was the funeral procession arranged ere the clouds broke, and the sky shone out blue and clear upon the car and its attendants. It was but a respite, so to speak, in the war of nature, for the doors of St. Paul's had not long been shut ere the storm burst forth again, and in rain and wind the day closed which witnessed the funeral of the great Duke. Again, the mind which is prone to superstition will find food on which to ruminate. He who had conquered, and, for well nigh forty years, preserved the peace of Europe, was gone; and there followed his removal from among us the war in the Crimea, with all the unsatisfactory results to which it has led.

* Austria was at this time offended by the treatment given to one of her generals by a mob of draymen. She could not be made to understand that every respectable person in the kingdom lamented the outrage, but that there was no remedy for it except by due course of law.

CHAP. VI.

THE DUKE AS A MAN, A SOLDIER, A STATESMAN.—HIS PLAYFULNESS.—HIS KINDLINESS.—HIS SELF-POSSESSION.—HIS WISDOM.

If there be any English reader who, after a perusal of this narrative, finds it difficult to arrive at a just appreciation of the great man whose career has been therein set down, the circumstance must be attributed to one of two causes. Either he has little accustomed himself to draw inferences from events as they pass before him, or we have very imperfectly accomplished the task which we ventured to set to ourselves. For the character of the Duke of Wellington was, perhaps, more completely free from disguise than that of any other man, whether of ancient or modern times, who has filled so large a space in the world's history. The great leading principle of his moral being was—duty. In private life he was truth itself. As a public man, he had but one object in view, viz., to benefit, to the utmost of his ability and skill, the state, whose servant he was. Of personal ambition, in the vulgar acceptation of that term, the Duke knew nothing. The desire of winning applause, or of advancing himself to places of honour and power, seems never, from first to last, to have moved him. There are no stories extant of a boyish ambition in him to become the leader of his companions in their sports and pastimes. He never

taught them how to construct castles of snow, nor led them to the attack or defence of such castles when constructed. His career at school is so completely without note, that had not Robert Smith recorded the circumstance of a bout at fisticuffs between the future deliverer of Europe and himself, the biographer of the Duke of Wellington would have been absolutely without a tale to tell of all that his hero may have said or done at Chelsea, at Eton, and at Angers. And so it is with his life as a subaltern, a captain, a major, and an aide-de-camp to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. It is a mere vacant space on the paper which is soon to be filled with the record of exploits such as struck the world with wonder;—a sure proof that the same simplicity of character which distinguished his Grace in after years belonged to him in youth; and that content to do his duty, and to enjoy existence in his own peculiar way, he never made an effort to push himself out of his place, or to attract, in so doing, the gaze or admiration of the multitude.

It was this high principle, in our opinion, rather than the absence of natural ability, which rendered the life of Arthur Wellesley, up to the age of twenty-five, so completely a blank. It was spent under circumstances which did not suggest to him any sufficient reason for stepping out of the beaten track. That he learned well, and thoroughly understood his duty as a regimental officer, we know from the fact that he had not long assumed the command of a battalion before it became the best disciplined in the service. But being conscious of his own defects as an orator, and little relishing the system of corruption which prevailed around him while he sat in the Irish parliament, he appears to have taken

no pains to make his influence felt in the House of Commons or out of it.

The powers which all this while lay dormant within him came at once into play as soon as an adequate appeal was made to his sense of duty. He seems to have been almost the only officer of rank in the army of the Duke of York in Flanders who did not treat the requirements of the campaign as secondary to his individual wants and humours. Whatever Colonel Wellesley was directed to do, he did energetically and punctually. Everybody else seemed to regard time as something not to be accounted for. The rearguard which covered the retreat beyond the Wahl was always where it ought to be to a moment. Other divisions rarely found their proper places, or found them too late. We have often heard him criticise that campaign, and always in the same terms. It was the best school to which an officer could be sent, who had sufficient discrimination to observe blunders and the effects of them, and wit enough to take warning from what he saw.

Colonel Wellesley obtained, as he deserved, great praise for his conduct in the Low Countries; yet so little was personal ambition or vanity stirred by it, that he made an effort, as we have seen, immediately on his return to England, to retire from the service. Happily for England, for Europe, and for himself, it proved unsuccessful; and India soon afterwards opened to him a field well suited both to his temperament and his genius. With what assiduity he applied himself there to questions, the solution of which might enable him to be of use to the government and to the people, but which had certainly no direct connection with his own success in his profession! With what untiring zeal he worked

that others might benefit by his labours,—as in preparing for the Mysore campaign, and making all the arrangements necessary for the expedition to Egypt! And how ready he was, on every occasion, to do justice to merits far inferior to his own, while his own were systematically passed over! We do not mean to insinuate that all this failed, or could fail, to bear fruit in due season. Devotion to duty, if it be accompanied with talent, generally leads, even under our system, to advancement. But advancement, for the sake of the personal advantages which result from it, is not the end of a great man's ambition. In proportion as he achieves it, he becomes conscious of a wider sphere of usefulness, and is sensible that his responsibility increases with the increase of his power. This was, to a remarkable extent, the effect of his early promotion upon General Wellesley. Each new step upon the ladder only placed him in a situation which more than that from which he had ascended, supplied him with motives for fresh exertion; and that befell in this instance, which befalls in the instances of all men similarly circumstanced. Wherever placed, he commanded the entire confidence, not only of the government which employed, but of the men and officers who served under him. There are now lying before us two letters, written in 1802, by a young officer in the Company's service to his relatives at home. They describe the movements of two corps, which at two separate times went out, under Colonel Wellesley's orders, on special service from Seringapatam; and each contains this remarkable expression:—"Everything goes well, because Colonel Wellesley is in command. Whatever he undertakes he does admirably. Perhaps it was scarcely fair to employ

him, rather than General ——; but we are all delighted to have him at our head; he makes us so confident and so comfortable."

The extracts which we have made from his Indian correspondence show how willingly he acted on the principle of duty into whatever situation he might be thrown. When collecting grain in the Deccan, he puts from him the opportunity of which others took advantage to enrich themselves. He gains so little by his command at Seringapatam, that the necessary hospitalities incident to it threaten him with ruin. His patronage is never exercised except for the advancement of the public good, and in reward of meritorious services performed. Colonel Close asks him to provide for the son of an old officer who was the friend of both. He acknowledges the claim so far as it is admissible, but explains that he, and such as he, are bound to look not to the ties of personal regard, but to the higher requirements of the public service. An offer is made to him of separate command, which he could not accept without outraging the feelings and doing injustice to the merits of a senior officer. He points out where the injustice lies, and, professing himself ready to do whatever may be required, suggests that the wrong in question ought not to be committed. And all this at a time when his pecuniary affairs are in such confusion that he is obliged to his brother for the means of purchasing his steps; and is glad on the receipt of prize money, because it enables him to repay the debt.

On his return home from India, where he had led large armies in the field, and administered the affairs of provinces equal in extent to many European kingdoms, he is appointed to the command of a brigade of

infantry in Sussex. He goes through his routine duties zealously. Not a word of complaint or murmur ever escapes him; and when taunted, goodhumouredly, with the change in his condition, he replies, "I have eaten the king's salt, and whatever he desires me to do that becomes my duty." Of his Irish administration the details have not yet seen the light. But this much we may say, without any breach of confidence, that, in an age of universal corruption, he neither stifled nor concealed the scorn which he entertained for the venal statesmen by whom he was surrounded.

Read over that portion of his correspondence which has already been published, and you will find that the same spirit of integrity, the same devotion to duty, which were his polestars while rising into greatness, guided him to the end of his career. Read, as some day or another the world will read, the still more interesting correspondence which, for the present, must remain under lock and key; and the impression already made will be more than confirmed. Whether he be in the field or in the senate, whether he strive to control the action of foreign governments or to guide the counsels of the legislature at home, he seeks ever the attainment of one object, and seeks it honestly. He will not arrive at an end justifiable in itself, by means which cannot be justified. He will never do evil that good may come. He rejects with indignation the use of the dagger when offered to rid him of Dhoondiah; and he will give no countenance to Colonel D'Argenton's proposal to excite a mutiny in Soult's army. His great ground of quarrel with the Portuguese Regency is, that they are never true to their engagements; and that in their own persons they refuse to set the example of that

obedience to law and right which they exact, or profess to exact, from the peasantry. He condemns the Spanish Juntas and the Cortes, even while he obeys them, because they are more intent on promoting the views of party than on directing the energies of the country against the common enemy. And so it is at home. Believing that the will of the nation can be constitutionally expressed only through the two houses of Parliament, he will give no countenance to the formation of loyal societies out of doors, even at a time when, between political unions on one side and repeal associations on the other, the power both of the legislature and of the Crown seemed to him on the eve of dissolution. Nor was the case otherwise in matters of less prominent importance. He has trusts imposed upon him, and in no instance will he use them except for the public good. The freemen of Sandwich, Dover, and the other cinque ports, may vote as they please. He will neither give place to the supporters of his own policy, nor refuse it to such as oppose him, except upon the ground of personal fitness. He declines to put into the Charter-house an individual of whom he knows nothing, though the applicant employs a prelate to beg for him and avers that he had been instrumental in saving the Duke's life. He discountenances a proposal to damage or throw out a bill, which is most distasteful to himself, because the means suggested appear to be dishonest. Whatever partook, or seemed to partake, of the crooked or disingenuous, was abhorrent to his nature; nor would any considerations of probable gain even to the country induce him to take part in it. Indeed, he goes further. More than one public man, of acknowledged ability and weight in the house of which he was a member, made

proposals to the Duke which, in his estimation, amounted to a breach of faith with their colleagues. He declined to receive such proposals, and preferred the imminent hazard of defeat to the prospect of success, by no means an obscure one, through the help of those whom "he could not trust."

There will be found in the appendix an admirable summary of the Duke's qualities as a general and a politician, for which we are indebted to Captain Brialmont, and to which, as far as it goes, there is little to be added. But one or two points which M. Brialmont has overlooked, we may without impropriety notice here. The point which he seems to have had mainly in view was to compare the Duke with Napoleon as a military commander, and he arrives at the conclusion, which is not perhaps in his case unnatural, that the foremost place is to be assigned to the French emperor. For reasons elsewhere stated, we dissent from this judgment, as indeed we do from any endeavour to compare two men between whom, either in their moral or in their intellectual organisation, there was in point of fact no similitude. In everything the Duke and Napoleon stood in strong contrast one towards the other. Napoleon could not serve. He never undertook a trust in a subordinate situation which he did not divert to purposes of his own aggrandisement. He never, when advanced to the pinnacle of power, entered into an engagement which he was not prepared, when it suited his own interests, to violate. The Duke was the most perfect servant of his king and country that the world ever saw. He flourished no doubt in a condition of society which presented insuperable obstacles to the

accomplishment of ambitious projects, had he been unwise enough to entertain them: but there is proof in almost every line which he wrote, in almost every word which he spoke, that, be the condition of society what it might, the one great object of his life would have been to secure the ascendency of law and order, and to preserve the throne and the constitution of the country unharmed. Nor can you place your finger upon a single engagement into which the Duke ever entered, whether in private life as a member of society, or in public life as a general or a statesman, the terms of which were not rigidly fulfilled, however great the inconveniences might be which attended their fulfilment.

But this is not all. An attempted parallel between two men whose lot was cast in moulds so essentially unlike fails at every turn. One, falling upon a season of anarchy and confusion, raised himself by the force of his own genius to supreme power; the other, born into a constitutional and well regulated state, aimed only at serving his country, and served it faithfully. One, master of the greatest empire which the world has ever seen, wielded its enormous resources at pleasure; filled up his ranks by a process of unlimited conscription, and repaired the disaster of to-day by the victory of to-morrow. The other, acting under the control of a government parsimonious yet extravagant, feeble and vacillating, because dependent for its own existence on the popular will, could not reckon from one day to another on being supported in any enterprise. To him victory itself was pregnant with danger; a single defeat would have been ruin; because battles, however they may terminate, cannot be fought without some loss, and the losses of an army which is recruited by volun-

tary enlistment are hard to supply. If, indeed, you seek to bring these two men into comparison, you must do so by considering what each did with the means at his disposal, till you arrive at an epoch when they are fairly pitted against each other in the field, and one goes down. Even then, however, your comparison will be incomplete, and the inference drawn from it imperfect. Let them stand apart, therefore, each upon his own niche in the temple of fame which they helped to rear one for the other, while you look back into history in search of leaders of armies with whom they may more appropriately and severally be brought into parallelism.

And here to the mind of the scholar will occur at once the names of two warriors, each a world's wonder in his day, whose position, whose genius, and, subject to obvious exceptions, the very detail of whose careers correspond with marvellous exactitude to those of Napoleon and our own Wellington.

Alexander the Macedonian was indeed born to a throne, and died a victor, lamenting that there were no more worlds to conquer. But Alexander's glory was achieved, and his victories won, in every instance, over armies far less perfectly organised than his own, and over generals immeasurably his inferiors. Alexander's tactics were bold, often rash, always aggressive, and his obstinacy was as strong as his arrogance was extravagant. The resources of each new state, as he overran it, were applied by him to purposes of further conquest, and if he escaped the destruction with which he seemed to be threatened in Bactria, it was because his troops refused to follow him further, and he was compelled, sorely against his will, to yield to their remonstrances.

Napoleon established his military reputation in contests with such leaders as Melas, Mack, and the Duke of Brunswick. He brought against armies drilled in the formal precision of Frederick's school new tactics, which had their rise rather in the necessities of the great French revolution than in the genius of him who was its creature. His most memorable battles, likewise, were fought with numbers scarcely exceeding those with which Alexander forced the passage of the Granicus. It was only after he had annexed Holland, Belgium, and Italy, that he brought into the field such hosts as dictated peace to Austria in the palace of Schönbrunn, and perished through lack of forethought on the march from the Vistula to Moscow. Finally, he gave the law to continental Europe for ten years, because Europe was constrained to enslave itself, and he died at last defeated and in exile, only because self-worship had become the ruling passion of his nature. Might not Alexander have fallen as he fell had circumstances induced him to turn his arms against the Romans, or had there been in the far east, a people prepared to make the sacrifice which Russia made, when she committed her ancient capital to the flames, in order that the invaders might not find shelter within its walls?

Turn now to the careers of Hannibal and of Wellington, and observe in how many particulars these testify to the presence in each of the same temper, the same forethought, the same indomitable will, the same extraordinary genius for political not less than for military affairs, the same postponement of self and the claims of self to public duty. Both established their reputation as brilliant soldiers while serving against

troops inferior to their own, and under the direction of kinsmen, not the least of whose merits it was that they knew how to make use of them. What Hannibal had been in Spain, when Asdrubal, his brother-in-law, commanded there, Wellington became in India during the governor-generalship of his brother Lord Mornington. The former, though subordinate in rank, led the Carthaginians in the field as often as any enterprise requiring more than common skill and conduct was determined upon; and by his successes enabled Asdrubal to extend the limits of the Carthaginian empire to the Iberus. The latter, while yet a colonel, pacified the Mysore, and defeated Dhoondiah; and as one of the youngest major-generals in the country gained the battle of Assaye, and brought the great Mahratta confederation to the feet of the East India Company. It may be accounted an accident that, with so many centuries between, these two great men should have equally assumed, for the first time, the chief command of armies in the Spanish Peninsula; yet out of that circumstance, whether accidental or not, events arose which bring their characters more and more into parallelism. Hannibal and Wellington were both citizens of free states, of states governed by popular or aristocratic assemblies, in which party and its claims were at least as much attended to as the requirements of the public good. Both served powers which were rather naval than military, which were more ambitious of wealth, more covetous of influence, than bent upon the extension of their territorial limits. The highest ambition of Carthage was to become the first maritime nation of the old world, and having accomplished that end, she made use of her navy to push her commerce

everywhere. Powerful at sea, she was comparatively weak on shore, not through any lack of courage in her inhabitants, but because her military system was radically unsound, and she was too free and too wealthy to endure a better. What followed? As soon as Hannibal found himself in independent command, he was glad to borrow from the Romans all that was best in their system, and to apply it, as far as circumstances would permit, to his own army; just as Wellington learned many useful lessons from the French, and would have learned more, but that the nature of the government under which he served prevented him.

Again, Carthage, with professions of peace continually upon her lips, was continually engaged in war, into which the cupidity of her merchants, rather than the ambition of her government, usually hurried her. And the mercantile element prevailing over the military in her councils, she starved, both in men and means, almost every foreign expedition which she sent out. So also it was, and, to a certain extent, continues to be, with England. Her fleets, manned by the press-gang, swept the ocean during the war of the French Revolution; her armies, raised by voluntary enlistment, were wasted upon enterprises as profitless as they were discursive.

When Hannibal broke with the Romans, by undertaking the siege of Saguntum, his force consisted of perhaps 80,000 men, of whom less than one half were drawn from Africa. The remainder consisted of Spaniards and, as we should now call them, Portuguese (Vaccæi, Olcades, Vettones, and others), whom he drilled in the Carthaginian tactics, and officered, in the higher ranks at least, with Carthaginian leaders.

If inferior in some respects to the best of his Carthaginian legions, these became, under such management, excellent troops, and supplied the place of the reinforcements which his own government was either unable or unwilling to send him. If Wellington had not found in Portugal facilities for recruitment, he could have neither held his ground within the lines of Torres Vedras, nor made his famous march from the Tagus to the Ebro.

Again, the appliances which are indispensable towards carrying on war, such as money, stores, provisions, means of transport, Hannibal was obliged to create for himself. The supplies furnished to him from Africa, besides arriving in driblets, were always inadequate. Had not his administrative abilities been of the first order, he never could have begun his march towards Italy. Wellington's case, in its leading features, was very much the same. The most serious of the difficulties with which he had to contend, were occasioned by the negligence or short-sightedness of his own government. He might have starved, he certainly would have become immovable, but that he created for himself a commissariat, a mint, a foreign trade in corn, magazines, and, above all, a system of transport which never failed him.

Even in their special excellences as commanders of troops, there is a striking similarity between the two men. Both were quick in establishing channels of intelligence, by means of which they became acquainted with all the enemy's movements. Both excelled in one of the most difficult operations of war, the passage of rivers. Wellington on the Douro and the Adour is but the counterpart of Hannibal on the Rhone and the Po;

each crossed where the enemy least expected him, and by means which were as bold as they were hazardous. We may place them side by side also in the care which they took of their troops, and in the forethought which provided that the baggage necessary to this end should never be far in the rear. They equally saved their people from exposure to every uncalled-for hardship; they equally kept them, as far as possible, well clothed, well fed, and, above all, well shod.

To the superficial observer, it may appear that, so far as dash and enterprise are concerned, Hannibal leaves Wellington far behind; and the fragmentary account which has reached us of the passage of the Alps, and of the brilliant campaigns which followed, may serve to give weight to this opinion. But two points deserve consideration here. First, Is that an enterprise worthy of a great general which separates him from his base of operations, leaving him no alternative between complete success and total destruction? and next, did Hannibal, when he invaded Italy, commit this grievous error, exposing himself thereby to an amount of risk which there was nothing in the state of his own or the enemy's preparations to justify? The former of these questions will be answered in the negative, by all who understand what wise enterprise is. The second cannot receive a reply in the affirmative, except at the expense of Hannibal's military reputation, which no competent judge will venture to assail. The truth is, that Hannibal's inroad into Italy was quite as safe, or he believed it to be so, as Wellington's early attempts to penetrate from Portugal into Spain; first, when side by side with Cuesta, he fought the battle of Talavera; and again, when after the battle of

Salamanca, he made his entry into Madrid. He undertook both operations trusting to the assurances of the Spaniards that they would supply the wants of his army, and operate, at least, a diversion in his favour. It was thus that Hannibal acted two thousand years before Wellington was born. From the Ebro to the Alps he conquered, and took military possession; and he crossed the Alps themselves because he had reason to believe that the Gauls who dwelt beyond them would join him to a man. Neither were his communications with his immediate rear entirely broken, even after Hanno had been defeated; while the sea was always open to him, by means of which reinforcements and supplies could at any time reach him from Carthage. Hannibal and Wellington were equally deceived in their expectations. Both, after gaining great battles, were forced to withdraw: the one to defend Carthage, which he failed in doing; the other to save Portugal, and to gather strength for a third and more successful effort in Spain.

We might pursue this parallel further, by showing how closely these great men resembled each other in the moderation which they exhibited when carrying all before them, in their unfailing courage and determination, when to human appearance their cause was become desperate. Hannibal in Italy, maintained among his troops the same strict discipline which Wellington maintained in the south of France; and both secured thereby the good will of the people to whom they came as conquerors. The defeat of Hanno, terrible as it was, no more broke the courage of Hannibal than Wellington's resolution was shaken when tidings of the battle of Austerlitz reached him. Finally both were

the devoted servants of their country, and of its constitution, though both suffered from the inaptitude of the latter to a state of war. Marked differences the inquirer will doubtless find in the tempers of the men as well as in the careers of the generals. But these seem to be the results of the different circumstances under which they were placed. All that belonged, properly speaking, to themselves, their quickness to observe, their powers of calculation, their coolness, forethought, self-possession, justice; their fertility in resources, their exceeding strength of will, were essentially the same. Had Hannibal been thrown into Wellington's age and circumstances, he would have done, in all probability, much as Wellington did; had Wellington filled Hannibal's place in history, the name would have been changed, but the exploits of the Carthaginian commander would have come down to us, very little varied in their records from what we now find them.

In estimating the character of the Duke of Wellington as a soldier, it has not been unusual both in England and elsewhere, to draw between him and John Duke of Marlborough a parallel generally to the advantage of the latter. According to our view of the case, the materials for such a parallel are as scanty as the conclusion adverse to the Duke of Wellington is unjust. In this they doubtless resembled one another, that both understood how to handle troops; that both were careful of the health and general comforts of their men, and that both paid great attention to details. But so far they only fall into the groove along which great commanders have run since the world began; for no man can long command an army at all who is careless of the health and comforts of his men, and inattentive

to matters of detail. When we look closer into the subject, however, it will be seen that there is not much similarity in the conditions under which Marlborough and Wellington respectively made war; and hence that the similitudes which are discoverable in the two careers affect particular operations rather than the genius of the men who directed them. The Duke of Marlborough, for example, assumed the command of an allied army in the Netherlands, after having studied his profession under Turenne and William III.; the latter an unsuccessful, but not therefore an incapable officer. The Duke of Wellington's masters in the art of war were the Duke of York and Lord Harris,—brave men both, but certainly not to be spoken of in the same breath with Turenne or William III. The Duke of Marlborough found himself at the head of Dutch, Austrian, and Sardinian troops,—all of them in as high a state of discipline as his own, and at least as well appointed. He had as his coadjutor Prince Eugene, a general scarcely inferior to himself in skill and capacity, and he carried on his operations against such officers as Tallard and Villars, the Duke of Burgundy, Villeroy, and Boufflers.

The Duke of Wellington was forced to construct for himself a Portuguese contingent, and having raised it to the highest state of perfection of which it seems to have been capable, used to say, that when led by British officers, it was equal to the Sepoys. As to the Spanish armies, they were sometimes rather an incumbrance to him than the reverse; they could never, to the end of the war, be entirely depended upon. With respect, again, to his own lieutenants, the most that can be said of them is, that several among them possessed a fair share of ability; whereas his opponents were, Soult,

Jourdan, Massena, Marmont, Victor, and finally Napoleon. Again, Marlborough, when supplies were wanting, made his requisitions upon states, which, as they were under the management of regular governments, were always able, and generally willing, to furnish them. Wellington, on the other hand, was driven to create his own resources, and to provide his own means both of collecting, and paying for them. Marlborough, supported by the Queen, and backed by the undivided influence of the Revolution government, had at his command the whole military resources of Great Britain. Wellington found it necessary to sustain the courage of a feeble cabinet, which, in the face of popular clamour and a strong parliamentary opposition, was afraid to put forth the strength of the empire, even though in withholding it they exposed both their general and his army to destruction. No doubt the field deputies were a source of great annoyance to Marlborough, from which, however, he succeeded at last in delivering himself; but the Portuguese Regency, and the Juntas, and Cortes of Spain, hung like a mill-stone round the neck of Wellington, from the opening to the close of the struggle. We might go further, and refer to the tone which pervades the correspondence of these two men,—the one always keeping in view self-aggrandisement, and the interests of party, the other taking no serious thought of anything except the public service, and the best means of promoting it. But this is not necessary; Marlborough and Wellington were both great men,—great in politics, perhaps greater in war; but except that neither of them ever sustained a defeat, there is little which, to him who examines their respective courses with attention, will serve to

place them in any degree of parallelism one towards the other.

And this naturally leads to a consideration of the calls which were made upon them, for the management, not of combined armies alone, but of courts and cabinets, of which the views were often as narrow as they were discordant. The task imposed upon Marlborough in this respect was heavy enough. He had to excite the States-General, always indolent and greedy, to self-denial and activity, while he kept up the sinking courage of the emperor, and restrained the impetuosity of the House of Savoy. He succeeded, as he invariably did, in diplomacy, by dint of great penetration into the characters of others, by winning manners, and the hearty support of Godolphin and the Duchess Sarah at home. But success enabled him only to lay upon others a responsibility which he could not himself undertake. He never found it necessary, first to create the resources of the States with which he was in communication, and then to wield them. How it fared with Wellington in these respects in India, in the Spanish Peninsula, and in France, we need not here stop to point out. The foregoing narrative has missed its mark if the tale be not fully told already; while for a general and accurate view of the whole case, we refer to M. Brialmont's summing up, which the reader will find in the Appendix.

The place to be allotted to the Duke of Wellington as a leading statesman under a constitutional government will be determined, as a matter of course, according to the opinions entertained by those who sit in judgment upon him, on certain great constitutional questions. That he was a Royalist in every sense of

the term, all who came in contact with him understood. The government of the empire was for him the King's government; the peace of the realm was the King's peace; the army, the navy, the magistracy, the parliament itself were the King's. The throne was the fountain, not of honour only, but of all the rights and privileges which the people enjoyed. Yet the throne, as he regarded it, was as much hemmed in by law, and even by custom, as the humblest of the lieges; and so it came to pass that, Royalist as he was, no man stood up more stoutly for the people and their rights than the Duke of Wellington. Like the best of the cavaliers in the time of the first Charles, it was for the crown, as the greatest institution in the country, that he was prepared to risk everything. Hence, if the King's ministers proposed measures which he believed to be mischievous or unsafe, he opposed them. Hence, too, if the sovereign expressed wishes, a compliance with which would tend in his opinion to bring the crown into disrepute, he resisted such wishes. Had his advice been taken, the country might have escaped much, if not all the scandal of Queen Caroline's trial. He overruled George IV. in other caprices, equally with that calculated to add to his unpopularity. While prepared at all hazards to deliver William IV. out of his difficulties, he did not hesitate to point out to his Majesty when he had gone wrong. And even towards Queen Victoria, for whom he would have cheerfully laid down his life, he took on one memorable occasion an attitude somewhat savouring of harshness. He joined the opposition to the grant proposed by Lord Melborne for Prince Albert on his marriage, and cut it down from 50,000*l.* to 30,000*l.* a year. However unpalatable at

the moment this act might be, neither the sovereign nor the people could mistake his motive, and both the sovereign and the people gave him in return increased esteem and reverence.

For many years after he became a minister, the Duke's place in the cabinet was a subordinate one. His own tenure of office as head of an administration, was brief. Yet he contrived in that interval to pass a measure from grappling with which all previous governments had shrunk. His Catholic Relief bill would have been more satisfactory, had he been able to carry it in its original form. But with all the imperfections which others engrafted upon it, who will speak of it as a blunder? That the Tories of 1829 blundered in breaking off from his guidance, there are probably few survivors of that gallant but headstrong band who will now deny. But surely the blame of subsequent misfortunes, if misfortunes we are to consider them, rests, not with him who got rid of an insuperable obstacle to all government, but with his angry followers, who, to gratify a spirit of revenge, placed him in a minority in the House of Commons, and insured the accession of the Whigs to office.

It is not unusual to hear the Duke condemned, first, for the obstinacy with which he opposed himself to the liberal measures of Lord Grey's government, and next, for endeavouring to bolster up the system, which the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832 had rendered impracticable. If the plain but authentic tale which we have told of his Grace's proceedings on the former of these occasions do not suffice to vindicate him from the charge of blind obstinacy, then must all reasoning on our part be useless. The Duke did not believe that,

under the system to be established by Lord Grey's Reform Bill, the prerogatives of the crown, the rights and privileges of the Established Church, the preponderating influence of the landed interest in the legislature, or the proper ascendency of the mother country over the colonies could long be preserved. He was likewise of opinion, that in proportion as the popular element gained strength in the constitution, the foreign policy of England would become vacillating and uncertain. And believing, further, that every change in these directions, besides being evil in themselves, would pave the way to other changes still more mischievous, he offered to the Reform Bill at every stage all the opposition in his power. Was this the act of a blindly obstinate man? Did he overlook, in so doing, the danger of worse things; of a revolution effected by physical force, and overthrowing in its progress every vestige of the institutions to which he was attached? The Duke did not overlook these things. He had simply no belief in their reality. He knew that the political unions, the moment they took one step in the direction of an armed revolt, would, if the King's ministers proved true to their sovereign, unite against them all the well-disposed subjects of the crown; and by these, independently of the standing army, any mad attempt at rebellion would at once be stamped out. The great object of his opposition, accordingly, was to take the government at an eventful crisis out of the hands of a body of ministers, who seemed to him unable or unwilling to put down these political unions, and to trust the matter in dispute between them and their opponents to the arbitration of a free parliament. But the Duke knew all the while that, from the moment

a scheme of parliamentary reform was laid in the King's name, and by the King's ministers, upon the table of the House of Commons, some measure of the sort became a necessity. His resistance was, therefore, not to reform itself, but to that particular degree and kind of reform which the cabinet had proposed. Which, then, was the obstinate party? The Duke, who refused to accept a particular measure, or the ministers who, refusing themselves to modify that measure, and taking steps to prevent its modification by others, brought the country, by their own showing, to the brink of anarchy, and carried their point at last only by virtually destroying the House of Lords.

Again, was the Duke right or wrong in the anticipations which he formed as to the inevitable consequences of passing that particular measure of reform? Has any minister since 1832, found it — we do not say an easy task,—but a task of which, from one hour to another, he has not good cause to doubt whether it will be practicable,—to carry on the government of this country? Has the crown the same latitude which it had previously to 1832, in the selection of its constitutional advisers? In what position, as regards influence in parliament, are the territorial proprietors of England now placed? Does the Established Church stand upon the ground which she occupied before her property passed into the hands of commissioners?—before her prelates ceased to own the estates which still nominally belong to their respective sees, and church-rates were paid as cheerfully as any other burden upon property! So also in regard to the colonial and foreign policy of this country: is it what it was? In all these respects the country may have gained, not lost. The Duke's views

of what the constitution really is, or used to be, may be wrong views. It may contribute to the well-being of the largest numbers, both at home and abroad, that the political influences of the British empire are changed. But surely no one can deny that they are changed, and that they are changing daily. Now the Duke dreaded these changes. He expected that they would come on more rapidly than they have done. He feared that they might come with greater violence. Admit that he was wrong in degree,—was he therefore wrong in substance, and in fact?

But entertaining and even expressing such opinions, why did the Duke interest himself any more in public affairs? Why did he not leave events, after the passing of the obnoxious bill, to take their own course, without striving to stay or even to direct them? They who ask these questions, cannot understand the nature of him of whom they are speaking. The Duke of Wellington could no more hold aloof from the service of his country, in the war of politics when it went against him, than he could have withdrawn, at the end of an unfavourable campaign, from the command of an army in the field. The strength which the crown, the aristocracy, and the church had lost, by the abolition of the system of close boroughs, he endeavoured, in co-operation with Sir Robert Peel, to supply, by the setting up of new combinations. He was thus a willing party to all the liberal measures which Sir Robert proposed, up to the last; and if he yielded his own judgment even on the question of the corn laws, it was because he saw that the repeal of those laws had become inevitable, and because he believed that it was better for the country, with or without these laws, to be governed by

conservative statesmen, than by statesmen who were not conservative. In all this, as well as in his anticipations of the effects on the general state of society of a more popularised system of government, the Duke may have been mistaken. We are scarcely, as yet, in a condition to decide whether he was mistaken or not. For the settlement, which a quarter of a century ago was accepted as final, has ceased to be final, and the effects of future changes, who will venture to predict? But because he entertained such opinions, and did his best to act up to them, the Duke of Wellington's statesmanship no more deserves to be undervalued, than we have a right to undervalue the tenacity of purpose, which induced him to stand fast behind the lines of Torres Vedras, at a time when the rest of the world, including the government which he served, had given up the cause of European deliverance as lost.

Of the Duke as an orator, enough has already been said, to convey a tolerably accurate impression to the mind of a careful reader. He had been many years a regular attendant in the House of Lords, before he ever thought of addressing it, except when some appeal was made directly to himself, and then he spoke briefly. He became all at once its leader, not in council only and by the force of his strong understanding, but in debate. His speeches, like his letters, are plain, straightforward, and to the purpose. His arguments were from time to time well sustained, and even ingenious: as in his censure of Earl Grey for dissolving parliament in 1831, and the view which he took of the effect of the laws against Roman Catholics, upon the constitution properly so called. His articulation, never very clear, became in latter years difficult, and some-

times painful. He would make long pauses when speaking, repeat himself, and occasionally employ terms which amounted to exaggeration. But in every instance what he said had in it a large measure of good sense, and was invariably listened to, both in the House of Lords and elsewhere, with deference and respect.

The attention which the Duke commanded for himself, he never failed to give to others. There he sat, with his hat drawn over his eyebrows, and his hand up to his ear, listening to one noble lord after another, as if each had an argument to advance, which might possibly change his own views of the point under discussion. And when otherwise unable to catch the substance of what was said, he would move as close to the speaker as the customs of the House allowed, and stand till the speech came to a close.

Of the Duke's personal peculiarities, both physical and mental, it may be thought that enough has been said elsewhere, yet our portrait would scarcely be complete, were we to omit all notice of them in this place. Nature had endowed him with a robust frame and an iron constitution. In height he measured about 5 feet 9 inches, — we speak, of course, of what he was in the vigour of his days, for latterly old age had shrunk and bowed his frame, and given him the habit of stooping. His shoulders were broad, his chest well-developed, his arms long, and his hands and feet in excellent proportion. His eyes were of a dark violet blue, or grey, and his sight was so penetrating, that even to the last he could distinguish objects at an immense distance. The general expression of his countenance when silent or pre-occupied, was grave; but his smile had a charm about it which, when once seen, could never be forgotten.

A forehead not very high but broad and square, eyebrows straight and prominent, a long face, a Roman nose, a broad under jaw, with a chin strongly marked, gave him a striking resemblance to more than one of the heroes of antiquity, especially to Julius Cæsar. His hair, which was originally coal black, had become white as silver before he died, but to the last there was no baldness, even at the temples. If you met him in a crowd or upon the street, and were entirely ignorant that he was a great man, you would be impelled by some secret impulse to fix your eye upon him, and to turn round and look after him when he had passed. The writer of this sentence saw him for the first time as he crossed the line of march during a military operation in Spain. Only three mounted officers attended him, and he was simply dressed in a grey frock, a cocked hat covered with oil-skin, and grey trowsers; but instinctively he was recognised as the commander of the forces, and the impression then made upon the mind of a boy, never in after life passed away.

The military costume of the Duke on active service was singularly plain, though becoming, and very peculiar. On state occasions he wore, as a matter of course, the full dress of his rank, with all his orders and decorations; but in the field his garb was either a blue or a grey frock—blue when fighting was not expected, grey, if a battle were in preparation or in progress. Over this, that he might be more easily recognised from afar, he often threw a short white cloak, which is still in existence, and may be seen in a glass case at Apsley House. His cocked hat was very low, rising but little above the crown of the head, and he rarely surmounted it with a plume. The boots known as "Wellingtons,"

were of his own invention, and outside the trowsers he used often to wear mud-guards of strong leather, which overlapped and were fastened with straps and buckles. His sword was a light steel-mounted sabre, which was suspended from his waist by a black belt. He never wore a sash except *en grande tenue.*

His morning dress, as a civilian, was scrupulously neat and clean, but varied very little, and that only with the change of season. In summer he might be recognised, on foot or on horseback, by his low-crowned narrow-brimmed hat, his white cravat fastened with a silver buckle behind; his blue frock, white waistcoat, and white trowsers. In winter there were the same hat, neckcloth, and frock, with a waistcoat blue, sometimes red, and blue trowsers. He never wore a great coat, but in severe weather threw a short cloak or cape over his shoulders, made of blue cloth, with a white lining. His evening attire, except when he was in mourning, consisted of a blue coat with metal buttons, a white cravat and waistcoat, black breeches, and silk stockings, or tight black pantaloons. On these occasions he wore the order of the garter under the left knee, with the golden fleece suspended round his neck, the blue or other ribbon, and a star. When at Walmer, he often dressed for dinner in the uniform of the Cinque Ports, viz., a blue coat with scarlet collar and cuffs, and blue trowsers with a red stripe down the outer seam.

Though a bold rider and a fearless driver, it cannot be said that the Duke was either skilful in equitation or an expert whip. His seat when mounted was loose, and latterly not very graceful. He spared no expense in furnishing his stables, but somehow or another his horses were rarely without a fault. The truth, we be-

lieve, was, that besides being but an indifferent judge of the animal at the outset, he became so much attached to it after he had ridden it for a while, that he continued to use it after any other man would have exchanged it for another. Of the sort of carriage in which he used to be conveyed to and from the Horse Guards, we have already spoken. In the country, before he ceased to be his own charioteer, he was in the habit of driving sometimes a curricle, sometimes, when his house was full of guests, a sort of *char-à-banc*. Being deaf in the left ear, he sat always on the left side of the box, and his driving was like that of Jehu the son of Nimshi, furious. It happened that on one occasion, we being in another carriage behind him, endeavoured to follow close through the narrow uneven lanes which connect Barfriston with Walmer. It was a vain effort; he was soon out of sight. Arriving by-and-by at the castle gate, we were met by Lord Clanwilliam, who had been his Grace's companion in the curricle. "The Duke gets along," was the remark, "he soon left us behind." "There is no doubt of that," was the answer; "I thought more than once that he would have left me behind too."

The Duke's manner of life was plain, regular, and methodical. He mixed, indeed, freely in the society of London during the season, for everybody desired to have him, and he went everywhere — not in search of personal gratification to himself, but because he knew that others would be gratified by his presence. Indeed he felt, and to his more intimate friends often complained, of the burden which society was to him, though in this, as in graver matters, his own ease was invariably postponed to what he held to be a duty. Elsewhere than in London, his habits were simple, we had almost

said severe. The rooms most plainly furnished in Strathfieldsaye and Walmer Castle were those which he occupied himself. He slept upon a small iron bedstead, which might have served him, and was commonly, though erroneously, supposed to have done so, throughout his wars in the Peninsula. It was without posts or curtains, or hangings of any kind; and the bedding consisted of a hair mattress, a blanket, and an eider-down quilt. At Walmer, his bedroom served him as a private sitting-room also. It was situated within one of the bastions of the castle, and, besides his couch, contained a few chairs, two tables, and a bookcase so placed that he could take down a volume from it at pleasure while in bed, and a chest of drawers. The Bible, the Prayer-book, a copy of Jeremy Taylor's Holy Living and Dying, and Cæsar's Commentaries, lay within his reach, and judging from the marks of use which are upon them, must have been much read and often consulted.

The Duke was most exact and particular in his correspondence. No letter, even the most eccentric, remained unanswered. When, indeed, numbers of persons took to writing to him for the mere purpose of obtaining his autograph, he so couched his replies as to meet the peculiarities of each case. There was much originality in these answers. Some ran thus:—"F. M. the Duke of Wellington regrets that it is not in his power, &c. &c. He is one of the few persons in this country who don't meddle with matters with which they have no concern." Others took this turn:—"F. M. the Duke of Wellington can give no opinion upon a matter of which he knows nothing."

In 1845, when the Queen paid him a visit at Strathfieldsaye, the newspaper reporters applied to him,

according to the custom of the country, to be admitted into the house, in order that they might give an account of what was passing there. The Duke wrote to them in these terms:—"F. M. the Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to Mr. ——, and begs to say that he does not see what his house at Strathfieldsaye has to do with the public press."

A gentleman of Belfast wrote to him the following letter:—"May it please your Grace, I have taken the liberty of requesting your opinion — Was Napoleon guilty or not of the murder of his prisoners at Jaffa? and if there is any military law or circumstance that would justify the deed?" The following was the Duke's answer:—"F. M. the Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to Mr. H.; he has also received Mr. H.'s letter, and begs leave to inform him, that he is not the historian of the wars of the French Republic in Egypt and Syria."

The Duke, when prime minister, received frequent proposals from Mr. Haydon for the improvement of the fine arts. He sent them back with the following note:—"F. M. the Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to Mr. Haydon; he begs leave to reserve his opinion till Mr. Haydon shall have submitted to him a practicable plan."

A great number of authors applied to the Duke to subscribe to their works. His answer was always the same. "F. M. the Duke of Wellington begs to decline to give his name as a subscriber to the book in question. If he learns that it is a good book he may become a purchaser."

Equally characteristic were the Duke's letters, whether of courtesy or of kindness. A young author, who

had published a work of which the success was probably greater than its merits, was informed by some of his friends that it had attracted the attention of the Duke of Wellington, and the suggestion was made to him that he also should apply for leave to dedicate a new edition to his Grace. He received by return of post the following answer:—

"London, November 9, 1826.

"Dear Sir, — I have this day received your letter of the 7th inst., and I beg to assure you that you have been correctly informed that I had read your work with the greatest interest, and that I admired the simplicity and truth with which you had related the various events which you had witnessed: the scenes in which you had been an actor, and the circumstances of the life which you had led as an officer of the 85th regiment, in the army in the Peninsula and the south of France.

"I should be happy to have an opportunity of testifying my sense of the merits of your work by consenting to the dedication to me of the second edition, only that I have long been under the necessity of declining to give a formal consent to receive the dedication of any work.

"I conceive that by such consent I give a sort of tacit guarantee of the contents of the work so dedicated. I know that I should be considered to have placed myself in that situation by some who might not, perhaps, approve of those contents. From what I have above stated, you will see that I could have no objection to stand in the situation described, in relation to your work; and I must admit that it would be

better to draw a distinction between good and meritorious works and others, and to give my sanction, so far as to consent to receive the compliment of their dedication gives such sanction, to the first and not to the last. But then there comes another difficulty. Before I give such sanction I must peruse the work proposed to be dedicated to me; and I must confess that I have neither time nor inclination to wade through the hundreds, I might almost say thousands, of volumes offered to my protection, in order to see whether their contents are such as that I can venture to become a species of guarantee for their truth, their fitness, &c. &c. I have, therefore, taken the idlest and the shortest way of getting out of this difficulty, by declining to give a formal consent to receive the dedication of any work. This mode of proceeding frequently gives me great pain; but in no instance has it given more than on this occasion, as you will perceive by the trouble which I give you to peruse, and myself to write, these reasons for declining to give a formal consent to accept the compliment which you have been so kind as to propose to me.

"If, however, you think proper to dedicate your second edition to me, you are perfectly at liberty to do so; and you cannot express in too strong terms my approbation and admiration of your interesting work.

"I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

"Yours, most faithfully,

"WELLINGTON.

"I was informed when I landed at Dover, in April, of the change of your line of life and circumstances, by one of your former brother-officers."

The individual to whom this letter was addressed derived from it, as may be supposed, the highest gratification; and the kindness which it manifested personally to himself ceased only with the life of the illustrious writer.

The Duke's correspondence during the agitation of Lord Grey's reform bill was, as we have seen, immense. If printed in detail it would fill volumes; but a few specimens, merely to show upon what principle he acted, both as a public man and as an individual, may be with perfect propriety inserted here.

At a moment when the public mind was at the height of its agitation, the individual to whom the Duke wrote so kindly on the subject of his book, took the liberty of expressing to his Grace a wish that certain concessions should be made. The following is the Duke's reply:—

"London, April 11, 1831.

"My dear ——, I received your letters of the 8th and 9th. It is curious enough that I, who have been the greatest reformer on earth, should be held up as an enemy to all reform. This assertion is neither more nor less than one of the lying cries of the day.

"If by reform is meant parliamentary reform, or a change in the mode or system of representation, what I have said is, that I have never heard of a plan that was safe and practicable that would give satisfaction, and that while I was in office I should oppose myself to reform in parliament. This was in answer to Lord Grey on the first day of the session. I am still of the same opinion. I think that parliament has done its duty: that constituted as parliament is, having in it

as a member every man noted in the country for his fortune, his talents, his science, his industry, or his influence; the first men of all professions, in all branches of trade and manufacture, connected with our colonies and settlements abroad, and representing, as it does, all the states of the United Kingdom, the government of the country is still a task almost more than human. To conduct the government would be impossible, if by reform the House of Commons should be brought to a greater degree under popular influence. Yet let those who wish for reform reflect for a moment where we should all stand if we were to lose for a day the protection of government.

"That is the ground upon which I stand with respect to the question of reform in general. I have more experience in the government of this country than any man now alive, as well as in foreign countries. I have no borough influence to lose, and I hate the whole concern too much to think of endeavouring to gain any. Ask the gentlemen of the Cinque Ports whether I have ever troubled any of them.

"On the other hand, I know that I should be the idol of the country if I could pretend to alter my opinion and alter my course. And I know that I exclude myself from political power by persevering in the course which I have taken. But nothing shall induce me to utter a word, either in public or in private, that I don't believe to be true. If it is God's will that this great country should be destroyed, and that mankind should be deprived of this last asylum of peace and happiness, be it so; but, as long as I can raise my voice, I will do so against the infatuated madness of the day.

"In respect to details, it has always appeared to me that the first step upon this subject was the most important. We talk of unrepresented great towns! These are towns which have all the benefit of being governed by the system of the British constitution without the evil of elections. Look at Scotland. Does Scotland suffer because it has not the benefit of riotous elections? I think that reform in Scotland would be, and I am certain would be thought, a grievance by many in that country. I can answer for there being many respectable men in Manchester, and I believe there are some in Birmingham and Leeds, who are adverse to change.

"But how is this change to be made? Either by adding to the number of representatives in parliament from England, or by disfranchising what are called the rotten boroughs! The first cannot be done without a departure from the basis and a breach of the acts of Union. And, mind, a serious departure and breach of these acts, inasmuch as the limits of the extension could not be less than from fifteen to twenty towns. The last would be, in my opinion, a violation of the first and most important principle of the constitution, for no valid reason, and upon no ground whatever excepting a popular cry, and an apprehension of the consequences of resisting it. But this is not all. I confess that I see in thirty members for rotten boroughs thirty men, I don't care of what party, who would preserve the state of property as it is; who would maintain by their votes the Church of England, its possessions, its churches and universities, all our great institutions and corporations, the union with Scotland and Ireland, the connection of the country with its foreign colonies and possessions, the national honour

abroad and its good faith with the King's subjects at home. I see men at the back of the government to enable it to protect individuals and their property against the injustice of the times, which would sacrifice all rights and all property to a description of plunder called general convenience and utility. I think it is the presence of this description of men in parliament with the country gentlemen, and the great merchants, bankers, and manufacturers, which constitutes the great difference between the House of Commons and those assemblies abroad called 'Chambers of Deputies.' It is by means of the representatives of the close corporations that the great proprietors of the country participate in political power. I don't think that we could spare thirty or forty of these representatives, or change them with advantage for thirty or forty members elected for the great towns by any new system. I am certain that the country would be injured by depriving men of great property of political power, besides the injury done to it by exposing the House of Commons to a greater degree of popular influence.

"You will observe that I have now considered only the smallest of all reforms — a reform which would satisfy nobody. Yet it cannot be adopted without a serious departure from principle (principle in the maintenance of which the smallest as well as the greatest of us is interested), and by running all the risks of those misfortunes which all wish to avoid.

"I tell you that we must not risk our great institutions and large properties, personal as well as real. If we do there is not a man of this generation, so young, so old, so rich, so poor, so bold, so timid, as that he will not feel the consequences of this rashness. This

opinion is founded not on reasoning only, but on experience, and I shall never cease to declare it."

We have described, in another place, the risk which the Duke ran, in visiting Walmer Castle after the Reform Bill had been thrown out in the House of Lords, and the manner in which he evaded it. The following is his answer to the letter which warned him of his danger, and described, at the same time, the source whence his correspondent had received his information:—

"London, Nov. 7, 1831.

"I received only yesterday morning, on my road to London, your letter of the 4th inst. It is my duty to go to Walmer and to Dover, and I am not to be prevented from doing so, either by threats of insult or injury. What I always do in these cases is to give information to the magistrate. It is his duty to protect all his Majesty's subjects, particularly those acting under the King's authority; and even to take precautions for their protection, if necessary.

"It is my opinion that these secret informants, who will not, and probably dare not, come forward with their information, do more harm than good. There is a perpetual gossip going on in the public-houses upon all sorts of plans of mischief. Is it quite certain that these informants do not suggest the very plans of which they give information?

"I intended to be at Walmer this night, but a letter which I sent to announce my arrival did not go. I shall, therefore, set off to-morrow morning, and I hope to arrive early in the day. I suspect that those who will attack me on the road will come rather the worst out of the contest, if there should be one."

Everybody at that time had some suggestion to make; and his Grace's correspondent having, among other things, consulted him on the propriety of endeavouring to form constitutional societies, he received the following answer:—

"I quite concur in all that you suggest as steps to be taken, with the exception of the formation of societies. We must never forget the Roman Catholic Association in Ireland, in its various modifications and forms. There is nothing so easy as to give a society a constitutional title, and to hold out for it the most beneficent objects, and then to turn it to the most mischievous purposes. Those who have not had to deal with these mischievous societies, are not aware, as we 'hacks' are, of all that can be done with them. I don't think that I could belong to one that had the most innocent views and objects."

The writer of this memoir was, in 1834, presented by Lord John Russell to the chaplaincy of Chelsea Hospital. As the offer of the appointment came entirely unsolicited, and as there was no accord at that time between Lord John's policy of parliamentary reform and the opinions entertained by the object of his kindness, the circumstance naturally excited some surprise; and the same post which conveyed to his lordship the writer's acknowledgments, carried a letter to the Duke, stating how the case stood, and venturing to ask advice. He received, with the least delay possible, the following answer:—

"Strathfieldsaye, February 12, 1834.

"I was in town yesterday; and am just now returned, and have received your note.

"I don't think that it will be disagreeable to you, or will do any harm, to tell you what I know of your appointment.

"Lord John inquired about you from Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who told him that he would apply to me about you. The object of the inquiry was to know whether you were a party-writer.

"I desired Lord Fitzroy to tell Lord John that you, as most other good clergymen of the Church of England, were a zealous Conservative politician; but that I did not believe you had ever been a party-writer; that when I was in office I was anxious to promote you in the Church, on account of * * * and that I had earnestly urged you, by all means in your power, to avoid party discussions; that I never heard of your having engaged in them; and that I firmly believed you had not.

"I learned no more upon the subject till I received your letter.

"You see that the advice that I gave you was judicious; and that you are in the enjoyment of the advantage resulting from it.

"I shall be very sorry to lose your society at Walmer Castle, but I hope that I shall see you in London.".

One more specimen, in rather a different style, and we pass on to other matters.

In 1836, a bill was brought in to effect certain changes in the constitution of the Scotch universities. It was greatly disliked by the High Church party in both kingdoms; and one of these, hoping to engage the Duke's opposition to it, called his Grace's attention to its assumed defects. The following was the Duke's answer:—

"London, June 12, 1836.

"The question of the Scotch universities has not escaped my attention. Care is taken that nothing should. Neither has it escaped me that this bill is founded on the report of a commission appointed, I believe, by Sir Robert Peel in 1828. We cannot blow hot one day and cold another on such subjects: at least I cannot. Moreover, I know that I should have nobody to support me on that subject."

Of the Duke's habits of patient industry it may well appear superfluous to speak. We have seen how in India, in the Spanish peninsula, and in France, hours which others would have devoted to necessary repose were spent by him in toil. And as if all this had not been sufficient to tax his energies fully, he seems to have made copies of many of his own letters, and to have arranged and docketed them all. This, indeed, was a practice which he appears very early to have begun, as if there had been present with him from the outset a conviction that his name would sooner or later become historical, and that means should be at hand of connecting it only with the truths of history. And he never abandoned the habit to the end. Boxes of his papers, chronologically arranged, stood in their proper order at Apsley House, when he died, and stand there still. When re-examined and resorted, a process to which the filial piety of his son is now subjecting them, they will supply to some future biographer materials the most complete that were ever brought together for the history of a great man and of the times in which he lived.

A volume might be filled with anecdotes illustrative

of various points in the Duke's character; of his playfulness, his kindly disposition, his perfect self-possession in moments of danger and difficulty, and of his severe wisdom. We have ourselves heard him say, half jocularly, that all his life long he had been a Jonas; for he never undertook a voyage at sea without encountering a storm. Others said of him that under such circumstances he was as cool and collected as if in a calm. General Alava has left it on record, that on the evening after the battle of Quatre-Bras, he found the Duke by the road side, receiving reports of the enemy's movements, and of the results of the action at Ligny. Alava, who had listened to all sorts of sinister rumours, approached him timidly, but was at once reassured when greeted in the following terms: "Well, Alava, were you at the Duchess of Richmond's party last night?"

A gentleman, not remarkable for always saying the right thing at the right moment, happened to dine in his company one day, and during a pause in the conversation asked, abruptly: "Duke, were not you surprised at Waterloo?" The Duke smiled, and answered: "No; but I am now."

When Sir De Lacy Evans with his legion was carrying on military operations near San Sebastian, the Duke was asked: "What will all this produce?" His answer was: "Probably two volumes octavo."

The Commissioners for the Provisional Government having announced to him, in 1815, that the empire was at an end, he replied: "I knew that a year ago."

It is told of him that when a colonial bishop wrote home to remonstrate because guards were not turned out to him, and sentries instructed to salute, the Duke,

on being consulted by the Secretary of State, made this minute: "The only attention which soldiers are to pay to the bishop must be to his sermons."

Sometimes his graver sayings carried a sting in their wit. The late Sir William Allan used to tell with great glee, that being sent for to receive the price of his picture of the Battle of Waterloo, he found the Duke busy counting over whole piles of bank-notes. Allan, willing to save the Duke's time, observed that a cheque upon his Grace's banker would serve his purpose; whereupon the Duke, not over pleased at being interrupted in his calculations, looked up and said: "Do you think I am going to let Coutts's people know what a d——d fool I have been?"

On the occasion of a regiment of cavalry being ordered unexpectedly to the Cape of Good Hope, one of the officers, not remarkable for zeal in the performance of his duty, applied for leave to remain at home. The Duke's answer was very laconic: "Sail or sell."

Of his kindly disposition the following are manifestations. An old gentleman of the name of Robertson desired one day particularly to see him. He was admitted to an audience, and stated that he did not expect to live long, but could not die in peace without seeing the Duke, and that he had travelled from Scotland for that single purpose. Touched with the old man's manner, the Duke not only expressed his own gratification, but begged Mr. Robertson to stay and dine with him. "Many thanks," replied the old Scot, "I can't do that. I have seen your Grace, and have now nothing more in this world to wish for:" and so withdrew.

He was walking, one day, in the streets of a manu-

facturing town, when an operative accosted, and desired permission to shake hands with him. "Certainly," replied the Duke; "I am always happy to shake hands with an honest man."

He never met, in his rides and walks among the lanes near Walmer or Strathfieldsaye, any poor man who claimed to have served under him without giving him a sovereign. He used to laugh at himself for doing so, and acknowledged that it was ten to one against the object of his bounty deserving it: but nothing would induce him to omit the practice.

But perhaps the most touching testimony to his gentleness, is that which Mr. Richard Oastler, the great and honest mob orator, has placed on record. Describing an interview to which the Duke admitted him, and his own embarrassment when he found himself closeted with the hero of the age, Mr. Oastler continues, "On that space," (a space free from papers on the sofa,) "at the bidding of the Duke I sat. His Grace standing before me said, 'Well, Mr. Oastler, what is it you wish to say to me?' I observed, 'It is very strange that I should sit while the Duke of Wellington stands, and in Apsley House too.' 'Oh,' said his Grace, 'if you think so, and if it will please you better, I'll sit.' So saying, he took a seat on an easy chair, between the sofa and the fire-place. I was then desired to proceed. Being strangely affected with a reception so very different from that anticipated, I expressed my surprise, and craved the Duke's indulgence. Placing his right hand on my right shoulder, his Grace said, 'We shall never get on if you are embarrassed. Forget that you are here; fancy yourself talking with one of your neighbours at Fixby, and proceed.'"

It is not worth while to transcribe more of what passed between them; but the result must be given in Mr. Oastler's words. "In a short time I returned to Huddersfield, met thousands of people at an out-door assembly, and told them all that the Duke of Wellington had told me. Oh, how they cheered!"

The Duke's self-possession in circumstances the most critical, was marvellous. While the French and English armies were moving on parallel lines, just before the battle of Salamanca, the Duke placed himself in the early morning on a hill, whence he could see all that was going on. He had with him, besides the head-quarter staff, one or two mounted officers from each division, ready to carry orders to their respective chiefs. It was during that interval, when both sides were pushing to take possession of the Arapiles; and when the fate of the battle appeared to hang upon success in that endeavour. The Duke and his followers breakfasted on the hill side; and at the conclusion of the meal the Duke said to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, "I am going to take a sleep. Do you see that copse?" pointing to a little wood a good way ahead of the French column of march. "As soon as the enemy reach it, call me."

The Duke then wrapped himself in his cloak, withdrew behind a bush, and was fast asleep in a moment. Meanwhile the staff smoked their cigars, drank some glasses of wine, and chatted and laughed, till Lord Fitzroy, suddenly, as it appeared, remembering the Duke's instructions, asked for a telescope, and turned it towards the copse. The head of the French column was just passing it. He called the Duke, who sprang up, looked through his telescope, and said in a quiet tone, "Now, gentlemen, you must mount, and be off to

your divisions; and tell Packenham to attack immediately." The attack was made, and 40,000 men were beaten in forty minutes.

The Duke held that, for the sake of the army, and of the public service, he was bound to take as much care of his own health as circumstances would allow. He made a point, therefore, of securing, whenever it could be had, six hours' sound sleep at night. With this view he made one of his aides-de-camp sleep in an outer room, if they were under a roof, and in his outer tent if they were encamped, giving him strict orders not to bring anybody into the Duke's chamber till he should have explained his business; and if the business did not seem to be urgent, not to introduce him till the Duke got up.

At that critical period when he was retreating from Burgos, and Soult with a very superior force lay in front of him, Sir Willoughby Gordon came into the aides-de-camp's room one morning about two o'clock, and desired to be taken to the Duke. Colin Campbell was on duty that night, and requested to be made acquainted with the nature of Gordon's business; which the latter, after a good deal of reluctance, explained. He came to tell the Duke that the enemy were interposing between him and Ciudad Rodrigo, and that the communications of the army were in danger. Hearing this, Campbell went in and awoke the Duke, "What does he say?" asked the Duke sitting up. "Hand me the map, it lies upon the table." The map was handed, and a light held that the Duke might examine it. "The thing 's impossible," said his Grace, "the French were forty miles from Rodrigo at seven o'clock last night; and they can't be upon our communications now, unless

they had wings." So saying he laid his head upon the pillow, and was asleep again in a moment.

It turned out, from a subsequent report, of which Colonel Arentschildt was the bearer, that for the apprehensions entertained by the chief of the staff there was some excuse. A body of French cavalry had made their way between Arentschildt's outposts and Rodrigo; but it was not of great strength, for Arentschildt attacked it with his pickets, and put it to the rout, killing a colonel, and bringing in sixty or seventy prisoners.

It was not, however, in consequence of having proved his own superiority over them, that the Duke arrived at the conclusion that he had little to dread from either French skill or French valour. Mr. Croker, in an article contributed by him to the "Quarterly Review," relates the following anecdote: — "He dined in Harley Street one day, in June 1808, just before he set out to the command of the expedition which was assembling in Cork harbour. The ladies had withdrawn, and he sat *tête-à-tête* with his host, and was silent. On being asked what he was thinking of, he replied, "To tell you the truth, I was thinking of the French whom I am going to fight. I have never seen them since the campaign in Flanders, when they were already capital soldiers; and a dozen years of successes must have made them still better. They have beaten all the world, and are supposed to be invincible. They have besides, it seems, a new system, which has outmanœuvred and overwhelmed all the armies of Europe. But no matter, my die is cast. They may overwhelm, but I don't think they will outmanœuvre me. In the first place, I am not afraid of them, as everybody else seems to be; and secondly, if what I hear of their system of manœuvres

be true, I think it a false one against troops steady enough, as I hope mine are, to receive them with the bayonet. I suspect that all the Continental armies were more than half beaten before the battle began. I, at least, will not be frightened beforehand."

"They who were nearest to the Duke," says M. Brialmont, "and observed him most closely, during the memorable 18th of June, testify that, though he found himself for the first time in presence of that extraordinary man, and of that incomparable French army which had heretofore triumphed over united Europe, he never exhibited the faintest symptoms of emotion. Verey, the celebrated physiologist, has reason on his side when he says that 'the self-possession which remains unshaken in the midst of danger, is one of the attributes which belong only to intellects of the highest order.'"

The Duke's wisdom, like that of other wise men, was shown more in his life than in his conversation: yet certain sayings of his have passed into aphorisms, and will never be forgotten while the English language exists. Here are a few of them:—

"A great country ought never to make little wars.

"Be discreet in all things, and so render it unnecessary to be mysterious about any.

"The history of a battle is like the history of a ball.

"Animosity among nations ought to cease when hostilities come to an end.

"He is most to blame who breaks the law, no matter what the provocation may be under which he acts.

"One country has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of another. Non-intervention is the law, intervention is only the exception."

A story is told of the Duke, during the progress of the battle of Waterloo, which we must not pass by. While he was watching the French formations, an officer of artillery rode up, and pointing to the place where Napoleon stood with his staff, observed, "that he could easily reach them, and had no doubt that he would be able to knock some of them over." "No, no," replied the Duke, "generals commanding armies in a great battle have something else to do than to shoot at one another."

His Grace dined one day in Paris with M. Cambacères, one of the most renowned *gourmets* of France. The host having pressed a *recherché* dish upon the Duke, asked eagerly, when the plate was cleared, how he had liked it. "It was excellent," replied the Duke; "but to tell you the truth, I don't much care what I eat." "Good heavens!" exclaimed Cambacères, "don't care what you eat! Why then did you come here?"

The Duke was fond of talking of his Indian wars, and spoke well of the sepoys as they were in his day. He used to say that "they were very like the Portuguese. They would go anywhere, and do anything, when led by British officers and supported by British troops."

It is a singular fact in this great man's history, that he never lost a gun to the enemy. "Returning with him one day from the hunting-field," says Lord Ellesmere, "I asked him whether he could form any calculation of the number of guns he had taken in the course of his career." "No," he replied, "not with any accuracy; somewhere about 3000, I should guess. At Oporto, after the passage of the Douro, I took the entire siege-train of the enemy; at Vittoria and Waterloo

I took every gun they had in the field. What, however, is more extraordinary, I don't think I ever lost a gun in the field. After the battle of Salamanca," he went on to explain, "three of my guns attached to some Portuguese cavalry, were captured in a trifling affair near Madrid, but they were recovered the next day. In the Pyrenees, Lord Hill found himself obliged to throw eight or nine guns over a precipice; but those also were recovered, and never fell into the enemy's hands at all."

Though pretending to no eminence either in scholarship or science, the Duke entertained the greatest respect for both. On two separate occasions he expressed a desire to be elected a fellow of the Royal Society. At first his meaning appears scarcely to have been understood, but the wish being repeated, the Royal Society at once, and with peculiar satisfaction, received him into the list of its fellows. He was proposed by the late Marquess of Northampton, and seconded by Sir Robert Harry Inglis, and he seems to have been better pleased with this distinction, than with many others which had been conferred upon him by some of the sovereigns and peoples whom he had served.

Of the great tenacity of the Duke's memory notice has been taken elsewhere. It never forsook him to the last; and it manifested itself as distinctly in the management of great as of small matters. In 1843, when the terror of the Seikh invasion was at its height, the Duke was requested by the government of the day, to draw up a plan for the defence of India. This paper or memorandum he read "with great emphasis" to Lord Ellesmere, who says, "It embraced all three presidencies, and was full of geographical details. It

had been written, as he told me, without reference either to a map or a gazetteer."

It was soon after this, that when called upon to name three officers, one of whom might be selected to go out as Lord Gough's successor in command of the army, he wrote, "Sir Charles Napier, Sir Charles Napier, Sir Charles Napier."

We must bring these anecdotes to an end. Hundreds more, equally characteristic, are doubtless in circulation; every one of which deserves its own place here; but already the limits at our command are passed, the subject remaining still unexhausted. If told in detail, they could scarcely add to the measure of admiration in which, by all who know how to value real greatness, the memory of the Duke of Wellington is held. He was the grandest, because the truest man, whom modern times have produced. He was the wisest and most loyal subject that ever served and supported the English throne.

APPENDIX.

I.

M. BRIALMONT'S ESTIMATE OF THE DUKE'S MILITARY CHARACTER.

After having described in detail the events of a life so remarkable and so well-accomplished as that of the Duke of Wellington, it remains for us to set forth, in the form of a summary judgment, the impression which has been made upon us, by a careful study of the actions, the labours, and the character of that great man. And in order that we may not be accused of sitting down to this examination in a spirit either too lenient or too rigorous, we shall take care to support each of our assertions with irrefragable proofs, deliberately and cautiously collected.

This condensed synthesis will have the effect of making generally known a man as yet very inaccurately estimated; although all his acts were performed in broad daylight, and he never attempted to disguise a single error or a single weakness.

"The foremost quality in a general," says Napoleon, "is that he shall have a cool head, which receives just impressions of things; which is never confused, nor allows itself to be dazzled or intoxicated by good or bad news."

Wellington possessed in a high degree all these valuable qualities. Calm, cool, ever master of himself, yet capable of vigorous action, nature had made him for war. Endowed with excellent health, with a rapid *coup d'œil*, with great intelligence, with an exhaustless fecundity of ideas, with a spirit of observation, of order, and of foresight, which neglected nothing, he possessed, over and above these qualities, that which is more rare, namely the faculty of arriving at a prompt decision amidst unlooked-for circumstances, and of accepting resolutely the responsibility of the gravest action. He never exhibited greater perspicacity, or a judgment more clear and more firm,

than when called upon to decide in the most delicate affairs, either of policy or of strategy. Surrounded by the embarrassments of a war so difficult, and in which everything seemed to conspire for his destruction, amidst the wavering action of the English government, the hostility of the Spanish population, the unskilfulness of the Portuguese regency, the sufferings and weakness of the allied troops, the constantly increasing strength of the enemy, the talents of their generals, the pitiable condition of the Spanish army, always beaten, yet always ready to fall again into the same mistakes, no one ever saw Wellington discouraged or even affected by his position. His discontent and his complaints were exhibited only in his correspondence.* On the field of battle and in the presence of his subordinates he appeared perfectly at his ease, and full of confidence. If by chance some unlooked-for danger, one of those incidents which occur in all battles, and are the touchstone of military genius, befell to complicate his situation, he knew how to profit by it on the instant, and to turn to his own advantage that which would have destroyed a general less able or less confident than himself. But for this rapid *coup d'œil*, and that promptitude of action, he would have sustained a defeat after Talavera, at Salamanca, at Orthez, and perhaps at Waterloo.

Wellington was especially skilful in unravelling the designs of his opponents. "Impenetrable in his own purposes," says the author of the memoirs of Massena†, "he divined those of the enemy, and appreciated them justly, though it might be slowly." M. Thiers confirms this judgment by a significant fact. When Massena was before the lines of Torres Vedras, the English government required Wellington to say whether it might not be possible to withdraw the fleet of transports, which cost upwards of seventy-five millions of francs a year. The Duke replied, that "certainly it would be possible, but that, nevertheless, it would be prudent to leave them where they were, though he hoped that he should have no occasion for them." He added, says M. Thiers, and it did the greatest credit to his political intelligence, that probably Marshal Massena would be supported

* More than once he announced his intention of quitting Spain, and leaving the Peninsula to its fate; but his letters had generally for their object to overcome the obstinacy of the ministers, or to hasten operations in the success of which he was interested.

† General Koch, t. vii. p. 173. The opinion of that general is the more valuable, as he is for the most part unjust towards the Duke of Wellington.

from the side of Castile feebly, from that of Andalusia not at all.* Everything fell out as Wellington had foreseen.

In 1812, Napoleon and Berthier imagined that the Duke of Ragusa, by assuming an offensive attitude at Salamanca, would hinder Wellington from laying siege to Badajoz.† Marshal Marmont appreciating the sagacity of his opponent, replied, that the English general was not to be duped by any such demonstration, and that the only means of saving Badajoz would be to establish three divisions of the army of Portugal in the valley of the Tagus.‡ The event justified the opinion.

Personal courage, which was so necessary in the generals of antiquity, is no longer the chief qualification in the commanders of modern armies. Wellington, therefore, made no effort to distinguish himself by brilliant personal achievements.§ Nevertheless, as often as his presence on a point of danger or at the head of a column of attack was necessary, he exposed himself gallantly. At the battle of Assaye he had two horses killed under him. In 1811, when advancing with Beresford and a few officers to reconnoitre Marmont, who was preparing to cross the Douro, he got surrounded by a small body of cavalry, and made his way through them only sword in hand.‖ At Salamanca, he received a contusion on the thigh and a ball through the hat. At the siege of Burgos he often exposed himself in the trenches, and escaped, says Sherer, only by a miracle. At the battle of Orthez, a spent ball gave him a contusion on the lower part of the thigh, and the same day, when reconnoitring Marshal Soult's position from a height, he served for some time as a mark to the French artillery. Finally, during the memorable battle of

* Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, t. iii. p. 417.

† See among others Berthier's letter to Marmont, February, 1812. Memoirs of the Duc de Ragusa, t. iv. p. 306.

‡ Letter of the 23rd of February, 1812, to the Prince of Neufchâtel, in the memoirs of the Duke of Ragusa, t. iv. p. 312.

§ Wellington in some measure drew his own portrait in the following lines, addressed on the 15th of May, 1811, to General Campbell: "The desire to be forward in the engagement of an enemy is not uncommon in the British army; but that quality which I wish to see the officers possess who are at the head of the troops, is a cool discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude how far they can and ought to go with propriety."

‖ See his letter of the 6th of November, 1811, to Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens. That accident was the result of a surprise occasioned by the similarity in the head gear of the 3rd English Hussars and the French Chasseurs-à-Cheval.

Waterloo, he showed himself on every part of the field where the presence of the chief seemed to be necessary. Never, perhaps, had he exposed himself so lavishly; the greater number of the officers in attendance on him were killed or wounded at his side.

In the midst of scenes the most agitating, Wellington retained his self-possession unmoved. Neither success nor its opposite seemed much to affect him. "I found myself near him," says Napier, "on the evening of Salamanca, when the blaze of artillery and musketry, flashing up as far as the eye could reach, made apparent all that he had gained. He was alone, the light of victory shone upon his forehead, his glance was quick and penetrating, but his voice was calm and even sweet." So also he appeared on various occasions at Talavera, at Busaco, at El-Bodon, at Sauroren, at Orthez at Waterloo. He watched everything without manifesting the slightest agitation, and received tidings of the events of the battle, satisfactory or otherwise, with the impassibility of a man who had foreseen all, had calculated all, and could not be taken by surprise. If he had been the mere spoilt child of fortune, as has so often been said of him, this never could have occurred, because unlooked-for successes astonish, and not unfrequently confuse, those who achieve them.

No doubt fortune enters largely into the events of war, but, whatever certain authors may say to the contrary, no human being ever trusted less to accident than the Duke of Wellington. He was of opinion that, in war as in everything else, success depends much more upon the steady observance of rules than upon momentary inspiration, or the exceptional concurrence of favourable circumstances. Again, though deficient neither in determination nor in audacity, and though his natural temperament impelled him to hazardous enterprise, his reason led him to give the preference to means more slow perhaps, but, as experience demonstrated, more certain in their issues. He calculated with rare sagacity the probable result of his own strategical operations, and did not make up his mind to execute them till he saw reason to count, his own genius aiding him, on a successful event. This prudence has caused several French authors to allege that Wellington was deficient in enterprise, and that he endeavoured to make amends for the want of a natural genius for command by an excess of precaution unworthy of a true warrior. M. Thiers assumes, that the Duke, according to his custom, was unwilling to fight except *à coup sure*; that is to

say in defensive positions well nigh impregnable, with a numerical superiority which, being added to an excellent choice of ground, made the result as certain as anything can be in war.* The same judgment has been pronounced by Colonel Koch, in the memoirs of Marshal Massena: — "The first and true merit of Wellington," he says, "is that he never undertook an operation except *à coup sure*.† He never stood upon uncertain ground; in a word, he added to the diplomatic ability and some of the qualities of Marlborough the faults with which the Duke of York stands charged."‡

These two quotations, taken from authors comparatively more just to the English general than the majority of their countrymen, testify how deep seated in France is the opinion that Wellington was wanting in enterprise and hardihood.

In the preceding volumes we have refuted this opinion, by the statement of undeniable facts. To those who may not retain these facts immediately in their recollection, we shall content ourselves by addressing the following questions, leaving to their own good faith the task of replying to them.

Was he a timid general who, on the plains of Assaye, with 7500 men, of whom only 1500 were Europeans, and with 17 pieces of cannon, attacked 50,000 Mahratta soldiers strongly intrenched, covered by a river, and protected by 100 pieces of cannon? Was he a timid general who, on the plains of Argaum, after marching nine leagues under a tropical sun, threw himself upon the united forces of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, put them to the rout, and vigorously followed them up by the light of the moon? Was he a timid general who had no sooner landed with 9000 men, at the mouth of the Mondego, than he decided upon marching against Junot, whom he believed to be at the head of a force double in point of numbers to his own? § who, previously to the battle of Vimiero,

* History of the Consulate and of the Empire, b. xlii. p. 101.

† Memoirs of Massena, t. vii. p. 450.

‡ Ibid, t. vii. p. 173.

§ General Thiebault, who reproaches Wellington with having saved the army of Junot owing to his slowness, forgets that with the English corps there were no more than one hundred horses present; that the staff and the administration were alike wanting in experience; and that, under such circumstances, it was an act of no common audacity to make a movement in advance at all. Had Wellington been a timid general, he would have waited for the troops which were to co-operate with him.

proposed to turn the position of Torres Vedras by a flank march along the sea, an operation of which Generals Burrard, Dalrymple, and Clinton disapproved because of its excessive rashness?· and who, finally, after the battle, undertook, though still in vain, to cut off the French from Lisbon, by seizing Torres Vedras and Mafra, a plan, which Napier describes as one of those prompt and bold combinations which only great generals either form or execute? Was he a timid general who, destitute of a bridge equipment, effected the passage of the Douro in the face of Soult's army, an operation which the Duke of Dalmatia considered to be impracticable, and which, according to the author of the Memoirs of Joseph, was an act of "insane rashness?"* Was he a timid general who, at the head of 50,000 men, of whom 30,000 were Spaniards wholly undisciplined, marched upon Madrid, and on the plains of Talavera withstood the shock of the French armies?† And when, after this latter combat, 90,000 French troops occupied the valley of the Tagus, intending to march upon Lisbon, was it the act of a general destitute of enterprise to halt nine days with 17,000 famishing soldiers at Jaraicejo, in order that he might again assume the offensive in the event of their carrying their project into effect?‡ Wonderful boldness!—absolute folly, which we are far from representing as meritorious in the English general; but which, on the other hand, affords ample proof that he was certainly not a timid man.

More than courage, hardihood was needed to induce him to wait for Massena at Fuentes d'Onoro, with an army weakened by the departure of Beresford, and in a very bad position, with Almeida in his rear still held by the enemy, and the rocky river Coa, into which, had a reverse occurred, the allied army would have been driven in irretrievable confusion.

Not less striking is the determination at which Wellington arrived, to lay siege to Badajoz, midway between the armies of Soult and Marmont, each as strong as that of the Anglo-Portuguese §, and im-

* Memoirs of Joseph, t. vi.

† Of that operation the author of the Victories and Conquests of the French Armies delivers the following judgment: "The Anglo-Portuguese, after the evacuation of Portugal, conceived a plan, the hardihood of which contrasts strongly with the habitual circumspection of British generals. . . . In his *rash* presumption, Sir Arthur Wellesley believed," &c. &c.—B. xix. p. 277.

‡ This plan, proposed by Soult, was overruled by Ney and Joseph.

§ This siege must not be confounded with that of 1812.

mediately afterwards to take up a position at Campo Mayor, with a view to give battle to both armies united.*

With the same hardihood, the same coolness, he awaited in 1811, at Guinaldo, the attack of 30,000 Frenchmen, to whom he could oppose only 13,000 men, both his wings being as yet many leagues in the rear.

We have seen also how Wellington astonished Soult by the audacity with which he carried the Picurina fort at Badajoz, without pausing to breach it, and by his assaulting the town itself before either the counterscarp had been thrown down, or the fire of the place subdued.

Most audacious also was the plan which comprehended not only the capture of Rodrigo and Badajoz in presence of the armies of the centre and of the south, but the invasion of Andalusia afterwards, the repulse of Soult beyond the Guadalquiver, and the destruction of the French arsenal at Seville.†

The surprise of Almaraz by 6000 men under the orders of General Hill, affords another proof of the boldness which Wellington could display, when common means failed him, and when he was hard pressed by circumstances.‡

The brilliant offensive movements which resulted in the battle of Salamanca entered so little into the calculations of the French generals, that on the 30th of June, 1812, Marshal Suchet wrote to the king, "I doubt whether in the actual state of England, Wellington dare risk a battle; he has too much to lose, and the French may obtain too much glory, for him to hazard an engagement so far from his ships."§

* The battle did not take place only because Soult and Marmont, in spite of their numerical superiority, exhibited much less hardihood than Wellington.

† This plan would have been carried into effect, had not circumstances compelled Wellington to carry the war into the north, and effect his great object in another manner.

‡ General Sarrazin, formerly chief of the staff, and Bernadotte, describe that operation as rash.—P. 237.

§ He was not the only one who entertained this opinion. Soult, in a letter to King Joseph, dated May 26, 1812, says: "It is certain that Wellington will march upon Andalusia, in order to compel the army of the south to raise the siege of Cadiz." The King and Berthier were equally mistaken. Finally Dorsenne, writing to the Duke of Ragusa on the 23rd of January, says: "The English would deviate from their ordinary prudence, if they were to march with all their force upon Salamanca; they would offer to us too many advantages, and would find good reason to repent it." What is the value, in the teeth of such evidence as

The Duke's flank march upon the Arapiles in presence of the French army, on the 15th of November, 1812, was imprudent even to temerity. It succeeded only because Soult lost the opportunity of rendering it disastrous.

We may quote again Wellington's prompt determination to cross the bridge at Burgos, under the fire of the castle, with a superior enemy threatening him; and his admirable march of concentration in May, 1813, by which he made himself master of the Douro. In order to execute that march, 40,000 men of all arms, under the orders of Graham, with horses, guns, and pontoons, were obliged to cross a district considered up to that moment impracticable even for light corps.*

And here too we may call to mind the skill with which Wellington, after having outwitted the Duke of Dalmatia, crossed the Bidassoa, on the 7th October, 1813. If that operation had not succeeded, the rising tide must have placed the English troops in a desperate situation, for there was no retreat for them except by the fords and at low water.

Again, was ever operation more perilous than the passage of the Adour at its mouth, upon a floating bridge, constructed of chasse-marées, forced at all hazards into the river, in spite of bars and sand-banks, to point out which there were no beacons? And looking to the manner in which the operation was effected, have we not a right to say that Soult never anticipated that it would be tried, just as a few years before, he had not anticipated the passage of the Douro? Lastly, in order to bring to an end this enunciation of conclusive facts, let us remember that Napoleon blamed Wellington for having accepted battle at Waterloo with the only army which England possessed; knowing that the Prussians could not come up before mid-day, that

this, of the following assertion by M. Thiers: "Though little fertile in genius and hardy combination, Wellington was nevertheless attentive to the opportunities which fortune threw in his way. *He did not create*, but he seized them, and that was generally sufficient, because the opportunities which fortune offers are always the surest, inasmuch as men never create them for themselves, except at the cost of great hardihood and peril."—B. xlii. p. 114.

The campaign of 1812, terminated by the battle of Salamanca, demonstrated that Wellington knew well enough to create at his pleasure the opportunities of victory; for it was he who took the initiative then, very much to the astonishment of the French generals.

* The Tras-os-montes.

the right wing of the enemy's army had received orders to pursue them, that the position of Mont St. Jean presented no serious obstacle to the assailants; and finally that the Anglo-Netherland army would be attacked at an early hour on the 18th by a force at least equal in number to itself, superior in quality, and commanded by the most illustrious general of modern times. One word more. He who merited this reproach from a man so remarkable for his audacity as Napoleon, cannot surely be described as a general cautious and wanting in audacity.

The truth is, that the Duke of Wellington exhibited on all occasions as much of enterprise as it was possible to display at the head of the army which he commanded, and in the circumstances in which he was placed. The writers who complain that he did not always turn to account the favourable opportunities which occurred to overwhelm his adversaries, and assume the offensive, forget that the English army is with difficulty recruited; and that it must be managed with a degree of parsimony which is not necessary with the French army, drawn as the latter is from the inexhaustible sources of the conscription. They forget that Wellington could not live at the expense of the country in which he made war; that the necessity of forming magazines, and causing his supplies of every kind to follow him, occasioned great loss of time; that he was obliged to reconcile the interests of a commander with the duties arising out of a complicated situation; that the necessity of arranging his operations in concert with the Spanish generals and local authorities was a source of perpetual delay to him; and that the want of money and means of transport from which he suffered so frequently, was equivalent to a want of enterprise and mobility; the English army being destitute of a resource which was open to that of the enemy, viz. pillage and requisitions. They forget that Wellington was as a general subordinate to the Duke of York, a man greatly wanting in talent and resolution; that he was bound besides to conform to the instructions of the English minister, often very incomplete, almost always peremptory and most embarrassing; and that of all needs there is none more troublesome to a general, nor more opposed to the spirit of enterprise, than that of regulating military operations according to the state of public opinion, the most changeable of all changeable things, especially in England.

When the news was good, the enthusiasm of the English people became boundless, their confidence unlimited; but the slightest

reverse, or the smallest disappointment, effected a complete change in their disposition, and their despondency became at once as extreme as had been their enthusiasm. Thus after the success at Baylen was made known, the people of England believed that the Spanish patriots, supported by a handful of English soldiers, would be perfectly able to drive away the French armies from their country. Under this impression large subsidies were voted by acclamation. A short time afterwards arrived tidings of the success at Vimiero, and the capitulation of Cintra. Here there was real cause for rejoicing; but people imagined that Junot ought, like Dupont, to have been compelled to lay down his arms, and from this false notion it arose, that the generals who had beaten the French and delivered Portugal were dragged before a court of inquiry (a proceeding which had never occurred before), and publicly degraded. These clamours, slowly allayed by the evidence of facts, regained fresh energy, when the remains of Sir John Moore's army, driven from Corunna, were seen to disembark. Men regarded the war in Spain as an act of madness, and came at once to the conclusion, that Buonaparte was invincible by land.

Wellesley, restored to public favour, proceeded to take command of the troops, and marched with perhaps too much confidence, towards Madrid. He gained the battle of Talavera, but was almost immediately obliged to retire upon Badajoz. New deceptions, new clamours! The commander-in-chief and the ministers were attacked with extreme violence in both houses of Parliament by Lord Grey, Lord Holland, Ponsonby, Whitbread, and others. The advocates of the war became fewer in number and more timid; nevertheless the party of the ministers carried them through, and they obtained fresh authority to continue the struggle. Happily for them, some rapid successes justified this determination, for on the least reverse, indeed on the smallest disappointment, the army would have been recalled.

When tidings arrived one by one, of the retreat of Massena, of the capture of Badajoz, and of Ciudad Rodrigo, the English people became enthusiastic in the extreme. But their admiration, always dependent upon circumstances, could not hold out against the retreat from Burgos. Exaggerated by the voice of prejudice, and compared to Sir John Moore's retreat, that operation gave rise to fresh clamours. They were, however, the last to which Wellington was subject. The victories of Salamanca, Vittoria, Orthez, Toulouse, and Waterloo,

raised at last his glory and popularity to a height from which they could never afterwards be brought down.

In the midst of this flux and reflux of public opinion, the position of the English general was at times as disagreeable as it was perilous. Sometimes he was accused of doing nothing, and of manœuvring like Fabius. Sometimes he was reproached with desiring to compromise everything by his insane rashness.* Wellington knew that the slightest act of indiscretion might compromise him with the government or the nation, and that the smallest check, under certain circumstances, would lead to the recall of the army.

This conviction added to the fear of crippling his force, already weak in point of numbers, obliged the Duke to exercise great circumspection. There was besides another reason, which hindered him from striking blows as rapid as those which could be delivered by the French army. It is to be sought for in the peculiar constitution of the English soldier. Firm only in the battle, he is easily knocked up upon the march, and sustains with difficulty privations and fatigue. Three days' provisions are all that he can be made to carry; whereas the French soldier carries sometimes as many as fifteen complete rations, and in spite of that burden, performs forced marches with less difficulty than the other experiences in compassing an ordinary stage. Besides, it is extremely difficult to keep the English soldiers together after a victory, and this it is which accounts for the languor with which Wellington on more than one occasion followed up the enemy.

In the face of these strong reasons, which rendered it incumbent on the Duke to be prudent in the extreme, he exhibited a greater amount of determination and dash than the Emperor's lieutenants. Indeed it is curious to observe how the historians who criticise most keenly the pretended slowness of Wellington, and his extreme timidity, never think of comparing his conduct with that of the French generals, whose condition nevertheless was much more favourable to vigorous action.

A regard to impartiality compels us to supply this defect, by remarking,

* On the 21st of April, 1810, Wellington wrote to Mr. Charles Stuart: "The state of opinion in England is very unfavourable to the Peninsula. The ministers are as much alarmed as the public, or as the opposition pretend to be; and they appear to be of opinion that I am inclined to fight a desperate battle, which is to answer no purpose.".

1st. That on the testimony of French authors themselves, the indecision and slowness of Marshal Ney saved the army of Castanos and Palafox from complete destruction, after the battle of Tudela.

2nd. That the same deficiency in determination and enterprise caused Massena to lose the battle of Busaco.

3rd. That in July, 1809, Soult lost precious time in collecting the entire corps of Ney and Mortier, a portion of which would have changed the face of affairs, if it had debouched a few days earlier into the valley of the Tagus.

4th. That Soult and Marmont generously threw away the opportunity of defeating the English army at Campo Mayor, where it had taken up a position with numbers inferior by one half to those of the French army.

5th. That on the 26th of September, 1811, the Duke of Ragusa, in consequence of an act of indecision still more marked, permitted Wellington, during thirty-six hours, to organise leisurely at Guinaldo his means of retreat, when he might have crushed him with superior numbers.

6th. That Soult, in November, 1812, not only neglected a good opportunity of interposing between the English army at Arapiles and Ciudad Rodrigo, but permitted Wellington to effect a flank movement of the most dangerous kind in order to reach that place, although he was three times as strong in cavalry as the English general, one and a half times stronger in infantry, and well nigh twice as strong in artillery.

7th. That Suchet, through an exaggerated fear of compromising a part of his conquests, repeatedly refused to join his troops to those of Marshal Soult, in order to stop the offensive march of Wellington across the Pyrenees.

8th. That St. Cyr was wanting in vigour and determination, after the battle of Valls, and that in 1812 Marmont allowed the opportunity to escape of attacking Almeida, where he would have found the *matériel* necessary for besieging Ciudad Rodrigo, though he had in hand 28,000 men, and though the works of the place were in the worst possible condition.

In stating these facts, we are far from pretending to say that Wellington always stood above reproach. A great general has well observed, "that he who makes war makes faults." We have with perfect impartiality pointed out those which are chargeable on the

Duke. His glory will not be obscured by this, and it will be acknowledged, we are confident, that in the war of the Peninsula he showed himself superior, as a tactician, to Massena, to Marmont, to Suchet, and to Soult.* The French will never pardon in the Duke d'Albufera the fault which he committed when he refused to fall upon the right flank of the army which was about to invade France, when, with 20,000 good troops upon the Ebro, he permitted the castle of Saragossa to be taken by the bands of Espoz y Mina, and when at last he retired upon Catalonia, instead of operating in Arragon, in concert with Soult's army.

Massena, so brilliant in Switzerland and Germany, failed to sustain his reputation in Portugal. He exhibited no token of genius, except during the progress of his retreat.

Marmont committed at Salamanca irreparable faults, of which, doubtless, the results were aggravated by the wound which placed him *hors de combat* at a critical moment.

The behaviour of Joseph at Vittoria was that of a general who had not attained even to mediocrity. Finally, the Duke of Dalmatia had to reproach himself, up to the end of his career, with having lost, at Arapiles, the opportunity of crushing the English, with the strongest army which France, up to that moment, had assembled on one point in the Peninsula.

It would not be fair to judge a warrior only by the results which he has achieved, because battles may be cited which have done more honour to the vanquished than to the victor. On the other hand, however, it is monstrous to assume that a general could be constantly successful throughout a lengthened enterprise, without possessing talent, especially if opposed to able adversaries and excellent troops. We must, therefore, be permitted to observe, in reference to Wellington, that his combinations were rarely counteracted, and that he came out victorious from many battles, fought upon the most varied theatres, and against troops of all kinds, in India, Denmark, Spain, and the Low Countries.

To arrive at a just conception of the importance of the results

* It was owing to this superiority that he possessed in a higher degree than they the qualities necessary to bring to a successful issue a war so peculiar as that of which the Peninsula was the theatre. Napoleon recognised the importance of these qualities when he wrote to Joseph: "In a war of this kind, coolness, patience, and calculation are required."—Note dated Bayonne 21st of July, 1808.

achieved by that general, it is necessary to call to mind all that we have elsewhere stated in regard to the English army; the inadequacy of its system of recruitment, the imperfect organisation of its various services, the negligence and incapacity of its officers, the habitual misconduct of the men, the wretched condition of the *matériel*, and the constant and troublesome interference of the civil power, in the most minute details of military administration. Wellington did all that was possible to better this state of things, but he was constantly thwarted by the bureaucracy of the Horse Guards,—bound hand and foot by old traditions. The Duke of York, who ought to have facilitated the work, was retrogressive, methodical in every respect, too dependent on his subordinates, who were for the most part wanting in experience and military talent. The consequence was, that Wellington, instead of receiving the support of the government, encountered only delays, hesitations, prejudices, obstacles of every kind. Sometimes, as for instance in the appointments which they made, and in the relation in which the army stood towards the fleet, the public offices enfeebled the authority of the commander-in-chief, at a moment when his necessities were the greatest. Sometimes they disturbed the management of the army by frequent and ill-timed changes.* And sometimes they dallied with decisions the most urgent, as, for example, when it became necessary to nominate a successor to the chief command, in the event of Wellington being killed, or placed *hors de combat.*†

In the teeth of all these obstacles, Wellington succeeded in introducing into the organisation and discipline of the British troops several beneficial changes. He created, in 1808, a field commissariat, for the management of which, even to its most minute details, he himself drew up the rules. He reduced the quantity of baggage, always very considerable in English armies; he bettered the condition of the engineer corps and of the staff; he forced the government to enrol, for the first time, companies of sappers and miners; he formed a pontoon train, which proved of great service; he improved the carriages in use for the transport of ammunition and provisions; he effected great changes for the better in the *matériel* of the hospitals; and, lastly, he rendered the parade movements of the

* Despatches, vol. ix. pp. 602, 625.

† Wellington had proposed Beresford for this place, but he could never obtain a decisive answer on the subject. Despatches, vol. ix. pp. 209, 585, 608; vol. x. pp. 41, 121; and vol. xii. p. 208.

army, too long neglected, more precise, and introduced greater regularity into every department of the service.* He himself set an example to all under him, by scrupulously attending to the most minute details. Thus at a time when great operations might have well occupied his whole attention, he directed his officers, in a general order, to take care that the men mixed up with their soup certain nutritious articles, which he had ordered to be issued to them. "Whether it be barley or maize," says he, "the grains must be steeped before they are boiled." This order vouches for the importance which the Duke attached to preserving the health and general efficiency of his soldiers. The following passage from a letter addressed by him to Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens, bears testimony to the same wise precaution. "There is nothing to which I have at all times paid greater attention than settling the men's accounts. I consider regularity in this respect to be indispensable to the maintenance of discipline." †

Not less importance was attached by Wellington to the maintenance of *esprit de corps* in the army; he desired above all things to keep it free from the disastrous influence of political intrigue. "One thing I beg of you," he writes to Lord Liverpool, on the 2nd of January, 1810, "that you will send me no party men. The army must be kept free from the spirit of discord, otherwise we shall be in a bad way." Disputes among officers gave him the greatest annoyance; and if, in spite of his remonstrances, any one engaged in them, he never failed to point out that "these were times when all the zeal and activity of officers were required to defend the rights and interests of the country." ‡

If there was one human being whom he detested more than another it was a man of a quarrelsome disposition. In order to prevent discussions and disputes, he advised those high in office "to recognise no party but that of the public good; and to employ indiscriminately, in whatever services might be required, those whom they believed to be endowed with zeal and ability."

It was by these means, by obliging all under his command to do their duty, and by driving away every cause of insubordination and

* [In substance M. Brialmont is correct. But the Duke made no change in the parade movements of the army, that matter having been taken up by Sir Henry Torrens, not always to the Duke's satisfaction.]

† 12th of August, 1812.

‡ Letter to Colonel Murray, 14th of September, 1803.

indiscipline, that the Duke succeeded in making his army the most perfect that England had ever produced. "I always thought," he says, "that I could go anywhere, and do anything that I chose, with that army. It is impossible to conceive a machine better mounted or in more perfect order than was the Peninsular army when I quitted it on the Garonne."*

We shall but imperfectly appreciate the importance of this result, unless we keep in view the state in which the army was when Wellington assumed the command. "Military men," says Alison, "with very few exceptions, from the general down to the drummer-boy, were ignorant, to a great extent, of the most essential of their duties; insomuch that the commander-in-chief was forced to busy himself about the most trifling details of every branch of the service, under the penalty of seeing his best arranged plans defeated through the ignorance and incapacity of his subordinates. These were the defects, so conspicuous in the campaign of 1794, which gave to Napoleon and the French generals such a poor opinion of the English army.

The organisation, the discipline, and the instruction of the troops made marked progress under Wellington's firm and wise direction; nevertheless, take it for all in all, the English army of the Peninsula was always inferior to the French. This the Duke repeatedly acknowledges, and adds that it must always be so as long as England puts from her a system of enlistment, which will admit of her losing, without feeling it, one half of the troops in the field every year by privations and fatigue alone.

It has been charged as a reproach against Wellington, that he lacked the firmness necessary to restrain his men from sacking and pillaging towns taken by storm. The English army did, in point of fact, commit frightful excesses at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and St. Sebastian. In this latter place, particularly, "the most revolting cruelty was added to every other description of crime."† Yet these horrors can in no manner be imputed to the commander-in-chief. The history of all armies unfortunately shows that it is impossible to prevent the sack of a town taken by assault after a murderous siege; when the assailants are rendered mad by the remembrance of past sufferings, or by the desire of avenging some

* Evidence before the Committee on Military Punishments.

† Napier.

recent humiliation. This occurred almost daily in Spain, where, on one side as well as on the other, the feeling of hatred was intense. Hence it came about that the struggle took at once a character of cruelty inconceivable.* Wellington did everything in his power to put a stop to these excesses, but he failed. Writing to his brother Henry on the 9th of October, 1813, he says, "It has fallen to my lot to take many towns by storm; and I am concerned to add, that I never saw or heard of one so taken, by any troops, that it was not plundered. It is one of the evil consequences attending the necessity of storming a town; which every officer laments, not only on account of the evil inflicted thereby on the unfortunate inhabitants, but on account of the injury it does to discipline, and the risk which is incurred of the loss of all the advantages of victory at the very moment they are gained."

Wellington entertained the greatest horror of plunderers; indeed it may be said without exaggeration, that no man ever made such efforts as he, to restrain his soldiers within the limits of duty and law. His very first measure, at the outset of his career, was a protest against all acts of violence. At Seringapatam he stopped pillage by hanging several soldiers at the gates of Tippoo's palace, and planting sentries over all houses that were exposed to it. In consequence of these energetic measures he soon re-established order, and inspired the inhabitants with a greater amount of confidence than they had ever experienced during the more prosperous periods of the Mysorean dynasty.

At the close of the Mahratta war, Sir Arthur Wellesley felicitated himself less upon the triumphs achieved by his troops, than upon the discipline and moderation of which they had set the example: "My multitudinous partisans," he writes to Col. Close, "are so well disciplined, that I can trust them to go anywhere. We have been here, at Noobly, for a month, and the shops in the heart of the camp are all respected." In like manner he expresses his gratification "that the soldiers of the army, one hour after the assault of Gawilghur, had quitted the town with as much regularity as if they were merely marching through it."

* [M. Brialmont is right, so far as the French and Peninsular nations were concerned; but, as he himself elsewhere shows, the war was conducted between the French and English in the spirit of the most perfect chivalry. Towards its close, indeed, the good understanding between both officers and men sometimes produced inconvenience.]

During his stay in India, Wellesley used the utmost precautions to prevent his men from committing outrages in the villages. Every one taken in the act was hanged, and the generals received orders to pursue the same course towards their subordinates. But it was chiefly in the Peninsula that Wellington distinguished himself by a just rigour against plunderers. We need not quote the many general orders which he issued, prohibiting his soldiers from taking anything from the Spaniards or Portuguese without paying for it. We need not call to remembrance the energy which he displayed in dealing with the soldiers who infringed these orders. It will suffice if we draw attention to certain matters of fact, not generally known, which exhibit the marvellous pains which he took to prevent the slightest injury to the rights of property.

In his order of the 13th June, 1809, he requires his troops "to spare the olive and other fruit trees in constructing their huts;" and after Talavera, when the poor soldiers were dying of hunger, "he prohibits them from taking grapes or vegetables without paying for them." In 1810, still guarding against unnecessary destruction and scenes of confusion, he published the following order: — "The commander-in-chief entreats general officers and officers commanding regiments, to prevent the troops under their orders, by all the means in their power, from cutting down olive and other fruit trees to make fires." By another order of the same year, he forbids officers to hunt game in parks or preserves. "That custom," he says, "implies a total forgetfulness of the rights of property; which the officers would be obliged to respect if they were in their own country."

On the 13th of April, 1811, Wellington being at Villa Marmosa, charged the chiefs of corps, "not to cut down the green corn for forage, but rather to turn out their horses to graze in the meadows," and when this advice was not strictly followed, he wrote, "that a regard to the interests of the army, added to a feeling of pity for the unfortunate inhabitants, ought to prevent the wanton destruction of forage, and of every thing else." *

In 1812, at Fuente Guimaldo, Wellington forewarned his soldiers

* We may refer again to his two letters of the 16th of March, 1811, in which he acquits his soldiers of blame for having taken some wood to burn, during the pursuit of Massena, from a royal park, as well as some branches of olive from the grounds of the Count Castello Melhor. With a generosity rare in leaders of armies, he offers to pay out of his own purse for the wood which the poor soldiers, who daily expend their lives for the defence of the Peninsula, had taken.

that he would allow nothing to be done in Spain, which had been forbidden in Portugal. "No one," he says, "must quit the ranks to steal the fruit, either in the gardens or in the fields." While the Spanish soldiers in various ways, and particularly after Talavera, exhibited a hostile feeling towards the English, Wellington required that the peaceable inhabitants should be treated with the utmost possible kindness.

On the 2nd of July, 1812, he issued an order, which began thus: "The commander-in-chief has had frequent occasion earnestly to beg that the officers will treat the authorities of this country with respect and the people with kindness." The same generosity of sentiment marks the whole of his intercourse with the French nation. When about to pass the frontier, on the 9th of July, 1813, he calls upon his soldiers to secure the good will of the inhabitants by their humanity and justice. "To avenge the conduct of the French generals in Spain," he says, "on the peaceable inhabitants of France, would be conduct unworthy of the soldiers to whom the commander-in-chief now addresses himself. Accordingly, the rules for making requisitions for the necessary supplies, and giving receipts, must be observed as heretofore." Finally, as if to take away even the shadow of a pretext from such as would charge the Duke with encouraging pillage, he pushed his severity so far as to give the following directions: —

"St. Jean de Luz, 18th Dec. 1813.

"Officers must take care that the men do not break down, nor damage in any manner, the flooring, stairs, doors, or windows of houses, nor the doors of farm buildings, and they must ascertain from the inhabitants whether they have any ground of complaint in regard to these matters."

Every soldier who violated these orders was severely punished; indeed, for the sake of example, Wellington caused men convicted of mere marauding to be hanged; and in another place we have cited the proclamation in which he authorised the inhabitants of the south of France themselves to inflict summary punishment on soldiers taken in the act of plunder. We have seen also, that he preferred sending back the Spanish troops behind the Pyrenees, and fighting the battle of Orthez without them, to winking at acts of brigandage which he had vainly endeavoured to repress by measures of discipline.

"I am not base enough to allow pillage," he writes to Don Freyre. "If you wish your men to plunder, you must name some other general to command them."

So strong was Wellington's aversion to everything like unnecessary destruction, that he refused, throughout the whole of the war in Spain, to attack fortified places by bombardment. He would rather expose himself to enormous difficulties, and see the blood of his soldiers (of which he was so chary) flow, than doom a mass of homeless people, against whom he had no ground of complaint, to perish amid the flames, or under the ruins of their own houses. "In all the sieges in which I have been engaged," he writes to General Bentinck, "I have never made use of more than cannon, because in my opinion, a fire of mortars and howitzers produces no effect, except upon the inhabitants of a town." *

This fact alone may serve to show how unjust is the judgment of certain Spanish authors, who have reproached Wellington with having encouraged the pillage of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and St. Sebastian.† It was not in the power of any man to stay these disorders. Under certain conditions all armies plunder, even within their own territory. Hence Wellington, during his stay in Portugal, had less difficulty in keeping his own soldiers within the bounds of discipline than the Portuguese, who were always disposed to rob their own countrymen.‡ It is well known also, that the Spaniards were almost more afraid of their own soldiers than of the enemy.

* 24th March, 1812.

† General Lamore (p. 179) repeats the following anecdote, which is accepted as a truth by the historian of the "Consulate and the Empire" (book xlii. p. 117). After the breakfast which Lord Wellington gave to the French officers on the day of the surrender of Badajoz, Philipon entreated the Duke to put a stop to the pillage; upon which the English general replied, that the customs of war permitted the plunder of a town taken by assault; and that the soldier ought to be rewarded for his bravery and devotion. To those who knew the Duke, or have merely pondered the career which it has been our privilege to describe, it must be evident that the Duke never could have uttered these odious words. There is nothing, either in his actions or in his correspondence, which does not contradict the statement. Besides, there is ample evidence of General Lamore's disposition to exaggerate, and of his malevolence towards the English general, in the following statement (p. 203):—"The sack of Badajoz, which a word from him might have stopped, will tarnish for ever Wellington's laurels,"—an assertion simply false, and of which we cannot speak in any other terms.

‡ See his order of the 12th and 13th of April, 1811.

"It is mortifying," wrote Sir Howard Douglas to Lord Wellington, "to be obliged to repeat, that the Spanish troops do more damage to their country than an equal number of French troops." And, in point of fact, it was no uncommon thing to see the peasantry in Catalonia, Andalusia, and the other provinces, join the French in pursuit of the guerillas.

Stringent as Soult's orders were, he could never prevent the French soldiers from pillaging their own countrymen.* Excited partly by want, partly by the thirst of vengeance, they were more to be dreaded than the enemy.* With a view to put a stop to the brigandage, Soult, in 1813, caused a meritorious officer to be shot, because he had allowed his men to destroy certain houses in Sarre. When we see such crimes perpetrated by the soldiers of the most civilized nations, we are at no loss to understand how the influence of generals, and the vigour of military law, are powerless amid certain contingencies, to prevent the sack of towns.

If Wellington must be held responsible for the excesses which marked the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and St. Sebastian, we may at all events quote, in extenuation of these faults, the conduct of the French troops, and the orders of the Emperor's generals, under circumstances in which the English general would, without doubt, have shown himself less cruel and less implacable. Who can have forgotten the bloody executions ordered by Murat, after the insurrection in Madrid; the sack of Evora, which has secured to Loison a celebrity so little to be envied; and the barbarous conduct of the same general at Guarda and Atalaya; the pillage of Medina by Monton's troops, after the battle of Rio-Seco †; the sack of Cordova by Dubart's army; the burning of Manresa by the troops of Macdonald; the barbarous executions of Duhesme in Catalonia;

* Lapine (pp. 284-5) describes some scenes of violence perpetrated by French soldiers, chiefly in crossing from Aire to Mabourguet:—"We were in despair at being unable to apply any remedy. It is at least certain that the French general, inflamed with a just indignation, seized the arms of a soldier in the column, and fired upon the men who wandered hither and thither at a distance from the road, and showed themselves indifferent to the reiterated appeals and remonstrances of their chiefs." See also the letter written by Clarke, on the 5th July, 1813, to Joseph: "His imperial majesty hears, with much concern, of the outrages which are committed within the French territory."

† Torreno gives a fearful but, we believe, true account of French atrocities in Spain.

Mataro so cruelty treated, and the many villages reduced to ashes by the same general; and, lastly, the infamous conduct of De Lannes, who, three days after the capitulation of Saragossa caused Don Basello Roggiero to be arrested in the night beside the sick-bed of Palafox? That gallant patriot, after being dragged through the streets, was bayoneted, and cast with Don Santiago Sas, who suffered the same fate, into the Ebro.

After the battle of Ucles, Victor's troops committed, in the village which gave its name to the action, atrocities which could be rivalled only by the massacres during the "reign of terror." Sixty-nine of the principal inhabitants, besides several members of religious houses, priests, and monks, belonging to the most illustrious families of La Mancha, were tied up, two and two together, first insulted, and then had their throats cut to a man.

In 1809, the French troops put to death in Oporto some thousands of persons; and the same year the Duke of Dalmatia burned to the ground the towns of Morentan and Cobriera on the Minho, in punishment of certain offences committed by the peasantry in the course of the campaign.

The city of Leyria, and the convent of Alcobuça, where the ashes of many Portuguese kings repose, were destroyed the year following by express orders from General Massena; and the troops set fire, besides, to a vast number of towns and villages, with a view to cover their retreat towards Guarda. "The conduct of the enemy, throughout the whole retreat, was marked," wrote Wellington on the 14th of March, 1811, "by acts of barbarity, which have seldom been equalled and never surpassed."

A French author, the Duke de Ragusa, particularises atrocities in that campaign, which neither the sufferings of the troops, nor the cruel demands of a system of requisitions, could justify.

"While the army was at Santarem, detachments were sent out, some armed, some without arms, to examine the surrounding country, and to bring in everything which they could find. If a Portuguese met them, he was seized and put to the torture, in order to wring from him a declaration of the places where goods of any kind might be hid. The first warning was to hang him till he grew red in the face; the next, to keep him hanging till he became blue; and then death followed."

M. Guingret, commandant of a battalion in Massena's army, confirms this testimony by the following unheard of statement. "The

women and girls found in the caves and hiding-places were subjected to the grossest outrage. Our army had, indeed, fallen into such a state, that police regulations and discipline became powerless. No one was punished for insubordination; the most culpable licence prevailed. One occurrence in particular which took place during this war, and of which no one ever thinks, shows the extent to which demoralisation was carried. Women taken by marauding parties, whom the marauders detected by their long hair, were put up to sale. I have been present at a card-party where a young girl was played for as an article of luxury. It was a common thing to torture the peasants till they told where their goods lay. . . To such a pitch of degradation was the evil carried, that it rendered our soldiers remorseless and cruel."

In 1810, Suchet, with a view to escape the delay incident to besieging the castle of Lerida, had recourse to an ingenious but barbarous stratagem. Having taken the town, he drove back the women and children, and indeed the whole population, into the castle, and then opened a fire of mortars upon these masses, exposed without cover to all its horrors. As he had foreseen, the governor, unable to hold out against the cries and sufferings of such a multitude of victims, surrendered immediately.

At Saragossa, more terrible reprisals took place, which Suchet describes in the following language. "The fifth assault was followed by a frightful massacre. The awful example which, in my last report, I anticipated with regret, was at once followed; and it will not soon be effaced from the memory of the Spaniards. Four thousand men were slain in the streets. Of 10,000 or 12,000 who endeavoured to save themselves by leaping from the walls, upwards of 1000 were sabred or shot."

The author of the "Memoirs of Joseph" (vol. v. p. 224) thus describes a bloody tragedy which occurred in the little town of Chincon, after the affair of the Somme Sierra. "The 27th Light Infantry, being appointed to examine the communes adjoining to the theatre of war, was received at the gates with a fire of musketry. The regiment carried the town, put the inhabitants to the sword, and fired the houses. The same thing occurred at Colmenar. . . : These executions," adds M. Ducasse, "were doubtless terrible; but they intimidated other communes, and saved a great deal of bloodshed."

Marshal Soult caused an old police officer, called Lopez, to be

-hung, because he was taken in the act of collecting horses for Ballasteros. This severity might not appear odious, but that Lopez had been previously arraigned before two tribunals and acquitted.

On the 18th of December, 1809, Augereau issued to the Catalonians the following proclamation,—a very *chef-d'œuvre* of cruelty.

"Every man taken with arms in his hands will be hanged as a highway robber, without trial. Every house in which resistance is offered to our troops shall be burned. All shall suffer the same fate."

General Caulincourt executed, at Cuença, frightful reprisals, which obtained for him the congratulations of the Emperor. "Caulincourt," writes Napoleon to Joseph (31st July, 1808), "has done well at Cuença. The town has been pillaged; it is the law of war, for the place was taken by assault." *

When he entered Salamanca, Wellington was painfully affected by observing how much that city had suffered from the presence of the French army. "For three years," he writes to Lord Liverpool, "the people of Salamanca have groaned under the yoke. During this interval, the French, among other acts of violence and oppression, have destroyed thirteen convents out of twenty-five, and twenty-two colleges out of the same number, which adorned a city, the seat of learning and the sciences." †

Comparing these acts with those attributed to Wellington, and bearing in mind that there are few troops so moral as those of the French army, and few penal codes so severe as that of the English, we are forced to the distressing conclusion, that there are conditions under which hatred and the thirst of vengeance overpower the better feelings and nobler sentiments of human nature in all armies. Discipline, however strict, is incapable of restraining the fierce anger of the soldier. A system of moral training, more perfectly developed, may perhaps lead to this result; yet, even then, it may be doubted whether such lessons can ever be learned as shall restrain men from acts of barbarism, who, after being repeatedly driven back from the breach, force their way at last, their blood heated by the fury of

* This is not the law of war. The laws of war only permit the garrison which defends a breach to the last to be put to the sword. And this is enough, in all conscience!

† Most of the acts of barbarity and rapine which we have quoted receive some extenuation (they cannot be justified) from the cruelty of the Spaniards, and the unfortunate necessity imposed upon the imperial army to subsist by pillage.

battle, over the dead bodies of their comrades into a town. It would therefore be unjust in the extreme, to hold the English general responsible for all the bloodshed in Badajoz and St. Sebastian. Indeed we are astonished that the English army should not have committed in the Peninsula greater enormities than it did; and that it can be compared in this respect without disparagement to the French army, of which the elements are relatively so superior. Nothing short of the energy and perseverance of Wellington could have brought about such results; for, in a moral point of view, the English soldier is, on the admission of his own officers, perhaps the most degraded in the world. Raised from among the lowest of the people, sometimes taken from the very gaols, he possesses no portion of the moral character or patriotic feelings which animate the soldier called by conscription to arm in his country's defence. Hence it was, that to the end of his life Wellington strenuously resisted the abolition of corporal punishment. He stated with truth, that the utmost rigour of military law could not prevent his finding frequent occasion to complain of the behaviour of his troops. Desertion and habits of plunder could never be entirely put a stop to in the Peninsular army. Indeed there are numerous documents in existence to prove that, in the retreat from Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo, multitudes of English soldiers quitted their colours.*

When Wellington was called upon to give evidence before the Royal Commission on Military Punishments, the question was put to him, "Do you consider that drunkenness is at the root of all the crimes in the British army?" his answer was, "Invariably." And when on another occasion he was requested to give his opinion on the subject of discipline in the ranks, he said, "The man who enlists into the English army is generally the greatest drunkard, probably the worst man in the trade or profession which he follows, or in the

* [Once more we must enter our protest against these sweeping charges. What M. Brialmont says of the manner of enlistment into our service is perfectly true. Nor, in the existing state of public feeling, is it probable that anything short of some great national disaster will open men's minds to perceive its inadequacy, as well in a political as in a social point of view. But we deny that, either in the Peninsula or anywhere else, in the presence of the enemy, was the British soldier prone to desert. He might straggle and maraud at times, when victory or a reverse loosened the bands of discipline, but desertion to the enemy was a crime scarcel known. For one English soldier who went over to the French, ten Frenchmen came in to the English lines.]

town or village where he lives. There is not one in a hundred who, at the time of his enlistment, does not belong to the latter class, or to the very outcasts of society."

It is easy to understand, that for an army so composed, a stern chief and a rigorous code are necessary; yet that the case should be so in England, where public opinion is entirely against the infliction of punishment by courts martial, is a matter passing our comprehension. Nevertheless these punishments, so far from being excessive, proved in most cases inadequate. Wellington found constant cause to complain of the composition and proceedings of courts martial. Throughout the whole of the war in the Peninsula, soldiers could be tried only according to English law, of which the forms, suitable enough in times of peace, proved for an army in the field most inconvenient. Hence, in 1809, Wellington wrote to Lord Castlereagh, "I am satisfied that the law is not severe enough to maintain discipline in an army employed in the field." * This sentiment is repeated in his despatch of the 24th June, 1810, to Lord Liverpool; and in the following extract from a letter, written at the opening of the campaign: "I have not a friend in the country who does not write to express his fears of what may happen, if these disgraceful irregularities continue; and I declare that I am unable to stop them."

At the close of the campaign of Salamanca, Wellington testifies to the misconduct of his army. "Outrages of all sorts," he says, "are committed with impunity, mere statements not being received as evidence by courts martial, and the soldiers are little better than a band of robbers. I have enlarged the authority of the Provost-Marshal, as far as it is possible to do so; but that authority is not sufficient, and I have no means of adding to it." . . . "Our penal military law," he writes again to Lord Castlereagh, "is weakened; and we have not adopted the novel modes of repression and punishment which are made use of by other nations, and even by the enemy, though we have imitated them in arrangements which tend only to increase and aggravate our disorders."

The Duke was desirous that the proof of guilt before courts martial should be rendered less rigorous; that a military police

* See his letter to Mr. Villiers, in which he complains of the difficulty of detecting criminals and convicting them, according to English law; and of the reluctance of the inhabitants to appear to give parole evidence before courts martial. After the retreat from Burgos, many soldiers charged with marauding by the local authorities were, on these accounts, acquitted.

should be formed, similar to that in use in the French and other armies; that the officers should be compelled to do their duty with greater strictness. Yet all his proposals were rejected; insomuch that up to the termination of hostilities Wellington found himself beset by difficulties, from which a little special legislation at the opening of the war would have freed him.* Not only was he unable to punish, effectually, infractions of discipline and neglect of duty, but he wanted that which is still more essential to one in chief command; he had no power to reward merit. Writing to Lord Castlereagh, in 1809, he says, "I command the army, yet I have no power to reward, or even promise a reward." In the following year he wrote to Lord Liverpool thus:—"I have taken the liberty of drawing your lordship's attention to the state of discipline of the army in general, which I stated to be attributable in some degree to the want of the power of reward in the hands of those who are honoured with the charge of commanding his Majesty's troops on foreign and active service." And again, to Colonel Torrens:—"In all services except that of Great Britain, and in former times in the service of Great Britain, the commander-in-chief employed against an enemy in the field had the power of promoting officers, at least to vacancies occasioned by the service in the troops under his own command; and in foreign services the principle is carried so far as that no person can venture to recommend an officer for promotion belonging to an army employed against the enemy in the field, excepting the commander of that army. . . . I, who command the largest British army that has been employed against the enemy for many years, and who have upon my hands certainly the most extensive and difficult concern that was ever imposed upon any British officer, have not the power of making even a corporal.† It is impossible that this system can

* These complaints run through very many of his letters. In one despatch the following remark occurs: "The army being numerous and much divided, it is not always possible to get together the members of a court martial and the witnesses who must follow them; and when the court is assembled, its proceedings must be suspended if the army, or a portion of it, be engaged in operations against the enemy. If the manner of judging by courts martial be inconvenient on active service, the fault rests, oftentimes, with the law, and not with the manner of its execution." The consequence was that, in order to punish those whom the law could not reach, Wellington had recourse to somewhat irregular measures. He stopped the promotion in a regiment of cavalry which misconducted itself at the battle of Vittoria.

† By all accounts, the Emperor's marshals were much more favourably circum-

last. . . . It is not known to the army and to strangers; and I am almost ashamed of acknowledging the small degree, I ought to say nullity, of power of reward which belongs to my situation; and it is really extraordinary that I have got on so well hitherto without it."

We share in all respects this feeling of astonishment, because, in order to stimulate zeal and foster obedience and devotion, it is absolutely necessary that the soldier should receive his reward immediately after the performance of the exploit, and from the hands too of him who has exposed him to danger. The English government does not understand this necessity, or rather refuses to admit it, because it is afraid of irritating that extreme susceptibility which has at all times, in Great Britain, regarded the influence of military power as dangerous to the public liberties.

In one of his letters to the military secretary, Wellington points out with some warmth that no attention whatever is paid to his recommendations, and that officers who had quitted the Peninsula and gone to England were promoted in preference. In another letter he expresses his surprise that general officers should be sent out without consulting him, and that he should not have the right even to reject them if he considers them incapable. His authority was so weak, that he declared to Lord Liverpool that he was unable to prevent officers from going away whose assistance was necessary to him. "The consequence of the absence of some of them," says he, "has been that in the late operations I have been obliged to be general of cavalry and of the advanced guard, and the leader of two or three columns, sometimes on the same day. . . . My opinion has always been that the government should do everything in its power to increase the authority of the commander-in-chief in this country, but every proposal to give additional power to persons in authority is received in England with jealousy, though why, I have never been able to understand."

It follows from these facts, and from others which we have quoted

stanced. They nominated to all inferior offices, and sometimes to that of *chef de bataillon*. Thus, to give but one example, an ordinance of 1813, authorises Jourdan to nominate, during a certain time, to all vacant offices, from that of *sous-lieutenant* to that of *chef de bataillon*, inclusive. The same power was recently given to the commander-in-chief of the French army in the Crimea. The English government, jealous of all pre-eminence, never has consented, and never will consent, to give to its generals similar authority.

elsewhere, when speaking of the difficulties thrown by the government in the way of the exercise of supreme power, that Wellington usually found himself very awkwardly situated as commander-in-chief of an army. He possessed neither the means of ensuring prompt obedience to his orders, by strict laws suitable to circumstances as they occurred, nor the power of stimulating by rewards the zeal and self-devotion of his subordinates. It was the War Office which distributed promotions and decorations, which appointed to employments and fixed the amount of pay. Wellington, to use his own expression, had not even *power to make a corporal.* His recommendations were almost always set aside or misunderstood. Officers who had never quitted their native country passed over the heads of the heroes of the Peninsula. "The neglect of justice in dispensing promotion," says Colonel Napier, "disgusted everybody." While in the French army young men were seen to arrive in a few years at the highest stations, the best of Wellington's officers remained six or seven in the same rank. Take two examples. Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, the able engineer who had constructed the lines of Torres Vedras, and directed the sieges of Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, Burgos, and Salamanca, was still a Lieutenant-Colonel in 1813, when he was killed by the bursting of a shell in the trenches before St. Sebastian. The English army did not possess a staff-officer more able, braver, more indefatigable, than Lieutenant-Colonel Waters. That officer proved eminently useful throughout the war, and Wellington, in consequence, spoke of him as a very remarkable person. In spite of this title and these recommendations, Waters held at Waterloo the rank which he had acquired in 1809 at the passage of the Douro.

The commander-in-chief of the English army had no other means of stimulating his officers than by speaking of them in general orders, or making mention of their services in his reports to the British government. As to the private soldiers, means of stirring up in them emulation were entirely wanting; and this it was which rendered so admirable the courage and determination which they displayed upon the field of battle. It has been pretended that this determination was the result rather of the phlegmatic constitution of the English than of their moral qualities. "Never," says Napier, "was a more unworthy calumny advanced. Napoleon's soldiers fought for glory, which shed its halo over the humblest of them, and carried them on to honour. The English soldiers, on the contrary,

served a jealous and selfish aristocracy. No recompence was awarded to their bravery—no bulletin marked their names for the applause of their fellow-countrymen—no hope gave a colour to their life of fatigue and dangers—their death itself was never chronicled; yet, were they ever wanting in courage?"

Verily it is a matter of astonishment, that with means of action so limited at his control, Wellington could still exercise such immense influence over his troops. If we may believe one of his aides-de-camp, that influence was owing rather to the Duke's services—services which English patriotism could never look upon with indifference—than to any feeling of affection or gratitude on the part of the soldiers. "Though it be indisputable," says Napier, "that Wellington, as a general, commanded at all times the confidence of his subordinates, it is less certain that he always secured their affection." Weighty as this evidence may be, we are still of opinion (looking to the facts of the case) that we are justified in rejecting it. No doubt Wellington was not popular in the English army, in the same sense that Napoleon was popular in the French army; but the circumstance is accounted for by the difference in their characters and situations. Gifted by nature with an ardent temperament, and finding himself at the head of an intelligent army, in which the ideas of liberty and social equality had struck deep root, the Emperor, impelled thereto by impulse as well as by calculation, made strong appeals to the imagination of his soldiers. Flattering their tastes, playing upon their weaknesses, chief and comrade at the same time, he ruled them, while he made himself adored. The same community of sentiments, of manners, and of habits, did not exist, and could not exist between the Duke of Wellington and the mercenary soldier of Great Britain. This latter, in point of fact, found himself from age to age under the control of a proud aristocracy. The officer kept him always at a distance, and was respected, and nothing more.* This consideration alone hindered Wellington from maintaining with his subordinates that familiarity which marked the intercourse of Napo-

* [M. Brialmont is quite mistaken in all this. As a foreigner, he cannot understand the relation between the English officer and soldier. The devotion of the latter to the former, when he is well treated, surpasses that of a son to his father. We have seen a whole company in tears when burying their captain; for whom, before he was killed, there was not a man among them but would have given his life.]

leon with his own soldiers as often as he was desirous of raising to the utmost their courage and devotion.

It is, moreover, to be remembered, that, like the nations which they served, the characters of these two generals were essentially different. Wellington was not by nature a man of strong passions. A calculator, cool, and methodical, free from prejudices and strong impulses, he appealed to reason rather than to imagination. The Emperor, on the other hand, captivated men's minds by brilliant images and actions which dazzled. His rare qualities commanded admiration, and the very faults of his character won for him partisans. "Mankind," says a moralist, "are not for the most part greatly taken, except with those in whom they find something to pardon."* It is not necessary to carry the parallel further in order to comprehend that Wellington knew as well as Napoleon how to win the esteem and respect of his subordinates. Perfect evenness of temper and character, combined with a depth of benevolence and justice, drew towards him by little and little those whom his grave and reserved manner might have repelled at first. The soldiers appreciated his unceasing efforts to better their condition; they were touched with his anxiety to spare their blood; they admired his impartiality, his truthfulness, the justice and disinterestedness with which he assigned to every one the portion of praise and blame which was due to him; above all, they were proud to obey a general who, in exchange for their rude devotion, gave them glory and prestige.† All who served in Spain, or in India, under his orders, pronounced Wellington to be in truth an excellent chief.‡

* [The Duke of Wellington's passions were naturally very violent. His temper was irritable, and he was capable of strong likings and dislikings; but his judgment was so evenly balanced, that he seldom failed to keep them under control. I think it was the late Mr. Croker who said of him justly, "that he felt as much as man could do, but possessed the rare quality of consulting his reason before he permitted the feeling to express itself. This was on great matters; in smaller things he was impulsive enough.]

† Though he did not possess the power of fascination which belonged to Cæsar, the Peninsular army experienced towards the Duke the same feelings which the tenth legion expressed for the victor of Pharsalia.—*Memoir of the Duke from the Times.*

‡ Earl de Grey and Lord Ellesmere state that all who were so fortunate as to be on terms of friendship with Wellington entertained sentiments of the liveliest affection for him. He was kind, affectionate, indulgent in discussion, and always ready to render service where he could.

Severe and rigid in points of duty, indulgent, simple, and gay in the relations of private life, he delighted to see his officers amusing themselves, and mixed not unfrequently in their parties of pleasure. He listened with patience to the complaints of the soldiers, carefully returned their salutes, and showed himself always ready to oblige them. Hence it was that Wellington, in spite of his frigidity and strictness, exercised great influence over his army, and inspired the officers, as well as the soldiers, with unbounded confidence. The Spaniards themselves, averse as they were to English intervention, and ill-disposed towards the Duke, rendered full justice in the end to his talents and character. During the latter campaigns, his presence among them on the battle-field sufficed to reassure them; it prevented the return of those deplorable panics, of which, at the beginning of the war, they had given so many examples.

Napier is of opinion that Wellington's popularity suffered from the barbarism of the penal military code, and from the defects inherent in the English system of promotion. We readily accept this explanation, except only so far as it relates to corporal punishment, of which Napier appears to be the avowed enemy. Doubtless it is humiliating to human nature, that punishments of this kind should still be applied in the army of the most enlightened people in the world. Philanthropists of all nations exclaim against these disgraceful flagellations. The English themselves condemn them in the most energetic terms. Many attempts have been made in parliament to introduce a more humane code; but in every instance they have been rejected by large majorities. The Duke of Wellington was always found among those who resisted such motions, and as his authority carries with it great weight, the feeling of reprobation which attaches to laws, the existence of which are deplored by all generous hearts, has been reflected upon him. Far from complaining of this responsibility, the Duke has always taken credit for it, because in his opinion the abolition of corporal punishment would bring ruin upon the English army. He defended that opinion before the Royal Commission for inquiring into military punishments, with a power of argument which overwhelmed and confounded his opponents. "The end of chastisement," says he, "is not only the punishment of the guilty, but example. . . . Besides, there is no punishment which makes an immediate impression except corporal punishment. You send a man into solitary confinement; nobody sees him in that situation; nobody knows what he suffers while he is shut up.

Consequently that punishment has no effect as an example. I take it upon me to declare, that a hundred times over the mere threat of a flogging has hindered the commission of great crimes. . . . I have thought upon this subject now for six or seven years. I have turned it over in my mind in all manner of ways, and I declare that I cannot form an idea of what you could substitute for the old manner of punishment."

This conclusion drew down on the head of the Duke of Wellington the thunders of the press and of the opposition. The principal argument of the Reformers was this: Since the French and German armies have abolished corporal punishment without suffering inconvenience, why cannot that of England do the same thing? The Duke refuted that objection, by pointing out, that no parallel can be drawn between armies recruited by conscription from all classes of the people, and an army of which the constituent elements are drawn from the very dregs of society; between armies docile, moral, and sensible of reproof, and an army of hardened blackguards, given up to debauchery and drunkenness; between armies numerous, and capable of sustaining a certain amount of relaxed discipline, and a small force, in which the slightest approach to weakness leads to disorders which might result in irreparable disasters.

The Duke further pointed out that discipline ought to be rigorous in the extreme, in an army disseminated by feeble corps over the whole surface of the globe, and of which the men, wherever they may go, begin their service on board ship, where all the restraints of honour, of remonstrance, and secret reprimand, as well as all separation or distinction between the different classes, become absolutely impracticable. The fragments of that army are only at remote intervals brought under the surveillance of the corps from which they become separated. The detachments in Ireland, in India, at Honduras, and in New South Wales, can never be subject to the inspection or control of their chiefs. "When these matters are taken into account," says the Duke, "the wonder is that there should be any discipline in our army at all, notwithstanding the strictness of the system of which the opposition complain."

Regard to truth compels us to acknowledge that this objection will be unanswerable, so long as England shall decline to reform her system of recruiting, or till the lowest classes, from which the army is raised, shall have made great progress in moral refinement.

They who ground upon notions of philanthropy their judgment in regard to this serious question of corporal punishment, have come to the conclusion that the Duke of Wellington was a hard-hearted man,—that his soul was inaccessible to generous emotions.* They are entirely mistaken in this respect. Those who have lived in intimacy with the Duke render full justice to the excellent qualities of his nature. Under a reserved exterior, he was kind, simple, and devoted; by nature he was prone to clemency; he punished only because the interests of his army required it; in many instances he pardoned with too great a facility. That to which he always looked in inflicting punishment was example. The following order, dated the 4th of March, 1811, illustrates this statement. "Considering that for two years not a soldier of the Brigade of Guards has been brought before a court martial, and that scarcely one of them has been imprisoned in the public guard-house, the commander-in-chief desires that this brigade shall be exempted from attendance at the execution which will take place to-morrow."

As often as for any reason a long interval intervened between an arrest and a trial, Wellington almost always preferred setting the prisoners at liberty. His correspondence furnishes ample proof of this. Again when a particular crime was rare, and example was so far useless, the Duke readily pardoned the criminal. Towards the end of the Peninsular war, crime had greatly diminished. A man was convicted at that time of desertion. "I pardoned him," says Wellington, "because the offence had become very rare."

An officer of the Peninsular army conducted himself ill before the enemy. Instead of handing him over to a court martial, Wellington wrote to the Duke of York, and begged that the resignation of the unfortunate man might be accepted. "Want of courage," he says, "is very uncommon among the officers of this army, and this crime need not be visited with an exemplary punishment."

After Waterloo, he followed the same course. "Many brave men," he says, "and I believe even great men, have appeared a little frightened in a battle like this, who afterwards conducted themselves remarkably well." "Believe me," he wrote once, "all those whom you see in uniform are not heroes."

* The author of the "Memoirs of Massena," General Koch, is manifestly unjust towards Wellington, when he says (vol. vii. p. 172): "There is nothing to indicate in him the presence of the blood-vessels which connect the heart with the brain."

This philosophic clemency induced the Duke to pardon many faults and weaknesses which others would have punished.

If ever an English regiment got compromised in any affair, it would always count on the most favourable interpretation being put upon its conduct by Wellington. It was thus that he stood forward to excuse the precipitate retreat of the 14th Dragoons at the battle of Chilianwallah, in the Punjab, and of the 62nd Infantry at the battle of Ferozeshah. But the Duke had another object in view while acting thus. It was, as he says himself, "to hide from the men and from the world, that an officer could misconduct himself in the presence of the enemy." "If it happen that an unfortunate fellow shall misbehave, I prefer letting him retire from the service, rather than expose him to the world."

Here is another instance of clemency, as it is given by the Duke in his evidence before the Royal Commission on Military Punishments. "A sergeant deserted, taking with him the pay of his company. He was caught. I sent him to the halberts, but I did not punish him. Up to that time he had borne an excellent character. I pardoned him, and not long afterwards made him a non-commissioned officer again. I afterwards recommended him for a commission. He got it, and became a staff-officer in the Peninsular army. That man had been fooled by women into committing his crime. It is in affairs of this kind that a soldier may be betrayed without becoming an absolutely bad character."

It is certainly difficult to reconcile this readiness to make large allowance for men's weaknesses with the Duke's habitual strictness and severity.

The excellence of his heart is shown in many other cases than these. Colonel Walsh, in his "Military Reminiscences," describes a little adventure of which he was an eye-witness. Captain Mackay, an intelligent and brave officer, but who, being rough and unmannerly, was no favourite with Sir Arthur, was put in charge of the baggage. The employment did not accord with his adventurous disposition, so he requested leave to take the field with his corps, the 4th Regiment of Native Cavalry; but the proposal being considered inconvenient to the public service, it was rejected by the Adjutant-General Barclay, who had previously taken the opinion of the commander-in-chief. Mackay, disregarding this refusal, wrote to the Duke, that, "if his regiment should be engaged, he would join it at all risks." "He knew," says Walsh, "that by so doing he

would forfeit his commission; but he was determined to lose it honourably." On perusing the letter, Wellington said, "What the d—— would the fellow be at! I suppose he must have his own way." And Mackay did take part in the battle of Assaye; at the close of which, after fighting with extraordinary gallantry, he had his horse killed, and was himself blown to pieces by the bursting of a shell. When Wellington heard of it, his eyes filled with tears—a touching tribute to the memory of a brave comrade."

His behaviour to officers, who, in a fit of ill-humour, might write to him in an unbecoming strain, was not less characteristic. Instead of bringing them to punishment, he would beg of them to reconsider their letters, and to withdraw them. "I have no malice towards Mr. Downie," he writes to General Mackenzie, on the 25th June, 1809. "A gentleman who feels a censure so sorely will take care not to incur the risk of receiving another." Again, on the 18th of August, 1811, in a case not dissimilar, he "requests an officer to reconsider the subject," adding, "I assure you that nothing will give me more satisfaction than to have succeeded in prevailing upon you to recall expressions which nothing should have provoked you to use to your commanding officer."

Having been accused, on a certain occasion, by Morillo, of sparing English marauders, and reserving all his indignation for the Spaniards, the Duke contented himself with writing to the immediate superior of that officer in these words: "I hope that General Morillo will withdraw his complaints, as made in a moment of irritation, to which all men are liable. If he does not do so, I hope that he is prepared to prove them."

It will be recollected that Ballasteros openly denounced the nomination of the Duke to the chief command of the Spanish armies, in terms so violent that the Cortez felt itself obliged to supersede him. Such unworthy conduct did not prevent the Duke from bestowing upon Ballasteros, a short time afterwards, extravagant praise. "He is the only man," so he wrote to Lord Liverpool on the 24th Nov., 1812, "that has done anything."

A young Englishman, who had been employed for about a month in the commissariat, addressed a letter to the Lords of the Treasury, in which he said that the commissary-general and his officers, as well as Wellington himself, were either knaves or fools; and that by adopting a new method of administration, which he professed to have invented, millions would be saved to the public. Having been informed of the circumstance, Wellington merely wrote to Mr.

Villiers, the young man's patron, "I only beg that he will write no more letters to the Treasury, about matters which he does not understand."

At the conclusion of the war in France, an officer having complained intemperately to the Duke, that his name had been omitted from the list of those recommended for the Bath, the Duke replied to him on the 8th of February, 1815, from Vienna, "The expression of this irritation, however unjust towards me, and unpleasant to my feelings, has not made me forget the services which you and your brave corps rendered, upon every occasion on which you were called upon; and although I am afraid it is too late, I have recommended you in the strongest terms to the Secretary of State."

But it was not towards his own brethren in arms, and his fellow citizens exclusively, that the Duke exhibited such marked forbearance. The Spanish soldiers were treated with equal indulgence. He never failed, in spite of the many causes of complaint which he had against them, to speak in the warmest terms of their services, as often as the opportunity of so doing occurred. More than once, indeed, he had the delicacy to pass over in silence the faults and failings of which they had been guilty. His report of the battle of Talavera bears witness to this fact, in which he takes no notice whatever of the disgraceful conduct of Cuesta's troops who, on the 27th, ran away, without firing a shot, from Mileaud's cavalry. Again, the Duke, with great generosity, undertook the defence of these troops, when, after the battle, Cuesta gave orders that they should be decimated. About fifty men had been shot, when he succeeded in persuading the Spanish general to stop the execution of the rest.*

Under the guise of extreme reserve, Wellington nourished a tender and compassionate disposition.† He took greatly to heart the death of his officers. After the battle of Vittoria, he wrote to his brother: "My grief for the loss of Cadogan takes away all my satisfaction at our success." And so also, on the day following the battle of Waterloo, he says in a letter to Lord Aberdeen, "I cannot express to you the regret and sorrow that I feel, when looking round I perceive the

* Toreno, vol. iii. p. 47.

† He was much touched when misfortune befell his officers. This is shown in his letter of the 19th November, 1812, to Sir Edward Paget, in which he expresses, with equal truth and feeling, his concern that he should have been made prisoner by the French. His letter to Maucune thanking him for the care he had taken of his prisoners, tells the same tale.

losses which we have suffered. The glory of a triumph like this, so dearly purchased, is no consolation to me." Writing the same day to his friend Marshal Beresford, he says, "Our losses quite prostrate me, and I am quite indifferent to the advantages we have gained. I pray God that I may be saved from fighting any more such battles; for I am broken-hearted with the loss of so many old friends and comrades."*

Such a wish, expressed at a moment when the allies were in the very glow of victory, does the greatest honour to the character of Wellington.

Napier states that he saw the Duke in a passion of tears, when after the assault of Badajoz, the report was made to him that upwards of 2000 brave men had fallen in the course of that terrible night.

Another eye-witness describes a similar scene, as occurring in his presence after the battle of Waterloo. "Dr. Hume, the principal medical officer at head-quarters, entered the Duke's chamber on the morning of the 18th of June, to make his report of the killed and wounded. He found the Duke asleep, unshaved, and unwashed, as he had lain down late over-night. The duty being urgent, Hume awoke his chief, and the Duke, sitting up in his bed, desired him, without asking any questions, to read. It was a long list, and took a good while to go through; but after he had read for about an hour, the doctor looked up. He saw Wellington with his hands convulsively clasped together, and the tears making long furrows on his battle-soiled cheeks. At first the Duke did not seem to notice that Hume had ceased to speak, but in about a minute he cried, 'Go on,' and till the reading was closed, he never once moved from his attitude of profound grief."

Compare this with the conduct of Napoleon. He regarded his soldiers as "mere pieces on a chess-board."† Provided the issues

* Letter to Prince Metternich, 26th June, 1815.

† This was his own expression. The following circumstance may serve to illustrate his meaning:—When in command of the artillery of the army of Italy, he was visited one day by the wife of a Deputy, with whom he had been acquainted at Nice; who expressed a wish to see what fighting was. He immediately ordered an advanced post on the hill of Tende to be attacked. Nothing could be gained by the action; but his fair hostess at Nice had her curiosity satisfied. Some soldiers lost their lives for the whim of a coquette, and for a general indifferent to the sufferings of humanity. It is fair to add that Napoleon afterwards expressed regret at having so acted—at St. Helena.

of an affair fulfilled his hopes, he cared for nothing beyond. The simple-minded and modest English general was endowed with a more feeling heart; he entertained a more elevated opinion of human nature. He neither flattered his soldiers, nor worked upon their pride, but he took care of their health, and spared their blood, with a tenderness which on more than one occasion made him an object of ridicule to the French generals.*

It was characteristic of Wellington that he treated his subordinates with extreme politeness. No one ever saw in him those bursts of ill-humour and brutality to which Napoleon often gave way. No one ever had occasion to complain of a single unjust word or ungenerous depreciation of his motives. In the harshest of his orders he invariably made use of the language of a gentleman. He possessed in a high degree the calmness and urbanity which ensure obedience to orders in public life, that charm of manner, which in the relations of private society springs from either high birth, or natural elevation of character. In his orders and official letters, Wellington *requests, entreats,* he very seldom *commands.*† If any of his generals showed signs of harshness or ill-breeding, he never failed to correct him. On the 20th September, 1811, he wrote to General Campbell, "It would undoubtedly be better, if officers placed in the situation in which you were, could correct neglects and errors likely to be attended by consequences fatal to the public interests, in language which should not hurt the feelings of the person to whom it is addressed; and with a manner divested of vehemence."

He gives the same advice to Beresford, which the misconduct of certain Portuguese officers, in writing direct to their own government, instead of sending their correspondence through him, had provoked. "I would introduce into this order and into the correspondence no severity or asperity; only a plain and short abstract of facts."

* It has been said that Wellington was guided by prudential considerations in this. They may have had their weight—they probably must; but a careful study of the acts and character of Wellington leads to the conclusion that they weighed much less with him than motives of humanity.

† In his order of the 8th April, 1811, the following expressions occur: "The commander of the forces is always concerned to be obliged to occasion trouble to any officer; but the officers of the army may depend upon it, that no duty which they are called upon to perform can be omitted without serious inconvenience to the service, which will be felt sooner or later."

In this spirit he acted when, in his general order of the 17th, he observed, "Whatever may be a man's rank or situation, he ought to be treated with mildness and civility." And on another occasion he entreated his officers never to make use of harsh language to their inferiors. "Expressions of this sort," he says, "are not necessary, and they may wound, but they never convince."

Thus far we have endeavoured to show what Wellington was in the conduct of war and at the head of an army. It remains now that we look at him, beset by all the difficulties arising out of the administration of affairs of detail and of politics. And in this second phase of his career he appears to us to be neither less great nor less worthy of admiration than in the first. Indeed, we know not which to admire the most, the ability with which he conducted military operations, or the talent, not less valuable, whereby he succeeded in getting the better of political embarrassments, and in disentangling the intrigues of every kind, which stood in the way of the execution of his plans.

A very inadequate idea would be formed of Wellington's merits, if we overlooked the entanglements which, from the first day of the war to the last, gave him more trouble than the French army itself.

In Portugal he had to struggle against the aristocratic and overshadowing faction of the Souzas (which the court of Brazil favoured); the sloth and weakness of the government at Lisbon; the indecision and concealed animosity of the Prince Regent.*

In Spain the local juntas, which were made up for the greater part of factious men, the most hostile to England, stirred up their fellow citizens one against the other, under the pretext of keeping alive their enthusiasm. They squandered away the money and arms which, at the commencement of the war at least, the English government sent to them in great abundance; and ended by frustrating, sometimes by their rashness, sometimes by culpable inactivity, the best arranged schemes of defence.

The Cortes, deeply embued with the spirit of reform, and carried away by the same extravagant passions which swayed the journalists and populace of Cadiz, threw constant hindrances in the way

* M. Thiers makes too light of these difficulties, when he says, "The court of Janeiro and the regency soon gave way, when the English general shook his redoubtable wand." We could quote twenty cases in which the court and regency placed themselves in direct opposition to Wellington. Most of these have been noticed elsewhere.

of the Duke's plans, by refusing to decree necessary measures, by adopting faulty schemes of finance*, by giving direct orders to their troops and generals, instead of requiring them to obey implicitly the commander-in-chief, and by enacting laws which disgusted the clergy and the rural population, the two great mainstays of resistance to France.†

While their country was filled with foemen, and the echoes of hostile cannon shook the hall of assembly, the members of Cortes passed their time in drawing up energetic proclamations; in discussing questions of abstract right, and in passing the most absurd resolutions. Will it be credited, for example, by posterity, that, during the most critical period of the war, in 1813, the Cortes decreed by statute that St. Theresa of Jesus should be honoured as the patron saint of Spain?

To these sources of embarrassment must be added, the profound ignorance, the dulness, and at the same time the extreme tardiness of the Spanish generals; the wretched state of the regular army, and the little sympathy which existed between it and the *Partidas*; the inveterate hatred of the Spaniards for the Portuguese people; the total want of local resources; the ill-will of the Spanish and Portuguese authorities; and though last, not least, the supineness of the English government, not only itself destitute of experience in war, but subject to the caprices of a nation, of which the manners and customs are all repugnant to an honourable career in arms.‡

* Among other wild schemes, the Cortes set up a property tax, on a sliding scale; of which the effect was, to confiscate the estates of all who had anything, under the pretext of helping such as had nothing.—*Toreno*, vol. iv. p. 181.

† One of these was a law for suppressing the Inquisition. However right in itself, the act proved to be most inopportune, for the Inquisition, strange to say, was as much in favour with the peasantry as with the priests.

‡ Every writer who has touched on this subject arrives at the same conclusion. "There is no people in the world," says Sir Francis Head, "which has so little knowledge of military matters as the English. Convinced that a standing army is unconstitutional, they hate to see it. And this hatred is as strong in the labouring classes as in any other, who look upon soldiers as their natural enemies, and will rather be shut up in workhouses than enlist." So also says Napier, "The English people are pugnacious without being military; and under the pretext of maintaining liberties, which they have not, oppose the maintenance in time of peace of such an establishment as might be useful in the event of war." Wellington, in a memorandum, dated April 22, 1823, expresses himself in still stronger terms.

"Few nations," says one of the most distinguished of British historians *, "present so strange an admixture of chivalrous with mercantile spirit; justly proud of her historical glory, yet unreasonably jealous of military expenditure; covetous beyond measure of renown in war, yet always anxious to patch up a peace; ever leaving themselves without resources, when the danger is past, yet more fearful than any other people of reverse, when danger is near; babbling about Crecy and Azincourt when war rages, yet when peace returns, thinking of nothing, except how to effect reductions."

But Wellington was called upon to provide, not for the wants of his own country alone. It devolved upon him to regenerate, so to speak, the Portuguese nation; to create in that people new habits and a new character; to exalt and encourage them, without having the power either to reward or to punish; to wage war with abuses, old and even respected; with confusion in the management of civil affairs, with worn-out institutions, fenced round with numerous abuses, and high social influences. And, lastly, he was called upon, without making any appeal to revolutionary principles, to combat an aristocracy, strongly attached to its privileges, and to sustain and bring forward the people, among whom alone throughout the nation, the principle of patriotism was not dead. Never, perhaps, in the history of the world, has the commander of an army found himself in a position so arduous, and so complicated.

Left entirely to himself, without advice, almost without support, having his military chest almost always empty, and generals under him of a very secondary order, he was forced not only to provide for everything, but in his own person to execute everything. While his responsibility was immense, his power of action was circumscribed by a host of necessities not always easy to be observed; the necessity of respecting the laws and institutions of the Peninsula, as well as the authority of the local magistrates; the necessity of taking nothing from the inhabitants without paying its full value; the necessity of preserving discipline in his army, under regulations adapted rather for a time of peace than one of war; the necessity of explaining to his government, and obtaining its sanction for measures, which in every other army would be left to the management of the commander-in-chief. Finally, the necessity of so managing all his proceedings, as that they should fall in at once with the views of the

* Alison.

English nation, and the requirements, and even the caprices of the British parliament.

His mode of encountering these difficulties marks him as eminently gifted with practical genius. He made up for the defective system of recruitment at home, by raising in Portugal a national army of 30,000 excellent troops.* He supplied the want of money, by establishing a trade in corn on a large scale; and at his own risk encouraged speculations which turned out very lucrative. He encountered the depreciation in the value of English paper, and defeated the schemes of usurers, by issuing Treasury notes, coining gold, and displaying all the resources of a first-rate financier. He said himself, once upon a time, "When I think of the exertions which I was obliged to make in the Peninsula, it appears to me, that nature intended me rather for a chancellor of the exchequer, than for a minister of war or a commander-in-chief." †

His long experience of Indian intrigue gave him peculiar facilities for counteracting the selfish and shifting policy of the Peninsular nations; while his active participation in the government of Mysore, had developed, to a great degree, the ability which was natural to him, in the administration of political and civil offices. A leader deficient in these qualities, would have probably failed in Spain, however great, in other respects, his military talent might have been. We cannot too often repeat this fact. One essential condition of success in Wellington's case was this, that he was able to hold his own among those governments, the interests of which were almost always opposed one to the other; that he could conduct his military operations without offending, either the parliament to which he was responsible, or the regencies of Spain and Portugal, whose support was essential to him; or the native armies with which it was his duty to co-operate, or even the pretenders to vacant thrones, whose influence, troublesome as it might be, still required to be managed.

It follows from what has been here laid down, that the part assigned to Wellington in the Peninsula was that of a general administrator, a financier, and a diplomatist. In Portugal, especially,

* In 1809, 20,000 Portuguese troops, commanded by English officers, were taken into the pay of England.

† Of the Duke's aptitude in accounts, we have elsewhere spoken; and it will be seen, by reference to the despatches, that so long ago as the period of his service in India, he had attracted the notice of the Marquis Wellesley by his skill as a financier.

his attention was turned to every question, which, directly or indirectly, bore upon the sustenance of the people, their industry, their finances, their agriculture, their commerce. His correspondence testifies in the most remarkable manner to this fact. It contains, among other papers, memoranda addressed to the Prince Regent, in which is shown the great want of reform in every branch of administration, vitiated, as they all were, by abuses which the hidalgos desired to perpetuate, and from which the lower orders of the people greatly suffered. Sometimes Wellington touched upon the unfair freedom from taxation which the nobles enjoyed, as well as the exemption from the conscription, which was extended not only to them, but to their domestic servants also. Sometimes he spoke of the wretched condition of the Portuguese labourers; and of the unfair manner in which the subsidies from England were disposed of, in consequence of abuses in local administration, and of the dishonesty of the agents employed to distribute them. And sometimes he pointed out how agriculture might be revived, in districts over which the tide of war had rolled.

It was one of the peculiarities of that illustrious man, that he was able to attend to all manner of secondary questions without neglecting the interests of his command, and that he could do so under circumstances when it might be well supposed that his thoughts were too fully occupied to admit of his turning them out of the one engrossing channel. Thus, on the 14th of April, 1812, while Marmont lay before him, and after a severe action, in which his able dispositions had secured important advantages to the allies, he wrote out, after nightfall, in his tent, an elaborate plan for the establishment of a government bank of Portugal, "treating the subject," says Napier, "as he did every other connected with finance, like a master, down to its most minute details."

In all the reforms proposed by Wellington, two main objects are discernible,—to deliver the Peninsula as soon as possible from the invaders, and to improve the material condition of the poorer classes. He was fortunate enough to compel the adoption of several of these reforms, in spite of the opposition of the *fidalgos*, and the prolonged resistance of the court of Rio Janeiro. Doubtless it is not a little curious to find him standing before the English aristocracy in the light of a popular reformer in Portugal, yet so it is. "If the government of Lisbon," he writes to Mr. Stuart, on the 11th of May, 1810,

"desires the lower classes to sacrifice their interests and their business to the public good, and if it is ready to punish them for the slightest infraction of the law, it must begin by acting in the same spirit towards the upper classes; these are they on whom it is especially incumbent to do their duty; nor ought any name, however illustrious, or any patronage, however powerful, to save from punishment all who fail to act as becomes them in defence of their country."

We beg particular attention to this letter, because it has been said over and over again, that the Duke never entertained a single generous feeling towards the masses. And from this belief concerning him arose the *sobriquet* which he received in England, viz. "the Iron Duke."* Nothing however justifies that assertion in the Duke's career, which was marked at every stage by acts of great generosity, and entirely devoted to the defence of national interests in their very nature popular. To the allegations of party men, we therefore oppose facts which admit of no denial. His ceaseless struggle for the deliverance of the Peninsula, and the energy which he displayed in maintaining the rights of the people in Portugal; his opposition to the English government when it was prepared to bring on the ruin of Spain by the emancipation of her colonies; his honourable endeavour, at the end of the war, to obtain from the Regency in Madrid an amnesty in favour of all citizens driven into exile; his behaviour towards the French nation, elevated and generous; his refusal to support the premature pretensions of the Duke d'Angoulême; his powerful intervention whereby the monuments of Paris were saved from the fury of the Prussians; his wise endeavours to dissuade the allied sovereigns from imposing terms too severe upon the vanquished; and last of all, the support rendered to the government by his popularity and great name, in order that from his own party the repeal of the corn laws might be wrung,—we defy any one to point out a single member of the liberal party in

* [Great misapprehension prevails, both at home and abroad, concerning the origin of this sobriquet. The fact is, that it arose out of the building of an iron steam-boat, which plied between Liverpool and Dublin, and which its owners called the Duke of Wellington. The term Iron Duke was first applied to the vessel; and by and by, rather in jest than in earnest, it was transferred to the Duke himself. It had no reference whatever, certainly at the outset, to any peculiarities, or assumed peculiarities, in his Grace's disposition."]

England who has rendered greater or more enduring services to the cause of liberty and progress.*

No doubt Wellington was far from taking up and supporting every novel idea which floated into popularity. By the opinions which he entertained respecting the great influence of property, by his traditionary views as to the government of nations, by his own habits, and by his connections of family and friendship, he was attached to that great conservative party, which, however much it has been decried, is still powerful in England; and which accepted reform, in the popular sense of that term, only as a last resource. He did not, however, hesitate to separate himself from that party, and to become the champion of the lower orders, as often as he felt that he could do so without touching the fundamental principles of his political creed. The Duke was not the man to take up the quarrels, the prejudices, the hatreds of the leader of a faction, much less to make himself the ready instrument of their combination.† Before feeling as a Tory, he felt as an Englishman; before feeling as an Englishman, he felt as a man. It is well known that the ultra Tories of Great Britain hated Napoleon, because he was the leader of the army, and the representative of the principle of democracy in Europe. Hence their disappointment was extreme when, towards the end of the war in Spain, they saw the democrats obtain influence in the Cortes, and exhibit a disposition to treat with Joseph. In this policy Wellington largely shared; yet he did nothing to resist the movement, fearful lest he might thereby stir up civil war. His advice to the government was, on the contrary, to keep quite aloof from such internal disagreements, and to confine all their efforts to

* [We have elsewhere shown that the Duke's character, in this respect, was greatly misunderstood. Opposed he was to the Reform Bill of 1832, and he resisted its becoming law, till there seemed to be no choice, except between withdrawal of such resistance and a revolution. But he assented to every measure of free-trade which Lord Liverpool's administration originated. He repealed the laws which rendered Dissenters and Roman Catholics ineligible to seats in parliament; and he would have begun a course of gradual reform in the representative system of the country, had he not been thwarted by members of his own cabinet, who afterwards turned round upon him and betrayed him.]

† On 17th September, 1808, Wellington wrote to Sir John Moore, "Though I hold a high office under government, I am not a party man;" and again, on the 7th April, 1810, to Admiral Berkeley, "We ought to do great things at this moment, if there was less of party and more of public spirit in England."

supporting the war in which they were engaged with France.* "His superior wisdom alone," says Napier, "prevented the Tories from interfering with the internal government of Spain, which must have led, without doubt, to an open rupture."

Again, it was Wellington who, in 1814, resisted every attempt to do violence to the feelings of the French people, by compelling them to declare against Napoleon, with whom the Allies were still in treaty. "Don't urge the people to declare themselves," he writes to Lord Bathurst, "but allow them, as the parties most directly interested, to choose their own time and manner of effecting their own purpose." †

So far from advocating reaction, as has been said, Wellington, on every occasion, preached up tolerance. He deplored the blindness of Louis XVIII.'s advisers, and blamed that prince himself, for calling to his councils the members of his family for forming an administration irresponsible and without unity, for creating a war-department, except from the army itself, and for surrounding himself with people who had no real interest in the maintenance of the charter. Moreover, it was he who, after the battle of Waterloo, first advised the king to follow a course of liberality and moderation. "Your Majesty will do well," he writes, "to precede your arrival with some proclamation or act, which shall announce a policy of oblivion and pardon, which shall promise a steady adherence to the letter of the charter."

The enlightened views of Wellington were so fully appreciated at that period in France, that the patriots addressed themselves to him in order to obtain guarantees, as in 1814 they had addressed the Emperor Alexander, in order to obtain the charter. Fouché preferred treating with him rather than with Louis XVIII. On the 27th of June he wrote: "By you, above all, are the French understood and appreciated; you will stand up for their rights in the face of all Europe." The Duke responded so faithfully to that appeal, that the first act of the allied sovereigns was to declare, "that the capitulation of Paris was not binding upon them; that it was a mere personal act on the parts of Wellington and Blucher." This declaration pointed clearly enough to the restitution of the works of art, and that result was accomplished immediately after the overthrow of

* See his letter to Lord Bathurst, 5th September, 1813.

† 11th April, 1814.

Talleyrand's semi-liberal administration, which had been formed under the auspices of the English general.

The Duke's correspondence affords ample proof that he was opposed to the rigorous measures adopted by Ferdinand against the liberal members of the Cortes, and that he urged the king to grant to his people a constitution, in union with the ideas and wishes of the times. And finally, we may refer again, in proof of the liberality and kindliness of his opinion, to his abhorrence of the slave trade, which he pronounced to be "an odious traffic."

Sincere friend as he was to the people, however, Wellington always showed himself (and this perhaps it was which gained for him the character of illiberality), inaccessible to the false illusions of "pure democracy." He had taken too close a view of the intrigues, the disorders, and the secret ambition of that party, he had suffered too much from its political incapacity, and its extravagant susceptibility, he had been too well satisfied of the feebleness of a popularly-elected Cortes, and of the democratic constitution of Spain, not to be the declared enemy of a principle, which being infused into the government, and exercising unbounded freedom of action, had done more harm than good to the national cause. "It cannot be expected that Spain can ever become a useful ally to England, or an ally at all, so long as the republican system of government shall last."

Towards the end of 1813, events had taken such a turn, that Wellington hesitated whether, in order to prevent an open rupture with the clergy and the rural population, he ought not to support the Spanish generals who desired to get rid of the Cortes altogether.* It was because the Spaniards had given him such excellent reason for distrusting anarchy, the sure result of organic changes prematurely effected, that he opposed himself so strictly to Irish agitators, and to those who endeavoured to carry by intimidation the question of Parliamentary Reform.

* "I beg of you to let me know," he wrote to Lord Bathurst, "whether, in the event of my taking steps to put down the democracy, I may count upon the approval and support of the government." When he wrote this letter, Wellington was convinced that the Cortes was powerless for good, and that there was some danger of its throwing Spain once more into the hands of France. In the hope of averting that calamity, he wrote, on the 25th of January, to one of the most influential and sensible members of that body, and explained his own views as to the best means of securing to Spain the blessings of rational liberty. This letter, which proposes to modify the Spanish constitution on the model of that of England, shows that he never desired to see despotism established in the Peninsula.

His unbending determination on these points called down upon him the censure of the Whigs, while the Tories reproached him with yielding too much to the Liberals, in the support which he gave to Catholic emancipation and to the repeal of the corn laws. To those who consider it a point of honour to stand by their party at all hazards, who condemn as discreditable every concession to circumstances, or to the necessities of governing; who, rather than sacrifice what they call their principles and self-respect, would suffer the republic itself to perish — in the opinion of such men, Wellington could not be other than a statesman of a mean order. But his large intelligence and noble character enabled him to think light of opposition of every sort which had its origin in any other feeling than the desire to promote the public good, and to maintain the honour of the nation. He attached no value whatever to that false popularity, which is to be won only by flattering crowds, and pandering to the the passions. The well-being of the people at large, apart from all regard to clique or faction; the internal prosperity of Great Britain, and the real necessities of government, — these circumstances alone occupied his thoughts at all times, and under all circumstances. In a word, love of country filled his mind so completely, that there was no room left in it for love of party; and this it was which rendered it easy for him, without shame, without embarrassment, to pass from one political camp to another, and to give his advice to the crown, as the colleague of men of all shades of opinion.* Nor must the fact be lost sight of, that this practice of changing sides in politics, which throws some shadow over the characters of public men, and which there is, for the most part, good reason to condemn, occurs more frequently in England than in any other constitutional government. William Pitt, Canning, Castlereagh, Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Palmerston, and Lord John Russell, afford remarkable illustrations of this truth. And it is worthy of remark that not only have all these statesmen rendered eminent service to their country, but that the greatest reforms, the most important measures of every sort which have been carried into effect in Great Britain, were effected by mixed administrations; by men of talent who, by mutual and patriotic concessions, undertook to govern independently of party, and for the public good.

Principles, as they are called, had no value in Wellington's eyes; he looked exclusively to results.

In Portugal he was constrained by a regard to the common in-

terests of the alliance to support the people against the pretensions of the Regency and of the fidalgos, because the people alone were energetic and devoted. In Spain, on the other hand, he was forced to sustain the party of the clergy and the nobles against the *tiers état*, because the former alone stood firmly by England, after France had assumed towards Spain an attitude of liberality.*

The same disinterestedness, the same desire to secure the triumph of a good cause, led him to take part with the Regency (in which, however, he had many enemies) when it refused to recognise the treaty of Valençay, which threatened to involve England and Spain in serious difficulties. Cordially as he disliked the Cortes, — to the full as much as he did the Regency, — Wellington, at the termination of the war, made praiseworthy efforts to induce the Spanish generals to support that assembly in resisting the pretensions of Ferdinand VII.† Yet it was the same practical good sense which rendered him hostile to the Spanish constitution, impeding as it did the action of civil government, and paralysing military control; to the Cortes, which, like all other popular assemblies, strove to get into its own powerless hands every influence in the state; and to the Regency, which met every useful measure proposed by the commander-in-chief with a veto, based now upon some scruples of legality, now upon some inadmissible deference to the feelings of national self-love. He had reason on his side, over and over again, when he wrote to the Spanish minister of war: "So long as the enemy is in the country, we must do all that we can to drive him out, whatever may be the constitutional privileges which may be invaded by these measures."‡

It is evident from all this, from his mode of reasoning as well as

* From the commencement of the war the democratic party had, in point of fact, displayed a fixed antipathy towards England. It was openly said at Cadiz, 1812, that the yoke of the French was more tolerable than the protection of the English. Yet, in spite of this open hostility, Wellington never mixed himself up with the domestic policy of Spain. On the contrary, he warned his own government, over and over again, to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality.

† It is well known that Elio's army declared openly against the Cortes, and that that of Equia, under the direction of the King, assisted in arresting two members of the regency, with several deputies. The third army seemed disposed to follow in the same course; but when brought in contact with Wellington, his influence restrained it from deviating from the path of duty. *See* Toreno, vol. vi. p. 491.

‡ Letter to the Minister of War, 4th December, 1812.

of acting, that the Duke never looked upon power as a means of causing his own opinions or principles to triumph. He entertained far higher and more patriotic views of the statesman's mission, views which Sir Robert Peel expressed so admirably on an occasion of great solemnity: "My consolation for the sacrifices which I am called upon to make, I must find in that hope of honourable fame, which is to be acquired only by those who, according to the best of their judgment, fallible at the best, pursue the course which leads to the public good."

Among liberal institutions, there was one for which the Duke had little sympathy, though he was fully alive to its beneficial consequences—we allude to the liberty of the press. It must be acknowledged, however, that he had excellent reason for the dislike with which he regarded it. The press had, in point of fact, given the signal for that burst of disapprobation with which the Convention of Cintra was regarded in England. It had demanded and obtained the recall of the victorious generals,—a measure which would have probably cut short the career of Wellington, had he not been supported by the influence of his family, and the prestige of his former victories.* It was, moreover, through the erroneous and unjust measure taken by the London journals of Sir John Moore's retreat, of the campaign of 1809, and the failure before Burgos, that the enthusiasm of the English people was changed into rage, and the recall of the Peninsular army all but determined upon. On the other hand, the newspapers of Lisbon, of Cadiz, and Madrid assailed, with the fiercest rancour, every act of Wellington, with the view of rendering him an object of suspicion to the Cortes, the Regency, and the people. Neither did they spare the Spanish generals themselves, who suffered the more from such attacks, that they had nothing to trust to except public opinion and the confidence of their troops.

The national press of Spain was given over, in a great measure, to turbulent men, who, to the utmost of their poor ability, scattered the seeds of anarchy and weakness in all directions. Their virulence increased as danger grew less imminent. In 1813 it passed all

* [M. Brialmont is a little too severe upon the English Press. It wrote down the Convention of Cintra, without doubt, and produced the recall of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard. But the return of Wellesley to England was voluntary. The step was taken out of delicacy towards Sir John Moore, with whose claim to command the army he was unwilling to interfere.]

bounds. Wellington and his gallant officers, the real preservers of the country, were described as robbers and assassins. They even attributed to the English commander-in-chief the design of seizing the Spanish crown.

Calumnies and slanders such as these affected, however, less harm to Wellington than the daily indiscretion of the English journals, which published in their columns all the information which they could pick up respecting the state and position of the allied army. The officers of the army, and the English ministers themselves, became, so to speak, accomplices in this abuse, by giving up for publication details which the French generals vainly endeavoured to obtain elsewhere, and of which they invariably made use. "I could point out the articles in the newspapers," wrote Wellington in 1813, "which have enabled them to form their plan of operations."

All the attempts of the Duke to put a stop to these acts of culpable indiscretion, proved fruitless. At the same time, the Duke never ceased to remonstrate against them. "Your Lordship must allow me," he wrote to Lord Liverpool in 1809, "to call your attention to the articles continually published in the English newspapers, which describe the position, the numbers, the places, and the means of execution at the disposal of the armies in Spain and Portugal. . . . The English newspapers often tell exactly, not only what regiments are stationed at different posts, but of what number of effective men they are composed; and this information reaches the enemy as soon as it reaches me, at a moment, too, when it may be of the utmost consequence that he should be kept in ignorance."

It is not wonderful, that a commander to whom the press had wrought so much mischief, should entertain for it no very friendly feeling; or that he should from time to time give vent to his ill-humour with journalists in language which was not always measured.

Writers who censure the habit to which Wellington was prone, of estimating without regard to party ties, opinions and even institutions, according to the results which they produced, and who mistake for weakness and versatility that which was in truth the result of moral firmness and practical good sense, do not hesitate to deny the Duke's right to be accounted a statesman. And if by statesmanship be meant an aptitude for parliamentary warfare; the power of sustaining or embarrassing a minister by secret cabals; if it require the talents of a politician to prepare an arena, in which ambitious individuals may contend, and to attach to his own fortunes

rising influences, to retain old supporters at the same time that he conciliates new; if, in a word, statesmanship consist in knowing how to direct or to defeat the thousand intrigues which are mixed up in all the public affairs of a constitutional country; if the art of governing consist of such knowledge and such faculties as these, then Wellington was indeed a statesman of very ordinary calibre. But if we are bound to concede the title only to one who conceives, attempts, and brings to a successful issue great designs, who knows how to surmount unlooked-for difficulties; to disentangle complicated situations, and to create resources for himself, when all around seems desperate; who can preserve his calmness and self-possession in the midst of passions inflamed to madness; who can discover the road to success, which all besides have missed; who can make head against intrigues, frustrate mischievous projects, and forget in the pursuit of one probable issue all selfish and meaner considerations; if, in short, we are bound to assign the title to him who arranges his plans wisely, and executes them with as much of vigour as he has exhibited prudence in their preparation; if such be the qualities necessary to make up a great statesman, then, beyond all question, Wellington as a statesman was great. What he did in the Peninsula to sustain the war, and to provide for success, in spite of the obstacles thrown in his way by the people and their indigenous governments, by the natives of the country, and, above all, by the conflicting views of the cabinets of London, Madrid, Lisbon, and Rio Janeiro, could have been done as well neither by Canning, nor by Castlereagh, nor by Percival, nor by Lord Liverpool, nor by Sir Robert Peel; and yet no one has ever disputed the right of any of these ministers to be accounted a great statesman.

There is no end to the material proofs of perspicacity and political intelligence with which the whole of Wellington's career abounds. What his notions were of the system of government in India, and of the fate of the French conquests in Egypt, has been shown elsewhere. Experience justified them all, as well as the predictions recorded in a memorandum lately brought to light on the financial condition of Mysore. The reforms which he effected in the general government of Seringapatam, received the commendation of all competent judges. The same thing may be said of the modifications which he introduced into the civil administration of Portugal. Among these latter may be cited, the establishment of a military chest, a new system of customs, an improved method of raising taxes,

and some important changes for the better, in the management of the arsenal and dockyard, as well as the liquidation of the national debt. On all these subjects the Duke entertained ideas the most just, as well as the most elevated; though his influence was not always powerful enough to force their adoption upon others. We cannot sufficiently admire the clear-headedness with which, in his tent before the enemy, he exposed the folly of an English delusion, the establishment of a bank in the Peninsula similar to that of Great Britain; * with which he withstood the proposal to sell the property of the crown and of the clergy; and, last of all, to throw the English army for its subsistence upon a system of requisitions, similar to that which the French had adopted since 1789.

But that which goes beyond the utmost limit of praise is the exquisite tact, the consummate ability, with which he succeeded in rendering practicable a legitimate demonstration in the south of France; and his wise course of proceeding in 1815, whereby he brought about the second restoration; in defiance of the Chambers, the army, and the people, who shouted with one voice, "Down with the Bourbons!" and in spite, to a certain extent, of the allied sovereigns themselves, who entertained doubts as to the possibility, or, at all events, as to the fitness, of replacing Louis XVIII. upon the throne.

Again we may refer, in proof of Wellington's political perspicacity, to the opinions which he entertained of the Peninsular nations, at different stages of the war, and the view which he took of the resources of France, as well before as after the great catastrophe of 1815. Every one of these opinions, not less than the measure which he took of the men with whom from time to time he was brought into connection, events fully justified. Indeed, so curiously accurate in those respects is his correspondence, that many of the letters might be supposed to have been written long after the events to which they refer had occurred. Thus on the 22nd of April, 1809, before the Cortes met, he wrote to his brother, Henry Wellesley, "I declare that if I were in Buonaparte's place, I should leave the English and the Cortes to settle Spain between them as they pleased; and I

* [M. Brialmont falls into the same mistake which almost all foreigners, not dealers in money, commit when speaking of the Bank of England. They seem to regard that corporation as a great national concern, instead of what it is—a private company, brought by accident, as much as anything else, into immediate communication with the government.]

should not have the smallest doubt but that in a very short time Spain would fall into the power of France." * * "There is not a man in this country capable of conducting the government." * * "I should prefer to the Cortes a wise Bourbon, if we could find one and make him Regent."

At a moment when the prestige of the empire was accepted every where, Wellington not only expressed doubts as to the stability of that edifice, which seemed as if it must endure for ages, but pointed out distinctly the causes which must operate to throw it down, and the means by which its fall might be hastened. From that hour, while prosecuting the war in Spain, he took care as much as possible to regulate his own proceedings according to the general state of Europe. Something told him that the little army on the Mondego had a mighty part to play in the sanguinary drama which agitated the world, and that not the fate of the Peninsula alone was at stake, nor yet the question of England's naval supremacy, but the independence and the liberty of all nations; menaced by the ambition of one man. "Spain," says a French author,* "was then what Britain used to be in the days of Cæsar, — the last rampart. Wellington there fixed and defended himself. His task was to gain time for Europe, that it might rally. There lay the weak point, there was the heel of Achilles. Hence the attention of Europe fixed itself, in the end, on that corner where the flame smouldered, and on that man, not brilliant but determined, towards whom as yet no attention had been turned. The emperor observed him too, and from the mountains of the North he spoke from time to time of falling upon the South, and putting an end to the struggle as with a thunderbolt. That deaf and dumb protest was to him a sore, irritating and ceaseless; the blasted spot which threatened his destiny.

On the 17th of March, 1810, Wellington wrote to Mr. Stewart in these terms: "The interests of the whole world are too closely connected with the struggle in which we are engaged, to permit us to withdraw one step." And again in December, 1811, to Lord W. Bentinck: "I have long considered it probable that we shall see a general resistance throughout Europe, to the horrible and base tyranny of Buonaparte, and that we shall be called upon to play a leading part in the drama, as counsellors as well as actors." The same year he writes again to Lord Liverpool: "I am convinced, that if we only hold on a little longer, we shall see the world emancipated."

* Jean Lemoine.

The Emperor's marriage with the Archduchess Maria Louisa produced no change in Wellington's opinions. The ceremony was scarcely over when he wrote to General Crawford: "The Austrian marriage is a terrible event, and must prevent any great movement on the continent for the present. Still I do not despair of seeing at one time or another a check to the Buonaparte system. Recent transactions in Holland show, that it is all hollow within and that it is so inconsistent with the wishes, the interests, and the existence of civilised society, that he cannot trust even his brothers to carry it into execution." In a letter dated the 5th of July, 1811, to General Dumouriez, he observes, "It is impossible that Europe can much longer submit to the debasing tyranny which oppresses it." And again to Mr. Charles Stuart, "Either Buonaparte must drive us out of the Peninsula, or he must lower his tone in Europe."

In a letter to M. Constant de Rebecque, of the 31st of January, 1812, he thus expresses himself respecting the financial and territorial condition of the empire: "War is to Buonaparte's government a source of revenue. * * At first he did not seek to extend the territory of France beyond what has been called its natural limits. * * It seemed as if he were not ignorant of the hazards to which an empire too far extended is exposed. * * It was neither safe nor convenient to pillage Austria, Prussia, Russia, or Denmark. But now Buonaparte has need of the resources of Holland, of the Hans Towns and of Rome, to replenish his exchequer; and it is for this reason that he has absorbed them." Again on the 8th of August, 1813, he writes to Lord Bathurst: "He (Napoleon) exists internally upon the most extensive and expensive system of corruption that was ever established in any country, and externally upon his military power, which is supported almost exclusively by foreign contributions. If he can be confined to the limits of France by any means, his system must fall. It cannot bear the expense of his internal government, and of his army; and the reduction of either would be fatal to him."

These views, which now appear to us obviously just, were, when first put forward, absolute novelties. No doubt there were many acute intellects who, after 1812, regarded the empire as at an end, or, at all events, considered that its downfall must be near; but we are unacquainted with any single document which indicates so clearly as the Wellington Correspondence of 1810, the source of the weak-

ness and the causes which were at work to effect the overthrow of Napoleon's power.

The following letter to Lord Bathurst, written immediately after the passage of the Pyrenees, shows how well the Duke understood the temper of the French people: "I am more than ever convinced that Napoleon's power stands upon corruption; that he has no adherents in France but the principal officers of his army, and the *employés civils* of the government, and possibly some of the new proprietors."

Equally just is the sketch which he gives of the state of society in Paris during his residence there in 1814, and of the dangers which menaced the government of Louis XVIII.: "That miserable revolution, and its immediate consequences, have entirely ruined the nation. Everybody is poor; and the cause of it is, that the institutions of the country prevent any family from becoming rich and powerful. All, therefore, look to employment in the public service, not, as formerly, for the honour therein arising, but for the means of subsistence. The king cannot keep up one-fourth of the imperial army; and a horde of *employés* (Buonaparte, for reasons now well understood, took a vast number of persons into public pay) are sent about their business. If you contemplate this picture, which is perfectly true, you will not fail to discover both the cause and the nature of the perils with which we are threatened. Yet this discontent might be overcome if they would only adopt wise measures for improving the tone of public opinion."*

This letter, taken with the rest which we have quoted, does honour to the good sense and clear political foresight of the Duke of Wellington. There did not befall a single event—a single consummation of any moment—which he had not, in some sort, predicted in his despatches. It may be truly said, that he foretold in succession—the final success of the war in Spain—the influence which that war would exercise over public opinion in other nations—the general rising of Europe against Buonaparte—the fall of the empire, supported as it was by corruption within, and by military force without—the disastrous campaign in Russia†—the awakening of

* Letter to General Dumouriez, 26th Nov., 1814: "I am obliged to you for the intelligence from the north."

† Letter to Lord Bathurst, 25th July, 1812: "If the Emperor of Russia has any resources, and is prudent, and his Russians will really fight, Buonaparte will not succeed."

public spirit in Germany—the triumph of the allies in the campaign of 1813*—the defection of the French people attracted towards their ancient kings by an insatiable desire for repose and liberty†—the return from Elba, brought about by the blunders of the restoration, and the discontent of the army—the failure of Buonaparte's efforts to re-establish a power which never had any other foundation than the force of armies—last of all, the outburst of the Spanish people against Ferdinand, brought about by the stupidity of the king, and the fatal counsels of those by whom he was surrounded.

Wellington saw the great advantage which would result to the Allies, and especially to the house of Bourbon, from his continuance in the south of France, and this it was which induced him so early to reject the proposal to serve with his army in the north of Europe.‡

Towards the end of 1813, the Duke's influence had become so great that the English minister consulted him on every question of importance that arose. We see proof of this in his letter of the 22nd of February, 1814, in which the Duke explains to Lord Bathurst his views respecting the defence of Canada; in that of the 10th of January, the same year, in which he expresses an opinion that the Allies ought to operate by debouching from Mayence instead of moving through Switzerland; and in that of the 14th of August, 1813, in which he laid down the basis, so to speak, of the final act of the Congress of Vienna: "There appears no concert, or common cause, in the negotiations for peace. There are some leading principles, however, in the political state of Europe, on which the interests of all parties should coincide, such as the independence of Spain, Germany, Italy, of Holland, and France; the restoration of Hanover to the king's family, the re-establishment of the Russian frontier, and of the Prussian influence over Saxony and Hesse; a frontier for the Austrian monarchy, and influence in Germany to balance that of Prussia; the re-establishment of the independence of the Hans Towns," &c.

* Letter to General Dumouriez, 22nd Nov., 1813.

† See his letter to Lord Bathurst, 10th July, 1814.

‡ See, among others, his letter of the 10th January, 1814, to Lord Bathurst, in which he says, "Though I am quite sure that Buonaparte has no intention of making peace, in spite of all his fine speeches and declarations, I am equally sure that the people of France will compel him to do so, provided the Allies sustain no disaster."

With these multitudinous proofs before him, of sagacity and political forethought, no one, it is presumed, hereafter will refuse to Wellington the title of a statesman.*

The Duke of Wellington possessed great moral energy, and invincible confidence in the success of his own enterprises. When all appeared lost in Spain, and elsewhere the question raised was about the recall of the army, he wrote to the minister:—"Don't despair—the enemy will conclude by evacuating the country."† And on another occasion:—"I am quite sure that the French will not take possession of Portugal this winter, at all events, unless they receive large reinforcements, and even in that case, it is probable they will not succeed." And yet again:—"It is true that in the course of this campaign, which has been necessarily defensive on our part, nothing very brilliant has been done. I should have run the risk, in case of failure, of being horribly abused, and of losing even the little reputation which I have acquired; but I should have acted untruly towards the government, if I had not frankly declared it was my opinion that it would betray the honour and interests of the country unless it should continue its efforts in the Peninsula, of the results of which there is no reason to despair, notwithstanding the defeat at Areyzaga."

Some time afterwards he wrote to Lord Liverpool: "I am greatly pleased at the news which you send me respecting the state of affairs in the north" (the probable rupture between France and Russia), "God grant they may be true; in which case we shall see some day an end to this frightful tyranny. Indeed, whether the present news be true or false, my firm conviction is that they will become true sooner or later, and that by holding on a little longer we shall witness the deliverance of Europe." This confidence in the future, which contributed so largely to success in the Spanish war, Wellington manifested from its very commencement. He saw likewise at the outset, that in order to arrive at a triumphant issue he must establish himself, not at Cadiz, as the government wished,

* M. Thiers, in his "History of the Consulate and the Empire," says, "The English had lost Nelson and Pitt. Wellington, indeed, remained to them, superior to both." At the same time, the French historian destroys in some degree the effect of this eulogium by observing, a few pages further on, "The English soldier, steady and slow, was a fit instrument for the genius *little expansive*, but wise and resolute, of Sir Arthur Wellesley."

† Letter to Lord Liverpool, 10th March, 1810.

but in Portugal. Before he had even landed he wrote from on board the "Crocodile" on the 2nd of July, 1808, to General Spencer, "We can do nothing more useful for the Spaniards than to occupy Portugal and organise a good army there." In a note dated the 7th of March in the following year, Sir Arthur reiterated this opinion by saying, "I have always been convinced that whatever might be the result of the war in Spain, it would be our duty to defend Portugal, and that the measures taken for the occupation of that country would prove eminently useful to the Spaniards in their war with France." On the 25th of August in the same year, he wrote to Lord Castlereagh, "My opinion is that we ought to maintain ourselves in Portugal, and that we are very well able to do so if the Portuguese army and the militia are filled up." And on the 7th of May, 1811, to Lord Liverpool, "Consider that Portugal will be the base of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature these may be. My opinion has never varied on this point."

Those who have formed their judgment after the event, consider it quite natural that Wellington should have taken Portugal as the base of his operations. We must be permitted to observe, however, that this notion, obvious and conformable as it is to the principles of strategy, did not present itself to any one, and was, on the contrary, rejected by the whole world. Sir John Moore himself had pronounced the defence of Portugal against the French army to be impossible; and this testimony of a brave man was naturally enough placed in opposition to the Duke's views, who in consequence found it extremely difficult to press his own opinion upon the government in London, and still more so to make the officers of his army comprehend that he was able to provide against all contingencies. He stood alone for a long time in the belief that Spain could be defended from Lisbon. Neither the opposition of his staff, nor the criticisms of parliament, nor the fears of the minister, nor even his own reverses, could shake that happy confidence. Wellington's force of character exhibited itself throughout, in the contests which he was driven to maintain with his own government in order to keep his army in the Peninsula. "I conceive," he writes on the 14th of January, 1810, to Mr. Villiers, "that the honour and interests of the country require that we should hold our ground here as long as possible, and please God I will maintain it as long as I can; and I will neither endeavour to shift from my own shoulders on those of the ministers the responsibility for the failure, by calling

for means which I know they cannot give, and which, perhaps, would not add materially to the facility of attaining our object; nor will I give to the ministers, who are not strong, and who must feel the delicacy of their own situation, an excuse for withdrawing the army from a position which, in my opinion, the honour and interest of the country required they should maintain as long as possible. . . . . . You see the dash which the common council of the city of London has made at me. I act with a sword hanging over me, which will fall upon me, whatever may be the result of affairs here. But they may do what they please; I shall not give up the game here as long as it can be played."* On the same day he says to Lord Liverpool, "I shall become their victim; but I am not to be alarmed by this additional risk, and whatever may be the consequence, I shall continue to do my best in this country." On the 27th of March in the same year, writing to General Stuart, he says, "Though the difficulties of all kinds with which we have to contend were greater than they are, the interests of Great Britain and the world are too deeply involved in this contest for us to recede one step from it which may not be rendered absolutely necessary by circumstances." In holding this language Wellington opposed himself to the almost unanimous opinion of his countrymen. "Every officer," he says, "who arrives from England tells me that the recall of the army is generally expected, and some of them even add that this expectation is entertained by the King's ministers. This is not very encouraging." At the period when this letter was written, the Duke had received formal orders from the minister to prepare for the evacuation of Portugal. It was probably in reference to these orders that, on the 2nd of April, he wrote to Lord Liverpool: "I am willing to be responsible for the evacuation of Portugal under your lordship's instructions of the 27th of February. Depend upon it, whatever people may tell you, I am not so desirous, as they imagine, of fighting desperate battles. If I was, I might fight one any day I please. But I have kept the army for six months in two positions, notwithstanding their own desire and that of the Allies, that I should take advantage of many opportunities which the enemy apparently offered, of striking a blow against them, in some of which the single operation would certainly have been successful. But I have looked at the great result of maintaining our position in the

* Letter to Mr. Villars, 2nd January, 1810.

Peninsula, and have not allowed myself to be diverted from it by the wishes of the Allies, and probably of some of our own army, that I should interfere more actively in some partial affairs; or, by the opinion of others, that we ought to quit the country prematurely: and I have not harassed my troops by marches and counter-marches, in conformity to the enemy's movements. I believe that the world and the Peninsula begin to believe that I am right." On the 19th of December, 1810, he writes again to Lord Liverpool: "All things considered, I have not the slightest doubt of the final success of my operations; and whether I succeed or not, I am convinced that my system is the only one which can be attended with advantages." On the 25th of May, 1811, he says to Mr. Villiers, "I persevered in the system which I thought best, notwithstanding that it was the opinion of every British officer in the country that I ought to embark the army; while, on the other hand, the Portuguese civil authorities contended that the war ought to be maintained on the frontier, for which they wanted not only physical force, but the means of providing for the force which they could produce in the field. I believe nothing but something more than firmness could have carried me through the nine months' discussion with these contending opinions. To this add, that the people in England were changing their opinions almost with the wind, and you will see that I have not much to look to, excepting myself."

The opposition made vain efforts to shake this rare firmness, — a combination of faith in the future and of confidence in himself. Wellington did not even endeavour to cast upon others the responsibility of a struggle, the least failure in which would have proved fatal to his reputation. He accepted frankly his share of the unpopularity which attended the capitulation of Cintra. He openly avowed himself to be the author of the strong measures which were taken for the defence of Portugal. He exposed himself boldly to the attacks of the opposition, who accused the government of having compromised the success of the campaign of Talavera, in the unfortunate expedition to Walcheren, by writing the following letter, of which the prime minister made use, in order to relieve the cabinet from its responsibility: "You will perhaps be glad to know, that I don't think affairs would have been in a better state here, if you had sent your great expedition into Spain, instead of to the Scheldt."

* See letters to Lord Liverpool, 25th August, and 6th Dec. 1809, and 23rd Nov. 1812.

Wellington exhibited the same self-denial in 1813, by writing to the prime minister thus: "It is not the government which ought to be attacked for the want of success in the siege of Burgos; it had nothing whatever to say to the siege, it was entirely my own act."

However critical his situation might be, the Duke never clamoured for succours which he knew that the government was not in a condition to supply. "I believe," he writes to Mr. Villiers, "enjoying as I do the confidence of the ministers, being aware of their resources, the use they make of them, and the difficulties of every kind with which they have to contend, it would be dishonourable in me to propose in my despatches measures which they could not adopt, notwithstanding the advantages which might result from them. I know very well," he adds, "that 40,000 men could do what 30,000 could not. But when the ministers cannot find them, would it be right, would it be honourable in me, to ask for a single man more than is absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of the object which I have in view?" *

The more adverse circumstances became, and the more politicians kept aloof from him, the greater readiness Wellington exhibited to add to his own labours and responsibilities. This strength of character and admirable perseverance produced results which military genius alone never could have brought about. It was by the possession of these qualities that he kept his army from becoming discouraged under circumstances, when fortune seemed almost to have deserted him. To this fact, General Stewart, among others, one of the principal actors in the war of the Peninsula, refers. "When we learned at Deleytosa," he says, "after the battle of Talavera, that the Austrians were overthrown, the whole army became disheartened. It was believed that it would be impossible to make head against the French. Sir Arthur did not share in this opinion. He spoke and acted as if events had taken the course which he desired, and this opinion led every one of us to believe that the commander-in-chief had foreseen all, and provided against it." The same author says again: "I do not pretend to blame any officer, but this I will venture to say, that there was but one man in the army who did not

* See also letter to Lord Liverpool, 19th August, 1813: "I have never been in the habit of troubling government with requisitions for forces, but have always carried on the service, to the best of my ability, with that which has been placed at my disposal."

despair of the undertaking, and that was Sir Arthur Wellesley. So far from desponding, he affirmed that he was quite able to defend Portugal, even if Spain should submit."

Perseverance, calm and energetic like this, proves that Wellington had perfect confidence in his own plans of campaign, at which he arrived, not till after deep study, and the most laborious consideration of every possible contingency. Before carrying a project into effect, he was accustomed to examine it in all its bearings, and to provide against all results. His judgment, always sound, was acted upon neither by fear nor by enthusiasm. For this reason it was, that he took juster views of things than other men, and calculated every issue of an operation before he undertook it. Hence, in 1811, he wrote to Lord Liverpool, "Spain will in the end throw off the yoke of France." On the 17th of October, in the same year, to Admiral Berkley, "I am firmly of opinion, that the enemy will not succeed in his attack upon Lisbon;" to Lord Liverpool, "The French army of the north, and that of Andalusia, will probably not come to the support of Massena;" to the minister of war, "Cadiz has been fortified, as well as Portugal; it may therefore be doubted, whether the French will ever take either the one or the other;" Lord Bathurst, on the 12th of July, 1813, "I believe that I could guard the Pyrenees as easily as I can Portugal;" and on the 18th of June, 1815, before the battle of Waterloo, at three in the morning, "Keep the English quiet, I beg of you, as much as you can. Let them be ready to start; but don't let them get hurried or frightened, for all will turn out well for us."

One virtue, not often found, Wellington possessed to a high degree, namely, moderation in success, and clemency after victory. His instincts caused him very easily to understand, that to govern, men must not hate; and, as a distinguished writer expresses it, that "great statesmen are generous in their natures." In 1803, when the war with the Mahrattas was about to open, Sir Arthur Wellesley issued the following proclamation: — "General Wellesley does not intend to make war upon the inhabitants. Amildarhs and others are therefore required to remain quietly at their stations, and to obey such orders as they shall receive. If they do no injury to the British arms, no injury will be done to them." In 1804, after having reduced these barbarous people to subjugation, he recommended the Peishwah "to proclaim a general pardon and amnesty, as the best means of re-establishing his authority, as well as order and internal

tranquillity." "The war will never come to an end," he wrote to the Governor-General, "unless he publish a general pardon; and I do not suppose the government wishes English troops to become the instruments of the Peishwah's vengeance."

In the same spirit he wrote to the president of the English council at Poonah. "I am of opinion, that as soon as the war is brought to an end, every feeling of animosity should cease." And again to Colonel Murray, "Treat the Mahrattas with the greatest kindness, with the utmost possible forbearance."

When in 1810, the Prince Regent of Portugal, acting on the solicitations of the court of London, gave Wellington authority to dismiss Souza and the Bishop of Oporto, his two most determined enemies, he abstained from exercising it. He even kept in their places functionaries devoted to the interests of the Fidalgos; believing that more was to be gained by gentleness and forbearance, than by harshness, dependent on physical force. He had, indeed, the mortification to see that his excellent intentions were misunderstood; yet this did not prevent him from writing, three days afterwards, of his own accord, to the regency in Madrid, and advising the publication of a general amnesty, in favour of all Spaniards then in exile. "If my efforts," he says, "to free the country from its oppressors be crowned with success, negotiations must, sooner or later, be opened for the conclusion of a definitive peace between Spain and France; and the amnesty will remove the main difficulty which stands in the way of the completion of such an arrangement. Besides, all these exiles, some of them very wealthy, others possessed of even great ability, will act as a sort of rallying point in France, by means of which the revolutionary party will always be able to disturb the internal tranquillity of Spain."

In order rightly to appreciate Wellington's noble and generous views, the letter from which we have just quoted must be read at length.

We may be permitted once again to refer to the appeal made by him, in 1810, to Lord Liverpool, with the view of getting up in England a national subscription for the Portuguese, ruined by the war; and the strong measures which he adopted to prevent the pillage of the provinces invaded by his troops, notwithstanding that the inhabitants of these provinces were very ill-disposed towards him.*

* The Duke's moderation and forbearance sometimes conflicted with the views of the English government; as, for example, when the English government with-

The whole of the Duke's career abounds with traits of this kind. It has been shown how he recovered and brought up the son of Doondiah, found upon one of the battle-fields of India; how he interested himself in favour of General Franceschi*, the young Mascarhenas, and many other victims of the cruelty of the Spanish government; and with what solicitude he protected, against the fury of the Portuguese, the wounded, and such of the enemy's soldiers as the fortune of war threw into his hands after the evacuation of Oporto in 1809. On the latter occasion, he addressed to the inhabitants the following proclamation:—"The French troops having been expelled this town, by the superior gallantry and discipline of the army under my command, I call upon the inhabitants of Oporto to be merciful to the wounded and prisoners. By the laws of war they are entitled to my protection, which I am determined to afford to them."

In order to secure similar protection for his own soldiers, the Duke, well aware of the humanity of the French officers, wrote, on the 9th of August, 1809, to General Kellerman, in these terms:—"Having the honour of your acquaintance, I venture to ask your good offices with the commander-in-chief of the French army, and to recommend to you my wounded. If it be Marshal Soult who commands, he owes me all the care which he can bestow upon these brave soldiers, because I saved his, when the fortune of war placed them in my hands, from the fury of the Portuguese people, and they were well taken care of." In point of fact, he had permitted the French surgeons to attend to the sick of Soult's army, and to pass to and from the allied camp with a safe conduct.

The French, touched by these chivalrous proceedings, were anxious to repay them; and hence it was that Marshal Victor caused provisions to be distributed among the English whom he found in the hospital at Talavera, when his own men were dying of hunger.†

drew the licenses which the Duke had granted to French trading vessels, after the capture of St. Jean de Luz.

* A French general, whom the Junta of Seville, in spite of Wellington's remonstrances and entreaties, left to die in a pestilential dungeon.

† "The French general officers have, in general, behaved remarkably well to the British officers and soldiery who fell into their hands, in consequence of the march of the Spanish army from Talavera de la Reyna, in the month of August last, and in many instances, they have supplied the officers with money."—*Letter to Lord Liverpool*, 17th Dec., 1809.

Thanks to this interchange of good offices, the struggle, which was carried on with so much barbarism between the French and the inhabitants of the Peninsula, never lost, between the English and the French, the character of civilised warfare. At Talavera, during one of the intervals of the battle, the soldiers from the two armies might be seen descending to a little stream, which meandered through the middle of the plain to refresh themselves, and mutually to compliment each other upon the gallantry which they had displayed during the morning.

The Spaniards, always vindictive, pursued a diametrically opposite course. Indeed, after the battle, the English came to blows with Cuesta's soldiers, in order to prevent them from killing or mutilating the wounded Frenchmen.* Take another trait, which does honour to Wellington's army:—On the 25th of July, 1810, Marshal Ney, after having driven in General Crawford, determined to follow him across the Coa. On two different occasions he endeavoured to pass the bridge upon that river; but was repulsed. At the second attempt, while the fire was still going on, a French surgeon, waving his handkerchief, sat down to dress the French wounded, amidst a shower of projectiles. His courage and humanity were respected, every musket was turned away from him, though his countrymen, whose courage could not be restrained, were forming for a third attack.†

M. Chateaubriand has described another trait of humanity, quite as honourable, in a letter addressed, in 1815, to the "Journal de Paris." "We have too much respect for glory to withhold our admiration from Lord Wellington; indeed, we are touched even to tears, when we see that great and venerated man promising, during our retreat in Portugal, two guineas for every prisoner who should be brought to him alive."

These acts should be understood by the French, for in truth he established between the two armies such an exchange of good offices as did honour to humanity, even amid scenes of the wildest carnage.

The Prince of Essling had no sooner arrived at Torres Vedras than he was anxious to reconnoitre the English lines. "He found himself," says M. Thiers, "under one of the enemy's batteries, which

* How different was the conduct of the English, who, after the battle of Busaco, permitted the French to come and remove their wounded, and even assisted them in the performance of that sacred duty!

† Napier, vol. v. p. 351.

he examined with a glass resting upon a low garden wall. The English officers, who distinctly recognised the illustrious marshal, exhibited a feeling worthy of civilised nations when they are unfortunately reduced to the necessity of making war. By a general discharge of their guns they might have overwhelmed the staff of the commander-in-chief with bullets, and probably destroyed himself; they fired but one shot in order to make him aware of the danger, and with such accuracy that they beat down the wall on which his glass rested. Massena understood the courteous notice, saluted the battery, and remounting his horse rode away."*

In a cavalry affair after the combat of El Bodon, 1811, a French officer was on the point of cutting down Captain Felton Harvey, when he perceived that that gallant soldier had lost an arm; he immediately gave his horse another direction, saluted his adversary with his sword, and passed on.†

The same year General Hill put to the rout at Aroyo da Molinos, Gerard's division of Drouet's corps. During the combat, an Austrian officer, called Sternowitz, who had formerly served in the French army, fell into Gerard's hands. He would have undoubtedly been condemned and shot, had not Hill, trusting to the generosity of his opponent, entreated to have that officer sent back as a personal favour to himself. Drouet, notwithstanding the severe check which his troops had sustained, granted the request, and sent back the prisoner, who was besides a gallant soldier.

In the night between the 9th and 10th of June, 1811, the English assaulted Fort St. Christoval at Badajoz, where Captain Jondion commanded. The assault was repulsed and the ditch crowded with dead. "In the midst of the confusion some English officers implored the generous compassion of their enemies. The gallant Jondion, who was at the head of his people upon the ramparts, shouted out to the officers to plant one of the ladders and to come up into the fort, where he would give them the assistance which they required. The advice was followed, and the French soldiers themselves assisted the enemy in mounting the breach.‡

The same thing was done under similar circumstances after the unsuccessful assault of St. Sebastian on the 25th of July, 1813. The particulars have been described elsewhere.

* History of the Consulate and the Empire, vol. iii. p. 417.

† Napier, vol. vii. p. 318.

‡ Victories and Conquests, vol. xx. p. 252.

A little before the battle of Salamanca, in July, 1812, the English and French, passing the Douro in groups, contended with each other amicably which should give place to the other. "The camps on each side of the river appeared at times," says Colonel Napier, "to belong to the same army, so difficult was it to make these brave soldiers entertain towards each other feelings of hostility."*

About the same period it was not unusual to see French and English officers salute each other in a friendly manner on marches when their troops moved in parallel directions; as, for example, during the march of the Duke of Ragusa on Guarena, in July, 1812.†

The French general Ferrey, having been wounded on the retreat to Corunna, died soon afterwards of his hurts at Almeida. On the 27th of July the English, on entering the place, saw the Spaniards busy in digging up the general's body for the purpose of mutilating it. The soldiers of the Light Division, the same who had so often fought the brave division of Ferrey, immediately interfered and took the body out of the hands of those who would have done it outrage; they then buried it with all respect in a new grave, upon which they piled up masses of rock in order to prevent the repetition of such indignities.

Not less honourable was the act of Marshal Ney, who, after having done his part towards the destruction of Sir John Moore's army, caused a monument to be erected to that brave general in the bastion of Corunna where his body had been buried. We may quote also the magnanimity of that veteran English soldier of the celebrated 43rd regiment, who on the 9th of December, 1813, at the moment of the attack, went on to warn a French sentry who had been left behind, and even helped him to put on his knapsack. In the morning of the same day the French had done a similar act of kindness to a sentinel of the 43rd.‡

Colonel Napier, in his "History of the War in the Peninsula," quotes an analogous proceeding, which well deserves to be recorded. "One day," he says, "the Duke of Wellington had ordered a detachment of riflemen to seize a hill which was guarded by a small number of French soldiers. Seeing the riflemen move on very quickly without pulling a trigger, he sent to desire that they would

* Napier, vol. ix. p. 177.
† Id. ib. p. 191.
‡ Id vol. xii. p. 241.

commence firing. "There is no occasion for it," replied an old soldier, who at the same time lifted up the butt of his musket and ran his fingers over the barrel as if he were playing upon a wind instrument. That soldier, instead of firing, transmitted to the French sentry a telegraphic despatch, which conveyed some such information as this, 'We want that post for a quarter of an hour; you are not in force enough to hold it; fall back, and you shall have it again.' The despatch was fully understood, and not a shot was fired on this occasion."

Lieutenant-Colonel Leith Hay, an eye-witness of the proceeding, relates that when the veteran General Rey came out of the citadel of St. Sebastian with a handful of brave men, all that remained of the garrison originally 4,000 strong, the English officers who beheld the imposing spectacle treated him with every mark of respect. General Rey, greatly moved, lowered his sword in acknowledgment of the civility of his loyal adversaries.

Wellington encouraged by his example such proceedings as these, which robbed war of some of its horrors, and ensured to the soldier his own self-esteem and the good opinion of the world. As often as the Duke could oblige a French general he never permitted the opportunity to pass. Thus, on the 20th of October, 1809, he wrote to Kellermann: "Your aide-de-camp, M. de Turrenne, is a prisoner with the commander-in-chief of the Spanish army in Castile, and he has been sent to Seville. He passed thither before I was aware that he had been taken; but I have news of him, and he is quite well. I have applied to the Spanish government that it will do me the favour to consent to his return to the French army in exchange for Lieutenant Cameron, but I have not yet got an answer. You may be sure that I will do what I can to restore Lieutenant de Turrenne to you; and that, if I do not succeed in that object, I will use my best endeavours to make him comfortable."

Another generous act of his has been made known to us by King Joseph, who, on the 1st of September, 1812, wrote to his wife, "Wellington has had the courtesy to send me on your letters, which had been taken by the enemy."

It is very agreeable to record these humane and chivalrous proceedings, because they form a happy contrast to the scenes of horror and carnage of which the war in Spain presents, unfortunately, so many examples.

The generous intervention of three English officers saved the life

of General Lavalette in 1815. However reprehensible the act might be in a legal point of view, it testifies most honourably to the sentiments of regard for the French which were entertained by soldiers formed in the school of Wellington.

When the fortune of war caused any officer of mark to fall into the Duke's hands, he was in the habit of treating him like a comrade, and admitting him to his table. Take a case described by General Lamare, chief engineer at Badajoz, during the siege of that place: "On perceiving the prisoners the Duke smiled, and said to them, with a frank and generous expression of countenance, 'You must be very tired, gentlemen; have you breakfasted?' 'No,' replied General Veiland, 'we have not had time' (in point of fact, we had tasted nothing for upwards of eighteen hours). 'Very well, gentlemen, come in and take some refreshment.' We all passed into a very plain tent, where a frugal breakfast was served."

The Spanish nation, or rather the chiefs of the advanced faction, not only disapproved of conduct such as this, but charged it as a crime upon Wellington that he took such excessive care of the French. These censures were published in a pamphlet written in the very office of the Spanish minister of war in 1813, in which the sack of St. Sebastian was discussed. The Duke was satisfied with replying to them thus:—"In regard to the charge of kindness to the enemy, I am afraid it is but too well founded, and that, until it is positively ordered by authority that all enemy's troops in a place taken by storm should be put to death, it will be difficult to prevail upon British officers and soldiers to treat an enemy when they are prisoners otherwise than well."*

It is, indeed, true that Wellington is open to reproach, for having taken no active measures to bring about the exchange of the wretched French prisoners thrown, well-nigh naked, on the burning rock of Cabrera.†

This exchange had been proposed by Cuesta after the surrender

* Letter to Henry Wellesley, 9th Oct., 1813.

† It is well known with what barbarity the English government placed 7000 French prisoners on that island, peopled, as Toreno says, only with wild underwood. About one half of these unfortunate creatures died. Upon the testimony of an English historian (Southey) they were driven to make buttons out of the bones of their comrades, and drinking cups out of skulls. 1500, no longer able to endure their sufferings, entered the service of Spain; 500, almost all officers, were carried to England. At the termination of the war there still remained 2000 Frenchmen upon the island.

of Tarragona, and the Duke resisted it; acting, however, under the orders of the English government, which on that subject would never listen to reason. We should have been glad if we could have discovered in Wellington's correspondence some words of protest against this excessive rigour, which was in agreement neither with his sentiments nor with his example. If he made none, it was probably because he despaired of leading the ministers to withdraw from a procedure adopted for the attainment of some definite end, to which they adhered with the obstinacy with which men usually cling to unjust and violent determinations. Nevertheless, it would have been worthy of a good citizen to make the attempt, and to have averted if possible from his country the disgrace of inflicting upon enemies, honourable though unfortunate, a treatment to which nothing in modern times can be compared, unless it be the disgraceful captivity in which French soldiers were detained on board ship at Cadiz, and the long suffering of that illustrious foeman who, too confident in the generosity of his enemy, "came to seat himself, like a new Themistocles, beside the hearth of the English people."*

It is, however, just to observe, that with respect to Napoleon, Wellington had nothing wherewith to reproach himself. He opposed undisguisedly, and after the fall of the empire rejected with disdain, the proposal to get rid of him by putting him to death.† The letter

* [We have no wish to defend their treatment of their prisoners during the war of the French Revolution by the English. It admits neither of explanation nor of excuse; but the refusal to effect exchanges must be charged, not upon the English government, but upon Napoleon. Repeated proposals were made to him to give back man for man in exchange for the English soldiers and seamen who had fallen into his hands; but he would never listen to them. Indeed, it was only the courtesy of his generals in Spain, or their personal regard for individuals, which enabled the Duke to accomplish the few exchanges which were effected during the war in the Peninsula.]

† General Muffling, who was appointed to arrange with the Duke about the offer, relates, in his "Memoirs," that Wellington said to him, "Such an act would disgrace us with posterity. It would be said of us, that we were not worthy of being the victors of Napoleon. Yet General Gneisenau insisted, in the name of his chief, upon effecting this object; and on the 27th of July wrote to Muffling, "Insist upon Buonaparte being given to us, that he may be executed. The law of eternal justice, as well as the declaration of March, permit and require it. Thus shall the blood of our soldiers killed and wounded on the 16th and 18th June be avenged." Two days afterwards he announced Blucher's purpose of shooting Napoleon where the Duc d'Enghien had been shot; but Wellington would not suffer it.

which he wrote on this occasion to Sir Charles Stewart bears date 28th of June, 1815, and well deserves attention. "Blucher," he says, "wishes to kill him; but I have told him that I will remonstrate, and shall insist upon his being disposed of by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with so vile a transaction; that he and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to become executioners; and that I was determined that if the sovereigns wished to put him to death they should appoint an executioner, which should not be me."

This letter, which reminds us of that of the Viscount d'Oste to Charles IX., exhibits a generous nature, which was capable of rising above vulgar animosities and prejudices. And so far Wellington proved himself superior to Napoleon, who, in his treatment of the Duc d'Enghien, the Queen of Prussia, and the royal family of Spain, overlooked what was due to misfortune; and who, with inconceivable forgetfulness of honour and self-respect, bequeathed a legacy of 10,000 francs to the wretched creature who made an attempt to assassinate the Duke of Wellington.

Some French historians, in extenuation of that frightful testamentary bequest, charge the Duke of Wellington with having advised the deportation of Napoleon to St. Helena; while others censure him for leaving Marshal Ney to his fate, though urged with tears by the unfortunate Duchess of Elchingen to interfere in his favour.

[Of his conduct in the matter of Ney's trial and execution a full account has been given elsewhere,] but a word or two in reference to Napoleon's exile are due, not so much to Wellington's reputation as to historical truth.

It was perfectly natural, that when he again fell into their power, the Allies should remove as far as possible from Europe one who had taken advantage of the geographical position of the island of Elba to revisit France and disturb the peace of the world. No further confidence could be reposed in his word or solemn engagements, after such a flagrant violation of the treaty of Fontainebleau, by which the place of his exile was fixed. As to the situation of St. Helena, it was not the Duke of Wellington who suggested it; indeed he appears never to have turned his attention to the subject at all. In fact, so early as the month of May, 1814, the plenipotentiaries had decided in a secret conference at Vienna, that if Napoleon should ever escape from Elba and fall again into the hands of the Allies, he should be

transported, either to St. Helena or St. Lucia.* It was Fouché who proposed to Louis XVIII. this remote banishment; Talleyrand supported him in the congress; and the proposal met with no opposition, except from the Emperor Alexander alone.

The Portuguese minister had proposed, on this occasion, one of the Azores; but Lord Castlereagh obtained a preference for St. Lucia or St. Helena. And if, at last, the cabinet of St. James made choice of the latter, it was because French travellers themselves had pronounced that island to be an agreeable and salubrious place of residence.

It is now admitted on all hands that the ill-treatment to which Napoleon was subjected in his exile, has been grossly exaggerated. Still the English government deserves censure for having failed to sweeten, by kindness and liberality, the evening of a life so brilliant, and to soothe as far as possible, the anguish attendant on the heaviest misfortune of modern times. But for this the Duke is not answerable; inasmuch as he did not become a member of the English cabinet till just before the Emperor's death. No doubt it would have been a glorious thing to see the victor of Waterloo publicly protesting against the annoyances which were inflicted by the minister on the captive of St. Helena; but the question is, was he aware of the particulars of that captivity—of particulars which were for the most part made known only after the Emperor's death, by his companions in exile? It was not Sir Hudson Lowe,† it was not the government, — the abettor of that unworthy jailor who was likely to speak the truth in regard to those matters. We are therefore entitled to assume that the Duke was never made fully aware of the just grounds of complaint which the Emperor had against those who guarded him. Could we believe the reverse, then the Duke would be culpable in our eyes for not protesting; at all events, for having failed to make any efforts with the government, to better the condition of the illustrious victim.

* Capefigue, Les Cent Jours, p. 144.

† [Sir Hudson Lowe long suffered, and still suffers, like many other faithful servants of the government which employed him, a great amount of unmerited odium, both at home and abroad. Mr. Fordyce's work has, in some degree, vindicated him from the charge of wanton cruelty; but even there the whole truth is not stated. Sir Hudson undertook a task the most repulsive to a generous mind which could have been imposed upon man; and he did his duty. Whether anybody else, who was determined not to connive at Napoleon's escape, would have fared better in the narrative of the Emperor's followers, may well be doubted.]

If we may venture to hazard a conjecture on the subject, we should say, that the absence of every document capable of dispelling our doubts, tells in Wellington's favour. At the same time, the contrary is quite possible; for the Duke was not one of those sentimental individuals who delight in giving utterance to generous protests in cases where they know very well they could not possibly succeed. In his inner heart he condemned many a proceeding, against which he never publicly protested; either because he was not so circumstanced as to be able to resist it, or because he had no hope of resisting effectually.

In alluding to what has been already stated respecting the course of conduct pursued by the Duke in Marshal Ney's case, and the immediate causes of it, the great fact must not be lost sight of, that there never lived a man so devoted as he to the call of duty; or so determinately opposed to the employment of other than honourable means in seeking the accomplishment of any purpose, whether it were great or small. When it was proposed to him to end the war with Doondiah Waugh by a stroke of the poignard, he rejected the offer with disdain; and when Captain d'Argenton applied to him for support, in causing the discontent to explode, which had begun to manifest itself in Soult's army, he gave the same steady refusal; considering it unworthy of himself and of the cause of which he was the champion, to obtain, through a military revolt, what ought to be the reward of ability and valour."*

Ever faithful to his own engagements, he never tolerated the breach of them in his subordinates. On the 20th October, 1809, he wrote to Kellerman: "When English officers give their parole that they will not attempt to escape, you may depend upon it that they will keep their word. I assure you that I should not hesitate to arrest, and send immediately back to you, any who should act otherwise."

This was not so with others. Napoleon is reproached with violating the capitulation of Madrid; Marshal Lannes with having acted in like manner towards Saragossa; and the Duc d'Albufera with having put to death several of the inhabitants of Valencia, after he had promised "that he would make no search after those

* This fact, and the absence of authentic documents, justifies us in believing that General Koch was misinformed when, in his "Memoirs of Massena," he made the following statement:—"Brilliant offers were made to General Brenier, in order to induce him to surrender Almeida; but he rejected them with disdain."

who might have taken an active part in the war, or in the revolution."

So great was Wellington's respect for treaties of this kind, that he refused to put arms into the hands of a body of the militia of Almeida, because they had engaged, in the capitulation, not to serve again against France.*

When Massena was at Santarem, it came to the Duke's knowledge that the *Ordinanzas*, after submitting to the French, had availed themselves of their position to massacre stragglers and small detachments of the enemy. He was exceedingly indignant at the proceeding, and gave strict orders to the *Ordinanzas* that they should cease to make war in so discreditable a manner.

The Duke entertained the greatest abhorrence of the duplicity of certain English statesmen, whose proceedings gave a handle to other nations for drawing a parallel between London and Carthage, by no means flattering to British honour.

During his service in India, though in constant communication with princes, corrupt and faithless, he rigorously abstained from every measure which might in any manner bring discredit on his country. "Better lose ten provinces," he says to Major Malcolm, on the 17th March, 1804, "than sacrifice our reputation for scrupulous good faith, and the good name which we have acquired in the war with the Mahrattas. . . . Strict justice ought to mark every proceeding of the Company towards the natives." So also, referring to the Peninsular governments, which displayed no great regard for truth or the faith of treaties, he wrote, on the 8th November, 1811, to Mr. Stuart, "It is difficult to say what will be successful, and what overwise, in these governments of intrigue; but, in my opinion, the broad direct line is the best.

Wellington was not less opposed to the policy of the Foreign Office, always shuffling, and generally selfish. At the same time, in order to avoid embarrassing the government, or hurting its influence on public opinion, he never went further than to protest against this policy, in his private correspondence, or in letters strictly confidential. "I declare," he writes to Major Malcolm, "that in reviewing the treaty of peace with Scindiah and its consequences, I am afraid that the *moderation* of the English government in India will look very much like the ambition of other governments."

* Belmas is quite wrong in saying, that Wellington employed these militiamen after the capitulation.

In a letter addressed to his brother Henry, on the 10th of August, 1810, he criticises severely the part which England proposed to play by interfering with Spain and her colonies. "I hope the Regency will have firmness to resist the demand of a free trade with the colonies; as a boon to the colonies, it might answer in some degree, and might be connected with measures of finance which would probably give them a very large revenue. But we have no right, and it is the grossest impolicy in us to demand it. Great Britain has ruined Portugal by her free trade with Brazil; not only the customs of Portugal, to the amount of a million sterling, are lost, but the fortunes of numerous individuals who lived by this trade are ruined; and Cadiz will suffer in a similar manner if this demand be agreed to. Portugal would be now in a very different situation as our ally, if our trade with Brazil was still carried on through Lisbon; and I would only ask, is it wise, or liberal, or just, to destroy the power and resources, and absolutely to ruin our allies, in order to put into the pockets of our merchants the money which before went into their treasury, and would be now employed in the maintenance of military establishments against the common enemy."

When, in 1813, the Coalition made war upon Napoleon under false pretences, affecting a liberality which was not real, and pacific intentions on which it did not intend to act, Wellington struck openly at the empire, and raised the standard of legitimacy, without taking any part in the guile which characterised the negotiations of that period. Instead of alarming the population by acts of reprisal, he endeavoured to gain their confidence by behaving towards them, not as a bitter enemy, but as the restorer of the only *régime* which could secure to them peace and prosperity. At the moment of planting foot upon the French territory, he wrote to his own government:— "I am bound to say that our success will depend altogether upon our moderation and justice."

This language, and still more the conduct, of the English general, presented a singular contrast to the acts and words of the Allies in the north and east of France. There, in spite of the most encouraging proclamations, were committed excesses of which the recollection has not yet been effaced from the memories of the people, and of which Wellington had the courage sternly to disapprove. His respect for authority, great as it was, did not induce him to accept by a tacit approval or well-bred silence, the responsibility of

one unjust or hateful measure. Few men have exhibited greater candour in defence of their opinions, though, at the same time, his disposition was neither captious nor critical; as a general rule, indeed, he never gave an opinion till he was consulted, or till he believed that his duty to the public required him to speak out. In the absence of these two motives, he declined to make his sentiments known, having adopted as his maxim this saying:—"That we ought not to interfere with matters which don't concern us."

In voting for Catholic Emancipation, he turned his back upon the majority of the people; upon the higher classes, so powerful in England, and on the middle orders, whose attachment to their religion is extreme. And in resisting parliamentary reform, he with equal courage risked his popularity with the advanced party, who vainly endeavoured to intimidate him with their menaces and outrages.

In all the phases of his life he exhibited the same temperament. Cautious and deliberate in arriving at a determination, but resolute and firm in adhering to it, he shunned no amount of personal sacrifice while endeavouring to carry it into effect. The Iron Duke on the field of battle—the Iron Duke in the cabinet—yet always kind, affable, and humane, so long as he could follow the inspirations of his own heart.

Wellington possessed that firmness of conviction and grandeur of soul, which could afford to despise both injustice and calumny. He never replied either to journalists or pamphleteers. Canning took notice of this characteristic in the House of Commons, on the 26th of April, 1811, by observing, "While our general is the butt of misconceptions of every kind, he never condescends to notice the inaccurate statements which are published; he has chosen his part, never to reply in words, but to leave the issues to refute both calumnies and calumniators."

Once only Wellington departed from this line of conduct, and that was, when he refuted the statements of a pamphlet published in the *Duende*, and based upon a letter written to the minister of war, by the Count de Villa Fuentes, *Xefe Politico* of *Guipuscoa*. That pamphlet was mainly directed against General Graham, whom it accused of having ordered and encouraged the sack of St. Sebastian. Wellington, in his capacity of responsible chief, undertook the defence of his subordinate, and the vivacity of his language shows, that on this occasion he was stung to the quick. "If this pamphlet,"

he writes, "is published in England, I will prosecute the printer. I do not know how much longer my temper will last, but I never was so much disgusted with anything as with that pamphlet; and I don't know which causes me the greatest annoyance, the behaviour of the soldiers who pillaged St. Sebastian, or the libel of the *Xefe Politico*, and the *Duende*." . . . "I am convinced that this new libel has been written at the dictation of the greatest of all blackguards, the Spanish minister of war."

Except on that occasion, Wellington invariably showed himself indifferent to the assaults of detraction and envy. "All those," he writes to General Cook, on the 9th of June, 1813, "who serve the public honestly and faithfully, have, for their enemies and traducers, those who are desirous of profiting by the public wants, inconveniences, and disasters, and by the misfortunes of the times." Looking at matters from this philosophical point of view, he wrote to Lord Liverpool, after the violent debates which arose out of the convention of Cintra, "I assure you, that nothing which has passed in parliament respecting me has given me one moment's uneasiness."

Noticing certain attacks made upon him in one of the opposition journals in 1815, he wrote on the 24th of November, to the editor: "It is a sort of privilege of modern Englishmen, to read in the daily newspapers lies respecting those who serve them; and I have been so long accustomed to be so treated, that I should not have thought it necessary to trouble you on the subject, &c." . . . . "I am really quite indifferent respecting what is read of me in the newspapers."

To the courage which rendered him victorious on the field of battle, and carried him triumphantly over obstacles of every other kind, Wellington added another sort of courage, which is as valuable as it is rare, viz. that which despises the idle gratification of personal vanity, and aims at results which shall be solid, in preference to those which are brilliant. Thus, while the war with the Mahrattas was impending, he made the greatest possible efforts to prevent a collision which others sought with eagerness, as calculated to earn for them promotion and distinction. More than once he permitted the opportunity to achieve a victory in the Peninsula to escape him, solely because he considered such victory to be useless, or believed that he could obtain a like result without risking the lives of his soldiers. Here is a remarkable example. At the opening of the campaign of 1810, the army and the people unanimously entreated Wellington to march to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo. He had excellent reasons

for doing nothing of the sort; he therefore refused, allowed the town to be taken, and bore with indifference the load of obloquy which this disgraceful act, as it was called, heaped upon him. With like stoicism, he despised the sarcasms of Massena; who in his proclamations attributed to fear the well-calculated inactivity of his illustrious opponent. We may point also to the patience with which Wellington waited for the retreat of the Prince of Essling,—an operation long foreseen, and which he could have hastened, without obtaining any real advantage by an attack upon Santarem.

The English officers on this, as on many other occasions, urged their general to assume the offensive, and to fight; but Wellington invariably refused to expose his soldiers to be killed, for the mere purpose of achieving glory to himself. This tenderness for human life, and contempt of personal renown, raise him far above the leaders of armies in general, who see nothing in war except a means of obtaining important benefits, or a brilliant reputation for themselves. "The government are quite mistaken," he wrote to Mr. Charles Stewart, on the 4th of June, 1811, "if they suppose that any selfish desire of acquiring character, has or ever will actuate my conduct. I come here to perform my duty, and I neither do nor can enjoy any satisfaction in anything, excepting the performance of my duty to my own country."

It was this total abnegation of self which induced Wellington to accept every kind of responsibility which the government thought fit to throw upon him. In 1809, he was sent to Hastings, that he might there busy himself in the discipline, the instruction, and the minute details, of a brigade of infantry. He discharged all the duties incident to his position with the most scrupulous exactitude. One of his friends, astonished at so much self-denial, asked him, "how he, who had commanded armies of 40,000 men in the field, and repeatedly received the thanks of parliament, could put up with the command of a brigade." "The real fact is," replied Sir Arthur, "that I am *nim-muk-wallah*, as we say in the East, that is, 'I have eaten the King's salt.' On that account, I believe it to be my duty to serve without hesitation, zealously and actively, wherever the King and his government may find it convenient to employ me." On another occasion, a colonel being offended because he was sent back to his regiment after having commanded a brigade, Wellington wrote to him in these terms: "I acknowledge that I cannot understand the nature of the feelings of an officer, which are to be mortified by his

performance of his duty, in the situation in which his Majesty and the rules of the service have placed him; and I can only say, that in the course of my military life, I have gone from the command of a brigade to that of my regiment, and from the command of an army to that of a brigade or division, as I was ordered, without feeling any mortification."

The magnanimity with which he handed over to Baird the command of the Egyptian expedition, after having collected the force and settled all the details of the enterprise, is well known. We see the same self-denying spirit in operation, at the commencement of the war in Portugal. He learned, in Mondego Bay, that Burrard had been nominated to command the army of which he had heretofore considered himself the leader, and after noticing the fact, he wrote to Lord Castlereagh thus: "All that I can say upon that subject is, that whether I am to command the army or not, or am to quit it, I shall do my best to ensure its success; and you may depend upon it that I shall not hurry the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they ought to be commenced, in order that I may acquire the credit of the success." Eight days afterwards, Sir Arthur wrote to the same minister in these terms: "I shall be the junior of the lieutenant-generals; however, I am ready to serve the government, wherever and as they please." Wellington's rule of conduct, however, in regard to this matter, is clearly laid down in the following lines, addressed to General Mackenzie: "The only proper place for any military officer, is that to which he is ordered."

In running over the Duke's voluminous correspondence, we find the following expression stereotyped over and over again. "Give me your orders, and you shall be obeyed." Yet this ready submission did not hinder him from offering his advice, and combating the ideas of his superiors; but when his respectful observations were not assented to, he submitted with a good grace, and applied himself to execute faithfully whatever instructions he might receive.

At the opening of the Mahratta war, Mr. Duncan, governor of Bombay, disapproved of Sir Arthur's plan for the organisation of the troops and the defence of Guzzerat, whereupon the young general wrote to him in the following terms: "I gather from your letter that you disapprove of my plan, and that you hold me responsible for its execution. I am perfectly ready and willing to accept the responsibility of any measure which I undertake, and to run all per-

sonal risks for the public service. But I should be presumptuous if, after hearing your opinion, I should persist in my own."

In 1810, referring to the evacuation of Portugal, which he had strenuously resisted, Wellington wrote: "All that I ask is, that I may not be held responsible unless I am permitted to act according to my own judgment. If the government adopt the opinions of others, and distrust the efficacy of the measures which I propose, they have only to give me detailed instructions, and I will strictly follow them." In 1813, after having protested against the recall of his provisional battalions, he wrote to Lord Bathurst upon the 9th of March: "But let the orders that they shall be sent away come from the quarter in which they ought to originate, and they shall be obeyed with alacrity, and you shall hear no complaints of their ill effects." So far indeed was this respect for authority carried, that when he received an order which was either impracticable or mischievous, Wellington, rather than commit an act of disobedience, applied for fresh instructions. It was thus, for example, that he acted in 1809, when desired to prepare for the evacuation of Portugal. He never put himself in opposition to a direct order, but he sometimes took advantage, as in 1808, of the general nature of the instructions and acted according to his own judgment. Writing on the 16th of April, 1814, to Mr. Cook, Under-Secretary of State, he says, "You in England gallop very fast, and you think that everything ought to go on as it appears to you; you forget, however, now and then, that your officers are very strictly instructed, and that those who mean to serve their country well must obey their instructions, however fearless they may be of responsibility."

Is proof still wanted of the Duke's ready submission to persons who, though superior to him in rank or station, were inferior in point of merit? We have only to recall his depositions before the court of inquiry which sat to investigate the details of the Convention of Cintra. He acknowledged in his evidence, that he differed in opinion from General Dalrymple, on several articles of the convention, yet that he had signed it in deference to the commander-in-chief. "I considered it my duty," he says, "to yield to the wishes of the commander-in-chief, for I make it a rule in everything that I do to conform to the orders and wishes of my superiors, whatever difference of opinion there may be between us." It was thus that in 1813, after having pointed out the absurdity of the plan for employing the Peninsular army in the north, Wellington concluded his

letter by saying, "I am at the orders of the Prince Regent, and I will do all which he and his government may consider advisable." In 1815 the Duke found that the front of operations established by the Allies was a great deal too much extended. Prince Schwartzenberg requested his opinion on this subject, as well as upon the whole tenor of the arrangements. Whereupon he drew up a memorandum, which he concluded in these words: "These are my general ideas, based upon the knowledge of our force, our position, and the strength of the enemy. But I am quite ready to do whatever may be desired, if the arrangements now proposed be not approved of." With any other man than the Duke of Wellington, this readiness to yield might have been mistaken for the absence of energy and the lack of a strong conviction.

Not less extraordinary is the respect which the Duke entertained for the authority of the law. This respect, so rare among conquerors, is as honourable to him as his most brilliant successes. "I beg leave," he writes to the Count de La Bisbal, on the 17th of March, 1813, "to point out the necessity of considering well every measure that is adopted on every subject, and whether it is consistent with law and regulation. Unless we should adopt and adhere to this practice, and unless we should ourselves set the example of obeying strictly the orders of our superiors, we cannot expect that our inferiors will obey ours."

In Portugal, as well as in France, Wellington required his soldiers to pay strict obedience to the authorities of the country. Writing to Crawfurd, he says, "I request you to understand that neither I nor any officer in the English army has any right to arrest and to punish magistrates, or other persons invested with civil authority." So rigid, indeed, was the Duke in this respect, that he prohibited his officers from shooting in the preserves in the neighbourhood of their cantonments, except with leave from their proprietors; that he ordered them to submit to be searched by the custom-house officers at their entrance into French towns; and that he punished severely the slightest infractions of the rules of the local police. We have seen how in Spain, while his army was suffering severely from the indifference or hostility of the natives, he prohibited his soldiers from gathering vegetables in the fields, or from taking any article without paying for it.

He issued a general order, forbidding English soldiers from taking any part in the meetings and ceremonies of Freemasons. This order,

dated the 5th of January, 1810, is thus expressed: "The institution of Freemasonry being contrary to the law of Portugal, the commander-in-chief desires that, so long as the English troops are in the country, the meetings of lodges, which take place in different corps, should be suspended, as well as the use of signs and other emblems; and that neither officers nor men shall take part in any masonic processions. The officers and soldiers will feel the necessity of obeying the laws of a country into which they have been sent."

It is well known how much reason Wellington had to complain of the extravagances and hostility of the Cortes. He had, undoubtedly, every right to treat the orders of that assembly with contempt. Nevertheless, "he considered it his duty" to submit at all times to its authority. But that which above all other things testifies to his unquestioning respect for law, is the fact, that to the end of the war he rigorously observed a penal code, of which the radically defective arrangements were the cause of many serious inconveniences. When a court-martial had delivered a ridiculous judgment, he complained of it, but always paid respect to it. On the 6th of June, 1800, writing to Lieut.-Colonel Close, he says, "I cannot approve of the decision of the court-martial, nevertheless I have confirmed it." A soldier having been convicted, in 1809, of having struck an officer, was treated with leniency. On being made acquainted with the fact, Wellington wrote to General McKenzie:—

"16th July, 1809.

"I am the more anxious that the general court-martial should revise their sentence upon this occasion, because I am concerned to state that several instances have occurred lately of soldiers having struck officers and non-commissioned officers, in the execution of their duty."

A rigorous observer of the laws and forms of justice, the Duke never knowingly committed one act which was contrary to law or to justice. If it happened at any moment that he had committed himself, he frankly acknowledged his mistake. It will be seen in his correspondence how ready he was to do justice to his inferiors, and to censure those in authority who abused their powers.*

* See among others his orders of the 14th of December, 1809, and that of the 13th of September, 1810, in which he says: "The officers of the army should recollect that it is not only not dishonourable, but that it is meritorious, to acknowledge a fault, and to make amends for it."

An officer having written to him in unbecoming terms, instead of putting him in arrest immediately, as others would have done, he communicated thus with Lieut.-Colonel Close: "No man is a competent judge in his own cause, and I shall, therefore, be obliged to you for your opinion upon this subject." On another occasion he gave it as his opinion that "to decide without inquiry would be unjust."

A man so scrupulously alive to the claims of law and equity could not possibly be inclined to favouritism. His bitterest detractors admit, indeed, that he encouraged no unfair preferences, while his officers, without exception, found in him an equable protector. "If I complain," he says to Lord Castlereagh on the 17th of June, 1809, "that I have no power to promote or reward officers, it is not because I desire to advance my own friends. I declare to you, on the contrary, that if I had the power to-morrow I would give promotion to no man except for good service rendered." So early as 1803, Sir Arthur Wellesley held the same language to his friend Lieutenant-Colonel Close, when communicating with him about a candidate for employment on the medical staff. "The individual whom you recommend to me is one for whom I entertain the greatest regard. I am much interested in his advancement, which was often pressed upon me in the strongest terms by his father, General Mackenzie, one of my oldest friends. But you and I, my dear colonel, must attend to recommendations superior to those of which I have spoken, and give them the preference over all the claims of private friendship or regard. I allude to recommendations which arise out of good services rendered."

Adding example to precept, Wellington brought these principles to bear upon the cases of officers in whose advancement he took the greatest personal interest. "All my aides-de-camp," he writes, "have been promoted in their proper turns, in the regiments to which they belong, on having carried to England despatches after a victory." Very few generals in command of armies would be able to say as much.

This remarkable impartiality was joined, in the Duke's case, to a military frankness which caused him to be beloved by his subordinates. If he had occasion to find fault with any one, he expressed his displeasure in well-measured language. Writing in 1811 to a deputy-commissary-general, he says, "I have given orders that you should be superseded, because I am perfectly convinced, and have

long known, that the public service will more and more suffer if you continue to be employed." With the same candour he says to a Spanish general, to whom he wrote on the 2nd of December, 1814, "I have not recommended you to the King of Spain for promotion, not because I have any doubt of your courage or zeal in the King's cause, but because I am aware that you have never studied the art of war, and that you pay little attention to the discipline or the condition of your troops."

This is the language of a man who has no other guide of life than truth and rectitude.

The same principle of justice is shown in his appreciation of the services of those who acted under him.* His greatest happiness was to bring them forward as much as possible; nor could any one say that his judgments respecting them were ever dictated by envy. We find, on the contrary, that his reports are for the most part too laudatory in their style; an honourable and, in truth, an extraordinary error in one who spoke so little about himself, that on reading his despatches it would be easy to believe that he had been nothing more than a spectator of the battles which he describes.

The violent attacks to which General Graham was exposed after the battle of Barossa, are well known. Wellington did not permit himself to be biassed by these clamours, but addressed warm congratulations to his companion in arms. He made the most favourable report of him to Lord Liverpool, and in a letter dated 27th March, 1811, recommended him strongly to the Prince Regent on account of "this glorious battle of Barossa."

We have seen that Marshal Beresford committed more than one mistake in the battle of Albuera, and that, especially at the commencement of the action, he merited anything rather than praise. In spite of this circumstance, and though the commander-in-chief might have felt something like envy of the good fortune of his colleague †, the Duke spoke of the marshal's conduct in terms of the

* Wellington knew how to do justice to the foreign troops who served under his orders. Thus, in 1851, when advocating the militia law in parliament, he said: "The English armies which have so well served the state, were never composed of more than one-third British subjects. Look to India, and Spain, and Waterloo, where we were so admirably supported by the young troops of Hanover and other foreign corps."

† [There was not one spark of envy in the Duke's composition; and to have envied Beresford his success at Albuera, would have been to convict himself of folly, as well as weakness.]

warmest commendation. "I think," he says, writing to Admiral Berkeley on the 20th of May, 1811, "that this affair is one of the most glorious which has occurred throughout the war." And in a letter written only two days afterwards to Lord Liverpool, "he could not sufficiently applaud the ability, firmness, and gallantry of the marshal."

After the battle of Vittoria, Wellington stated that Beresford had rendered him the greatest assistance by his friendly advice and co-operation throughout the campaign. A French general conceived that he was called upon severely to reproach the Duke in respect to this matter. "It is melancholy," he says, "to find the victor of Salamanca and Vittoria asserting that he is indebted for his laurels to a general who at the battle of Albuera was obliged to box with a Polish lancer." * Next to Graham and Beresford, the officers whose reputation came nearest to throw that of Wellington into the shade, were, without doubt, Hill, Hope, and Blücher.† Now observe in what terms the Duke speaks of the merits of these three officers. After the affair of Aroyo da Molinos, where Hill surprised and defeated Gérard's division, he wrote to the minister of war, "It would be particularly agreeable to me if some mark of the favour of H.R.H. the Prince Regent were conferred upon General Hill. His services have been always meritorious and very distinguished in this country, and he is beloved by the whole army." And when the same general, by a bold *coup-de-main*, had destroyed the bridge which covered the works at Almaraz, Wellington hastened to report to Lord Liverpool the operation, which he described as a "brilliant exploit."

At the battle of St. Pierre, Hill, with 14,000 men, sustained the attack of 35,000 Frenchmen; when Wellington arrived upon the ground with supports, Soult's situation was critical, and he was on the point of retreating. The intervention of the Duke rapidly completed what Hill had begun, and the allied army achieved another victory. In riding over the field of battle, where upwards of 5000

* Sarrazin, pp. 338, 339. The same writer says, p. 634: "Wellington carried too far the habit of complimenting his brother officers."

† [If Captain Brialmont had been better acquainted with English military history, he would have known that, of the officers here enumerated, Hope alone could establish any claim to the honour which he awards them. Hope would have been the last man in the world to speak of himself as a rival, in military talent, to the Duke of Wellington.]

English lay dead, the Duke met his brave lieutenant. He shook hands with him, and exclaimed with great delight, "Hill, the day is all your own!"* Hope received equal justice at his hands. "I have long entertained," he says, in a letter to Colonel Torrens dated the 15th December, 1813, "the highest opinion of Sir J. Hope, in common, I believe, with the whole world, and every day's experience convinces me of his worth. We shall lose him, however, if he continues to expose himself in fire as he did on the last three days; indeed, his escape was then wonderful, his hat and coat were shot through in many places, besides the wound in his leg."

As to Blücher, observe in what manner the Duke speaks of him in his official report of the battle of Waterloo. "I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them." That there was no affectation of modesty in all this, is proved by the tone which pervades the whole of the Duke's private correspondence. Thus, the day after the battle of Waterloo he wrote to his mother, "It is no impulse of vanity which leads me to speak so highly of my opponent, for it was not I who beat him, but the determined bravery of the English troops, and their unconquerable steadiness."

We have pointed out all the measures adopted by Wellington with a view to organise and discipline the English troops and the corps of auxiliaries in the Peninsula. It has been shown that the results arising out of these measures must be almost entirely attributed to him. No one has ever disputed this fact. Wellington alone expresses a different opinion. Writing to Lord Liverpool on the 8th of September, 1810, he says, "I should be unjust towards the army and do violence to my own feelings, if I did not seize this opportunity of calling your lordship's attention to the services of Marshal Beresford. To him exclusively we are indebted for the formation, discipline, and equipment of the Portuguese army, which has shown itself capable of attacking and beating the enemy. He has, besides, given me great assistance by his experience, ability, and knowledge

* [Captain Brialmont's authority for this is Mr. Maxwell, the writer of a romance. The total loss of the English, between the 9th and the 13th of December was only, in killed, 650; wounded, 3,907; missing, 504. Hill's battle took place on the 13th, and cost the army, out of the above numbers, about one-third.]

of the country." One more quotation from a letter written on the 4th of March, 1814, to Lord Bathurst: "Your lordship will have observed with satisfaction the able assistance which I have received in these operations from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, Lieutenant-Generals Sir R. Hill, Sir J. Hope, and Sir S. Cotton. It is impossible for me sufficiently to express my sense of their merits, or of the degree in which the country is indebted to their zeal and ability for the situation in which the army now finds itself." No better proof could be given of the Duke's greatness of soul than such testimonies as these. To the very end of his career he pursued the same line of conduct throughout. As often as a victory was won by the English army, in India or elsewhere, he was the first in the House of Lords to call for the thanks of parliament; and he availed himself of every such opportunity to speak in the most flattering terms of the merits of his companions in arms. Napoleon did not always exhibit the same degree of goodwill and disinterestedness towards his generals. He took the merit of everything to himself, and as often as one of his subordinates acquired a brilliant reputation his envy broke out in bitter reproaches. The "Journal" of St. Helena affords in this respect a melancholy picture of the character of that great man, who, with genius of the highest order, exhibited at times all the defects of a vulgar soul. His Memoirs, in fact, abound with unjust depreciations and reflections upon the most illustrious men of the empire. Greater than Napoleon in this respect, the Prince of Condé added to the brilliant qualities of a soldier the magnanimity which is inherent in a man well born and well educated, who, instead of giving honour exclusively to success, reserves it for those who have faithfully done their duty. He specially delighted in ranking Gussion and Sirot after Rocroy, Turenne after Fribourg and Nordlingen, and Chatillon after Sens.* When he was living quietly at Chantillé some of his friends besought him to write his own memoirs; but he refused, saying that if he did so he should be

* "I know nothing more noble than the despatches of Condé to the court, announcing his different victories. He speaks little of himself and much of others. In this respect Turenne resembles Condé. That which jars considerably in Cæsar's Commentaries, is the eager and perpetual pre-occupation with himself, which permits him to see no one but himself, attributes all to himself, acknowledges no faults, magnifies the smallest actions, praises only men of moderate abilities, detracts from those which are eminent," &c.—Cousin's Biography of the Prince of Condé, and published in the "Revue des Deux Mondes."

obliged to censure some estimable officers, and to speak well of himself. Free from egotism, devoid of envy, he rendered justice to all and to each, rejecting for himself the praises which he bestowed freely upon others. In this respect the character of Turenne resembled that of Condé, and Wellington resembles Turenne.

Wellington refused to write his own memoirs for the same reasons which were assigned by the conqueror of Rocroy, and declined to furnish information to writers who applied to him for explanations of certain points in his military life. It is even asserted that, in order to avoid criticising individuals whom he esteemed, he refused to read any work that treated of his campaigns.* In his voluminous correspondence there are hundreds of letters in which the names of officers and soldiers are mixed up with unfortunate occurrences. The letters have been published, but by order of the Duke the names remain blank. "It would have been too painful," he said, "to make mischief by such revelations, or to occasion distress in honourable families, and to add to the rigour of punishment by a degree of publicity which his orders, when originally issued, were never meant to attain."

Under a cold and reserved exterior, Wellington concealed a chivalrous disposition.† We have seen with what care he avoided taking notice of the faults committed by Crawfurd, at the opening of the campaign of 1810, and the magnanimous silence which he observed as to the conduct of Campbell during the siege of Almeida. However keenly he might be annoyed by the episode which closed that siege, and by the fierce attacks of the press, he disdained to justify himself by throwing the blame on his subordinates.‡ This

* Lord Ellesmere's "Life and Character of the Duke of Wellington."

† [This is a great mistake. The Duke of Wellington's manner was as frank and manly as his disposition was generous.]

‡ See his letter on the 15th of May, 1811, to Lord Liverpool: Napoleon's treatment of his generals, who were either blameable or unfortunate, is very different. Witness his reproaches to Bernadotte after Jena; to Dupont, after Baylen; to Dorsenne, after the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo; to Marmont, after Salamanca; to Jourdan and Joseph after each reverse to the armies in Spain. The correspondence of the Duke de Ragusa with the Prince of Neufchâtel, proves to us that when the result did not come up to his expectations, the Emperor never scrupled to alter the complexion of the order issued by himself, in order to throw the responsibility upon his lieutenants.—Memoirs of Marmont, vol. iv. Particularly the letters of the 18th and 20th of February, and of the 16th of April, 1812, from the Prince of Neufchâtel, and those of the 22nd and 25th of March from the Duke of Ragusa.

kindness of heart is exhibited again in the instructions which the Duke issued to the court-martial, which, in 1813, sat in judgment upon the conduct of Sir John Murray at the siege of Tarragona. Indeed he carried his compassion for that unfortunate general so far as to insinuate—"that perhaps it was a want of precision or distinctness in his instructions which led Murray to commit the faults which were imputed to him."

After the battle of Assaye, a charge of malversation was brought against an officer who managed the cattle department, and was killed in the action. Wellington had no particular regard for that officer; nevertheless, believing him to have been an honest man, he wrote to his accusers:—"As far as I can answer for any one, I will venture to say, that the charges brought against Captain Mackay don't contain a word of truth."

We have seen what a steady supporter Sir Thomas Graham found in his chief, when maligned by the Spaniards in consequence of the capture of St. Sebastian. Wellington refuted the calumnies, and took upon himself the responsibility of everything that was done. With the same energy he afterwards defended General Sir Harry Smith, when violently attacked for having unnecessarily prolonged the Caffre war. "I approve," said the Duke in the House of Lords, "of all General Smith's proceedings, of the orders which he issued to his troops, and of the arrangements which he made in order to ensure success." No one, after this declaration, ventured to say a word against Smith, who was in consequence absolved.

Being called upon, on another occasion, to express an opinion respecting Sir John Moore, and his disastrous retreat to Corunna, Wellington pointed out only one trifling error, and then remarked, "that his was an opinion formed after the result, and that perhaps he might not have arrived at it at the time, and under the circumstances in which his unfortunate brother officer was involved."

Again, when Wellington had become an object of universal censure and even ridicule, on account of his retreat from Talavera, he thought only of screening the government from the charge of rendering such retreat inevitable, through the expedition to Walcheren; he wrote therefore to Lord Liverpool, to say that "the campaign would have produced the same results whether the expedition in question had taken place or not."

So also, after Burgos, he assumed, in an official letter, the entire responsibility of the failure, though it would have been easy for him to show that the ministers alone were in fault.

When Fouché, abandoned by the king, was driven into exile, in order to avoid an open fall, or something worse, Wellington had the manliness to write to his Majesty in these terms:—"I am deeply grieved by what has befallen to the Duke of Otranto. To him alone you owe your return to the capital, and reascent of the throne. Neither Blücher nor I could have restored to you the crown. We should have had to deal with an army of 80,000 desperate men, who would have been too strong for us. We could not have refused a battle, had they offered it, and would have been obliged to fall back, till the other powers came up to support us; and your Majesty knows what their tempers were. The Duke of Otranto prevented the battle from taking place, and it is to him that you are indebted for your restoration to the throne of your ancestors."*

Assuredly this letter, written at such a moment, in defence of a man who had no friends in any party, was not the production of an egotist, a courtier, or an ambitious person. Indeed it may well appear marvellous that the victor of Waterloo should have ventured to say to the King of France, "Fouché alone has brought about your restoration." But the marvel ceases with those who know how modest the Duke was, how very little engrossed with thoughts of himself.

It was one of Wellington's maxims "to distrust his own judgment in matters about which he felt a personal interest." Thus, after the battle of Assaye, he was not too proud to submit his conduct to the criticism of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro. "As you are a competent judge of military operations," he wrote, "I shall be anxious to have your approval." His self-love did not cause him to shrink from avowals which others would have been ashamed to make. Having received orders, in 1808, to proceed into the Asturias, in order to examine the country, and make a plan of it, he wrote to Lord Castlereagh: "I am bound to let you know that I am no geometrician, and that I cannot draw a plan. I have, therefore, informed Sir Hugh Dalrymple that he must not think of employing me as you wish him to do. I am not a topographical engineer, and make no pretence of being able to sketch such a country as the Asturias." "I should distrust my own judgment," he writes again, "if I found it opposed to that of Sir John Moore, in a case which he has had the means of studying, and with which he is familiar." "Don Forjas is

* Letter quoted by Vaudencourt.

better informed than I, and knows more of the localities." "If your opinion differ from mine on any point in this general survey, I am satisfied that you are in the right."*

Never, in the midst of his most brilliant triumphs, did this modest simplicity forsake him. He received, after Vittoria, a letter from the Prince Regent of England, in which are the following expressions:—"Your glorious conduct surpasses all human praise—all means of recompense. . . . . I feel that nothing is left me except to offer my prayer of most earnest thankfulness to God for having, of His great goodness, given to my country, and to me, such a general as yourself."

So little was Wellington elated by praise like this, that, a few days afterwards, he wrote to the government:—"Tell the Prince Regent that if I am sent to take the command of an army in Germany, I shall do no better than others; whereas, in the Peninsula, I enjoy this advantage, that everybody believes me to be doing all that it is possible to do."

Such modesty is not, in general, the attendant on youth, for our earliest triumphs are, for the most part, those which most inflame our pride. But the young conqueror of the Mahrattas was an exception to the rule. In his report of his first victory, that of Assaye, he forgot altogether to state, that he led in person the last charge, and had two horses killed under him.

When about to quit India, Wellesley received from the inhabitants of Fort St. George and of Bombay addresses of the most gratifying nature. He replied to them by attributing the success of recent operations to the wise policy of the Governor-General; and while he eulogised General Lake, spoke of himself only as if he had been answering for others. So also, in 1812, when complimented by the municipality of Madrid, he took no notice whatever of his own victories, but accounted for his presence in the Spanish capital by observing, "that the issues of war are in the hands of Providence."

What a contrast there is between language so modest as this and the boasting of certain generals, whom the weight of their own greatness seems to have driven mad. Junot, for example, because he entered Lisbon without opposition, wrote to the minister of war

* Letters of the 1st of November, 1808, 5th of September, 1800, to Lord Liverpool, 2nd of April, 1810.

in this strain :—"The gods themselves pronounce for us—an earthquake declares it—at once bearing witness to their power, and doing us no manner of harm."

Declamation such as this was repugnant to the very nature of Wellington. Ever simple, ever true, he shrank from placing himself, under any circumstances, in a theatrical attitude. His personal *suite* was more unpretending than that of the meanest of the Spanish generals. It is said that in 1809 (before the reform of the Portuguese staff by Beresford) Brigadier Miranda had not fewer than forty-three aides-de-camp; whereas Wellington, when he made his triumphal entrance into Madrid, was accompanied by one officer only, Lord Fitzroy Somerset. We search in vain through the twelve volumes of his despatches for a single phrase used for the mere purpose of effect,—for a single letter written with a view to exalt his own merits, or to overshadow those of another. We find, on the contrary, a whole host of disclosures and acknowledgments, all tending to detract from the importance of his successes. In strong contrast to the practice of other leaders, who are inclined at all times to exaggerate the enemy's force in order to magnify their own triumphs, he so describes the French army, as to convey the highest notion of his own strength, and of his relative superiority over them. On the 3rd of November, 1810,—"It is impossible to describe to your lordship the pecuniary and other distresses of the French armies in the Peninsula. All the troops are months in arrears of pay; they are in general very badly clothed; their armies want horses, carriages, and equipments of every description; their troops subsist entirely upon plunder. . . . . This state of things has very much weakened, and in some instances destroyed, the discipline of the army; and all the intercepted letters advert to acts of malversation and corruption, and misapplication of stores, &c., by all the persons attached to the army. . . . . The French armies in Spain have never had any secure communication beyond the ground which they occupy. . . . . I attribute no small portion of our success to the difficulty which the enemy's generals find in obtaining information. At this moment, though the two armies are only a few miles apart, they don't know where we are. . . . . We have advantages in the Peninsula which the French cannot enjoy; we have possession of all the navigable rivers, of which we make use to convey our supplies as far as they will carry, and the naval power of Great Britain protects the arrival of these supplies, and the

formation of our magazines on the coast." It may be said, indeed, that Tacitus has drawn the portrait of Wellington in the following sentences, descriptive of his father-in-law, Agricola.

"Agricola never detracted from the glory of another in order to enhance his own. Centurions and prefects had all, in him, a faithful witness to their exploits. Some have, indeed, charged him with needless severity in his censures; but the same disposition which rendered him affable to such as did their duty, made him stern towards those who neglected it. His anger, however, left no trace behind; there was no ground of distrust because of his reserve or his silence. He considered it more honourable to war than to bear malice . . . . . In his despatches he described events as they occurred, without seeking to colour them with extravagant language. Plain in his apparel, frank in his conversation, having no other attendants than one or two friends—of the multitude, who judge men by outward appearances, and, seeing and observing him daily, sought to discover wherein his glory lay, how few found it out!!"

Whatever mistakes Wellington may have committed, they are all set forth in his despatches; indeed, but for the despatches they never could have been discovered. Thus, after Talavera, he writes to Lord Castlereagh:—"The army would not have suffered so much if I had only insisted, before entering Spain, that they would supply me with all the necessary means of transport." Again, speaking of the attack on the forts of Salamanca, he says, "I was mistaken in the estimate which I had formed of the means required to reduce these forts, and was obliged to send to the rear for a supply of ammunition; this necessarily lost me six days." And again, of Burgos, "The error which I committed was, not that I undertook the operation with inadequate means, but that I employed upon it raw troops instead of veterans."

In every report which he sent in, Wellington was guileless and truthful in the extreme. If, by chance, he made an inaccurate statement, he seized the earliest opportunity to correct the mistake. Few men, indeed, have carried so far the horror of falsehood. There is not a line in his voluminous correspondence which does not bear witness to the principle; which does not contain a protest against bad faith, loose morality, and charlatanism in every shape. Ranking truth above all other qualities, he had nothing more honourable of

his friend Sir Robert Peel to say, in the House of Lords, than this: "In the whole course of my communications with him I never knew an instance in which he did not show the strongest attachment to truth; and I never saw, in the whole course of my life, the smallest reason for suspecting that he stated anything which he did not firmly believe to be the fact."

One of Wellington's biographers relates this anecdote, as characteristic of the Duke. Having been asked, one day, how he could supply information to an historian like Napier, whose radical opinions were so much at variance with his own, he replied, "Because I am sure that whatever his opinions may be, he will write the truth."

It is this love of truth, this unvarying good faith, which gives to Wellington's despatches an historical value, which is not due, in the same degree, to any other documents of the kind. The French generals, and, above all, Napoleon, were far less conscientious in writing their bulletins. With them success is always exaggerated; defeat softened down. The emperor, indeed, never scrupled to alter, *notably*, the reports of his lieutenants, already inaccurate enough, and to publish in the journals exploits altogether imaginary.* It was in reference to one of these documents, thus revised and corrected, in the "Moniteur," that Wellington said, "It is impossible that Marmont or Dorsenne could have written such absurdities as these, to which their names are appended."

The same absence of bombast, which pervades the Duke's despatches, is discernible in all his orders and proclamations. The English soldier is neither supported by grandiose phraseology, nor depressed by its opposite. He must be spoken to in the language of reason, without tinsel or verbiage. Napoleon's exclamation on first seeing the Pyramids, however sublime in itself, would have produced no effect upon him. His country and duty are his sole masters. He devotes his entire life to them; and asks, in return, neither a place for his name in public despatches, nor that he shall be noticed in public monuments. If he is well paid, well fed, and well commanded, he considers that the state acts liberally towards him; he never dreams of bartering his blood for praise. Nelson

* There is remarkable proof of this in Napoleon's letter to Joseph, written from Villa-Caslin on the 23rd of December, 1808. "Publish in the Madrid journals," he says, "that 20,000 English have been surprised, and are destroyed;" and yet in this same letter he states: "The English appear to be at Valladolid."

knew his brave and modest comrades well, when he telegraphed to them at Trafalgar, "England expects every man to do his duty;" and Wellington never held towards his soldiers a different language. He took every occasion to congratulate them on their good behaviour, and reminded them, from time to time, of the advantages attending a good state of discipline. The following general order, issued after the victory of Salamanca, conveys an accurate idea of the spirit and style which distinguished all similar communications: "The commander of the forces returns his best thanks to the general officers, officers, and soldiers, for their conduct during the action of the 22nd instant. He will not fail to make the favourable report of them to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, which they deserve. He trusts that the occurrences of yesterday will convince them that success in military operations depends upon the obedience of troops to their orders, and their steadiness in their ranks, which they should not, on any pretext whatever, be tempted to quit."

Perhaps it may be imagined, that such simplicity and conciseness in writing their reports, and in their correspondence, is natural to English generals. If proof to the contrary be required, we have but to read the account of the battle of Albuera, by Beresford; of the capture of the works at Almoraz, by Hill; and of the assault of St. Sebastian, by Graham. All these are at once much more detailed, and more pretentious, than Wellington's statements of the decisive victories of Salamanca, Vittoria, and Waterloo.

So entirely repugnant to the Duke's character were exaggeration and charlatanism, that he condemned the use of them even in proclamations addressed by the Peninsular governments to nations naturally fond of the hyperbolical. This is shown in the following extract from a letter written to Mr. Charles Stewart on the subject of a proposed appeal by the Portuguese government to the people. "Everything of this sort," he says, "ought to be treated in a simple style, without inflation, and, above all, briefly. Such expressions as, 'Corez sobre os nonnos inimicos' (to succumb to our enemies), don't touch the actual evil. Everybody in Portugal is sufficiently impressed with the danger, and eager to avoid it. We have enthusiasm in plenty, and plenty of cries of 'Viva!' We have illuminations, patriotic songs, and fêtes everywhere; but what we want is, that each, in his own station, should do his duty faithfully, and pay implicit obedience to legal authority."

Henry Wellesley having submitted to his brother several articles,

which he proposed to get inserted in the Cadiz newspapers, in order to resist the growing influence of the democratic faction, the Duke said, "Whatever you may think fit to publish, confine yourself to a plain statement of facts and dates, and to such arguments as may be intelligible to every reader."

In all his communications with the French generals, Wellington exhibited the highest good breeding; and the judgments which he passed on the operations of the enemy's army were full of dignity.

Napoleon, on entering the Peninsula, said, "I go to plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon. I shall drive the English into the sea," &c. We find nothing at all resembling this in the Duke's proclamations. He even prevented the agents of England from affixing their signatures to exaggerations of the sort. Thus, when Mr. Stewart consulted him about a proclamation which the Spanish government had proposed to him to issue, he wrote, "In the first place, this abuse of the French is not becoming in a constituted authority like that of the Regency. . . . The whole affair resembles too much Junot's proclamations."

Wellington appreciated justly both the generals and soldiers of the French army. He never found a balm for personal mortification in abusing or underrating them. "The French army," he wrote to Lord Wellesley, on the 26th of January, 1811, "is, without doubt, a wonderful machine." "France," he said again, "is not an enemy whom I despise, nor does it deserve that I should." In many of his letters he speaks respectfully of the talents of his opponents; and would never allow any of them to be maltreated in his presence. One day Lord Aberdeen charged Marshal Soult, in the House of Lords, with having fought the battle of Toulouse after he had been made acquainted with the emperor's abdication; whereupon Wellington rose immediately to contradict the statement. On another occasion, he publicly congratulated General Dubreton on his gallant defence of Burgos; and even reminded him that he had given the English troops the greatest check which they ever received in the Peninsula.

How different this conduct from that of the Emperor, who reproached Joseph for having spoken well of the defenders of Saragossa —"For whom," he says, "we can entertain only supreme contempt;" and who, in the third bulletin of the army of Spain, heaped this unmerited abuse upon its illustrious commander: "Palafox was an object of contempt to the whole of the enemy's army, who accused

him of arrogance and meanness. Where danger was no one ever saw him."

Nelson was very different. Hatred to France and to the French people was a passion with him. He could not look upon a Frenchman or hear a word spoken in praise of France without becoming violently excited. Wellington, on the other hand, always entertained a profound admiration and sincere regard for the army and the nation to which he was opposed.

The single fault which we are bound to lay at his door is this, that in speaking of Napoleon, he sometimes expressed himself in unbecoming terms; his refusal to give him the title of emperor, and his habit of describing him as the open enemy of the human race, amounted to affectation. We regret also to read, in his letter to Lord Uxbridge of the 23rd June, 1815, this expression, "I am assured that Napoleon cannot make head against us; and that there is nothing for him now but to hang himself."

The French accuse him of want of tact and modesty, in placing the statue of Napoleon at the bottom of the stairs in Apsley House. The fact is undisputed; but the motive assigned for it is so entirely opposed to the sentiments and ordinary character of the Duke that we cannot possibly admit it. The victor of Waterloo possessed too much good sense as well as tact, to think of overshadowing by such means, the man whom one of his countrymen has pronounced to be "the greatest genius of ancient or modern times." * His voluminous correspondence does not contain a single letter which expresses even a doubt of the military superiority of the emperor; in many he exalts to the highest the incomparable genius of the French hero. "The most ardent of Napoleon's admirers," says Lord Ellesmere, "could not entertain a more exalted opinion of his military capacity than the Duke. I have heard him say a thousand times, that it was more dangerous to make a false move in front of the emperor, than before any other man; and I think that he was entirely of the opinion of the French, who considered the emperor's presence on the field of battle to be worth 40,000 men." At the same time he by no means regarded him as superior to the great men of antiquity. "I asked him one day," says Lord Ellesmere, "whom he considered to be the greatest general that ever lived?" He replied, "Hannibal." Others have put the same question to him, and always obtained the same

* Napier.

answer. Between this opinion, however, and the wretched motive attributed to the Duke, there is all the difference in the world; and we must continue to believe that the position of the emperor's statue, an unfortunate one no doubt, has no signification whatever; at all events, that it has no reference to the comparative estimation in which he held the two generals.

II.

M. BRIALMONT'S CONTRAST BETWEEN THE DUKE AND NAPOLEON.

"It is not easy to paint a portrait of Wellington, without at least attempting a sketch of that of the emperor Napoleon.

"Between these two men, alike the creatures of destiny, both of whom led great armies to victory, there is not, so to speak, the most remote similarity in talents, in character, or in genius. Each feature in the character of the one presents a striking contrast to that which is discernible in the other. In this respect alone they may be said to be in unison, that they equally arranged and conducted their operations in accord with the means at their disposal, with the specialities of the peoples whom they mutually served, and the diversities in the institutions to which they found it necessary to adapt themselves. Had Napoleon been placed at the head of an English army, he would have encountered difficulties, which even his genius might have found it difficult to surmount. Wellington in command of the enthusiastic troops of a victorious republic, would have been placed in a situation of equal delicacy. The one made all his appeals to the imagination, and aimed, so to speak, at prodigies only; the other addressed himself to reason and applied common means to the attainment of his objects.

"An imagination vast, insatiable, aiming ever at the infinite and at the impossible, faculties at once prodigious and most flexible, and strength of will which had no limits, yet admitted of marvellous varying in the ideas and impressions to which it was open, these were the main characteristics of Napoleon's genius. A well-balanced judgment, cool reasoning powers, a wonderful correctness of view as well in the field of battle as in the cabinet; sound sense of the most penetrating kind, which, in its strength, took the nature of

genius; a perseverance which nothing could overcome or turn aside from its purpose; a constancy imperturbable amid the greatest dangers — such are some of the qualities which contributed to render the Duke of Wellington a figure so colossal in the history of the nineteenth century.

"It was with a giant's strides that Napoleon pursued a career which raised him for a moment, to the pinnacle of human greatness. By the rapidity of his ascent he confounded the world; for everything connected with him took the turn of a magical improvisation. His rival, on the contrary, elevated himself, slowly, patiently, modestly, and by the exercise of a thoughtful courage. Never once did he lose ground. He moved steadily forward, with a happy moderation; his renown took a forward course which suffered neither check nor reverse.

"It was Napoleon's constant study to speak to the imaginations of men; to fascinate, to excite their enthusiasm, to inspire them with the love of admiration, which has some touch of fear mixed up in it; and to gain these ends he did not hesitate at times to stoop to the devices of a skilful actor on the stage. Always true to nature, the Duke never dreamed of making his appeals except to reason. It could not be said of him that, under any circumstances, he was an actor. Duty was the single rule which he proposed to himself, and he imposed the same, and none besides, upon others. He had a perfect horror of charlatanism and duplicity. He never condescended, under any circumstances, to flatter his soldiers; but on rare occasions he would remind them that they had shed their blood freely, because it was their duty to do so.

"It is easy, after all this, to account for the difference in style and in eloquence between the two generals. In Napoleon's proclamations especially in those issued during his Italian campaigns, we find the productions of a powerful orator, which, after the manner of the ancients, leave sublime images graven upon our souls. The general orders, the despatches, the reports of Wellington, are composed with a frigid and austere simplicity. Not one word is written for the sake of effect, or even of phraseology; everything is straightforward and true." *

To the talents of a general Napoleon added the genius of a statesman. Ambitious by natural temperament, not less than by reflection,

* Assemblée Nationale, Paris, 1852.

enterprising as men usually are who aspire to take the lead in times of revolution, he early directed his views towards the attainment of power. Amid the full blaze of the glory with which his victories in Italy and in Egypt had surrounded him, he returned secretly to France, and found himself strong enough to overturn an incapable government, and to establish one of his own. New successes justified this bold usurpation. By and by the hope of finding security under the strength and renown of his might, induced the nation to place the crown of St. Louis on the head of this fortunate soldier; and during fifteen years France and Europe bowed down before him.

All this was not enough for the genius of a Titan, "who desired to carry heaven by assault." * Having conquered men, he vainly imagined that the elements, that Fortune herself, were at his control. His ambition knew no bounds. He seemed to lose the consciousness of human weakness, and considered it unworthy of himself not to attempt impossibilities." In 1812 he "filled," to use an expression of Juvenal, "the universe."

If Wellington had found himself in the same circumstances, not only would he never have played the same part, but he never would have desired to play it. There was no part, either in his character or in the turn of his mind, which rendered him capable of becoming a celebrated pretender, a general eager for conquests, a despot, lamenting that he was unable, like Alexander, to pass himself off as the son of a god.†

Wellington was, in the strictest sense of the expression, a true man (*l'homme du devoir*). Under certain circumstances, he might have become a Monk,—he never could have been a Cromwell.

At the same time, though free from that species of ambition, sublime, perhaps necessary at times, yet more frequently blameworthy and disastrous,—which leads men to aim at thrones,—he was richly endowed with those qualities which insure to such as possess them a great and enduring influence over the destinies of their country. The wars in the Peninsula brought these qualities to light in a remarkable manner.

In the exercise of an absolute and irresponsible power, and in the

* M. Thiers.

† Several historians state that, after the ceremony of the coronation, Napoleon expressed his regret to Decres that the people were become too much enlightened to accept that belief in a divine origin by means of which Alexander succeeded in accomplishing such great things.

support of a warlike nation, Napoleon found all the resources which were necessary to sustain him in his strategic combinations. Wellington, on the other hand, saw his combinations perpetually frustrated by the action of powers jealous of one another, by party manœuvres, the irresolution of ministers, the military incapacity, and the settled antipathy of the English nation to the profession of arms. With Napoleon, the legislator and the general went forward side by side together; with Wellington, there was, up to the very close of his career, disagreement, wrangling, often open strife between these two influences. Compelled to pay respect to the laws and institutions of his country, he encountered difficulties of which the French generals knew nothing, and in the presence of which all resistance on their parts would have been useless.

As chief of an army, he found himself under the necessity of taking orders from statesmen who possessed no knowledge whatever of military affairs, but who, nevertheless, had the presumption to direct them,—a presumption as fatal as it was ridiculous, though in strict conformity with the spirit of constitutional governments. Under such governments, where probably nothing can be done except with the consent of parliament; where every plan must be subjected to public discussion; where the ministers, be they ever so able, must defend their own measures, before they attempt to expose the sophistries of their enemies; where no interest in the state can be wounded, no principle ignored, no right violated, no political influence treated with neglect, even though it be for the promotion of an important national object; in states so governed, the chief of an army is bound to enter into constant discussions with the responsible ministers, and to furnish them with the means of justifying themselves, and with information of every kind, from which the enemy, and he alone, is likely to profit. Men, horses, money, material, plans of attack and of defence, all supply subjects for such discussions; and whenever it happens that votes of credit are retarded, or that the ministers are embarrassed by want of confidence on the part of the House, the army must go without resources, the general must submit himself as he best can, and the campaign is put off, or interrupted, or ends unfavourably.

All these embarrassments Wellington encountered in the Peninsula, and they must never be laid out of view, when his case is taken up for criticism.*

* We may be permitted to observe that the late expedition of the English to the Crimea fully bears out the reflections here hazarded. The results of that expedi-

Napoleon, on the contrary, carried his determinations into effect on the instant, and without any control. During his reign, there was no liberty for the press, except to applaud, for the legislative assembly of the nation, except to obey. The emperor needed but to demand from France her last man, and her last crown, and France would give both without a remonstrance. She neither willed, nor thought, nor acted, except for him — so unbounded was the influence of her master, and his authority so formidable. With what marvellous success Napoleon planned and created that state of perfect submission! Absolute master of everything, his genius was not formed for restraint: he never could have submitted to the humiliations which Wellington was compelled to bear, without even the right to complain of them. If the British hero had been endowed with the temperament, fiery and susceptible, of the victor of Austerlitz, we may venture to assert, that he would have achieved no success in Spain. It is one thing to exercise command over a military nation, over homogeneous troops animated by the same spirit; it is quite another to act under the direction of a council of ministers; to be the subordinate general of a nation destitute alike of military habits and military institutions; to wage war at the head of an army composed of heterogeneous troops, among whom there is little concord; and, last of all, to receive instructions from three governments, directly opposed the one to the other.

By whatever standard we may test the influence of their rival positions, it is certain that the English general accomplished all which it was possible to effect, with the means at his disposal. If genius for war consist in being able, on a given theatre, to apply judiciously the principles of strategy, and to make the most of the resources, moral as well as physical, which are available, Wellington, in his own place, exhibited as much of that genius as Napoleon did in his. As each situation requires peculiar qualities, so they must be estimated, not so much by the greatness of the results obtained, as by the nature of the means employed to obtain them. To invade the Russian empire with 400,000 men, is not

tion bear fresh testimony to the military superiority of the Duke of Wellington. In fact, though the army, commanded first by Lord Raglan, and afterwards by General Simpson, was more amply provided than the army of the Peninsula, when at its best, with everything necessary to render it efficient, it suffered hardships unexampled, which official inquiries brought to light; and which all, by common consent, attributed to the carelessness of its leaders, to the defects of administration, and the want of experience in the war office.

a more difficult operation, than to land 9000 in Mondego Bay, for the deliverance of the Spanish Peninsula. With perfect fitness, therefore, may we bring into comparison the talents of two generals, one of whom, like Buonaparte, revolutionised the world, while the other, like Arthur Wellesley, claims only to have conducted, after seven years of war, 35,000 English troops from Lisbon to Toulouse, and from Waterloo to Paris.

It is undeniable that so far as genius for war is concerned, Wellington was inferior to Buonaparte, the greatest general, perhaps, that ever lived. His conceptions were less vast and less rapid. His plans of campaign were worked out slowly and painfully. Buonaparte, on the other hand, executed his with the facility of inspiration, and the confidence of a man who trusted on his star. It is clear, too, he possessed a vigour and decision to which Wellington very rarely approached. On the field of battle, however, the English general was quite as able, perhaps even more able, than the Emperor. He possessed in a very high degree that rapid *coup d'œil* and facility of moving masses, which are the distinguishing marks of eminent tacticians. Salamanca, Orthez, and Waterloo may in these respects be compared with the most brilliant actions of the consulate and the empire.

As a strategist Napoleon was incomparable. After him, but at a wide interval, came, among his contemporaries, the Archduke Charles of Austria, and Wellington. Both have given proof of talent; they both combined their operations with great intelligence, but we must not lose sight of the fact, that coming after Napoleon, they naturally profited by the admirable lessons and glorious examples of their master.*

In the Emperor's case, as in that of all ambitious men who have

* [We have elsewhere given an opinion on the question raised by M. Brialmont, and we need not repeat it here. But into one curious mistake he has fallen. He speaks of the Archduke and of Wellington as pupils of Napoleon. Whatever the Archduke may have learned of the Emperor, it is certain that Wellington learned nothing from him. He had shown his ability as a strategist long before there was time for him to study in the school of Napoleon; and when he did study there, it was to adopt a system, in many essential particulars opposed to that of the French Emperor. Napoleon fought all his battles in column. Wellington never engaged except in line. Napoleon made much use of his cavalry; and, as at Waterloo, destroyed it prematurely. Wellingfon kept his, as much as possible, for the close of the day; and it told. Napoleon made war support itself. Wellington respected private property, and paid for what he got.]

made themselves illustrious, the triumph of success often covered the unworthiness of the means employed to secure it. The death of the Duke d'Enghien, the *coup d'état* at Bayonne, the invasion of Portugal, the annexation of Holland to the French empire, the continental blockade, with a thousand acts of special injustice besides, were all, in his eyes, so many necessities of state; a melancholy expression which has for ages been applied to justify all the crimes, all the spoliations, all the chicaneries of which history makes mention. It is a positive pleasure to recollect, that neither in the public acts nor private life of Wellington did anything ever occur which would justify us in assuming that he tolerated the infamous theory, that crimes might be committed under the sanction of reasons of state.

When Napoleon, after having lighted up again the flames of war in Europe, fell helpless into the hands of the allied generals, Blucher appealed to reasons of state when he desired to have him shot on the same place where the Duke d'Enghien had perished. But Wellington, though he considered the Emperor to be the main obstacle to public peace, refused to connect himself with that act of reprisal, declaring that he never would consent to play the part of an executioner.

Justice requires that we should say unreservedly, that with less of boldness and genius, Wellington possessed a greater amount of moral consideration as to the selection of his means; that he was a more scrupulous observer of his engagements, in short, a more honest man than the unmatched victor of Austerlitz. He was gifted, moreover, with a larger share of patience and tenacity, his judgment was more calm, and sometimes clearer. Throughout the Peninsular war, he gave proof, in a remarkable degree, of an amount of sagacity and foresight, such as occur only here and there in the letters of the Emperor.

From the very opening of the war, he saw clearly the part which he should be able to play in it; and he long maintained, without a single opinion being offered in support of his, that Portugal could be defended, that Spain could be delivered by the occupation of Lisbon, and that success in the Peninsula would bring about the overthrow of the French empire. Napoleon, on the contrary, was of opinion that Spain would not rise in arms, and that if it did there would be no difficulty whatever in putting down the insurrection.

On the 27th of August, 1808, he wrote to his brother: "Before the month of January you will have 100,000 men, and there will not

be left one insurgent village in Spain;" yet a few weeks subsequently, Joseph was driven back behind the Ebro, by the victorious insurrection.

On taking leave of the legislative body in order to proceed into Spain, he exclaimed: "As soon as I appear on the other side of the Pyrences, the frightened leopard will take refuge in the sea, in order to avoid disgrace, defeat, or death." And the leopard concluded by conquering Spain, and planting its foot upon the territory of France.

When Napoleon gave audience to the Corregidors at Madrid, he emphatically announced that "the Bourbons can no longer reign in Spain;" yet the Bourbons have reigned ever since, while he himself was dethroned by a Bourbon.

"No power," he said again, "can be permitted to exist on the continent under the influence of England;" yet England succeeded in asserting the existence of Spain and Portugal, in establishing in the north of France the hostile kingdom of the Netherlands, and in exercising over the continent a preponderating influence.

In 1807 he wrote to Joseph, King of Naples, "It is disgraceful to us that the English should be able to offer us any resistance by land;" yet the English, after eight years of resistance, drove out of Spain 300,000 Frenchmen.

Being still under his original delusion in regard to him whom he called "a sepoy officer," the Emperor said to Soult at Waterloo, "Because he beat you, you believe Wellington to be a great general;" and the same day Wellington obtained over him a victory more decisive than that of Jena, Austerlitz, and Wagram.

Napoleon was often mistaken in his estimate of the men and things of his age. Cambacères saw further than he into the affairs of Spain; and M. de Bourbonne took a more correct estimate of the probable results of the Russian campaign. What an amount of misery France might have escaped had she listened to the counsels of these faithful servants, whom ambition had not yet blinded! In Spain blunder followed blunder, as the captive of St. Helena has himself testified.* The continental blockade, large as the concep-

* M. Thiers has enumerated many of these blunders. We cannot, however, give our entire assent to the view which he takes of some of them. For example, we are far from believing that the Emperor would have done better had he preferred Murat to Joseph, "merely because the southern gaiety of Murat would have

tion was, proved, in effect, not less disastrous; because it converted into the allies of England all who were affected by it, by ruining their commerce; while it led to the Russian war, the indirect cause, not only of the loss of Spain, but the downfall of the French empire.

Napoleon's rupture with Prussia compelled him to seek the alliance, less firm and, in every point of view, less advantageous, of Austria.* And, finally, his blind confidence in the friendship of Alexander, and in the fidelity of the House of Hapsburg, proved mainly instrumental in inducing those frauds and disasters which marked the closing stages of the imperial era.

These facts, together with a review of the evils which Napoleon's ambition brought upon France, will convey to posterity a less exalted notion of the political abilities of the Emperor. Every system of government must be tested by the results to which it leads. Now his empire fell to pieces in spite of the genius of its founder; and this it is which must for ever detract from his glory, brilliant as the latter may be.

Wellington, a mere general and nothing more, never held the destinies of the world in his hand. The faithful servant of a second-rate power, he began his career with an army so weak and so little esteemed, that the prince of the Asturias declined his assistance, greatly preferring a subsidy in money. Nevertheless, with that little army, supported by the undisciplined soldiers of Spain, the Duke maintained himself during six years; amid all the difficulties which could be presented to him by political mismanagement and by war. He defeated, in twenty battles, the best troops and ablest generals of the empire.† He raised the military reputation of England to the highest pitch. He drove the French from the Peninsula; and, last of all, triumphed over the Emperor himself. When, after an absence of seven years, he revisited his native country, Great Britain had become, thanks to his genius for war, a military power of the first rank.

been more acceptable to the Spaniards." After his sanguinary suppression of the revolt, and the general knowledge of his violent and irritable disposition, he would have been peculiarly ill-suited to reconcile Spain to her proposed lot.

* Napoleon's alliance with Prussia offered great facilities for the restoration of Poland, and for striking a mortal blow at Austria; whereas the Austrian alliance had a tendency to estrange Russia, which estrangement actually occurred.

† We may go further, and say that these generals were, for the most part, superior to those with whom Napoleon contended both in Italy and Germany.

Such results, achieved with qualities less brilliant than those of the Emperor, and with means far more narrow, secure to Wellington a renown which will never pass away. Probably, no one will ever think of placing him upon the same level with the French conqueror, but impartial history will assign to him the second rank among the men of his age.

England estimates Wellington above Marlborough; and there is nothing in this adjustment of honours which ought to surprise us. With genius less expansive, Wellington effected far more important results, without having received the same measure of assistance, either from the generals in alliance with him, or from his auxiliary troops. The one depended on the co-operation of such men as Cuesta, Blake, Ballasteros, and was supported by the feeble and turbulent armies of Spain; the other had, as his adviser, Prince Eugène, the foremost military genius of his age, and for auxiliaries the excellent troops of Germany and Holland. It was the fortune of the one to carry on war upon every variety of field of action—on the burning deserts of India, amid the snowy passes of the Pyrenees, upon the fertile plains of Belgium; the other never operated except within the circumscribed theatre of the low country, and in the fertile valley of the Danube.

Wellington's opponents bore the illustrious names of Victor, Marmont, Soult, Massena, Napoleon; Marlborough encountered Tallard, Villeroy, Marsin. Wellington received orders and instructions which it was his duty rigidly to obey, and was obliged to consult, even in the conduct of military operations, the ministry, the parliament, and the Duke of York, commander-in-chief of the army. Marlborough, on the contrary, wielded power well nigh unlimited. He governed Queen Anne through the affection which she entertained for himself, and the influence of his wife, who was all-powerful at court. He managed parliament, which gave to him its entire confidence, as well as to the Lord Treasurer Godolphin, whose son had married his daughter. "Thus master of the Queen and of parliament, of the war, and of its resources, more of a King than William had ever been; as much of a politician, and a far greater commander, he accomplished more than the allies had ever ventured to hope for."*

Wellington's sword was his only fortune. He raised himself gradually by the force of his talents, of his courage, of his persever-

* Voltaire's "Age of Louis XIV."

ance; and he preserved, to the end of his life, through the ascendency of his character, not less than because of the prestige of his victories, a popularity which is without example in the annals of English history.

As a general he is worthy of all admiration; as a man he claims, and obtains, universal esteem. Truthful, loyal, hating intrigue, duplicity, and charlatanism, the qualities of his heart were at least equal to those of his mind.

Marlborough could lay no claim to such elevation of sentiment. A politician and a courtier, he became, by the favour of his wife, and the support of the Whigs, the general of an army. The victories which he won justified the selection, and fairly earned for him the renown of a great captain. But during the progress of his wars he had recourse to means for maintaining his influence, which the honest and honourable soul of Wellington would have scorned to employ. It is well known how the Duchess of Marlborough supported the credit of her husband at the court of Hanover; and how the Duke, in order to obtain a reinforcement of seven or eight thousand of the Duke of Brandenburg's soldiers, became the obsequious flatterer of that prince, and stooped so low as "to serve him with a napkin at table."* Yet, in the end, his proneness to intrigue, his ambition, his despotic proceedings, and, still more, the arrogance of his wife towards the Queen, cast him down in a moment from the loftiest position which had ever been held by an English subject since Cromwell.

Greedy of power and of wealth, a courtier and an intriguer, Marlborough bore no resemblance whatever to Wellington, except in his military genius and his marvellous ability in mastering the difficulties of politics and war. Both, moreover, though with different means, and by the application each of his special talent, attained the same result. When they first appeared upon the stage of public life, France had been an object of apprehension to Europe, and the English army was held in no account. By an improved organisation they gradually raised the credit of that army; and they ended by opposing an impassable barrier to French ambition.

The author of the "Age of Louis XIV." affirms that Marlborough proved to France the greatest check upon her greatness which had appeared for many ages. Historians yet to come will have the same

* Voltaire's "Age of Louis XIV."

thing to say of Wellington, "That general," says the Count de Biornstierna, "enjoyed, in point of fact, the good fortune, heretofore without an example, of deciding the fate of two hemispheres: that is to say, the fate of India, by the conquest of Tippoo and the Mahrattas; and that of Europe by the overthrow of the not less grinding dominion of Napoleon."

When all by whom we are now surrounded shall have passed away; when names now illustrious among us shall scarce be known to philosophers and antiquarians, one will yet remain in the mouths of the English people, encircled with a halo of glory,—it will be that of the great captain and great citizen, Wellington!

III.

The following is a list of the titles of honour borne by the Duke of Wellington, and read out by the herald over his grave:—

Most High Mighty and most Noble Prince, Duke of Wellington, Marquis of Wellington, Marquis of Douro, Earl of Wellington in Somerset, Viscount Wellington of Talavera, Baron Douro of Wellesley, Prince of Waterloo in the Netherlands, Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo in Spain, Duke of Bennoy in France, Duke of Vittoria, Marquis of Torres Vedras, Count of Vimiero in Portugal, a Grandee of the first class in Spain, a Privy Councillor, Commander-in-chief of the British Army, Colonel of the Grenadier Guards, Colonel of the Rifle Brigade, a Field Marshal of Great Britain, a Marshal of Russia, a Marshal of Austria, a Marshal of France, a Marshal of Prussia, a Marshal of Spain, a Marshal of Portugal, a Marshal of the Netherlands, a Knight of the Garter, a Knight of the Holy Ghost, a Knight of the Golden Fleece, a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath, a Knight Grand Cross of Hanover, a Knight of the Black Eagle, a Knight of the Tower and Sword, a Knight of St. Fernando, a Knight of William of the Low Countries, a Knight of Charles III., a Knight of the Sword of Sweden, a Knight of St. Andrew of Russia, a Knight of the Annunciado of Sardinia, a Knight of the Elephant of Denmark, a Knight of Maria Theresa, a Knight of St. George of Russia, a Knight of the Crown of Rue of Saxony, a Knight of Fidelity

of Baden, a Knight of Maximilian Joseph of Bavaria, a Knight of St. Alexander Newsky of Russia, a Knight of St. Hermenegilda of Spain, a Knight of the Red Eagle of Brandenburg, a Knight of St. Januarius, a Knight of the Golden Lion of Hesse Cassel, a Knight of the Lion of Baden, a Knight of Merit of Wurtemburg, the Lord High Constable of England, the Constable of the Tower, the Constable of Dover Castle, Warden of the Cinque Ports, Chancellor of the Cinque Ports, Admiral of the Cinque Ports, Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire, Lord Lieutenant of the Tower Hamlets, Ranger of St. James's Park, Ranger of Hyde Park, Chancellor of the University of Oxford, Commissioner of the Royal Military College, Vice President of the Scottish Naval and Military Academy, the Master of the Trinity House, a Governor of King's College, a Doctor of Laws, a Fellow of the Royal Society.

The Duke was Field Marshal in the armies of England, Russia, Austria, France, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. The batons which he received with his military rank from the sovereigns of these countries, as well as the insignia of his various orders, may be seen at Apsley House. There also are exhibited the costly presents of plate and china, which were made to him by the crowned heads of Europe. Of the statues and other monuments erected in various parts of Great Britain and Ireland to his honour, it is needless to speak. They meet the traveller everywhere; bearing testimony quite as strong to the gratitude, as to the taste in the fine arts of the British people.

IV.

THE LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS DRAWN FOR HIS OWN USE BY LORD CASTLEREAGH, AND TRANSFERRED WITHOUT ALTERATION TO THE DUKE, BEFORE HE PROCEEDED TO VERONA.

The subject matter upon which the allied ministers will have to deliberate at the approaching meeting of Vienna, may be classed under the following heads: —

1. The Turkish question, external and internal.
2. The Spanish question, European and American.
3. The affairs of Italy

As British points, the slave trade, the Austrian debt, and the late Russian ukase, will demand attention.

In treating of the three first heads, the last in order, viz. the affairs of Italy, may be regarded for the present as of very secondary importance. When it was determined, two years since, at Laybach, that a congress should be held in the autumn of 1822 at Florence, it was in the hope that the withdrawing the armies of occupation from the Sardinian and Neapolitan territories might by that time have become practicable; but so little progress has as yet been made in restoring the military efficiency of the army of either state, more particularly of the Neapolitan, that it is altogether improbable that the kings of Naples and Sardinia would consent to dispense for the present with the aid of the Austrian forces.

The political concerns and relations of the Italian states cannot, in themselves, give occasion to much deliberation. Upon these, the position of the British minister, consistently with the principles laid down at Trappau and Laybach must necessarily be somewhat distinct from that of his colleagues at Vienna, as we are no parties to the acts which were taken by the allied cabinet then assembled. We acquiesced in those measures, and reserved to ourselves the right to interfere when we saw occasion, but we did not agree to charge ourselves with any superintendence of the system decided on; and we may, therefore, regard the duty of the British plenipotentiary on Italian affairs, as limited to informing himself of what is going on, and taking care that nothing is done inconsistent with the general system of Europe and the observance of treaties.

The affairs of the East present a much more extended field for consideration.

Perhaps the better way to examine the future course to be pursued, will be to retrace the principles hitherto acted on.

After the breaking out of the Greek insurrection, which was very early followed by a succession of differences between the Russian and Turkish governments, which ended in the withdrawal of M. de Strogenoff from Constantinople, the object of all his Majesty's efforts was directed, first, to prevent a rupture between Russia and the Porte; secondly, to soften, as far as possible, the rigour of war between the Turks and Greeks; thirdly, to observe in the contest a strict neutrality.

In the progress of the discussions growing out of this complicated state of affairs, our object has been to obtain an equitable satisfaction

for Russia for admitted infractions of existing engagements, and to replace the lives, properties, and religion of the Greek population under the protection of treaties now in force.

In furtherance of this end, the ultimatum of Russia, delivered in to the Porte on the $\frac{6}{18}$th of July, 1821, has been made the substantial object of all our efforts; and, according to the latest accounts, the prospect of its acceptance and execution is now encouraging, if the events of war do not provoke the Turks to fresh acts of severity and resistance.

It is probable, before the British plenipotentiary can reach Vienna, that the issue of the negotiation committed to Lord Strangford will have been ascertained. As it is likely to end in a refusal by the Turkish government to send a plenipotentiary to the frontiers, the first object of the British negotiator's efforts should be, to prevent this refusal from leaving any unfavourable influence on the mind of the Emperor of Russia, and to reconcile his Imperial Majesty to the pursuit of the same end by varied means.

What most merits attention at the present moment as bearing upon the future state of the negotiation, is the degree in which the Ottoman naval power has been paralysed in the Levant; the total inactivity to which the Turkish commanders in the Morea have been reduced from the failure of all naval supports; the consequently probable fall of some of the Turkish fortresses; and the progress made by the Greeks towards the formation of a government.

This latter circumstance exhibits a new and altogether distinct view of the character of the contest. So long as the force of the insurgents was directed by the mere will of their leaders, the principle of neutrality led to no other consideration than that of giving an equal rule of accommodation to the parties; but by the erection of a government, admitting of formal acts being done on the part of that government, we are more positively brought to deal with them *de facto*, upon matters of blockade and other questions dependent upon the law of nations.

Considering the course pursued by Great Britain now for so many years, towards the local governments exercising dominion in South America, and her avowed neutrality as between the Greeks and the Turks, it may be difficult for this country, if a *de facto* government shall actually be established in the Morea and the western provinces of Turkey, to refuse to it the ordinary privileges of a

belligerent; but it must be done with caution and without ostentation; lest it should render the Turks wholly inaccessible to any remonstrances.

The course to be taken must be left to discussion on the spot; with reference home, if necessary.

Should an intervention be suggested between Turks and Greeks, directed either to submission upon amnesty and assurances of protection for persons, property, and religion, or to the creation of a qualified Greek government, in either case care must be taken not to commit this country to any immediate or eventual concert of this nature that shall go beyond the limits of good offers. Engagements in the nature of a guarantee are to be considered altogether inadmissible.

The Spanish question has been stated to divide itself into two branches, the European and the American.

With respect to the first, there seems nothing to add or to vary in the course of policy hitherto pursued. Solicitude for the safety of the royal family, observance of our engagements with Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country, must be considered as forming the bases of his Majesty's policy.

It is of great importance that the British plenipotentiary, on his passage through Paris, should have a full explanation with the French government, and should endeavour to come to some distinct understanding with them, founded upon the principles, the arguments in favour of which are too well understood to require insertion in the instructions.

The present state of South American affairs is of a more serious nature. If the actual governments of South America shall maintain themselves, and if Spain shall, neither by her counsels nor by her arms, re-establish her authority within a limited time, other states will acknowledge them, sooner or later; and it is the interest even of Spain herself to find the means of restoring an intercourse, where she cannot succeed in establishing a dominion. The whole may be regarded rather as a matter of time than of principle.

In looking at the question of time, there are three distinctions to be attended to in the position of the country, with reference to which the decision is to be formed.

1stly. The territories within which the contest still subsists.

2ndly. The territories in which the struggle may be said to be

over, and the possession become complete on the part of the local government; and,

3rdly. The states in actual or intended negotiation with old Spain.

In the first there can be no justifiable ground for recognition. The number of provinces in which any show of resistance can now be said to be made by Spain must be regarded as very limited.

In the third case, it is equally obvious that we should await the result of the negotiation.

It is upon the second case that the real question for discussion arises, and upon which the British plenipotentiary will have especially to explain himself to the allied courts.

In doing so he will recall to their attention the intercourse which during a long period of years has subsisted between Great Britain and the provinces so circumstanced, and the impossibility of its now being obstructed or checked, without the certainty of rousing the utmost spirit of discontent in the commercial world; that the British parliament, in its late session, has found it necessary to give to that intercourse a character of reciprocity, and to relax in its favour the former principle of our navigation act, viz. the exclusion of the produce of South America, except in British ships. The question then resolves itself into one, rather as to the mode of our relations, than as to whether they shall, or shall not, subsist to the extent in matter of right, as regulated by the law of nations. In judging this point, it is material to distinguish the following descriptions of recognition :—

1st. The recognition, *de facto*, which now substantially exists.

2nd. The more formal recognition of diplomatic agents.

3rd. The recognition, *de jure*, which professes to decide upon the title, and thereby to create a certain impediment to the assertion of the rights of the former occupant.

Now as to the last description of recognition, there can be no fair pretence for calling upon this country to commit herself by its adoption. It is for the two contending states themselves to settle the question of title; not for third parties to interfere. They have a motive of convenience in doing so, however difficult may be the adjustment.

The practical question, therefore, is, how long should the *de facto* system of recognition be maintained, to the exclusion of the diplomatic, and when should the latter be adopted?

Some of the cases, where the adoption of such a change would be positively objectionable, have already been stated. To these may be added, the propriety, in many others, if not the necessity, of a previous explanation with Spain and our allies. With the former certain communications have already taken place. It will be the duty of the British plenipotentiary to enter into discussion with the allied cabinets, endeavouring, as far as possible, to bring them to the adoption of common sentiments; but taking care in every alternative to leave to the British government an independent discretion to act according to circumstances.

There only remain for special instruction, the slave trade, the Austrian debt, and the late Russian ukase.

The slave trade requires no comment.

The British plenipotentiary cannot press too strongly some settlement of the British claims, in the next question. The arguments and principles on which they are to be urged will be found in the previous correspondence.

Upon the Russian ukase, the objections to its enactment upon principle are set forth in the note addressed to Count Lieven, in reply to his communication of the ukase to the British government. The duty of the British plenipotentiary will be to bring the Russian cabinet to some determinate explanation as to the mode in which the difference of opinions on this instrument may be reconciled.

INDEX.

INDEX.

Adour, passage of the, ii. 193.
Adrianople, treaty of, Wellington's dissatisfaction with, iii. 369.
Agra, surrender of, i. 103.
Agricola, resemblance of Wellington to Tacitus's portrait of, iv. 355.
Ahmednugger, capture of, i. 104.
Alava, General, his anecdote of Wellington at Quatre-Bras, iv. 251.
Albuera, battle of, i. 393.
Alexander, Emperor, nature of the Holy Alliance as projected by him, iii. 59; renounces his liberal sympathies, 105; interview of with Wellington at Vienna, 137; his dynastic arrangements and death, 197, 201.
Alexander the Great, comparison of Napoleon with, iv. 218.
Allan, the painter, and the Duke of Wellington, iv 252.
Allen, William, the Quaker, interview of Wellington with, at Vienna, iii. 489; lectures the emperors and kings at Verona on the iniquity of the slave-trade, 140.
Allighur, fort of, taken, i. 102.
Almaraz, forts of captured by Hill, ii. 9.
Almeida besieged and taken by Massena, i. 309; invested by Campbell, 375; escape of the garrison, 381.
Angers, Military College of, Duke of Wellington educated at, i. 6.
Anglesey, Marquess of, urges the repeal of the Roman Catholic disabilities, iii. 335.
Angoulême, Duc d', his impatience resisted by Wellington, ii. 205, 209, 347; liberated by Napoleon, 381.
Apsley House windows respected by the mob, iii. 101; smashed in the Reform tumults, 409, 417.
Arbuthnot, Mr., friendship of Wellington for, iv. 150; last illness and death of, 151.
Areyzaga, General, defeated at Ocana, i. 285.
Argaum, battle of, i. 117.
Armies, instances of chivalrous conduct of the English and French, iv. 326—330.
Army, British, character of, iv. 286—290.
—— French, causes of its weakness, ii. 235; injured by the system of requisitions, 235; and by the quarrels of the generals, 249; its want of discipline, 255; cruelties perpetrated by, iv. 281—284.
Army, Portuguese, formed by Marshal Beresford, i. 229; character of, ii. 317.
—— Spanish, amount of, ii. 311; its generals, ignorant, 312; undisciplined, 314; isolated acts of bravery, 316; improved in 1812, 319.
Assaye, battle of, i. 106.
Asturias, population of, always hostile to the English, ii. 309.

Badajoz besieged and taken by Soult, i. 354, 356; invested by Beresford, 389; reinvested by Wellington, 404; siege raised, 407; reinvested and taken, 438—450.
Baird, General, leads the assault on Seringapatam, i. 65; hurt at not being appointed commandant there, 70; sent to Egypt with the Bombay army, 86; commands a division in Spain, i. 215, 220, 223.
Ballesteros defeated by Soult, i. 355; degraded, ii. 77; his misconduct, 321.
Barouilhet, affair of, ii. 179.
Battles; Alcabon, i. 263; Argaum, i. 117; Assaye, i. 106; Barouilhet, ii. 279; Busaco, i. 317; Corunna, i. 225; Delhi; i. 102; Elbodon, i. 413; Fuentes d' Onoro, i. 378; Furukabad, i. 130; Gebora, i. 365; Laswarrie, i. 103; Ligny, i. 414—418; Mallavelly, i. 56; Nive, ii. 181; Ocana, i. 285; Orthez, ii. 199; Quatre Bras, ii. 421; Rorissa, i. 192; Salamanca, ii. 32—37; Salinas, i. 264; San Martial, ii. 147; Saurorem, ii. 129; Sedaseer, i. 55; St. Pierre, heights of, ii. 181; Talavera, i. 267; Toulouse, ii. 217; Tudela, i. 216; Vimiera, i. 196; Vittoria, ii. 102; Waterloo, ii. 449—468.
Bayonne invested, ii. 195.
Belchite, cowardice of the Spaniards under Blake at, ii. 315.
Belgium, blunders in the campaign of 1794,

i. 14; English army evacuates, 18; causes of failure, 19.
Berar, Rajah of, i. 90; enters into alliance with Scindia, 98; defeated at Laswarrie, 103; and at Ahmednugger, 104; overthrown at Assaye, 106; and at Argaum, 117; concludes a treaty of alliance with the British, 120.
Beresford, General, sent to remodel the Portuguese army, i. 229; advances against Badajoz, 387; besieges it, 389; raises the siege, 391; defeats Soult at Albuera, 393; occupies Bordeaux, ii. 209; critical situation, 217; his successful flank march on Mount Rave, 218—221; dismissed from the Portuguese service, iii. 104.
Bidassoa, passage of the, ii. 152—156.
Biornstierna, Count, his opinion of British rule in India, i. 137.
Birmingham Political Union, iii. 372.
Blandford, Marquess of, proposes a sweeping measure of Parliamentary Reform, iii. 373.
Blucher, Marshal, remarks of Wellington after surveying his position, ii. 413; defeated by Napoleon at Ligny, 414—418; meeting with Wellington at the Maison du Roi, 469; his activity, 481; the victory at Waterloo unjustly claimed for, 488; marches on Paris, 498; his vindictive feeling towards the French, 500, 504, 511.
Bordeaux occupied by the Allies, ii. 195.
Boroughs nomination, Wellington's view of, iii. 374.
Bourquien, Louis, defeated at Delhi, i. 102.
Brennier, General, cuts his way out of Almeida, i. 381.
Brigands, a body of, destroyed on the Deccan frontier, i. 123.
Brinjarries, their value as a commissariat, i. 113, 153.
Bucharest, treaty of, iii. 207.
Burdett, Sir Francis, carries a motion for the relief of the Roman Catholics, iii. 286.
Burgos, castle of, successfully defended by Dubreton, ii. 51—57; effect of retreat from in England and Spain, 73—75; blown up by Joseph, 95.
Burgoyne, Sir John, letter from Wellington to on the national defences, iv. 180.
Burrard, Sir Harry, receives a command in the Spanish expedition, i. 183; his incapacity, 195; public indignation against, 202.
Busaco, battle of, and its results, i. 317, 319.

Cabrera, sufferings of French prisoners on the island of, iv. 331 *note*.
Calvo causes the murder of Frenchmen at Cordova, i. 179.
Cambacères, M., dinner anecdote of, iv. 258.
Cameron, Colonel Powlett, on the vices of interior administration in India, i. 140.
Campbell, Sir Colin, anecdotes of, iv. 156.
Canning, George, takes office as Foreign Secretary, iii. 123; discusses the Spanish question with Chateaubriand, 162; formally acknowledges the Spanish Colonies, 173; his ministerial conduct, 173, 223; instructions to Wellington on his Russian mission, 202—204; appointed Prime Minister, 225; his manner of seeking the appointment, 227—230; corresponds with Wellington, 231—235; his Corn Bill defeated, 248—251; defeated on the Penryn and East Retford franchise extension bill, 251; his death, 254.
Cantillon attempts to assassinate Wellington, iii. 61; tried and acquitted, 64; Napoleon's bequest to, paid by Louis Napoleon, 65.
Caroline, Queen, measures regarding, iii. 89, 96; arrives in London, 98; her trial and its consequences, 99; her funeral, 111.
Carnacero M., his interview with Wellington at Verona, iii. 154.
Cartaxo, Wellington entrenches himself at, i. 350.
Castlereagh, his letter of instructions for the English ambassador at the Congress of Verona, iv. 372. *See* Londonderry, Marquess of.
Cato Street conspiracy, iii. 90—95.
Caulincourt, General, his cruelties at Cuença approved of by Napoleon, iv. 284.
Channel Islands, their importance for the defence of England, iv. 176.
Chartists, measures of Wellington to meet the expected outbreak of, on 10th April, 1848, iv. 191.
Chateaubriand, M. de, discusses the Spanish question with Canning, iii. 162.
Chincon, massacre by the French on the capture of, iv. 283.
Choumara, Captain, memorandum of Wellington on his pamphlet regarding the battle of Toulouse, ii. 334—335.
Cinque Ports, Wellington last Lord-Warden of the, iv. 88.
Cintra, convention of, i. 200; public indignation excited by, 202; verdict of Court of Inquiry, 204
Ciudad Rodrigo, siege of, by Marshal Ney, i. 306; surrenders, 308; blockaded by Wellington, 411; blockade raised, 412; taken, 425—430.

Clausel, General, critical position of, ii. 110.
Clausewitz, General, strictures by the Duke of Wellington on his narrative, ii. 523.
Coimbra surprised by Colonel Grant, i. 323; atrocities of the French troops at, i. 365.
Colonies, Spanish, troubles in, i. 330; Wellington's opinion regarding, 338.
Condé, Prince of, his magnanimity, iv. 349; his reasons for not writing his own memoirs, 350.
Constantine, Grand-Duke, set aside by Alexander, iii. 197; visit of Wellington to, 215.
Copenhagen, Sir Arthur Wellesley commands a division in the expedition against, i. 159; bombarded and taken, 161.
Cordova, Frenchmen murdered at, i. 179.
Corn Laws, growing hostility to, iv. 119; Sir Robert Peel's propositions for modifying, 119; Wellington's course regarding, 120; Sir Robert's bill for their repeal introduced, 121.
Cortès, folly of, ii. 301; on the point of treating with Joseph before the battle of Salamanca, 310.
Corunna, battle of, i. 225.
Cox, Colonel, defends Almeida unsuccessfully, i. 309.
Craddock, Sir John, appointed to the command in Portugal, i. 228.
Crawfurd, General, his rapid march to Talavera, i. 271; attacked by Ney at Almeida, 308; slain at Ciudad Rodrigo, 428.
Croker, John Wilson, friendship of Wellington for, iv. 150.
Cuença, cruelties of Caulincourt at, approved of by Napoleon, iv. 284.
Cuesta, defeated by Marshal Victor, i. 238; his obstinacy, 255; ignorance and presumption, 259, 260; defeated by Victor at Alcabon, 263; places himself under the orders of Wellesley, 263; his incapacity, 273; resigns his command, 274; his misconduct at Talavera, 320.
Currency question, Wellington's views on, iv. 35—37.
Curtis, Dr., his correspondence with Wellington regarding the Roman Catholic question, iii. 339; and with Lord Anglesey, 341.

Dalmatia, Duke of, *see* Soult.
Dalrymple, Sir Hew, appointed to the command of the Spanish expedition, i. 183; negotiates the convention of Cintra, 200; public indignation against, 202.
D'Argenton's plot, i. 243.
Dawson, George, his speech in allusion to the Roman Catholic question, iii. 334.
Del Parque routed by Kellermann, i. 286.
Despatches, French, extraordinary difficulty in the transmission of, ii. 269—272.
Dhoondiah Waugh, campaign of Colonel Wellesley against, i. 78; defeated and slain, 82.
Donna Maria, appointed to the throne of Portugal by her father, iii. 193; supplanted by her uncle, 290; arrives in England, 292; seated on the Portuguese throne, iv. 69.
Douro, passage of the, i. 247.
Dowlat Rao, *see* Berar, Rajah of.
Dubreton, General, defends the castle of Burgos successfully, ii. 51—57.
Duel between the Duke of Wellington and Lord Winchelsea, iii. 351—360.
East Retford question, Canning defeated on, iii. 251; Huskisson's vote on leads to his resignation, 267—278.

Elbodon, extraordinary exploit at the affair of, i. 413; iv. 106.
Engineer stores, deficiency of, ii. 284.
Engineers badly trained, ii. 287.
England, state of in 1814—1818, iii. 74—76; discontent in the manufacturing districts, 76; collision at Manchester, 78; yeomanry and pensioners called out, 80; the "Six Acts," 84; Queen's trial and its consequences, 96—98; commencement of the Reform and Free Trade movements, 102; the Roman Catholic Question, 117; commencement of commercial relaxations, 177; consequent prosperity, 179; Canning administration, 225—254; Goderich administration, 255—258; Wellington administration, 258—397; repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, 282; sliding-scale Corn law passed, 287; Roman Catholic relief bill passed, 362; effects of the French Revolution of 1830 on, 379; agricultural disturbances, 382; Grey administration, 400; reform bill tumults, 409, 416; reform bill passed, iv. 62; Melbourne administration, 73; Peel administration, 78; Wellington's plan for the defence of, 176; ignorance of military matters in, 301.
Enthusiasm, Spanish, evanescent, ii. 306.
Erlon, Count d', at Quatre-Bras, ii. 427.
Essling, Prince of, *see* Massena.
Eton, Duke of Wellington undistinguished at, i. 5.
Exeter, Bishop of, his advice to Wellington on the recovery of the latter, and the Duke's reply, iv. 160.

Ferdinand, liberated by Napoleon, ii. 187; his ingratitude to the Spanish people, 187.
Flogging in the army, Wellington's reasoning in defence of, iv. 292.
Fouché, Joseph, hopelessness of maintaining the imperial dynasty seen by, ii. 382; his duplicity, 395; not trusted by Wellington, 396; nominated member of the provisional government, 497; thwarts Napoleon, 505; arranges Napoleon's flight, 505; negotiates with Wellington, 506; gained over to Louis XVIII. by Wellington, 509; and made minister of police, 510; hated by the royalist party, iii. 2; supplies money and passports for the escape of Ney and Labedoyère, 9; letter of Wellington to Louis XVIII. regarding, iv. 352.
Foy, General, retreat of, to the Bidassoa, ii. 111; at Quatre-Bras, ii. 423.
Foz d'Arunce, affair of, i. 363.
France, effect of the revolution of 1830 in, on the rest of Europe, iii. 378; on England, iii. 379.
Free Trade movement, commencement of, iii. 103; commencement of the change of policy regarding, 177.
Freyre, cowardice of the Spaniards under at Toulouse, ii. 317 *note;* and at Braga, 318; murdered by his troops, 318.
Fuentes d'Onoro, battle of, i. 377.
Furakabad, defeat of Holkar at, i. 130.

Gebora, defeat of the Spaniards at, i. 355.
Generals, English, inferior to French, ii. 294; Spanish, ignorant, 312; and misconducted, 320.
George IV., his measures regarding the Queen, iii. 89, 95; coronation, 111; anecdote of his visit to the field of Waterloo, 113; his coolness towards Lord Liverpool, 115; appoints Canning prime minister, 225; appoints Wellington prime minister, 258; assents to a Relief bill, 344; retracts his assent, 347; interview with his ministers, 346—348; renews his assent, 348; his death and character, 376.
Goderich, Lord, appointed prime minister, iii. 255—258.
Gordon, Sir Willoughby, instance of Wellington's self-possession in connexion with, iv. 255.
Government, home, its interference in the direction of the war injurious, ii. 277—284.
Governments, military, established in Spain by Napoleon, ii. 256; complained of by Joseph, 258.
Grampound, disfranchisement of, iii. 102.
Grant, Colonel, surprises Coimbra, i. 323.
Greece, insurrection in, iii. 253.
Grey, Earl, his interview with Lord Wharncliffe regarding the Reform bill, iv. 9; result of a second, 27; carries the first reading in the Lords, 47; defeated on going into committee, he resigns, 54; resumes office, 59; carries the bill, 62; resigns, 72.
Grouchy, Marshal, despatched in pursuit of Blucher, ii. 433; his movements, 441—444, 450; his exculpation, 472—476; engages Thielman's corps, 493.
Guarda, defeat of Sylveira by Marmont at the, i. 457.
Guerillas, their objects and barbarity, ii. 267; interrupt intercommunication, 269—272; armed by England, 311; mischief of the system, 323.
Guingret, Captain, his exploit at the bridge of Tordesillas, ii. 63.
Gurwood, Colonel, appointed Lieutenant of the Tower, iv. 90.

Hannibal, parallel between Wellington and, iv. 219; considered by Wellington the greatest of all generals, 359.
Harris, General, ascendency of Colonel Wellesley over, 51; takes the field against Tippoo, 53; besieges and takes Seringapatam, 57—67.
Herries, Mr., appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, iii. 255; his differences with Mr. Huskisson, 256—258.
High Wickham, Wellington's opinion of the staff-school at, ii. 287.
Hill, General, captures the forts of Almaraz, ii. 9; retreats before Soult, 65; repulses Soult at the heights of St. Pierre, 181; drives back Harispe, 193; pursues Soult, 200; defeats Clausel, 201, 212; appointed commander-in-chief, 260; complimented by Soult at Apsley House, iv. 92; dies, 97.
Hindoos, Colonel Wellesley's character of the, i. 26.
Holkar defeats Scindia and the Peishwa, i. 91; destroys a detachment under Colonel Monson, 129; defeated at Furakabad, 130; totally routed, 131.
Holy Alliance, its object and character as projected by the Emperor Alexander, iii. 53.
Hope, General, repulses Soult at Barouilhet, ii. 179; his operations on the Adour, 194; invests Bayonne, 195.
Hougoumont, attacked by Jerome's division, ii. 449; on fire, 455.
Howick, Lord, his motion for Parliamentary reform, iii. 373.
Hume, Dr., his account of the duel between

Wellington and the Earl of Winchelsea, iii. 351—360.
Hunt, Henry, the "radical," iii. 77; arrested at Manchester, 78.
Huskisson, Mr., his correspondence with Wellington on Canning's Corn bill, iii. 249; differences with Mr. Herries, 256—258; rebuked by Wellington, 261; his vote on the East Retford question, 266; resignation, and correspondence with Wellington, 267—278; his vote unjustifiable, 279; abortive attempt at reconciliation with Wellington, 367; his death, 384.

India, memoranda by Colonel Wellesley on the policy to be pursued in, i. 30, 32—41; Raymond organises troops for the Nizam, 31; ingratitude of France to her statesmen in, 35; state of, on the appointment of Lord Mornington, 36; character of his policy, 37; effects of British rule, 134; opinion of Count Biornstierna, 137; opinions of Sir Henry Russell and Lord Metcalfe, 138; vices of interior administration, 139.
Ireland, erroneous opinions on the causes of discontent in, iii. 179; evils of its condition, 180; their remedies, 181; Catholic Association, 182; Orange Lodges, 183; Emancipation bill carried in the Commons, 184, 286; organised agitation in, 289; state of, 304, 305, 309—312; Roman Catholic Relief bill passed, 362; not pacified by this measure, 371.
"Iron Duke," origin of the name, iv. 305.

Joseph advances to meet the Allies, i. 260; defeated at Talavera, 267; falls back, 271; his tactics, 276; defeats Areyzaga, 285; overruns Andalusia, 289; advances towards Salamanca, ii. 40; retreats upon Madrid, 42; moves towards Valencia, 44; denounced as a traitor by Soult, 59; gives him the command, 66; procures his recall, 83; arrives at Valladolid, 85; routed at Vittoria, 102—105; deprived of his command, 124; his character, and correspondence with Napoleon, 237—243; pecuniary embarrassment, 261; Napoleon's opinion of him, 266.
Junot, invasion of Portugal by the French army under, i. 170; defeated at Vimiera, 196; convention of Cintra, 200; incurs the displeasure of Napoleon, 207.

Kellermann routs Del Parque, i. 286; letter of Wellington to, soliciting his good offices for the British wounded and prisoners, iv. 326; at Quatre-Bras, ii. 424.
Kirkpatrick, Colonel, troops of the Nizam disarmed by, i. 43.

Labedoyère, Colonel, execution of, iii. 9.
Laborde, defeated at Rorissa, i. 192.
Labour question, Wellington's views on, iv. 34.
Lake, General, advances against Perron, i. 101; takes Allighur, 102; defeats Holkar at Furakabad, 130; raised to the peerage, 144.
Lamore, General, his malevolence towards Wellington, iv. 280 *note*.
Lannes, Marshal, defeats the Spaniards at Tudela, i. 216.
Laswarrie, battle of, i 103.
La Haie-Sainte, attack on, ii. 453.
Lavallette, escape of, iii, 44.
Lerida, Suchet's barbarous stratagem at the siege of, iv. 283.
Leslie, the painter, anecdote of, and the Duke of Wellington, iv. 173.
Leyria, severity of Wellington in repressing plundering at, i. 322; atrocities of the French troops at, iv. 282.
Ligny, battle of, ii. 414—418.
Liverpool and Manchester railway, death of Mr. Huskisson at the opening of, iii. 384.
Liverpool, Lord, his illness and character, iii. 222.
Londonderry, Marquess of, exhibits symptoms of insanity, iii, 118; his death, 119: the success of the Allies in 1814 mainly due to his wisdom and decision, 120 *note*; his instructions for Wellington as ambassador at the Congress of Vienna, 127—130, iv. 372.
Louis XVIII. his reactionary policy, ii. 372—377; flies from Paris, 381; resumes the government, iii. 3; reply of Wellington to, on the discourtesy of the French marshals, 25; warned by Wellington against the extreme views of his brothers, 39; changes the constitution, 43; change in the electoral law, 108; changes his ministers, 107—109; dissuaded by Wellington from withdrawing his minister from Madrid, 112; his crooked policy, 161.
Lowe, Sir Hudson, unjustly charged with cruelty, iv. 334 *note*.
Mackay, Captain, anecdote of his bravery, iv. 295.
Madrid, entry of Wellington into, ii. 44; entry of Ferdinand, 188.
Mahratta war, i. 89—129.
Mallavelly, battle of, i. 56.

Manchester, collision at, iii. 76.
Marches, rapid, of English troops, ii. 289.
Marlborough, parallel between Wellington and, iv. 225; contrasted with Wellington, iv. 369—371.
Marmont, General, succeeds Massena in command of the army of Portugal, i. 397; attacks Wellington at Elbodon, 413; marches to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, 431; prepares to support Badajoz, 433; prevented by Napoleon, 434; defeats Sylveira, 457; re-enters Salamanca, 457; prepares for the campaign of 1812, ii. 14; wounded at Salamanca, 34; defeated, 36; blamed by the emperor, 38.
Massena sent to finish the war in Spain, i. 292; unwilling to go, 305; invests and takes Almeida, 309; defeated at Busaco, 317; retreats, 319; his critical position, 321; arrives in front of Torres Vedras, 324; withdraws to Santarem, 347; refused supplies by Napoleon, 350; retreats, 357; atrocities of his troops, 365; his endeavours to repress them, 366; his embarrassments, 367; discord amongst his generals, 368; crosses the Agueda, 369; review of the campaign, 370; attempts the relief of Almeida, 375; attacks Fuentes d'Onoro, 377; repulsed, 381; unjustly treated by Napoleon, 384; his want of success attributable to the vagueness of the emperor's orders, ii. 264; considered by Wellington the best of the French marshals, iv. 155; barbarities perpetrated by, during his retreat, 282.
Melbourne, Viscount, appointed Prime Minister, iv. 73; resigns, 76; resigns a second time, 93.
Mendezabal defeated by Soult, i. 354.
Metcalfe, Lord, his opinion of British rule in India, i. 138.
Miguel, Don, usurps the throne of Portugal, iii. 290; driven away, iv. 69.
Mohiput Ram, anecdote of, in connexion with General Wellesley, i. 149.
Moira, Lord, sent with reinforcements to the Netherlands, i. 12.
Monson, Colonel, a detachment under, destroyed by Holkar, i. 129.
Montbrun, his unsuccessful attack at Fuentes d'Onoro, i. 379.
Montressor, Colonel, his affair with Tippoo, i. 55.
Moore, Sir John, hampered through the ignorance of the British ministry, i. 210; at Salamanca, 219; his plans for advancing on Madrid, 221; commences his retreat, 223; battle of Corunna, 225; his death, 225; Soult's testimony to his merit, 226.
Mornington, Countess of, i. 4; prejudiced against her son Arthur, afterwards Duke of Wellington, 5.
Mornington, first Earl of, i. 4.
Mornington, second Earl of, appointed Governor-General of India, i. 30; state of India, 36; character of his policy, 37; applies for permission to return to England, 131; created Marquess Wellesley, 132; successfully defended by Sir Arthur Wellesley in the House of Commons, 157; sent as minister to Spain, 287; takes office as Minister for foreign affairs, 294; his letter regarding Wellington's sons' college exercises, iv. 166.
Moscow, disaster of, its effect on the Peninsular campaign, ii. 325.
Moskowa, Prince of, *see* Ney.
Murat, his conduct to the royal family of Spain, i. 173; puts down a tumult in Madrid, 174; remarks of Napoleon to, regarding the insurrection, 178, his movements in Italy, ii. 371.

Napier, Sir Charles, on the vices of the interior administration of India, i. 139; Wellington's opinion of, iv. 117.
Napoleon Bonaparte, his birth and that of Wellington fell in the same year, i. 2; prepares at Boulogne for a naval expedition against England, 155; Pitt's prophecy regarding, 164; his projects regarding the Peninsula, 165; seizes Portugal, 170; policy regarding Spain, 171; sends troops into Spain, 172; perplexed by the Spanish insurrection, 177; his strictures on the battle of Vimiera, 197; resolves to take the command in Spain, 212; speech to the senate, 213; military operations, 215; takes Madrid, 217; advances against Sir John Moore, 222; returns to Paris, 223; plan of the campaign for the recovery of Portugal, 235; despatches Massena to finish the war in Spain, 292; reasons for having authorised Joseph's invasion of Andalusia, 312; refuses supplies to Massena, 350; his solicitude about Spain, 398; withdraws troops from the Peninsula for the Russian campaign, 419; prevents Marmont from covering Badajoz, 434; instructs his generals regarding Badajoz, 455; his injustice towards Marmont, ii. 38; liberates Ferdinand, 187; his correspondence with Joseph, 238—242; his opinion of him, 266; his attempt to direct the Spanish war contributes to its failure, 263; his Peninsular mistakes, 327—333; compared with Wellington, 333; returns from Elba, 372; arrives in Paris, 381;

his policy, 381; tries to negotiate, 382; prepares for war, 384; plan of the campaign, 393; his forces, 394; opens the campaign, 403; arrives before Fleurus, 411; defeats Blucher at Ligny, 414; his orders to Grouchy, 433; arrives in front of the Allies at Waterloo, 439; his plan of attack, 448; the battle, 449—468; anxious to die in Cambronne's square, 468; arrives at Paris, 494; abandoned, 495; abdicates a second time, 497; withdraws to Malmaison, 503; his flight, 505; Wellington's opinion of, iv. 155; instance of his influence over his troops, 158; not a parallel to Wellington, 216; compared with Alexander, 218; approved of Caulincourt's cruelty at Cuença, 284; his influence over his troops contrasted with that of Wellington, 290; ordered a useless attack for the gratification of an Italian lady, 298 *note*; his fall foreseen by Wellington, 315; his uniform refusal to exchange prisoners, 332 *note*; his execution opposed by Wellington, 332; his legacy to the assassin Cantillon, 333; his ill-treatment at St. Helena exaggerated, 334; his injustice towards his generals, 349, 350 *note*; contrasted with Wellington, 360—369; in genius, 360; in style, 361; in statesmanship, 361; in resources, 362; in strategy and tactics, 364; in political morality, 365; in foresight, 366; in ultimate success, 368.

Newspapers, English, supplied the best information to the French commanders, ii. 272.

Ney, Marshal, besieges and takes Ciudad Rodrigo, i. 306, 308; attacks Crawfurd at Almeida, 308; dismissed by Massena from his command, 368; delivers up Lyons to Napoleon, ii. 372; his pretended devotion to Louis XVIII., 379; arrives at Napoleon's camp, 405; ordered to carry the position of Quatre-Bras, 406; defeated, 420–425; at Waterloo, 452, 458, 465; supplied with the means of escape by Fouché, iii. 9, 12; arrested, 15; executed, 16; his case considered, 9—19.

Nicholas, Emperor, his character, iii. 198; interview with Wellington, 206; negotiations with, 206—214; his regard for Wellington, 215.

Nive, passage of the, ii. 178; battle of the, 181.

Nivelle, passage of the, ii. 172.

Nizam, troops organised for by Raymond, and officered by Frenchmen, i. 31; policy of the British towards, 32; treaty with, 41; his troops disarmed, 43.

Oastler, Richard, his interview with the Duke of Wellington, iv. 253.

Ocana, battle of, i. 285.

O'Connell, Daniel, establishes the Catholic Association, iii. 182; returned for Clare, 288.

Officers, English, inefficiency of, ii. 293.

Oporto, junta formed in, i. 177; bishop of, takes an active part in the insurrection, 191, 201.

Oporto, cruelties of the French at, iv. 282.

Orange, Prince of, overpowered by Ney at Quatre-Bras, ii. 421, 426; wounded at Waterloo, 465.

Orthez, battle of, ii. 199.

Otranto, Duke of, see Fouché.

Oxford, Wellington elected chancellor of the University of, iv. 84; its interests watched over by, 83.

Packenham, Lady Catherine, i. 12; married to Sir Arthur Wellesley, 157; her death, iv. 86.

Pampeluna surrenders, ii. 159.

Parliament, Reform of, motions for obtaining, iii. 379; Wellington's declaration against, 389; Lord John Russell's measure, 402—408; rejected by the Lords, 416; consequent tumults, 416; negotiations of Lord Wharncliffe and Harrowby regarding, iv. 5—28; Lord Wharncliffe urges concession, 39; first reading in the Lords, 47; second reading carried, 48; receives the royal assent, 62.

Pedro, Don, retains the empire of Brazil, and seats his daughter on the throne of Portugal, iii. 198.

Peel, Sir Robert, his plan for settling the Roman Catholic question, iii. 328-331; he wavers, 336; is persuaded by Wellington to remain in office, 342; resigns his seat for Oxford, 345; his interview with the king, 346—348; introduces the Roman Catholic relief bill, 349; his forgery bill defeated, 376; appointed Prime Minister, iv. 78; his manifesto, 79; resigns, 83; resumes office, 97; his administration successful, 117; his propositions to his colleagues for modifying the Corn Laws, 119; resigns, 123; introduces his bill for the repeal of the Corn Laws, 131; Wellington's testimony to his truthfulness, 198.

Peishwa, the, defeated by Holkar, i. 91; takes refuge with the British, 92; restored to his throne, 98.

Peninsula, ignorance of the British ministry regarding, and its consequences, i. 210; cost of the war, ii. 282.

Pennenden Heath, great meeting at, iii. 338.
Perponcher, General, his services at Quatre-Bras, ii. 422 *note.*
Perron, native forces organised by, i. 93; his treason and departure, 102.
"Peterloo," collision at Manchester, so-called, iii. 76.
Philippon defends Badajoz without success, i. 439–450.
Picton, General, leads an assault on Badajoz, i. 446; death of, ii. 453.
Pitt, William; his prophecy regarding a Spanish war, i. 164.
Pombal, affair of, i. 360.
Ponsonby, General, death of, ii. 454.
Portugal, invasion of, by the French, i. 169; English troops arrive under Wellesley, 189; battle of Rorissa, 192; battle of Vimiera, 196; convention of Cintra, 200; reorganisation of the army, 229; second invasion, 233; condition of the country, 293, 339; third invasion, 299; sufferings of the people during Massena's operations, 373; state of at the commencement of the campaign of 1812, ii. 5; cost of the war to England, 232; revolution in, iii. 104; suppressed, 169; Miguelite troubles, 193; Miguelite revolution in, 290; Donna Maria placed on the throne, iv. 69.
Protestants, Irish, meeting of in Dublin disapproved of by Wellington, iv. 31.
Provisionment, English, its advantages and disadvantages, ii. 274—277.

Quatre-Bras, battle of, ii. 421—424; narrow escape of Wellington at, 425; services of General Perponcher at, 422 *note.*

"Radical Reformers" first so named, iii. 77.
Ragusa, Duke of, see Marmont.
Redinha, affair of, i. 360.
Reform movement, commencement of, iii. 102.
Requisitions, military, bad effects of the sytem of, ii. 328.
Retiro, at Madrid taken, ii. 45; the garrison plundered and murdered by their Spanish escort, 45.
Rey, General, defends San Sebastian, ii. 116—123, 135—137; retires to the castle on Mount Orgullo, 139; capitulates, 140.
Ridge, Colonel, his exploit and death at Badajoz, i. 446.
Roman Catholic question, views of Wellington on, iii. 218, 295—300; his plan for settlement of, 314—327; Peel's plan, 328—331; finally settled, 362.
Romana, cowardice of the Spanish volunteers under, ii. 315.
Rorissa, battle of, i. 192.
Royal Society, Wellington a member of, iv. 259.
Russell, Lord John, carries a motion for repealing the Test and Corporation Act, iii. 282; his motion to enfranchise Manchester, Leeds, and Birmingham, 373; his Reform bill, 402—408.
Russell, Sir Henry, his opinion of British rule in India, i. 138.
Russia encourages Napoleon in his designs on Spain, i. 213 *note.*

Salamanca, forts besieged and taken, ii. 17—23; battle of, 32—36; an instance of Wellington's self-possession previous to, iv. 254.
Saldanha, Marquis of, arrives in England with Donna Maria, iii. 292; organises an expedition in favour of, 293.
Salinas, affair of, i. 264.
San Martial, repulse of Soult at, ii. 147.
San Sebastian, siege of, ii. 116—123; renewed, 135; stormed, 137; calumnies refuted, 142.
Santarem, Massena withdraws to, i. 346.
Saragossa, massacre by the French on the capture of, iv. 283.
Sauroren, battle of, ii. 129.
Scindia, defeated by Holkar, i. 91; campaign against, 93; defeated at Laswarrie, 103; overthrown at Assaye, 106; and at Argaum, 117; concludes a treaty of alliance with the British, 120.
Sebastiani defeats Cartajal, i. 239.
Sedaseer, repulse of Tippoo at, i. 55.
Sepoys, Wellington's opinion of, iv. 258.
Seringapatam, siege of, i. 57—69; republican club at, 69.
Shah Alum ruled by Dowlat Rao, i. 90; in the power of Perron, 93; restored and recognised by the British, 102.
Sieges: Agra, i. 103; Ahmednugger, i. 104; Allighur, i. 102; Almeida (Ney), i. 309, (Wellington) 375—382; Badajoz (Soult), i. 354—356, (Wellington), 437—450; Burgos, ii. 51—57; Ciudad Rodrigo (Ney), i. 306—308, (Wellington), 422—430; Copenhagen, i. 160; Retiro, ii. 45; Salamanca, ii. 17—23; San Sebastian, ii. 116—123, 135—137; Seringapatam, i. 57—69; cause of the unskilfulness of the British in conducting, i. 399.
"Six Acts," the, iii. 84.
Smith, Bobus, pugilistic encounter with,

the only tradition of the Duke of Wellington at Eton, i. 5.
Smith, Sir Sidney, and the order of the key, iii. 69.
Soldier, English, character of the, ii. 289.
Somerset, Lord Fitzroy, his mission to Spain, iii. 164; Wellington's instructions to, 164—167.
Souham, General, pursues Wellington, ii. 62.
Soult, Marshal, defeats the Marquis of Belvidere, i. 215; pursues Sir John Moore, 223; battle of Corunna, 225; erects a monument to Sir John Moore, and testifies to his merits, 226; takes Oporto, 236; hopes for the crown of Portugal, 237; his tactics, 241; defeated at the Douro, 247; retreats, 253; prepares to attack the Allies, 257; defeats Mendezabal, 354; besieges Badajoz, 354; which surrenders, 356; defeated by Beresford at Albuera, 393; retreats, 397; advances to the relief of Badajoz, 453; his plans rejected by Joseph, ii. 47; raises the blockade of Cadiz, 47; accuses Joseph of treason, 59; takes the command, 66; goes into winter quarters, 70; recalled, 83; appointed to command the armies of the Peninsula, 124; moves against the allies, 127; attacks them unsuccessfully, 129; retires, 131; repulsed at San Martial, 147; retreats behind the Nive, 174; unsuccessful at Barouilhet, 179; his oversights, 196; defeated at Orthez, 199; retreats, 200; retires to Toulouse, 211; which he fortifies, 215; battle of Toulouse, 217; abandons Toulouse, 225; acknowledges Louis XVIII. 227; causes of his failure, 227—230; attends the coronation of Queen Victoria, iv. 92; compliments Lord Hill at Apsley House, 92; Wellington's opinion of, 155.
Souza, Principal, measures of Wellington unceasingly counteracted by, i. 311, 322, 339—342, 420; ii. 159, 388.
Spain, projects of Napoleon regarding, i. 165; its condition, 167; policy of Napoleon, 171; French invasion, 172; revolt of the Spaniards, 174; Wellesley's troops refused at Corunna, 185; its internal condition, 208; arrival of Napoleon, 213; capture of Madrid, 217; alliance with England, 231; unsatisfactory condition in 1810, 333; colonial difficulties, 336, decline of French power in, 459; state of at the commencement of the campaign of 1812, ii. 4; hostility of the people and government to the English, 161—165; cost of the war to England, 232; difficulties of the French in carrying on the war in, 235 *et seq.*; dissensions amongst the generals, 249—255; indiscipline of the troops, 255; evil of separate military governments, 256; evils of Napoleon's interference in the direction of the war, 263; guerillas, 267; difficulty of intercommunication, 269—272; the army of Spain unjustly treated by Napoleon, 273; situation of the English army in carrying on the war in, 273, *et seq.*; justice of its cause, 273; commissariat difficulties, 274—277; military incapacity of the English ministers, 278—284; short comings in the commissariat, engineering, and staff departments, 285—287; character of the Peninsular army, 288—295; causes of success, 297; difficulties of the war, 300, *et seq.*; folly of the Cortès, 301; enthusiasm evanescent, 307; the Cortès on the point of treating with Joseph, 310; Spanish generals ignorant, 313; their troops cowardly and undisciplined, 314; improved under Wellington, 319; misconduct of Spanish generals, 320, 321; mischief of the Guerilla system, 323; causes of the success of the war, 325; revolution in, iii. 104; French invasion to suppress it, 169; Donna Isabella proclaimed, iv. 69; cruelties perpetrated by the French armies in, 281—284.
St. Amand, village of, attacked by Vandamme, ii. 414.
St. Helena, proposed for Napoleon's confinement by Fouché, iv. 434; ill-treatment of Napoleon exaggerated, 334.
St. Pierre, repulse of Soult at the heights of, ii. 181.
Stanley, Lord, pressed by Wellington to take the leadership of the conservative party, iv. 133; consequent correspondence, 134—145.
Stevenson, Colonel, i. 98; takes Jalna, 106; arrives at Assaye, 113; takes Burhampoor and Assirghur, 113.
Stevenson, Mr., treats Wellington for deafness, iii. 188; kindness of the Duke towards, 190.
Strathfieldsaye, the entire proceeds of the estate laid out on its improvement, iv. 174; anecdote of the duke's integrity connected with, 175.
Stuart, General, repulses Tippoo at Sedaseer, i. 55.
Suchet, Marshal, blockades Tarragona, ii. 143; refuses to co-operate with Soult, 144—146, 157, 186; repasses the Pyrenees, 188; the cause of Soult's failure, 227—230, 327; his barbarous stratagem at the siege of Lerida, iv. 283; massacre at Saragossa, 283.

Sylveira, defeated by Marmont, i. 457.

Tacitus, resemblance of Wellington to his portrait of Agricola, iv. 355.
Talavera, battle of, i. 267; its effect on Napoleon's opinion of English troops, 270.
Test and Corporation Acts repealed, iii. 282—285.
Thistlewood, conspires to assassinate the ministers, iii. 90; taken and hanged, 95.
Thomière, General, killed at Salamanca, ii. 35.
Tippoo Sahib, advice of Colonel Wellesley regarding, i. 30, 32; character of, 36; preparations for war with, 45; negotiations with, 46; rejects overtures, 52; his forces, 55; repulsed at Sedaseer, 55; defeated at Mallavelly, 56; falls back on Seringapatam, 57, defends Seringapatam, 65; his death, 67; his sons, 73.
Tordesillas, exploit of Guingret at the bridge of, ii. 63.
Torres Vedras fortified, i. 301; description of the lines, 324; Wellington retreats on, 321; Massena arrives in front of, 324.
Toulouse fortified by Soult, ii. 214; battle of, ii. 217—223; abandoned by Soult, 225; hoists the white flag, 225; cowardice of the Spaniards under Freyre at, 317; the victory claimed by the French, 334; Wellington's memorandum on Choumara's pamphlet regarding, 334—345.
Tower, reforms effected in by Wellington, iv. 89.

Ucles, atrocities of Victor's troops after the battle of, iv. 282.

Verona, Congress of, iii. 143—158; Castlereagh's letter of instructions for the English ambassador at the, iv. 372.
Victor, Marshal, defeats Cuesta, i. 238, 263; defeated at Talavera, 267; atrocities of his troops after the battle of Ucles, iv. 282; his kindness to the English in hospital at Talavera, iv. 326.
Victoria, Queen, accession of, iv. 87; her regard for Wellington, 91; her coronation, 91; her sorrow on his death, iv. 207.
Vienna, Congress of, state of Europe previous to, iii. 124; instructions for the Duke of Wellington as ambassador at, 127—130.
Vimiera, battle of, i. 196; French attack at, iv. 157.
Vittoria, battle of, ii. 102; insubordination after the, 290.

Wagner, Rev. William, letter of Wellington to regarding the education of his sons, iv. 163.
Waterloo, battle of, ii. 449—468; relative strength of the opposing armies, 439; Napoleon's confidence, 441; Grouchy's movement, 441; English position, 446; Napoleon's plan of attack, 448; Hougoumont attacked, 449; attack of La Haie-Sainte, 453; charge of French cavalry, 458, 461; charge of the Imperial guards, 465; flight of the French, 467; causes of French defeat, 471—481; criticisms on, 481—493; retreat open to the English, iv. 155.
"Waverers," the party of Lord Wharncliffe nicknamed, iv. 6; fail in their object, 27.
Wellesley family, origin of, i. 3.
Wellesley, Arthur.
Place and date of his birth uncertain, i. 1.
His descent, i. 3.
Disliked by his mother, i. 5.
Undistinguished at Eton, i. 5.
Removed to the Military College of Angers, i. 6.
Undistinguished there, i. 7.
Enters the army, i. 7.
Habits in youth, i. 8.
A member of the Irish parliament, i. 11.
Lady Catherine Packenham, i. 12.
Embarks with his regiment (the 33rd) for the Netherlands, i. 12.
In presence of an enemy for the first time, i. 14.
Distinguishes himself, i. 16, 19.
Meditates retirement from the service, i. 22.
Ordered to *India*, i. 24.
Change in character, i. 25.
Manilla expedition, i. 28.
Military memoranda, i. 48.
Ascendency and wisdom at Fort St. George, i. 49.
Fails in a night attack at Mysore, i. 57.
Succeeds in the morning, i. 65.
Commandant in Seringapatam, i. 70.
Assumes the command in Mysore, i. 78.
Conducts the operations against Dhoondiah, i. 78.
Superseded in the command of the Bombay troops for Egypt, i. 86.
Raised to the rank of Major-General, i. 93.
Mahratta war, i. 89.
Takes the field, i. 96.
Takes Ahmednugger, i. 104.
Battle of Assaye, i. 106.
Armistice and its policy, i. 114.
Battle of Argaum, i. 117.
Gawilghur taken, i. 118.

WELLESLEY, ARTHUR—*continued.*
Terminates the war, i. 120.
Pursues and routs a party of brigands, i. 123.
Organises the military resources of the Peishwah, i. 124.
Finally leaves Seringapatam, i. 125.
Obtains permission to return to Europe, i. 125.
Reasons for wishing to return, i. 125.
Military advice, i. 128.
His influence, i. 133.
Respect shown to him on his departure, i. 143.
Parallel with Clive, i. 145.
His disinterestedness, i. 148.
Military reforms introduced by him, i. 150.
Nominated an extra knight of the order of the Bath, i. 144.
Arrives in *England*, i. 156.
Trains a brigade at Hastings, i. 156.
Colonel of the 33rd regiment, i. 157.
Marries Lady Catherine Packenham, i. 157.
Member of Parliament, i. 157.
Defends his brother successfully in the House, i. 158.
Chief secretary of Ireland, i. 158.
Commands a division in the expedition against Copenhagen, i. 159.
Appointed to the command of the Peninsular expedition, i. 182.
Superseded by Dalrymple, i. 183.
Embarks for the *Peninsula*, i. 184.
His services declined by the Junta, i. 185.
Fixes on Portugal as a base, i. 186.
Disembarks, i. 189.
Opens the campaign against Junot, i. 191.
Battle of Rorissa, i. 192.
Battle of Vimiera, i. 196.
Convention of Cintra, i. 200.
Recalled, i. 207.
Receives the thanks of the Parliament, i. 208.
His memoir on the defence of Portugal, i. 230.
Appointed to the command of the Peninsular army, i. 232.
Arrives at Lisbon, i. 233.
Advances against Soult, i. 242.
Passage of the Douro, i. 247.
Enters Oporto, i. 252.
Advances against Victor, i. 258.
Narrowly escapes being made prisoner at Salinas, i. 264.
Battle of Talavera, i. 267.
Nominated to the chief command of the Spanish armies, i. 279.

WELLESLEY, ARTHUR—*continued.*
Raised to the peerage, i. 279.
Determines on disencumbering himself of Spanish troops, i. 282.
Acts on the defensive, i. 283.
Reasons for so doing, i. 287.
Advances toward the north, i. 288.
His opinion on the defensibility of Portugal, i. 295.
Fortifies Torres Vedras, 301.
His system of defence, i. 301.
Refuses to succour Ciudad Rodrigo, i. 306.
Retreats before Massena, i. 313.
Battle of Busaco, i. 317.
His severity on plunderers, i. 322.
Embarrassed by the conduct of the British government, i. 332.
His views, i. 343—346.
Pursues Massena, i. 359.
Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, . 378.
Siege of Badajoz, i. 404.
Raised, i. 407.
Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, i. 411.
Affair of Elbodon, i. 413.
Anecdote illustrating his coolness, i. 415.
Prepares for the surprise of Ciudad Rodrigo, i. 422.
Besieges and takes it, i. 425—430.
Raised to an earldom, i. 433.
Invests Badajoz, i. 437.
Siege and capture, 438—450.
Prepares for the *campaign* of 1812, ii. 1.
His difficulties, ii. 4—7.
Disposition of his forces, ii. 11.
His testimony to the army of the Peninsula, ii. 14 *note.*
Enters Salamanca, ii. 16.
Besieges and takes the forts, ii. 17—23.
Defeats Marmont at the battle of Salamanca, ii. 32—37.
Advanced to a marquisate, ii. 38.
Enters Madrid, ii. 44.
Takes the Retiro, ii. 45.
Besieges the castle of Burgos unsuccessfully, ii. 51—57.
Retreats, ii. 57.
Arrives at Ciudad Rodrigo, ii. 69.
Goes into winter quarters, ii. 70.
Accepts the command of the Spanish armies, ii. 76.
His difficulties, ii. 77—82.
Plans for the *campaign* of 1813, ii. 89.
Crosses the Douro, ii. 92.
Pursues Joseph, ii. 95.
Crosses the Ebro, ii. 96.
Battle of Vittoria, ii. 102.
Siege of San Sebastian, ii. 116—123.
Battle of Saurorem, ii. 129.
Narrowly escapes capture, ii. 132.
Refuses to invade France, ii. 133.

WELLESLEY, ARTHUR — *continued.*
His reasons, ii. 134.
Siege of San Sebastian renewed, ii. 135.
Town stormed, ii. 137.
Crosses the Bidassoa, ii. 154—157.
Proposals for sending him to Germany, ii. 166.
Passage of the Nivelle, ii. 172.
Protects the French population from pillage, ii. 176.
Crosses the Nive, ii 178.
Battle of the Nive, ii. 181.
His difficulties, ii. 183—186.
Passage of the Adour, ii. 193.
Battle of Orthez, ii. 199.
Struck by a glanced ball, ii. 201.
His policy, ii. 205—207.
Arrives before Toulouse, ii. 215.
Battle of Toulouse, ii. 217.
Condition of his army during the Spanish war, ii. 273, *et seq.*
His self-reliance, ii. 302.
Adverse to the Guerilla system, ii. 323.
Compared with Napoleon, ii. 333.
His memorandum on Choumara's pamphlet, regarding the battle of Toulouse, ii. 334—345.
Requested by Lord Castlereagh to repair to Paris, ii. 346.
His characteristic reply, ii. 347.
Communications with the Duc d'Angoulême, ii. 348.
Arrives at Paris, ii. 349.
Raised to a dukedom, ii. 350.
Proceeds to Madrid, ii. 350.
Endeavours to procure the adoption of policy there, ii. 351.
Order of the day taking leave of the troops, ii. 354.
His reception in *England*, ii. 355.
His personal appearance, ii. 356.
His reply to the thanks of the House of Lords, ii. 357.
Receives the thanks of the House of Commons, ii. 358.
His speech in reply, ii. 359.
Makes a military survey of the Low Countries, ii. 369.
His reasons for recommending a cordon of fortresses, ii. 364 *note.*
Ambassador at Paris, ii. 365.
His private life there, ii. 367.
At the Congress of Vienna, ii. 369.
Arrives at *Brussels*, ii. 386.
His opinion of the measures to be adopted against Napoleon, ii. 387.
Replies to calumnies regarding the declaration, ii. 389.
Prepares for the campaign, ii. 390.

WELLESLEY, ARTHUR — *continued.*
The invasion of Belgium not a surprise to him, ii. 397.
Informed of the attack on the Prussians, ii. 399.
Orders a march of the whole army, ii. 400.
His remark to Blucher on surveying his position at Ligny, ii. 413.
Repulses Ney at Quatre-Bras, ii. 421.
His narrow escapes, ii. 424.
Falls back upon Waterloo, ii. 437.
Battle of Waterloo, ii. 449—468.
Never doubted its successful termination, ii. 490.
Marches upon Paris, ii. 498.
Calms down Blucher, ii. 500.
Interview with the French deputies, regarding an armistice, ii. 501.
His anxiety to save Paris, ii. 504.
Enters the city, ii. 507.
Importance of his services in both restorations, ii. 508.
Always moderate, ii. 511.
Resists partition, ii. 515.
Receives the command of the army of occupation, ii. 518.
Effects of his victories out of Spain, ii. 520.
His strictures on Clausewitz's Narrative, ii. 523.
His justice and forbearance during the occupation of France, iii. 3.
Contrasted with the conduct of the continental commanders, iii. 4.
His conduct in relation to the death of Ney considered, iii. 9—19.
Justifies the restitution of works of art, iii. 19—23.
His unpopularity on this account, iii. 23.
His manner of noticing insults, iii. 24.
His rebuke to the French marshals, iii. 25.
His system of managing the army of occupation, iii. 26—30.
Resists its premature weakening, iii. 34, 47.
Arranges the international claims, iii. 37.
Attempt to destroy him by setting fire to his house, iii. 40.
His views on newspaper controversial liberty, iii. 51.
Arbitrates between Spain and Portugal, iii. 58.
His life attempted, iii. 61.
Advises the withdrawal of the army of occupation, iii. 66.
His disinterestedness, iii. 65.
His business habits and social character, iii. 67—71.
Appointed Master-General of the Ordnance, iii. 72.

WELLESLEY, ARTHUR—*continued.*
A cabinet minister, iii. 73.
His instructions to General Byng for the preservation of the peace, iii. 82.
Recommends the vigorous suppression of illegal training, iii. 87.
His estimate of the "farce of a county meeting," iii. 101.
Dissuades Louis XVIII. from withdrawing his minister from Madrid, iii. 112.
His story of George IV. at Waterloo, iii. 113.
Appointed ambassador to the Congress of Vienna, iii. 122.
Confers at Paris with M. de Villèle, iii 131.
Arrives at Vienna, iii. 136.
Confers with the Emperor of Russia, iii. 137.
His interview with William Allen, iii. 137.
Arrives at Verona, iii. 140.
His social and diplomatic life there, ii. 141—158.
Arrives in Paris, iii. 158.
His negotiations there, iii. 159—162.
Arrives in London, iii. 162.
His instructions to Lord Fitzroy Somerset on the Spanish question, iii. 164.
Defends in parliament his conduct at Verona, iii. 170.
His cabinet policy, iii. 176.
Favours the relaxation of commercial restrictions, iii. 177.
His conduct in illness, iii. 188.
Instance of his kindness and love of truth, iii. 190.
Ambassador-extraordinary to the Emperor Nicholas, iii. 198.
His instructions, iii. 202—204.
Interview with Count Nesselrode, iii. 205.
Favourably impressed by Nicholas, iii. 206.
Negotiates successfully, iii. 206—214.
Visits the Grand Duke Constantine, iii. 215.
His views on the Catholic question, iii. 218.
Appointed commander-in-chief, iii. 221.
His reasons for refusing office under Canning, iii. 225, 230—235.
Resigns the command of the army, iii. 239.
His speech in explanation, iii. 240.
His demeanour in opposition, iii. 247.
Defeats Canning's Corn bill, iii. 248—251.
Resumes the command of the army, iii. 255.

WELLESLEY, ARTHUR—*continued.*
Interview with the king to form an administration, iii. 258.
His ministry, iii. 260.
Rebukes Mr. Huskisson, iii. 261.
Correspondence with him on his resignation, iii. 267—278.
Assents to the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, iii. 283.
Opposes the Roman Catholic relief bill, iii. 286.
Considerations which influenced him subsequently regarding it, iii. 295—300.
Resolves to carry it, iii. 301.
His proceedings for this purpose, iii. 302, *et seq.*
Letter to the king, iii. 303—307.
His plan, iii. 314—327.
His letter to Dr. Curtis, iii. 340.
Dissuades Peel from resigning, iii. 342.
His interview with the king, iii. 346—348.
Duel with the Earl of Winchelsea, iii. 349—361.
Carries the Roman Catholic relief bill, iii. 362.
Consequent defection of his supporters, iii. 365.
Attempt to reconcile him and Mr. Huskisson, iii. 336.
Dissatisfied with the treaty of Adrianople, iii. 369.
His views of nomination boroughs, iii. 374.
Prosecutes Mr. Alexander for libel, iii. 375.
Deserted by the Whigs, iii. 377.
Refuses to interfere in elections, iii. 379.
Acknowledges Louis-Philippe, iii. 380.
Attends the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, iii. 383.
His dislike of railway travelling, iii. 386.
Replies to Earl Grey on the address, iii. 388.
Vindicates his declaration against reform, iii. 390.
Advises the king to abandon his visit to the city, iii. 393.
His increasing unpopularity, iii. 395.
Defeated on the civil list, iii. 396.
Resigns, iii. 397.
Ungenerous charges against him, iii. 400.
His life at Walmer, iii. 401.
His advice to his party, iii. 403.
Mob attack Apsley House, iii. 409.
He puts up iron shutters, iii. 410.
His reasons for refusing to meet other

WELLESLEY, ARTHUR—*continued.*
peers to concert plans of Parliamentary action, iii. 411.
Opposes the Reform Bill in the Lords, iii. 413—416.
His house attacked, iii. 417.
His life in danger, iii. 417.
Becomes leader of the Anti-Reform party, iv. 3.
Correspondence with Lord Wharncliffe regarding the Reform Bill, iv. 6—27.
His view of the representation, iv. 13.
His fears justified, iv. 22.
His proceedings in opposing change, iv. 23.
Warns the king against Political Unions, iv. 24.
Refuses to urge the king not to make peers, iv. 28.
Disapproves of the Protestant Meeting in Dublin, iv. 31.
His views on the Labour question, iv. 34.
On the Currency, iv. 35.
Rejects Lord Wharncliffe's suggestions for concession on the Reform question, iv. 41.
Grounds of his continued opposition, iv. 44.
Rallies his party after their unsuccessful opposition to the Reform Bill, iv. 48.
His plan for lessening its danger, iv. 50.
Appointed Prime Minister, iv. 56.
Fails in forming an Administration, iv. 58.
Secedes from the House, iv. 61.
Attacked by the mob, iv. 62.
His account of the affair, iv. 196.
Consolidates a party, iv. 65.
His opposition not factious, iv. 67, 87.
Refuses the premiership, iv. 75.
But undertakes the temporary management, iv. 75.
Becomes Foreign Secretary, iv. 80.
Resigns, iv. 83.
Enjoys the confidence of the crown and the nation, iv. 83.
Chancellor of Oxford, iv. 84.
His domestic life, iv. 85.
Death of the Duchess, iv. 86.
His attention to his public duties unceasing, iv. 88—90.
His defence regarding the Ladies of the bed-chamber, iv. 95.
Accepts a seat in the cabinet without office, iv. 97.
Appointed commander-in-chief by patent, iv. 97.

WELLESLEY, ARTHUR—*continued.*
His business habits at the Horse Guards, iv. 98.
Sanctions the introduction of the Minié musket, iv. 103.
His admiration of the British Infantry, iv. 105.
His opinion of regimental schools, iv. 107.
Adverse to the formation of a staff corps, iv. 109.
Anecdotes of his patience of involuntary error, iv. 111, 112.
Impatient of interruption, anecdote, iv. 113.
Improves barrack accommodation, iv. 114.
Favours improvements in the army, iv. 115.
His opinion of Sir Charles Napier, iv. 117.
His reasoning in defence of the Corn Laws, iv. 120.
His ruling principles as a statesman, iv. 122.
Advises the land-owners on the Corn Laws, iv. 129.
Presses Lord Stanley to place himself at the head of the Conservative party, iv. 133.
Consequent correspondence, iv. 134—145.
Characteristic replies to correspondents, iv. 145, 146.
Retires from political life, iv. 147.
His private life, 148 *et seq.*
His peculiarities, iv. 148—151.
His liking for things which happened to belong to himself, iv. 148.
His friendships, iv. 149.
John Wilson Croker, iv. 150.
Mr. Arbuthnot, iv. 150.
His daily habits, iv. 152.
His conversation, iv. 154.
His anecdotes, iv. 156—159.
His devotional habits, iv. 159.
Reply to the Bishop of Exeter, iv. 161.
His clearness of vision, iv. 161.
His domestic affection, iv. 162.
Allowance and directions for his sons at Oxford, iv. 163.
His fondness for children, iv. 169.
His liberality, iv. 171.
His hospitality, iv. 173.
His demeanour with artists, iv. 173.
His rigid integrity, iv. 175.
Suggests a plan for the defence of the kingdom, iv. 176.
Letter to Burgoyne regarding, iv. 180.
Makes arrangements for the defence of London against the expected Chartist

Wellesley, Arthur—*continued.*
outbreak on April 10th, 1848, iv. 190.
His health declines, iv. 193.
Refuses to bestow public patronage in return for personal services, iv. 197.
Cataleptic attacks become frequent, iv. 198.
His last dinner party, iv. 199.
His last illness, iv. 203.
Dies, iv. 204.
His funeral, iv. 207.
His personal character, iv. 209.
His military character, iv. 216.
Parallel with Napoleon unsuitable, iv. 216.
Compared with Hannibal, iv. 219.
Compared with Marlborough, iv. 225.
His character as a statesman, iv. 228.
His speeches, iv. 234.
His personal appearance, iv. 235.
His dress, iv. 236.
His manner of life, iv. 238.
Specimens of his correspondence, iv. 239.
His views of reform, iv. 243.
Characteristic anecdotes, iv. 251—260.
His sayings, iv. 257.
Brialmont's estimate of his military character, iv. 261—300.
His coolness, iv. 261.
His military penetration, iv. 262.
His personal courage, iv. 263.
His self-possession, iv. 264.
Instances of his enterprise, iv. 265—268.
Causes of his caution, iv. 269.
More enterprising than his opponents, iv. 271.
Improved the service, iv. 274.
Hated quarrelsome men, iv. 275.
Detested plunderers, iv. 277.
Tender of life and property, iv. 278—280.
His influence over his soldiers compared with that of Napoleon, iv. 290.
His defence of corporal punishment, iv. 292.
Instances of his clemency, iv. 294.
Instances of his forbearance, iv. 296.
Instances of his compassionate nature, iv. 297.
Brialmont's estimate of his administrative character, iv. 300, *et seq.*
Embarrassed by the Cortès, iv. 300.
Fertile in resources, iv. 303.
Erroneously thought hostile to the lower classes, iv. 305.
His tolerance, iv. 307.
His love of country, iv. 309.

Wellesley, Arthur—*continued.*
Causes of his dislike to a free press, iv. 311.
His title to statesmanship, iv. 313.
Foresees the fall of Napoleon, iv. 315.
His great moral energy, iv. 319.
His acceptance of responsibility and his perseverance, iv. 320—324.
His moderation and clemency, iv. 324—331.
Opposes the execution of Napoleon, iv. 332.
His respect for engagements, iv. 335—337.
His honesty of purpose, iv. 337.
His indifference to detraction, iv. 338.
His contempt of personal renown, iv. 339.
His self-denial, iv. 340.
His magnanimity, iv. 341.
His submission to authority, iv. 341—344.
Exempt from favouritism, iv. 345.
His frankness, iv. 345.
Supports his subordinates, iv. 346—348.
His reasons for not writing his own memoirs, iv. 350.
True to his subordinates, iv. 350.
His letter to Louis XVIII. regarding the Duke of Otranto, iv. 352.
His modesty, iv. 352—354.
Never hides a blunder, iv. 355.
His love of truth, iv. 355.
Historical value of his despatches, iv. 356.
His general orders, iv. 357.
His generous appreciation of the French army, iv. 358.
His exalted opinion of Napoleon's military capacity, iv. 359.
Considered Hannibal the greatest of all generals, iv. 359.
Contrasted with Napoleon, iv. 360—369.
In genius, iv. 360.
In style, iv. 361.
In statesmanship, iv. 361.
In resources, iv. 362.
In tactics and strategy, iv. 364.
In political morality, iv. 365.
In foresight, iv. 366.
In ultimate success, iv. 368.
Contrasted with Marlborough, iv. 369—371.
List of his titles, iv. 571.
Wharncliffe, Lord, his correspondence with Wellington regarding the Reform Bill, iv. 6–27; his interview with Earl Grey, 9–11; fails in the negotiation, 27; urges concession on his party, 39.
William IV. opens his first parliament, iii.

387; abandons his visit to the city, 393; refuses to create peers to pass the Reform Bill, iv. 54; dismisses Lord Melbourne, 74; sends for Wellington, 74; appoints Sir Robert Peel to the premiership, 78; dies, 87.
Winchelsea, Earl of his letter reflecting on Wellington, iii. 349; the consequent duel, 351–361.
Woolseley, Sir Charles, arrested for seditic iii. 77.
Wyatt, Mr., assists in the rebuilding Apsley House, iii. 100.
York, Duke of, his campaign in Belgiu i. 12; recalled, 16; his anti-catholic d claration, iii. 185; his death and cl racter, iii. 220

THE END.

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